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FORCED POLITICAL REORIENTATION IN JAPAN;
A STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF DEFEAT ON 
JAPANESE NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
There seems to be an ambiguous aspect with regard to 
Japanese national consciousness.^ A great deal of serious 
attention had been given to Japanese national consciousness 
and their perfervid political loyalties until Japan's defeat 
in 1945.  ^ In contrast, since the defeat there has been a 
studied indifference to the very same question.
In the course of planning the Occupation of Japan,
^National consciousness, once a very popular idea 
employed freely and blithely by most students of social 
science, is in recent decades shunned or employed sparingly 
and grudgingly by those seeking precision and solidity in 
their scientific studies.
^Insofar as this writer is aware, there has 
appeared no work dealing with Japanese national conscious­
ness that is comparable,in scope and content, to the study 
done immediately before the war by John Paul Reed, "Kokutai: 
A Study of Certain Sacred and Secular Aspects of Japanese 
Nationalism" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of 
Chicago, 1937).
2all agreed about the difficulty involved in re-educating the 
Japanese people.  ^ The utmost concern of the Occupation was 
to eliminate ultranationalism so as to make the Japanese a 
"peacefully-oriented" and "democratically-minded" people. 
In effect, the Occupation attempted to deprive the Japanese 
of their nationalistic sentiment or prejudice which was 
believed to have been responsible for militarism and 
ultranationalism.^
This attempt seems to raise two serious questions; 
1) Was the military occupation capable of eliminating the 
national prejudice nurtured and fortified in the course of 
many centuries?; 2) Could a democracy be established in 
Japan after the Japanese have been deprived of their sense 
of political loyalties? Of course, the former is closely 
related to the theory of acculturation^ and the latter to
For a highly sophisticated discussion of the 
controlled social change by the alien force, see Talcott 
Parsons, "The Problem of Controlled Institutional Change," 
Psychiatry, VIII, No. 1 (February, 1945), 79-101.
^For an overview of the objectives of the Allied 
Occupation in Japan, see the complete text of the Potsdam 
Declaration, The Department of State Bulletin, Publication 
2367, XIII, No. 318 (July 29, 1945), pp. 137-38; also see 
"the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan," 
in Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Political 
Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948 (2 
vols.; Washington, D. C. : Government Printing Office,
1949), II, 423-26.
^The widely-accepted principle in acculturation 
theory tells us that the first and easiest transfers between 
societies are in the realm of material culture, that 
transfers of forms of social organization are slower and
the theory of political development.®
It needs little intelligence to see that political 
loyalties as well as national prejudice can be neither 
created nor eliminated for immediate political purposes.^ 
Given the above reasoning, we seem in need of an explanation 
as to whether the pre-defeat treatment of Japanese national 
consciousness simply read more significance into it than it 
really had, or the post-defeat inattention to it is simply a 
manifestation of wishful thinking, indulged in an exercise 
of explaining away difficult political problems.
It is quite obvious that we cannot deal with the 
problem of Japanese nationalism with the assumption that the 
Japanese were an extremely nationalistic and aggressive 
people until the defeat, and that they have become fast
more difficult, and that the transfers of values and beliefs 
are slowest and face the greatest obstacles. For a fuller 
discussion of this point, see, for example, William H. R. 
Rivers, The History of Melanesian Society, Vol. 1 (Cam­
bridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1914), pp. 440ff;
Raymond Firth, "Notes on the Social Structure of Some South- 
Eastern New Guinea Communities," Man, LII (June, 1952), 86- 
89; idem. Economics of the New Zealand Maori (2nd edition; 
Wellington: N. Z.: R. E. Owen, Government Printer, 1959),
esp. pp. 443ff.
®For a convenient overview, see Lucian W. Pye, "The 
Concept of Political Development," The Annals, CCCLVIII 
(March, 1965), 1-13.
^For a forceful discussion of this argument, see 
Henry Walter Brann, "Is the Complete Disappearance of Racial 
and National Prejudice Realizable?," Southwestern Social 
Science Quarterly, XXVI, No. 1 (June, 1945), 76-85.
4learners of peace and democracy since the defeat.®
In short, this study attempts to examine the impact 
of military defeat and subsequent forced political reorien­
tation on Japanese national prejudice and political loyal­
ties.
In 1945, Ronald Lippitt declared; "It is now easier 
to smash an atom than to break a prejudice. The obvious 
implication of this statement is that mankind is able to 
make headway more in the realm of the physical world than in 
the mind of man. The intractability, or rather power, of 
mind has baffled and . annoyed many thinkers and social 
scientists. In the words of Joseph Conrad : "The mind of
man is capable of anything— because everything is in it, all 
the past as well as all the future."^®
Given the importance of the subjective factor in 
political life, few would question that the two most 
outstanding features that characterize Japan's modern hitory 
would be the lightning speed of her industrialization and
®Kenneth B. Pyle, "Some Recent Approaches to 
Japanese Nationalism," Journal of Asian Studies, XXXI, No. 1 
(November, 1971), 5-16.
^In his Preface to the August 1945 issue of The 
Journal of Social Issues devoted to the "Problem of Re- 
Education," p. 1.
Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness (Englewood 
Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice-Hall, Inc., I960), p. 30.
5the perfervid loyalties of her people.Discussing the 
importance of loyalty in their study of political culture, 
Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba asserted:
Loyalty to a political system, if it is based on 
purely pragmatic considerations of the effective­
ness of that system, represents. . . a rather 
unstable basis of loyalty, for it is too closely 
dependent upon system performance. If it is to 
remain stable in the long run, the system requires 
a form of political commitment based upon more 
general attachment to the political system— a 
commitment we have called "system affect.
The assumption and implications of this statement 
inspired the theme of this study. The present study will 
attempt to demonstrate the utility of "system affect" in 
examining the national consciousness of the Japanese people. 
The introduction by Almond and Verba of the new concepts of 
"system affect" and "output affect" to the study of loyalty 
seems to be a definite contribution to the problems of 
political stability, system performance, and nationalism.^^ 
Handicapped by its inability to distinguish between 
ultranationalism and "the creative power of the national
^^For a good discussion of this point, see Robert A. 
Scalapino, "Ideology and Modernization: The Japanese Case,"
in Ideology and Discontent, ed. by David E. Apter (New York: 
The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 93-127.
^^Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic 
Culture (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965), p. 354.
^^Ibid., Ch. III.
6sentiment, the Occupation launched a frontal attack on 
Japanese nationalism as a whole in an attempt to inculcate 
democratic ideas in the Japanese and to create a democratic 
society in Japan. This attempt by means of the military 
occupation not only did not fit well with the generally 
accepted acculturation theory, but also was apt to jeopar­
dize the hope of making a democracy established in a 
reformed Japan, for the political stability in the post­
defeat Japan would have been extremely unlikely without the 
political loyalties grounded in the national sentiments.
Ironically, it may be stated that the partial 
failure of the Occupation in its attempt to eliminate 
Japanese nationalism has contributed toward political 
stability and "democratization" in Japan.
Despite the rosy pictures painted by the panegyrists 
of the Occupation, numerous studies indicate that the 
Japanese remain as thoroughly nationalistic and patriotic as
^^Michael Karpovich, "Vladimir Soloviev on National­
ism," The Review of Politics, VIII, No. 2 (April, 1946), 
191.
^^Kenneth B. Pyle, op. cit., p. 5.
^^Commenting on the accomplishments of the Occupa­
tion, Chalmers Johnson used the following description; .
. one is drawn to the conclusion that although many right 
things were done, they were almost invariably done for the 
wrong reasons." Conspiracy at Matsukawa (Berkeley: Univer­
sity of California Press, 1972), p. 6.
7e v e r I n  the immediate post-war years, there was a 
general tendency to mistake a temporary setback compelled 
by a guilt-feeling on the part of the Japanese and a 
thoroughness of defeat for a complete change in Japanese 
national consciousness. As Fujiwara Hirotatsu has argued:
The forces which weakened ultranationalism in 
post-war Japan have also served to shake the base 
upon which natinalist sentiment rests. The unity 
which characterized prewar nationalism has been 
lost.^G
Fujiwara's view does not find an echo in Maruyama 
Masao's heart. Maruyama rather sees this post-war trend as:
The spiritual structure of past nationalism did 
not undergo a qualitative change; rather it would 
be correct to say that the change was quantita­
tive: nationalist feelings were atomized, dis­
appearing from the political surface and becoming 
embedded in the lower strata of national life.^^
A recent study from a broader perspective with the 
benefit of the passage of time since the defeat tells us
^^For typically critical views, see W. Macmahon 
Ball, "Reflections on Japan," Pacific Affairs, XXI, No. 1 
(March, 1948), 3-13; Douglas G. Haring, "Aspects of Personal 
Character in Japan," Journal of Asian Studies, VI, No. 1 
(November, 1946), 12-22; Addison Gulick, "The Problem of
Right and Wrong in Japan and Some of Its Political 
Consequences," Journal of Social Psychology, XXVI (Spring, 
1947), 3-20.
^®Fujiwara Hirotatsu, "Nationalism and the Ultra­
right Wing," The Annals, CCCVIII (November, 1956), 82.
Quoted in Ivan I. Morris, Nationalism and the 
Right Wing in Japan: A Study in Post-War Trends (Westport,
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1974), p. 40.
8that the basic characteristics of Japanese nationalism have 
not been altered by the defeat. Matsumoto Sannosuke notes:
Postwar nationalism in Japan is simply an apoliti­
cal replacement, rather than a political alterna­
tive, of prewar nationalism. With the increasing 
importance of Japan's international role, however, 
postwar nationalism will find it exceedingly 
difficult to remain apolitical.20
Another study by Hayashi Pusao, blunt but controver­
sial, argues that there was nothing wrong with the Second 
World War. He explains the history of Japan's modern 
century as a continuing struggle against Western domination 
in Asia. He attempts to restore a sense of dignity to the 
Japanese people, who have suffered needlessly a war guilt in 
1945. According to his words:
The Japanese people are a people blessed with a 
long history and tremendous potential. Japan, for 
this reason, survived as the sole independent 
country in the midst of the tempest of Oriental 
colonization by Western nations, undertook the 
internal reform known as the Meiji Restoration, 
and for approximately a hundred years has continu­
ously supported a difficult counteroffensive war 
for the sake of Japan and A s i a .21
Many were quick to demur that Pusao ' s writing is
Matsumoto Sannosuke, "The Significance of Nation­
alism in Modern Japanese Thought," Journal of Asian Studies, 
XXXI, No. 1 (November, 1971), 56.
^^Hayashi Pusao, DaitSa Sens5 KSteiron (The 
Affirmation of the Greater East Asian War) (2 vols.; Tokyo : 
Bancho Shobo, 1964-1965) I, 61.
9dangerous and untimely, and smacks of the war-time militar­
ism.^^ Perhaps James W. Morley is more convincing when he 
states that any kind of diplomatic Pearl Harbor is extremely 
unlikely, but Japan's economic muscle is bound to fortify 
the sense of Japanese nationalism.^^ Thus, it seems quite 
misleading to regard the postwar liberalizing trends in 
Japan as the fizzling out of the political loyalty and 
national consciousness of the Japanese people. An impress­
ive recent study by Franz Michael and Gaston Sigur seems 
quite right when it claims that " . . .  the Japanese are 
highly motivated in their loyalty to their country and their 
identity as J a p a n e s e . T h i s  assertion has further been 
confirmed by a recent Brookings Institution study which 
concludes that the greatness of Japan is attributable to 
human factors. The study confidently claims :
^^See, for devastating attacks, Hani Goro, "DaitSa 
Sens5 Koteiron 0 Hihansuru" (Criticizing The Affirmation of 
the Greater East Asian War), Chüô Koron^ July, 1965, pp. 
165-87; Yamada Munemutsu, Kiken na Shisoka; Sengo Minshu- 
shuqi O Hiteisuru Hitobito (Dangerous Thinkers: Those Who
Reject Postwar Democracy) (Tokyo: Kobunsha, 1965).
James W. Morley, "New Options for Japan: 1946-
1966," Asia, No. 8 (Summer, 1967), 3-21.
^^Franz Michael and Gaston J. Sigur, The Asian 
Alliance: Japan and United States Policy (New York:
National Strategic Information Center, Inc., 1972), p. 35.
^^Looked at from the standpoint of the scarcity of 
natural resources, the importance and role of human factors 
in Japan becomes axiomatic. For a comprehensive survey of 
Japan's natural resources, see General Headquarters, Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers, Japanese Natural Resources :
10
Though present difficulties are legion (oil and 
internal strains), Japan's vitality, ingenuity, 
flexibility of leadership, the ability of its 
citizens to identify personal with national 
interest indicate that the progress will continue. 
(Emphasis added.)
Nevertheless, the importance of Japanese nationalism 
is only occasionally touched upon just in passing at best or 
ignored at worst. The continued inattention to the most 
dynamic force of Japanese political life, in sharp contrast 
to the wealth of studies on nationalism in general, seems 
quite surprising when we take into account the fact that 
Japan has emerged as the second strongest capitalist 
economic power in the world in less than three decades from 
the ashes of defeat in 1 9 4 5 Instead, considerable 
attention has been directed almost exclusively to the 
remarkable physical recovery from the war ruins and the 
"outward" signs of democratization in Japan.
Perusal of the literature of political development
A Comprehensive Survey (Tokyo: Hosakawa Printing Co., 
1949).
2®Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky, eds., Asia's New 
Giant: How the Japanese Economy Works (Washington, D. C. :
The Brookings Institution, 1976), p. 581.
^^International Monetary Fund, International Finan­
cial Statistics, December, 1972.
^®See, for example, Robert E. Ward, "Political 
Modernization and Political Culture in Japan," World 
Politics, XV, No. 4 (July, 1963), 569-96.
11
attests that the subjective factors in political life 
continue to play an important role in national and
international politics. In the words of Lucian W. Pye, "the
problems of political development are affected on the one 
side by international development and on the other by the 
state of individual psychology within the domestic
society. We also have to admit that James Reston was
quite right when he acutely observed that :
For the moment it would seem that the bawling 
demands of nationalism are louder than ever, and 
while the leaders of the world talk incessantly 
about cooperation, consultation and common prob­
lems of a distracted world, each^grabs what he can
for himself and his own people.
Seen in light of Pye and Reston, the question of 
Japanese political loyalty and national consciousness 
deserves continued serious attention.The  hypotheses set
^^Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), p. 14.
^^The New York Times, December 19, 1971.
^^More than six decades ago, the importance of 
nationalism was forcefully described by a historian, William 
T. Laprade, "Nationalism," Annual Report of the American 
Historical Association for the Year 1915, p. 228: "The only
thing pertaining to nationalism about which I should be 
willing at present to commit myself in definite language is 
that it is the most fertile field for doctoral dissertations 
in modern history with which I am acquainted. . . .it offers 
the richest possibilities of immediate returns of any 
species of historical undertakings now in sight. I do not 
think I exaggerate when I say that hundreds of monographs 
must be written before it will be possible to say with 
authority what nationalism was in the past, what it is now.
12
forward for this study are; that individuals tend to 
assimilate or reject societal changes in terms of their 
dominant values; that any self-conscious national society 
has certain well-defined national values to which the 
individual's dominant values must be adjusted in some 
degree; such a national society, therefore, tends also to 
mediate the individual's reaction to greater and more remote 
societal changes.
The purpose of this study is threefold. First, this 
research is intended to gain a substantive understanding of 
the "uniqueness" of Japanese national c o n s c i o u s n e s s . 3 2  ^
good understanding thereof is a prerequisite condition^^ 
for exploring a host of serious problems stemming from the 
dynamic force of Japanese nationalism. Moreover, this 
understanding will be of use to the study of nationalism in 
general. It would also be useful in understanding the 
location of Japan's national potential. Second, in attempt­
ing to examine the impact of defeat on Japanese national
or what it is likely to become."
^^We should note here that an impressive study was 
done by Gebhard L. Schweigler under the supervision of 
Professors Karl W. Deutsch and Herbert C. Kelman on the 
postwar German national consciousness : "National Conscious­
ness in Divided Germany" (Ph.D. dissertation. Harvard 
University, 1973), later published by Sage Publications in 
1975.
^^Ibid., p. 55. As Schweigler rightly argues, 
"National consciousness is clearly a precondition for 
nationalism: there can be no will without consciousness."
13
consciousness, the author would like to make use of the 
concepts of "system affect" and "product affect" suggested 
by Almond and Verba. Third, this research will attempt to 
find out why some aspects were amenable, while others were 
resistant, to the forced political reorientation by the 
Allied Occupation.
On account of the nature of the subject, the 
research method used here is largely qualitative and 
historical. Yet, extensive use has been made of Japanese 
Opinion Polls with Socio-Political Significance, 1947-1957 
compiled and edited by Allen B. Cole and Naomichi Nakanish; 
and Kokuminsei no Kenkyu (A Study of the Japanese National 
Character) by the Tokei Suri Kenkyujo, Tokyo (Institute of 
Statistical Mathematics, Ministry of Education, Tokyo), a 
series of surveys conducted at intervals of five years 
beginning in 1953.
The present state of our understanding of the 
subject, however, necessitates it to be mainly qualitative 
rather than q u a n t i t a t i v e . 34 Dissatisfied with the qualita­
tive description of nationalism, Karl W. Deutsch made a 
pioneering attempt to present an operational scheme of 
quantitative measurement set forth in his celebrated
34cf. Louis L. Snyder, Varieties of Nationalism; A 
Comparative Study (Hinsdale, 111.: The Dryden Press, 1976),
pp. 5-7.
14
Nationalism and Social Communication^^  published in 1953. 
Despite the ambition involved in writing the book, the book 
was not greatly different from the traditional approach to 
the study of nationalism save that he confined his attention 
to the limited scope of nationalism: the function of the
language in political integration.^® It is also historical, 
for history "is the laboratory in which we work." What is 
more, " . . .  history and science in the study of politics 
are united by necessity in a permanent and inextricable 
alliance.
In Part One (Chapters II through VI), we will
briefly examine the historical background of Japanese 
nationalism and the development of ultranationalism by dint 
of Shinto, Kokutai, and "thought control," and see the
relationship between the Japanese national consciousness
and the changes in external factors.
In Part Two (Chapters VII through XI), we will
discuss the effects of the forced political reorientation on 
the Japanese people. This chapter is intended to deal
^®Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communica­
tion (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1953).
3®For a penetrating critique of Deutsch's works, see 
Wee Don Chang, "Political Development: A Critique of
Theories," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of 
Oregon, 1966), pp. 319-62.
^^Charles Lockhart, Bargaining in International 
Conflicts (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), pp.
115, 118.
15
primarily with how the military defeat and the subsequent 
Allied Occupation affected the deep-lying Japanese sentiment 
toward their country.
In Chapter XII, we shall examine the growing 
national pride of the Japanese people in proportion to their 
economic power. Here we will dwell upon the major elements 
that have historically contributed to Japanese nationalism.
In Chapter XIII, we shall consider the implications 
of national interest for domestic and world politics. Then 
we will examine the relationship between the ever-intensif­
ying "trade war" and the Japanese national consciousness. 
Finally, in Chapter XIV, we will present summaries and 
conclusions.
This study draws, for much of its sources of 
reference, upon previously published materials. In addition 
to the extensive use of the materials already mentioned 
(i.e., Japanese Opinion Polls with Socio-Political Signifi­
cance, 1947-1957 and a series of Kokuminsei no Kenkyu), 
heavily relied upon, in particular, are: Nihon no Rekishi
(A History of Japan) published in 1965-1967 by the Chüô 
Kôron Sha; Harada Kumao, Saionji Ko to Seikyoku ; Hara Kei 
Nikki, edited by Hara Heiichiro; Asaki Shimbun; Mainichi 
Shimbun; Yomiuri Shimbun; Nihon Keizai Shimbun; The White 
Paper on Defense, International Trade, Foreign Affairs; Asia 
Year Book; Japan Statistical Yearbook ; The New York Times ; 
Congressional Record; The United States Department of State
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Bulletin; Foreign Relations of the United States by the 
Department of State; The Political Reorientation of Japan by 
SCAB; The Yearbook of the United Nations. Other materials 
used are included in the bibliography.
PART ONE
CHARACTERISTICS OF JAPANESE NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS
CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS
Whether or not one is wont to regard the nineteenth 
century as the era of the nation-state and the twentieth 
century as that of international integration movements, 
nationalism does not seem to be fizzling out.^ What 
Carlton J. H. Hayes declared more than half a century ago 
seems to remain as valid now as then: "The most important
emotional factor in,public life today is nationalism."^
Though much has been written on nations in general.
-Students of nationalism agree that nationalism is 
by no means on the decline. For a few writings representa­
tive of this view, see Hardy C. Dillard, "Nationalism: 
Midcentury Puzzle," Virginia Quarterly Review, XXVIII, No. 4 
(Autumn, 1952), 532-46; Anthony D. Smith, "The Diffusion of 
Nationalism: Some Historical and Sociological Perspec­
tives," British Journal of Sociology, XXIX, No. 2 (June, 
1978), 234-48; Henry Steele Commager, "To Consult Our Hopes 
and Not Our Fears," The Christian Science Monitor, January 
7, 1980, pp. 12-14.
^Carlton J. H. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism (New 
York: The Macmillan Co., 1926), p. 1.
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on the evil nature of the nation-state, and on the trouble- 
making proclivities of Japanese ''ultranationalism," the near 
total lack of writing on Japanese nationalism itself, since 
1945, in particular, is very surprising.3 Perhaps, it is 
not too far-fetched to state that Japanese nationalism is 
more often than not treated in a rather perjorative sense.^ 
Indeed, it is true that Japan's foreign policies of 
aggressive and adventurous nature for several decades prior 
to 1945 had inflicted a host of inhumanities on other 
peoples.
Looking at superficial appearances only, one may be 
tempted, at least for the sake of convenience, to see the 
undeniable fact of military defeat in 1945 and the 
subsequent "programmed installation of d e m o c r a c y , to
^Kenneth B. Pyle noted this tendency very cogently; 
"Once seen as necessary and beneficial, nationalism came in 
the post-war period to be villified or simply ignored amidst 
the scholars' preoccupation with their antiestablishment 
liberal heroes. With some notable exceptions, nationalism 
has been slow to receive in Japan the thoughtful, 
dispassionate study it needs." In his "Introduction: Some
Recent Approaches to Japanese Nationalism," Journal of Asian 
Studies, XXXI, No. 1 (November 1, 1971), 5.
4gee, for example, Maruyama Masao, Nationalism in 
Post-War Japan, Eleventh Conference,Institute of Pacific 
Relations (Lucknow, India, October 3-15, 1950); Owen
Lattimore, "The Sacred Cow of Japan," Atlantic Monthly, 
CLXXV, No. 1 (January, 1945), 45-51; "The Japanese Empire," 
Fortune, September, 1936; "Japan and the Japanese," Ibid., 
April, 1944.
Sjohn D. Montgomery, Forced to Be Free : The
Artificial Revolution in Germany and Japan (Chicago; 
University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 4.
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borrow John D. Montgomery's expression, as sufficient 
justification for ignoring or discounting the importance of 
Japanee nationalism. Reasons for this postwar inattention 
to the pre-1945 extreme nationalisms seem to lie in the 
following: (1) it is not too rewarding academically,
because it is too complex and elusive; (2) it seems
repugnant to the idea of the seeming international coopera­
tion; and (3) the enormous human tragedy and havoc wrought 
by German Nazism, Italian fascism, and Japanese militarism 
in our times attach a negative, unpopular connotation to 
nationalism.®
Yet, what is clear is that the reality of 
nationalism does not disappear by being ignored. Contrary 
to the hopes of internationalists, international development 
is increasingly influenced by the shadows of competing 
nationalisms. After the First World War and particularly 
after the Second World War, nationalism has rapidly spread 
over the rest of the world to the "expectant p e o p l e s . I n
view of the looming spectre of competing nationalisms, it is
quite obvious that Japanese nationalism means much more than 
the war-time "ultranationalism." The fact that the Japanese
Gpor an extended discussion of this point, see 
Godfried van Bentham van den Verge, "Contemporary National­
ism in the Western World, " Daedalus, XCV, No. 3 (Summer, 
1966), 828-61.
^K. H. Silvert, Expectant Peoples : Nationalism and
Development (New York: Random House, 1964).
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ultranationalism during the militaristic era was unquestion­
ably discredited by the defeat in 1945 and the subsequent 
Allied Occupation of Japan did not signify a complete 
disappearance of Japanese nationalism. •
If we are to agree with Body C. Shafer that 
"Loyalty, patriotism, and national consciousness are the 
ingredients in nationalism and preceded it in time,"® then 
the general nature of Japanese nationalism has to be seen in 
the light of Japanese national history. Though the emer­
gence and development of Japanese nationalism in the modern 
sense of the word may be thought to date only back to the 
time of the Meiji Restoration,® the national consciousness 
of the Japanese people, however, seems to have preceded the
For a fuller discussion along this line, see 
Fujiwara Hirotatsu, "Uyoku Nashionarizumu ni okeru Sengoteki 
tokushitsu no shozai: Sono Shisoteki tachiba no Mondai"
(Post-war Characteristics of Right-Wing Nationalism; The 
Question of Their Ideological Basis), Shiso (Thought), No. 
340 (October, 1952), 964-82; Oda Makoto, "The Meaning of
'Meaningless Death'," Journal of Social and Political Ideas 
in Japan, IV, No. 2 (1966), 75-85; George R. Packard, III, 
"Japan's New Nationalism," Atlantic Monthly, CCXII, No. 4 
(April, 1963), 64-69; Hugh H. Smyth, "Nationalism in Japan," 
Fortnightly, CLXXII (September, 1952), 147-54; Asian Stu­
dent, February 25, 1978.
®Boyd C. Shafer, Nationalism: Myth and Reality
(New York: Harcourt, Brach and Co., 1955), p. 5.
®Kurt Steiner argues that "in pre-Meiji Japan 
popular orientation toward Japan as a national political 
system was minimal." See his "Popular Political Partici­
pation and Political Development in Japan," in Political 
Development in Modern Japan, ed. by Robert E. Ward 
(Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), p.
218.
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Meiji Restoration by many centuries.This fact that the 
Japanese national consciousness is many centuries old is 
bound to have an important bearing on any study of Japanese 
nationalism, for "national consciousness," as Gebhard L. 
Schweigler rightly argues, "is clearly a precondition for 
nationalism: there can be no will without consciousness."^^
The longevity and "uniqueness" of Japanese national 
consciousness have amply been manifested in historical 
events as well as in literature. Already in the Nara era 
are found Japanese sentiments and attitudes that may be 
regarded as the forerunner of the modern Japanese national 
consciousness. As many poems in the Manyoshu reflect the 
affective sentiments of the Japanese toward their society 
already existing at the early stage of Japanese national
^History reveals that the Japanese and the Jews 
have had an exceptional history of national consciousness. 
See H. L. Featherstone, A Century of Nationalism (London: 
Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1939), p. 11.
^^Gebhard Ludwig Schweigler, National Consciousness 
in Divided Germany (London and Beverly Hills: Sage Publica­
tions, 1975), p. 55.
^^Almost contemporaneous with the accomplishments of 
the Kojiki in 712 (Records of Ancient Matters)— the so- 
called "bible of Japanese nationalism"— and the Nihonqi in 
720, which is also known as Nihon-shoki (Chronicles of 
Japan), the compilation of the Manyoshu (A collection of 
Ten Thousand Leaves), a collection of more than four 
thousand short and long poems composed from the earliest 
period to around the year 760, was a very significant 
literary accomplishment in the Nara period, reflecting, like 
the Kojiki and the Nihonqi, the growing sense of "ethnocen- 
trism" and the moral and intellectual outlook of early 
Japan. These poems have been regarded as the purest 
manifestation of the early Japanese spirit.
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development, an expression of loyalty to the Emperor is 
discernible in the following poem:
At sea be my body water-soaked,
On land be it with grass overgrown.
Let me die by the side of my sovereign! 
Never will I look back.13
Devotion to the Emperor was considered essential for the 
preservation of the honor of the family and clan:
Our forefathers served the Imperial House 
With all their hearts faithful and true.
So Cherished and clean is the name of our clan.
Neglect it never, lest even a false word 
Should destroy this proud name of our father.
Many writings seem to establish that once a strong 
national consciousness is rooted in a people, many factors 
such as national tradition, political antecedents, victories 
in war, and humiliations in the world community tend to 
fortify the existent national consciousness.^^ The national
l^The Nippon Gakujutsu Shinkokai, ed., The Man­
yoshu (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1940), p. 151.
14i‘Ibid., p. 177.
ISpor various arguments in this connection, see John 
Stuart Mill, Consideration on Representative Government, 
1861 (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1907), pp. 120-24;
Arnold J. Toynbee, Nationality and the War (New York: E. P.
Dutton & Co., 1915); Frederick Hertz, Nationality in History 
and Politics : A Study of the Psychology and Sociology of
National Sentiment and Character (New York: Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 1944); Yanaga Chitoshi, "Japan: Nationalism
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consciousness of the Japanese is not merely a product of the 
thirties and the early part of the forties, but a product of 
a centuries-old national history. The unique nature of 
Japanese national consciousness still baffles us as much as 
it did many thoughtful observers in the past. What a war- 
correspondent of the epoch of the Russo-Japanese War wrote 
seems still cogent and merits quotation here:
We recognize almost grudgingly and in spite of 
ourselves, the existence of a moral force that 
appears able to govern and sway the whole conduct 
of a whole people, inspiring not a caste but a 
nation, from the highest to lowest, to deeds that 
are worthy to rank among the most famous in 
history and legend. We want to know what this 
force is, whence it came, and what it means; the 
sense of its existence m^es us jealous, uncom­
fortable, almost annoyed.
Whether the nature of Japanese national conscious­
ness is envied or denounced, one cannot fail to see the 
stark fact that the world is still divided into independent 
sovereign states, each of which has its own national 
consciousness. Writing in 1933, Frederick L. Schuman stated 
wishfully but pessimistically that a true world federation 
may come into being "if the members of the Western State 
System are capable of integrating their particular national
Suceeds and Fails," Current History, XIX (August, 1950), 67- 
72; Karl Loewith, "The Japanese Mind," Fortune, December, 
1943, pp. 132ff.
^^Alfred Stead, Great Japan: A Study of National
Efficiency (London: John Lane, 1906), p. 38.
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interests into world-wide international interests. A 
thorny aspect of the national interest is that the rising 
standards of living and heightening levels of education do 
not seem to be conducive to the diminution of the pursuit of 
national interests.^® In effect, national interest and 
national consciousness are mutually supportive. Many stud­
ies even in recent decades have revealed that neither the 
advanced industrial countries nor the developing ones are in 
the process of jettisoning nationalism in favor of interna­
tional collaboration based upon the sentiment of universal 
brotherhood.^  ^
Since there is, on evidence of history, a close 
relationship between Japan's modernizaton and Japanese 
national consciousness,^® it is almost impossible to deal
^^Frederick L. Schuman, International Politics; An 
Introduction to the Western State System (New York and 
London: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1933), p. 273.
Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism in the Twentieth 
Century (New York: New York University Press, 1979), p. x.
^^Gunnar Myrdal harbored no illusion as to the early 
demise of natinalism when he said: "The Welfare-State is
nationalistic." Beyond the Welfare-State (New Haven, Conn.: 
Yale University Press, 1960), p. 159; Cyril E. Black informs 
us that nationalism is a means to modernization, and 
modernizatin in turn becomes a vehicle in furtherance of 
nationalism in developing countries. See his The Dynamics 
of Modernization (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 9-
34.
2®Por a fuller discussion of the relationship 
between Japan's modernization and Japanese nationalism, see 
Robert A. Scalapino, "Ideology and Modernization," in 
Ideology and Discontent, ed., David E. Apter (New York:
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with the postwar state of Japanese national consciousness 
without first understanding its past.
Historical Background 
As many studies have pointed o u t , 21 the "unique" 
nature of Japanese national consciousness is largely 
attributable to geography and the Emperor system. Unlike 
many other countries whose geography impeded the political 
unification of their countries, Japan is an island country, 
a fact which has so conditioned and influenced her history 
as to facilitate the achievement of political integration 
and the consequent growth of national consciousness at a 
very early date.22
The geographical separateness of Japan was histor­
ically very crucial in that it was not only far enough from 
the continent of Asia to offer the needed security against
The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 93-127.
2^See, for example, Tsurumi Shunsuke, "Nihon Shiso 
no Tokushoku to Tenno-sei" (Characteristics of Japanese 
Thought and the Emperor System), Shiso, No. 336 (1952), 44- 
53; Maruyama Masao, Nihon Seiji Shiso Shi Kenkyu (A Study 
of History of Japanese Political Thought), (Tokyo; Tokyo 
Diagaku Shuppankai, 1970), esp. pp. 321-63; idem, "Nihon ni 
okeru Nashionarizumu, Sono Shiso teki Haikei" (Intellectual 
Background of Nationalism in Japan), Chüô Koron (January 
1951), pp. 295-304; Kinoshita Hanji, Nihon Kokka Shugi Undo 
Shi (History of Japanese Nationalist Movements), (2 vols.; 
Tokyo: Iwasaki Shoten, 1952).
22?he Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
Nationalism: A Report, 1939 (New York: A. M. Kelley,
1966), p. 160; Delmer M. Brown, Nationalism in Japan 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1955), pp. v-vi.
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from the Chinese civilization. The geographical location of 
Japan made the Japanese nation a cultural daughter of China; 
but, unlike the case of Korea, Japan's isolation kept her 
from becoming a cultural colony of C h i n a . ^4
The history of Japan amply suggests that Japan 
always sought to remain Japanese, on the one hand, and she 
kept herself busy with importing and assimilating things 
foreign that were deemed useful and beneficial to her, on 
the other.25 it may be stated that striking a balance 
between things imported from superior foreign cultures and 
things Japanese has been a very serious task in Japan ever 
since she was first exposed to the ancient civilization of 
China.26 "No nation," as Sir George B. Sansom states, "has
24por a good discussion in this regard, see Naoki 
Kojiro, Nihon no Rekishi, Vol. II; Kodai Kokka no 
Seiritsu (A History of Japan, Vol. II; The Formation of the 
Ancient (Japanese) State) (Tokyo: Chüô Koronsha, 1965),
pp. 61-78.
25h . Paul Varley, "Early Japan," in ^  Introduction 
to Japanese Civilization, ed. Arthur E. Tiedemann (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 4. "The Japanese have 
been cultural borrowers, from China in premodern times and 
from the West during the past century. They have taken 
eagerly from others whose things they have found appealing 
or useful. Yet Japan's cultural borrowing, apparently 
indiscriminate at times, has usually proven in the long run 
to be highly selective and the resultant advances in its 
civilization have been more the product of synthesis than 
outright imitation."
26por Japan's sensitivity to shifting influences in 
neighboring countries and her flexibility in absorbing 
foreign culture in the Yamato period, see Inoue Mitsusada, 
Nihon no Rekishi, Vol. Ill : Asuka no Chotei (The Great
History of Japan, Vol. Ill: The Imperial Court of Asuka)
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been more ready to consider new teaching, and yet none has 
been more tenacious of its own tradition."2?
An example will illustrate this point well. Prince 
Shotoku, a strong advocate of Buddhism, who exercised 
authority as regent to Empress Suiko from 593 until his 
death in 622, sought to accomplish the following things 
among others. The first was the consolidation and streng­
thening of imperial authority. The second was the propaga­
tion of Buddhism. The third was an attempt to restore 
Japan's influence in Korea, where her position had been on 
the decline since the kindom of Silla seized the control of 
Mimana in 562. Lastly, he tried to strengthen Japan's 
cultural ties with C h i n a . I n  short, what Prince Shotoku 
attempted to accomplish implies that Japan already in the 
Yamato period was assiduously pursuing her national aggran­
dizement through domestic reforms, ventures abroad, and 
cultural assimilation.
Confronted with the instability of the government 
amid the power struggle among the leading families and with 
the advent of the Bui dynasty. Prince Shotoku promulgated
(Tokyo: Shogakkan, 1974), pp. 198-217; John Whitney Hall,
Japan : From Prehistory to Modern Times (New York: Dela-
corte Press, 1970), pp. 35-47.
2?George B. Sansom, The Western World and Japan (New 
York: Alfred Knopf, 1950), p. 169.
^®See Naoki, op. cit., pp. 61-78.
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the so-called "Seventeen Article Constitution"^^ in the year 
604 to cope with the situation. Though the Constitution 
clearly modeled after, and benefited from, Chinese ethical 
principles and Buddhist doctrines, it was intended to create 
the desired unity, by strengthening the position of the 
Imperial Court, and by providing moral principles for public 
officials.
It should not go unnoticed that, even while Japan 
wholeheartedly embraced the Chinese civilization, she could 
entertain a sense of natonal pride. Prince Shotoku and 
Japanese leaders after him not only adopted the Chinese 
concept that tenshi (the Son of Heaven) was the supreme 
ruler possessing the Mandate of Heaven, but also added more 
myths to cast special luster on the Japanese Emperor, by 
equating him with Heavenly power itself. The Japanese 
believed that the Emperor of Japan, being the direct 
descendant of the Sun Goddess, was different in nature from 
that of China in that the Emperor of Japan was not a mere 
mortal who received a Mandate from Heaven— a mandate the 
Emperor of China received on account of his superior moral 
character— but also a living God.^®
29por the entirety of "Seventeen Article Constitu­
tion," see W. G. Aston, Nihonqi; Chronicles of Japan from 
the Earliest Times to A. D. 697 (London: George Allen &
Unwin Ltd., 1956), pp. 129-33.
^^Daniel C. Holtom, The National Faith of Japan 
(London: Kegan Paul, 1938), pp. 50-52.
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An extraordinary thing that seems to have always 
typified Japanese national consciousness ever since their 
initial entering upon the stage of high civilizaion under 
Chinese tutelege is that their enthusiastic importation of 
superior foreign culture has hardly dampened the deep-lying 
currents of Japanese national consciousness.
As early as A. D. 607, Japan claimed an equal, if 
not superior, status vis-a-vis China. Despite the fact that 
Prince Shotoku and the political leaders who succeeded him 
expanded Japan's contacts with China in an attempt to adopt 
the Chinese culture and change it to their needs, sending 
quite a few missions to the courts of the Sui (581-618) and 
T'ang (618-907) dynasties, and encouraging monks and 
students to travel to China to learn her culture and 
religion. Prince Shotoku defied the idea that Japan should 
play an inferior role in her dealings with China.
In a message he wrote for the Japanese Empress Suiko 
(554-628) to be delivered to the court of Sui through an 
official mission, he referred to the Japanese Emperor as the 
Emperor in the land where the sun rises and to the ruler of 
China as the Emperor in the land where the sun sets.3% 
Modern Japanese historians tend to view this episode as 
early evidence of Japan's insistence on national equality
3^Naoki, op. cit., pp. 90-94. 
33varley, op. cit., p. 25.
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with China. H. Paul Varley seems quite right when he 
states ;
. . . the Japanese from the time of the first 
references to the land of Wa in the Later Han and 
Wei histories had freely and even eagerly accepted 
an inferior, tributary relationship vis-a-vis 
China. Shotoku, if he was in fact the author of 
the 607 message, appears thus to have been the 
first Japanese leader to assert that Japan's 
national status was on a level with that of China. 
Prewar Japanese scholars chauvinistically over­
stressed the importance of this. Yet the fact 
remains that the Japanese, alone among the peoples 
of East Asia, were, with one exception, never 
again to accept subordinate treatment in their 
official dealing with China. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, it is discernible that at this early date 
there was an extremely sensitive national pride that was to 
thereafter characterize Japanese national consciousness and 
Japan's relationship with the outside world. The grandeur 
of China during the Sui and T'ang dynasties further 
sharpened the already exisitng Japanese national conscious­
ness and caused the political leaders to feel the urgent 
need to strengthen the powers of the central government.^4 
The acuteness of Japanese fear of China's growing influence 
was quite justified when we look at the greatness of the 
Middle Kingdom. James Murdock describes the dazzling 
immensity of the Chinese Empire in the following words;
33Ibid.
34Brown, op. cit., pp. 11-16.
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At this time (during the 627-650 Tai-tsung reign) 
China undoubtedly stood in the very forefront of 
civilization. She was then the most powerful, the 
most enlightened, the most progressive, and the 
best governed empire, not only in Asia, but on the 
face of the globe. Tai-tsung's frontiers reached 
from the confines of Persia, the Caspian Sea, and 
the Altai of the Kirghis steppe, along these 
mountains to the north side of the Gobi desert, 
eastward to the Inner Hing-an, while Sogdiana, 
Khorasan, and the regions around the Hindu Kush 
also acknowledged his suzerainty. The sovereigns 
of Nepal and Magadha in India sent envoys; and in 
643 envoys appeared ^ o m  the Byzantine Empire and 
the Court of Persia.
Indeed, grave concern about Japan's security was 
prompted by the situation in Korea. The Sui dynasty had 
invaded Korea three times during the second decade of the 
seventh century to bring the kingdom of Koguryo (37 B.C.-668 
A.D.) under its control. The Sui invasions against Koguryo 
had miserably failed, resulting finally in its own downfall. 
The T'ang dynasty which succeeded the Sui dynasty also 
entertained ambitions of conquering Koguryo. In 644 Emperor 
Tai-tsung of the T'ang dynasty launched an attack against 
Koguryo in an attempt to bring the latter to its knees. 
Like the Sui invasions against Koguryo a generation earlier, 
T'ang's attempt to eliminate Koguryo was a complete failure.
T'ang's three further attempts against Koguryo were 
equally unsuccessful in 647, 648, and 655. The military
alliance toward the middle of the seventh century between
35james Murdock, A History of Japan (London: K-gan
Paul, 1925), I, 146.
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the T'ang dynasty and the Silla dynasty, Japan's long-time 
antagonist, was established as a marriage of strategic 
convenience in that each party was pursuing conflicting 
political goals: T'ang, having failed many times in its
attempts to conquer Koguryo, hoped to achieve the same goal 
plus subdue eventually all of Korea with the help of Silla, 
whereas Silla hoped to conquer Paekche and Koguryo to 
establish its hegemony over all of Korea with the aid of the 
T'ang's military forces. 6^
It was obvious that the Japanese were very apprehen­
sive of the growing power of Silla and the expanding 
influence of the Chinese Empire. Either eventuality was 
deemed by the Japanese as posing a serious threat to Japan's 
security. This sense of foreign threat undoubtedly caused 
Japan to embark upon the reform movement. In 646 Nakatomi 
no Kamatari, founder of the Fujiwara family, formulated the 
Taika Reform edict, which, in essence, was the application 
to Japan of the centralized bureaucratic system of the 
Chinese E m p i r e . I t  should be noted here that the Taika 
Reforms, like the Meiji Restoration later, were undertaken 
in part out of fear of foreign encroachments.
Gpor a detailed discussion of this period, see Woo- 
keun Han, The History of Korea (Seoul: The Eul-Yoo 
Publishing Co., 1970), pp. 75-91.
37por an exhaustive treatment of this point, see Sir 
George B. Sansom, Japan : A Short Cultural History (rev. 
ed.; New York: Appléton-Century, 1962), Ch. V.
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Though it may be stated in broad outline that the 
Nara period was acquisitive, the early Heian period 
assimilative and the later Heian period selective, 
emphasizing mainly such features as the unending power 
struggles among the leading families and discrepancy between 
the sumptuous luxury and extravagance of the court aristo­
cracy and the abject poverty of the common people. This 
tendency seems to becloud the real state of people's 
consciousness in those days about their country. Despite 
the bloody succession quarrels and dynastic intrigues, the 
Japanese national consciousness seems to have remained 
unaffected, for it is the function and product of the 
Japanese insularity, the Emperor system, and the fear of 
foreign encroachments.^®
3®Yanaga Chitoshi had the following to say in 
discussing the importance and influence of geography of 
Japan: "The fact of insularity which is not unlike that of
Great Britain has had a profound influence on her national 
character and development. The comparative physical isola­
tion it afforded has enabled the nation to develop her own 
culture without being completely overshadowed and engulfed 
by Chinese civilization." See his Japanese People and 
Politics (New York: John Wiley, 1964), p. 10.
The prevalence of Japanese pride in their imperial 
system already in the seventh and eighth centuries is well 
described in the following words: "It is usually stated
that veneration of the emperors, amounting almost to 
religious worship, is a national characteristic of the 
Japanee, going back to the dawn of their history, and its 
belief is supported by the dogma that the succession has 
been and shall be 'unbroken for ages eternal.'" Sansom, 
Japan : A Short Cultural History, p. 176.
For Japan's early fear of foreign encroachments 
stemming from the unified Shilla, see Inoue, 0£. cit., pp. 
369-401.
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It is quite obvious that the threats from the 
domestic and external foes have contributed to the fortifi­
cation of Japanese national consciousness from the early 
days of Japanese history. The Ainu, among other unsubju­
gated, hostile, domestic tribes, which "gathered together 
like ants, but dispersed like b i r d s ,"39 had harrassed the 
Yamato state until the early years of the ninth century. 
Silla's conquest of Mimana in 562, the unified Korea under 
Silla in 668, and Silla's attempt to conquer the island of 
Tsushima in 894 did unquestionably heighten the security 
concern of the Japanese by compelling the Japanese to 
maintain military vigilance for more than three centuries 
following Japan's loss of Mimana to Silla in 562.
The Japanese national consciousness coupled with 
their security concern culminated in the Mongol Invasions in 
the late thirteenth century.^0 As Yanaga Chitoshi cogently 
describes :
The unsuccessful attempted invasions by the 
Mongols in 1274 and 1281 did more than anything 
else to awaken national consciousness. Out of 
these two experiences of successfully repulsing 
the would-be-invaders was developed the belief 
that Japan was under divine protection and
3^Sansom, Japan; A Short Cultural History, p. 196.
^Opor a full explanation of the implications of the 
Mongol invasions for Japanese national consciousness, see 
Kuroda Toshio, Nihon no Rekishi, Vol. VIII: Monqoru Shurai
(A History_ of Japan, Vol. VIII: The Mongol Invasions)
(Tokyo: Chuo Kôron Sha, 1965).
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therefore could not be conquered by invaders.
Indeed, the failure of the Mongol invasions was to 
have a profound influence on the centuries-old Japanese 
national consciousness and on the "uniqueness" of their 
imperial system. The close relationship between war and 
national consciousness has attracted the attention of many 
social scientists. "War is," as Walter Sluzbach writes, "of 
immense importance in the formation of national 
c o n s c i o u s n e s s . "42 in dwelling upon the influence of wars on 
history and politics, Frederick Hertz made a sweeping 
statement that merits quotation at length.
The modern nations have been mainly formed by 
wars, partly by conquest, partly by fusion under 
the menace of conquest. Every nation, further­
more, has developed its personality in great wars 
and everywhere the national ideology and character 
have been deeply influenced by them. Territory 
and language, religion and civilization, ideas of 
national interest and honour, the organization of 
the State and the structure of society were always 
to a large extent the product of w a r s . 42
The power struggle between two major military fami-
41yanaga, op. cit., p. 27.
4^Walter Sulzbach, National Consciousness 
(Washington, D. C. : American Council on Public Affairs,
1943), p. 55.
43prederick Hertz, Nationality in History and 
Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), pp. 
217-18.
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lies— the Taira and Minamoto clans— and the Mongol invasions 
ushered in the tradition of military dominance in Japan in 
the Kamakura period (1 1 8 5 -1 3 3 3 ) . From around the year
1200 on, the Imperial Court and the Emperor were gradually
relegated to the background and played no role of great
import in the political life of Japan until the Meiji 
Restoration in 1868.
The military dominance in Japanese politics, 
eclipsing the power and influence of the Imperial Court and 
the Emperor, did not extend so far as to deprive the Emperor 
of his imperial dignity. No military dictator attempted to 
bring the entire country under his direct control. He 
regarded the Imperial Court as the legal government and
secured imperial sanctions for all his policies and 
d e c r e e s . 45 it is worth noting the striking contrast of the 
monopolization of political power by the Shogunate with the 
continuous attachment of Japanese national sentiment and 
allegiance to the Imperial Court. A typical description of 
the sad state of the Imperial Court in the Ashikaga period
44jt may be pointed out that although the military 
profession had not been highly respected in Japan until the 
triumph of the samuarai in the Kamakura, there had almost 
always been a need for certain military forces to cope with 
the threats from possible external foes and unpacified 
internal tribes, keeping the military spirit alive.
45por an understanding of the relationship of the 
Shogunal rule and the Imperial authority, see Herschel 
Webb, "What is the Dai Nihon Shi," Journal of Asian Studies, 
XIX, No. 2 (February, 1960), pp. 135-49.
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(1392-1568) is found in the following passages;
The imperial house no longer mattered. The 
throne, as an institution, had no political 
significance. No emperor was important enough to 
be forced to abdicate his empty title, as they 
used to do under pressure. One was confined to 
the Shogun's Kyoto buildings for thirteen years, 
and another lay unburied for lack of funds for 
several months. The palace, after it was sacked 
and burned, was not properly rebuilt or guarded, 
so that commoners picnicked on the grounds, and 
members of the imperial family were pleased enough 
to sell their autographs or quotations for the 
classics copied in their elegant c a l l i g r a p h y . 4 6
In contrast, Kitabatake Chikafusa (1293-1354), 
writing in the middle of the fourteenth century, described 
the political and symbolic signficance of the imperial 
system in the following words;
Great Yamato is a divine country. It is only our 
land whose foundations were first laid by the 
divine ancestor. It alone has been transmitted by 
the Sun Goddess to a long line of her descendants. 
There is nothing of this kind in foreign coun­
tries. Therefore it is called the divine land.
Despite the vicissitudes of political fortune of the 
Imperial Court, the Emperor has been the rallying point for 
the J a p a n e s e . 48 it is useful to see that the Kamakura
4®Langdon Warner, The Enduring Art of Japan 
(Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 54.
47guoted in William George Aston, A History of 
Japanese Literature (Rutland, Vermont; Charles E. Tuttle 
Co., 1972), p. 167.
4®Helen Craig McCullough, The Taiheiki; A Chronicle
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period signaled the beginning of the feudalization of Japan 
and the triumph of the Samurai, necessitating and facili­
tating the advent of the warrior code. The ethic of the 
samurai dictated that the warrior live by the principles of 
duty, loyalty, integrity, honor, justice, and courage. Even 
though the term Bushido was not in use during the Kamakura 
period, the codes of the bushi that emerged with the 
military dominance in Japan eventually developed into the 
concept of Bushido in the Tokugawa era. Bushida, 
emphasizing loyalty in particular, served well in the 
feudalization of Japan and in the maintenance of feudalism 
in Japan for several centuries, on the one hand, and the 
concept of loyalty deeply embedded in Bushido was to be 
later mobilized for the destruction of the feudal Tokugawa 
Shogunate, by channeling feudal loyalty into national 
loyalty focused on the Emperor, on the other.^9 The 
fortification of the primordial loyalty of the Japanese 
toward the Emperor, the political doctrines of the Nichiren 
sect founded by Nichiren (1222-1282) espousing militant 
ethnocentrism and loyal service to the country, and the 
elevation of feudal loyalty to a national level during the
of Medieval Japan (New York: Columbia University Press,
1959), p .  X X .
49por a good discussion of the influence of 
Bushido on Japanese morals and social thought, see lenaga 
Saburo, Nihon DotokushisSshi (A History of Japanese Moral 
Thought) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1951).
39
days of the Meiji Restoration resulted in a synthesis of 
national consciousness and loyalty which was to have a 
profound influence on the political and social life of the 
Japanese.
The symbolic significance of the Japanese national 
habit of veneration for the Imperial Court is so deeply 
rooted in Japanese political culture that it scarecely needs 
emphasis or elaboration. Even during the Azuchi-Momoyama 
period (1573-1603) and the Tokugawa era (1603-1867) when the 
military dominance of politics was undisputed, no military 
dictator failed to show the due reverent attitude toward the 
Throne. Unlike the leaders of the Fujiwara, Taira, and 
Ashikaga families, who had shown disloyalty to the Throne 
and had with indifference suffered the Imperial Court to 
sink to indigence, Oda Nobunaga (1534-1582) paid due respect 
and deference to the Sovereign even when he was the supreme 
military master in Japan. Following his mentor's attitude 
of respecting the Throne, Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536-1598) 
allocated definite funds for the maintenance of the Imperial 
Court and enjoined his followers not to encroach on the 
rights and prerogatives of the Throne, the nobles of the 
Court, and the princes. In 1588, Hideyoshi compelled the 
six most powerful military barons to sign an oath binding 
themselves forever to respect the properties of the Throne 
and to give scrupulous attention to the well-being of the
40
Imperial Court.
Though the Tokugawa family ruled Japan unchallenged
for more than two and a half centuries (1603-1867), the
Tokugawa rulers were never free from the fear that the
Imperial Court might become a rallying-point for those who
were inclined to oppose the political authority of the
Tokugawa S h o g u n a t e . The Tokugawa rulers made every effort
to create and strengthen the belief that the Throne was the
supreme spiritual authority in the land and the ShSgun the
highest political authority. The Tokugawa leaders, like
political leaders before them, held the Throne in high 
52respect.
The seclusion of the Edo era from the ouside world 
had a variety of profound influences on the Japanese 
socially, culturally, and politically. Since it is 
unnecessary and beyond the purview of this study to treat 
the entirety of the Tokugawa heritage,, we will briefly touch 
upon the aspects that had bearings on the growth of Japanese 
national consciousness.
^^Shimmi Kichihi, Nihon ni okeru Buke-Seiji no
Rekishi (A Political History of Military Families in Japan) 
(Osaka: Sogensha, 1941), p. 218.
SlQeorge Sansom, A History of Japan, 1615-1867
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1963), pp.
17-18.
S^Tsuji Tatsuya, Nihon no Rekishi, Vol. XIII: Edo
Kaifu (A History of Japan, Vol. XIII: Laying the Foundation
of the Edo Shogunate) (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Sha, 1966), pp.
116-20.
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It was as much a concern for internal security, 
stability, and peace as the fear of foreign encroachments 
and anti-Christian attitude which was accountable for the 
isolation of Japan. The enforcement of isolation policies 
was, in a sense, a logical corollary of the national 
unification campaigns carried out by Oda Nobunaga and 
Toyotomi Hideyoshi. Since Japan had finally been united 
after a long period of turmoil and warfare, the Tokugawa 
Shogunate was steeped in maintaining and furthering the 
national unity.^3
The enforcement of national isolation had redounded 
to the strengthening of the insularity historically 
characteristic of the Japanese. The insularity, which tends 
to take on the notion that "stronger means e n e m y , "^4 
naturally stimulated "we-feelings" and contributed to the 
growth of a strong sense of exclusiveness. What is more, 
the national isolation virtually made Japan a "world state." 
As Arnold Toynbee writes:
The smallest human community constitutes the whole 
world for the people inside it if it is insulated 
from all other human communities on the face of
53it is not an idle play of wordage to depict the 
three principal figures in the national unification cam­
paigns of Japan as that leyasu "ate the pie which Nobunaga 
had prepared and Hideyoshi had baked." Sansom, A History of 
Japan, 1615-1867, p. 17.
S^Max Sylvius Handman, "The Sentiment of National­
ism," Political Science Quarterly, XXXVI, No. 1 (March, 
1921), p. 106.
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the planet; and it will be insulated from them if 
its members feel that outsiders do not count. . . 
. [E]ven tiny Japan was a world state during her 
two centuries of insulation under the regime of 
the Tokugawa shoguns. . . . [T]he world 
governments of the past have concentrated their 
energies on self-preservation; and they have tried 
to preserve themselves by a policy of freezing. 
They have tried to freeze not only their frontiers 
against the outer barbarians and not only the 
structure of public administration inside those 
frontiers; they have tried to freeze the private 
lives of their citizens as well. The most 
notorious recent instance of this policy is that 
of the Tokugawa regime in J a p a n . 55
Deeply interested in staying in power and concerned 
about a possible threat to its political authority, the 
Tokugawa Shogunate, like any dictatorship, brooked no 
insubordination. The Tokugawa dictatorship needed a set of 
moral principles to maintain political and social order and 
a social doctrine to regulate human relations and conduct. 
It believed that Buddhism, being tethered to abstract 
speculation, was incapable of providing answers to such 
problems as the legitimacy of the Tokugawa rule and the 
loyalty to one's feudal lord and country.56
Buddhism was abandoned in favor of Confucianism, for 
Confucianism was secular and stern.5? Indeed, Confucianism
55Arnold Toynbee, "How to Change the World Without 
War," Saturday Review, May 12, 1962, p. 17.
56iîy5e Murakami and Edward G. Seidensticker, eds.. 
Guides to Japanese Culture (Tokyo: Japan Culture Institute,
1977), pp. 159-60.
^^Confucianism had always been a very vital influ-
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found a strong ally in Shinto which made use of the 
teachings of Confucianism to strengthen itself and promote 
Japanese nationalism for the first half of the Tokugawa 
period. The alliance did not last long, for the Shinto 
doctrinaires, upon the destruction of Buddhism as an 
intellectual force, began to denounce Confucianism as an 
alien philosophy which had put an unwholesome influence on 
the Japanese people and conditioned the Japanese to be 
servile Sinophiles.
It is of interest to note that, though the 
teachings of Confucianism was largely responsible for the 
making of Bushido, the second half of the Edo period 
witnessed the eclipse of Confucianism as the first half had 
witnessed the eclipse of Buddhism. Up until the late Middle 
Ages there had been a general belief that Buddhism, 
Confucianism, and Shinto were not in essence mutually 
incompatible: Shinto explained the origin of Japan, Confu­
cianism was concerned with the present state of society and 
the moral principles regulating it, and Buddhism dealt with
ence in forming the ethical code of the samurai class. It 
was not until the Edo period, however, that the Confucian 
philosophy became the officially approved basis of 
government and the generally accepted code of all social 
conduct. For a list of approved attitudes and behavior 
patterns stemming from Confucianism, see Arthur F. Wright 
and Denis C. Twitchett, Confucian Personalities (Stanford, 
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962), p. 8.
SBp. P. Dore, Education in Tokugawa Japan (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1965), p. 64.
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the future and the maturity of the human mind.59
Despite the evidence that the Bushido— a product of 
Confucianism-— came to constitute the soul of Japan, Shinto 
was gradually eclipsing Confucianism. This clearly points 
to the fact that the Japanese led a movement toward a Japan- 
centered thinking. The Shinto adherents took Confucianists 
to task to the effect that the Confucian scholars had 
accepted China's primacy over Japan. Hiraga Gennai (1728- 
1779), though not an ardent patriot, railed against the 
Confucianists:
These frog-in-the-well scholars are earnest 
admirers of things Chinese and call Japan— their 
native land— the country of the Eastern barbar­
ians. . . . But for all their farting drivel 
about the "Way" and the arts of peace and the arts 
of war, if they had their rice salaries measured 
out in ancient Chinese bushels, they might not be 
so admiring of the Sages.
As the dictatorship of the Tokugawa family pro­
gressed, the influence of the Confucianists replete with the 
so-called Karagokoro (Chinese psychology)— a perjorative 
term often used by the more patriotic scholars for those who 
paid homage to the greatness of the Chinese civilization—  
gave way to the doctrine of "Japaneseness." What the 
patriotic Japanese attempted to accomplish by discrediting
59por a detailed treatment on the relationship 
between philosophical principles and political action, see 
Sansom, A History of Japan, 1615-1867, Ch. VII.
60Dore, o£. cit., pp. 45-66.
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the Confucianists was to bring about a respectful statue of 
Japan vis-a-vis China. Mindful of the indelible truth that 
the Chinese civilization had influenced Japan in great 
measure, the patriotic Japanese resorted to Kokokushuqi (the 
Doctrine of the Imperial Country) in order to disabuse the 
Japanese of inferior Japanese mentality toward China and to 
justify that Japan is not partial to China. Instead, Japan, 
they argued, was unique because her Emperor had no parallel 
e l s e w h e r e . i n  effect, the patriotic Japanese reversed the 
traditional order of placing China above Japan and argued 
that Japan was superior to China on the ground that, unlike 
the political system in China where anyone might acquire a 
virtue and become a ruler, in Japan virtue was always 
inherent in the Imperial dynasty, hence the Emperor was 
entitled to absolute and unconditional respect and devotion 
from his subjects, and the respect and devotion of the 
Japanese toward their Imperial system constituted the basis 
of Japanese national morality.62
The Kokugaku (National Learning) scholars, who were
61por an exhaustive treatment of the anti-Buddhist 
arguments by Confucianist, Shinto and Kokugaku scholars and 
the anti-Confucianists' arguments by Shinto and Kokugaku 
scholars, see Sajja A. Prasad, "Country of the Soul; Some 
Japanese Varieties of Patriotic Experience," (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation. Harvard University, 1970).
62Mauaoka Tsunetsugu, Iwanami Kozp;, Tovo Shicho, Vol, 
XIV: Nihon Shinto no Tokushitsu (Iwanami Lecture:
The Trends of Oriental Thought, Vol. XVI; The Character­
istics of Japanese Shinto) (Tokyo; Iwanami Shoten, 1936), 
pp. 7-8.
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the most formidable of the critics of Confucianism, shifted 
their emphasis from the original attention to Japanese 
culture to the attention to the Japanese nation.^3 Briefly 
stated, the Kokugaku movement as an active political 
movement was intent upon distinguishing between "superior" 
and "inferior" nations and peoples. Its attempts were 
concerned not only with freeing Japanese learning from its 
heavy dependence upon Chinese philosophy and literature, but 
also establishing the superiority of the Japanese political 
morality and cultural tradition over the moral and political 
principles of China. The Kokugaku scholars came to conclude 
tht both Buddhism and Confucianism were inferior to Shinto. 
The Emperor of Japan, they argued, was duly entitled to the 
complete obedience of the people because he was descended 
from the Sun Goddess. The "uniqueness" of the Japanese 
natiion lay in the eternal rule of the divine Emperors.®'^
The most prominent figure among the scholars of 
National Learning, Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801), ascribed 
the ill-treatment of the Imperial family by Hojo Yasutoki 
and Ashikaga Takauji to the harmful influence of the Chinese
GSpor an authoritative discussion on the relation­
ship between Confucianism and Kokugaku, see Maruyama Masao, 
Nihon Seiji Shiso Shi Kenkyu (A Study of the History of 
Japanese Political Thought) (Tokyo; Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan- 
kai, 1970), pp. 140-82.
a recent study _on Kokugaku see Matsumato 
Sannosuke, Kokugaku Seiji Shiso no Kenkyu (A Study of 
Kokugaku Political Thought) (Tokyo : Iwanami Shoten,
1957).
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classics. In China anyone with political ambition could 
topple a ruler by alleging that the ruler was deficient in 
virtue and become a ruler himself by dint of demagogic 
propaganda and superior military f o r c e . ^5 This denunciation 
of the "pernicious" Chinese influence may be said to have 
been a harbinger of the later fervor of xenophobia which 
obtained in Japan in the wake of the "black ships. " The 
Kokugaku political movement further shifted its emphasis 
from the nation to the Emperor, instilling patriotism in the 
Japanese.
Parallel to the cultural-literary works of the 
Kokugaku scholars ran the historical research by the 
scholars at Mito. The results of the Mitogaku exerted a 
decisive influence on the loyalty and patriotism of the 
Japanese in the mid-nineteenth century.6? While the 
Kokugaku was concerned with the Japanese literature and
GSgrnest M. Satow, "The Revival of Pure Shin-Tau," 
Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, III (1883), 
Part 1, Appendix, p. 13.
®®It is interesting to note that the Kokugaku 
movement inadvertently redounded to the destruction of the 
Tokugawa Shogunate. The advocates of Kokugaku, being the 
strong supporters of the Edo Bakufu and of the feudal 
system, merely discovered the longevity and significance of 
the Emperor system through their researcher. The fruits of 
the Kokugaku movement were used later by the Mito school in 
the letter's attempt to undermine the Edo Bakufu.
G7por a good discussion of the implications of the 
fruits of the Mito school for later political development, 
see Herschel F. Webb, "The Thought and Work of the Early 
Mito School," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia 
University, 1958).
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philosophy to discover the purity of the Japanese nation, 
the Mitogaku was concerned with the Japanese history to 
establish the legitimacy of the Emperor system for the 
Japanese nation.
Even though the Kokugaku scholars held the view that 
the Emperor was the only legitimate focus of national
loyalties, they did not go so far as to advocate the 
Emperor's direct rule. They were still disinclined to place 
the Emperor above Japan. The Mito scholars, however,
enlarged upon the idea of Sonno (reverence for the Emperor) 
so far as to restore a direct Imperial rule. Since the 
political authority of Japan, they argued, had orginally 
belonged to the Emperor and it had been taken away frm him 
by the Minamoto clan, it should be restored to him again. 
By the same token, they argued that the continuation of the 
Shogunate was tantamount to a division of national 
loyalties between the Shogun and the Emperor.®® Finally, 
the Mitogaku made a contribution to the development of
Tennôshugi (Emperorism), whereas the Kokugaku was conducive 
to the development of Nihonshugi (Japanism).
Another line of intellectual activity may be
mentioned here in that it also exerted a significant 
influence on Japanese national consciousness and patriotism.
®®Herschel Webb, The Japanese Imperial Institution 
in the Tokugawa Period (New York: Columbia Univeristy 
Press, 1968), p. 183.
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Roughly toward the late eighteenth century Tokugawa Japan 
could no longer remain unconcerned with the happenings in 
the outside world. The increasing awareness of new tech­
niques used by the "barbarian" intruders, which supplemented 
by increasingly detailed information on political and social 
conditions in Western countries, naturally alerted the 
Japanese to do something about the external threat. The 
first step was the encouragement of Ranqaku (Dutch Studies). 
The scope of Rangaku was expanded to include such subjects 
as geography, mathematics, chemistry, physics, and astro­
nomy. As the Japanese concern about their national security 
increased in the early nineteenth century, the Japanese 
widened their learning to include metallurgy, gunnery, 
military science, shipbuilding, survey, weapons, navigation, 
etc. This new learning came to be referred to as Yogaku 
(Western Learning). 9^
The more the Japanese learned about the Western 
world, the more they became convinced of the technical 
superiority of Western countries. The Chinese defeat at the 
hands of the British in the Opium War (1839-1842) was a 
truly ominous signal to the Japanese who had already been
G^Kitajima Shogen, Nihon no Rekishi, Vol. XVIII; 
Bakuhan no Nayami (A History of Japan, Vol. XVIII; The 
Problem in the System of the Edo Government) (Tokyo: Chü
o' Koron Sha, 1966), pp. 354-63. For a historical overview 
of Western learning in Japan, see Itazawa Takeo, Iwanami 
Koza, Vol. IV: Rangaku no Hattatsu (Iwanami Lecture Vol. IV: 
The Development of Dutch learning) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 
1933).
50
haunted by the national vulnerability to Western domination. 
The subjection of China to a semi-colonial status following 
the Opium War completely divested the Japanese of their 
illusion that the Western threat and "barbarian" outsiders' 
pernicious influence could be sucessfully dealt with through 
the policy of seclusion.Japan's clear realization of the 
international situation and the United States' p r e s s u r e ,  
in particular, led to the "opening of Japan." Thus the 
arrival of the Perry mission in 1853 marked a new beginning 
for the modern Japan. The frustration felt by the Japanese 
at the time is well described by George Sansom:
It is humiliating to reflect that in Japanese 
minds Western culture stood for a knowledge of 
advanced methods of slaughter, but it cannot be 
denied that guns spoke with a convincing voice to 
a people with a long military history.
Indeed, 1853 and 1945 were the two most important 
epoch- making watersheds in Japan's modern history not only 
in the sense that they were the new beginnings of social 
change, but also in the sense that they subjected the
70lbid., pp. 482-84.
71lt is worth noting that the advent of the "black 
ships" was not the first and only direct threat to Japan. 
"Some historians' treating of the opening of Japan that took 
place at the instance of Commodore Perry in 1854 are 
inclined to ascribe it almost entirely to American pressure; 
but the influence of Russia was of great importance and 
should not be overlooked." George Sansom, The Western World 
and Japan (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), p. 212.
72lbid., p. 243.
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Japanese to a similar national humiliation. The Japanese 
response to the advent of the "black ships" seems to have 
demonstrated two very important characteristics of the 
Japanese people. The Japanese are situational and national­
istic. That the Japanese signed, albeit under duress, 
Kanagawa Joyaku (A treaty of friendship concluded at 
Kanagawa on March 3, 1854 between Japan and the United
States) indicates that the Japanese are capable of accepting 
the inevitability of situations.^3 The acceptance by the 
Japanese of realities as given, however, did by no means go 
so far as to stultify their national consciousness. Despite 
the warning that came from the disastrous defeat of the 
Chinese at the hands of the British, the unmistakable threat 
that came from the "black ships," and the fact that the 
Japanese clearly understood the uselessness of temporizing 
in meeting American demands, the nationalistic feeling of 
the Japanese was not daunted. The national mood in the wake 
of the 1854 treaty finds a characteristic expression in the 
following passages:
The Shogun's officials, by a wilful error, have
73one of the outstanding features characteristic of
the Japanese way of thinking is the affirmation of the world
as it is. It can be stated that, on evidence of history,
the Japanese tend to reject the viewpoints that seek the
absolute in some realm beyond phenomena. For a detailed
discussion in this respect, see Nakamura Hajime, Tovojin
no Shii Hôhô, Vol. Ill: Nihonjin no Shii Ho, _ ...—  ----        ' ^  (Ways of
Thinking of Oriental Peoples, Vol. Ill: The Way of Thinking
of the Japanese People) (Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1962).
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given permission for friendly relations and 
commerce; worse than this they have promised to 
open ports, acts which must excite the profoundest 
indignation. If they go on in this slothful and 
supine way, they will gradually fall into the 
snares of these people, the fundamental laws of 
the state will be altogether lost, we shall be 
insulted, get our Government and laws from 
jurisdiction of barbarian States. Then the 
national glory which has lasted for thousands of 
years, will be utterly tarnished; then it will be 
too late to gnaw our entrails with rage, and 
disgraced as a country we shall become a dependent 
state.
The reaction to the weak-kneed policy of the Bakufu 
giving in to foreign threats led to the Sonno Jôi (Revere 
the Emperor and Expel the Barbarians) movement which was to 
resound throughout Japan until the Japanese were made aware 
of the impracticality of shouting the Joi part of the 
Sonno Joi movement. Convinced, following the joint 
display of American, British, Dutch, and French warships in 
Ô"saka Bay, of the futility of defying Western powers, the 
Japanese replaced the "Revere the Emperor and Expel the 
Barbarians" with the "Revere the Emperor and Down with the 
Bakufu."75
Upon the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the Japanese 
began to take drastic steps to catch up with Western 
countries with the political slogan of Fukoku-Kvohei (Rich
7^Quoted in Brown, o£. cit., p. 78.
^^Konishi Shiro, Nihon no Rekishi, Vol. XIX; 
Kaikoku to Joi (A History of Japan, Vol. XIX: The Opening
of Japan an<3~the Expulsion of the Barbarians) (Tokyo: Chü
o Koron Sha, 1966), pp. 291-96.
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Country— Strong Army). What should not escape our attention 
in understanding the Sonno Joi and the Fukoku-KyShei is 
that both movements were signal manifestations of a more 
positive form of national c o n s c i o u s n e s s . 76 implied by
the Fukoku-Kyohei, the Japanese nationalism, seems to be a 
combined function of a sense of foreign danger, of a 
persistent quest of national prestige, and of the glorifica­
tion of the Emperor s y s t e m . 77 As many historians argue, the 
years of foreign pressure prior to the Restoration gave 
birth to Japanese nationalism in the modern sense of the 
word. Fearful of further foreign pressures or possible 
encroachments and mindful of the usufruct of military 
superiority, Japan embarked upon an ambitious career of 
national aggrandizement through fervid nationalism, 
industrialization, and military preparedness. Thus, Japan's 
modern overseas adventures resulted in a great measure, from 
the examples of international competitions among nations and 
of obnoxious features of Western
imperialism.78
7®Brown, op. cit., p. 90.
77writing on the problems of nationalism in 1921, 
Handman was led to declare with forceful cogency that: ". .
. what lies at the bottom of nationalistic behavior is not 
interest in the other members of the group, but solidarity 
in repelling a common enemy. It is not so much sympathy 
with one's fellows as hostility toward the outsider that 
makes for nationalism." Handman, op. cit., p. 106.
78por an authoritative discussion of the impact of 
imperialism on nationalism in a broad historical perspec­
tive, see the Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. 
cit., esp. pp. 170-99.
CHAPTER III 
JAPAN'S ■IMITATION OF WESTERN POWERS
It is scarcely questioned that the display of naval 
fleet by occidental powers prior to the Restoration made a 
deep impression on the Japanese. They were confronted, as 
James Murdoch well pointed out, "with the alternative of 
assimilating and utilising its (occidental) most important 
intellectual, and material products, or losing their existence 
as a nation."^ While they became unmistakably convinced of 
their military inferiority, they were determined lest the 
"national honor" be overwhelmed and swept away. Yet, accus­
tomed to the Confucian concept of hierarchy, it was extremely 
difficult for the Japanese to accept their new position in 
international relations.
According to the traditional Confucian system of
2
foreign relations, there were no relations of equality.
The States could be either tribute-offering or tribute- 
receiving ones.^ Considering the Japanese abhorrence of an
^Murdoch, OP. cit.. I, 23.
2
For a fuller discussion of the conduct of foreign 
relations in a Confucian world order, see J. K. Fairbank and 
S. Y. Ting, "On the Ch'ing Tributary System," Harvard Journal 
of Asiatic Studies, Vol. 6 (1941-42), pp. 135-246.
^Ibid., p. 141.
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inferior position in dealing with foreign countries, the 
opening of Japan and the subsequent signing, under duress, of 
the treaties; containing the stigma of inequality, with West-
4
ern powers doubtlessly militated against their national pride.
Obsessed with the national humiliation to which they 
were subjected and fearful of foreign invasion, the Japanese 
toward the Meiji Restoration were dragooned into believing 
that the survival of Japan was contingent upon the drastic 
improvement of their defense posture and the speedy realiza­
tion of national unity. It would serve us well to recall 
that the struggle among Western powers for colonies and 
colonial expansion in Asia was at its height toward the mid-
5
nineteenth century. It was, therefore, quite natural that 
the Japanese feared that the struggle for colonial expansion 
among the Western powers might result in a tragic fate for 
Japan similar to that imposed on China or an outright enslave­
ment of their country.^
The Japanese fear for national independence not only 
rekindled the centuries-old national consciousness in a very 
special way, but also stimulated the latent military tradition. 
"The seeds of modern nationalism," as Yanaga Chitoshi writes, 
"were thus sown with the arrival of Europeans whose colonial
^Konishi, op. cit., pp. 120-23.
^Por a detailed discussion of this period, see Parker 
Thomas Moon, Imperialism and World Politics (New York; The 
Macmillan Co., 1926), esp. 320-26.
^Konishi, op. cit., pp. 103-105.
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7
and expansionist activities came to be known to the Japanese."
Japan's military inferiority in the face of the West­
ern naval squadrons and the existence of "unequal" treaties 
were not only distasteful to the Japanese natinal pride, but
Q
also powerful stimuli for fanning Japanese nationalism. The 
seriousness and extent of the humiliation suffered by the 
Japanese in the quarter century following the Perry visit had 
peculiar claims of sympathy of General U, S. Grant during 
his visit to Japan in 1879. The general was so shocked by the 
inuustice of Western powers in the Far East as to utter the 
following words:
Nothing has been of more interest to me than the study 
of the growth of European and foreign influence in Asia.
. ... I have seen things that made my blood boil, in 
the way the European powers attempt to degrade the Asia­
tic nations. I would not believe such a policy possible. 
It seems to have no other aim than the extinction of 
the independence of the Asiatic nations. . . .  I feel 
so about Japan and China. It seems incredible that 
rights which at home we regard as essential to our inde­
pendence and to our national existence, which no Euro­
pean nation, no matter how small, would surrender, are 
denied to China and Japan.9
Given the fear, as expressed by the former President
7
Yanaga, on. cit., p. 27.
^Yanaga Chitoshi contends that modern Japanese nation­
alism was a product of Japanese mysticism and modern Western 
nationalisms. Moreover, Japanese nationalism has been spurred 
by international humiliation and economic difficulties. See 
his "Japan: Naitnalism Succeeds and Fails," Current History. 
XIX (August, 1950), 67-52.
Q
John Russell Young, Around the World with General 
Grant (2 Vols.; New York: The American News Co., 1879), II, 
543-44.
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of the United States, that Japan, like China, might be 
carved up as the victim of Western imperialism, it needs 
no great imagination to fathom the Japanese national feeling 
about their political situation at the time. In order to 
understand the Japanese national psychology of the times, we 
have to project this humiliation resulted from the military 
inferiority against their national pride surrounding the Em­
peror. The significance in the Japanese nation of the rela­
tionship between the Emperor and his subjects warrants 
quotation at length:
The office (of the Mikado) is the highest known devel­
opment of the royal quality. Other sovereigns reign 
because of the divine right, the grace of God. The 
Mikado reigns because he is divine— not alone because 
his office is sacred, but that he is sacred himself, 
destined when he passes away to become one of the im­
mortal gods. In all the changes that have befallen 
Japan the reverence that surrounds the throne has never 
abated. When the tycoons reigned, holding the sword 
and the purse— absolute masters of Japan— a word from 
the secluded monarch of Kiyoto, who had never seen 
the sun shine beyond the walls of his castle, was 
sufficient to undo them. At his bidding the Tycoon 
resigned an empire. When the Emperor commanded, the 
feudal princes . . . surrendered rank, honor, heritage, 
and emolument. . . . The priests, the noblemen, the army, 
all obeyed his command because they regarded it as a 
command from heaven. Even the people, conversative as 
the Oriental mind naturally is, and proud of the 
traditions of an ancient civilization, changed in a day, 
and never questioned the change, because it was the will 
of the Emperor. No internal commotion or external 
pressure has affected the legend that makes holy the 
imperial person. The revolutions have never been ag­
ainst the Mikado, only against his officers, while the 
treaties made with the Tycoons never had any value in 
the eyes of the Japanese until they had been confirmed 
by the sacred will.10
l°Ibid., pp. 566-67.
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The above observation made by John Russell Young 
accompanying General Grant in 1879 at least suggests the 
dignity and influence which the Emperor commanded in Japan 
culturally, emotionally, socially, and politically. Defiant 
of Japan's degraded status, the Japanese political leaders, 
armed with the awe-inspiring influence of the Emperor, the 
people's traditional obedience to the government, the in­
creasingly strong national consciousness, and the single- 
minded national passion for improving Japan's military 
strength, embarked upon the epochal task of creating a proud 
and strong nation so as to "stand tall in the world" and "at­
tain equality with nations abroad.
Reforms and changes were forcefully and calculatingly 
undertaken either to strengthen Japan militarily and industri­
ally or to impress the Western world with an eye on the revi­
sion of the unequal treaties. While Japan was adopting and 
refining Western technology, she introduced a national con­
script army and a national education system, and made improve­
ments in communucations and transportation. All of these 
measures were solely directed at national aggrandizement and 
unity.
Maruyama Masao, Thought and Behaviour in Modern 
Japanese Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 
p. 142.
12For a good account of the relationship between the 
Meiji policies and Japanese nationalism, see E. Herbert 
Norman, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State (New York: In­
stitute of Pacific Relations, 1940), pp. 185-209.
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Of particular importance is that the new system
of national education was made to be a means of serving the 
13State. Because the Japanese sincerely believed the slogan,
14the so-called "Eastern morality and Western Arts," even 
during the hectic years of Westernization and modernization 
following the Restoration, the political leaders relied on 
"moral" education for achieving greater national unity, 
eliciting political loyalties, and instilling patrioticism.
The utmost emphasis put on moral training in loyalty 
and filial piety was demonstrated in the Memorandum for Elem­
entary School Teachers of June, 1881. Article 1 of the 
Memorandum reads :
In order to guide people, make them good, give them 
wide knowledge, and to do this wisely, teachers must 
particularly stress moral education to their pupils. 
Loyalty to the Imperial House, love of country, filial 
piety toward parents, respect for superiors, faith in 
friends, charity toward inferiors, and respect for one­
self constitute the great path of human morality.
The teacher must himself be a model of these virtues 
in his daily life, and must endeavor to stimulate his 
pupils along the path of v i r t u e . 15
The Explanation of School Matters of 1891 stated 
that the "first objective" of education was "the spirit of 
the reverence for the Emperor and patrioticism (Sonno Aikoku), 
See Kyoiku-Shi Hensankai, ed., Meiii Iko Kvoiku Seido Hatta- 
tsu-Shi (History of the Development of the Post-Meiji Educa­
tional System) (Tokyo; Ryüjin Sha, 1938), III, 131-32.
^^Irokawa Daikichi, Nihon no Rekishi, Vol. XXI: Kin- 
dai Kokka no Shuppatsu (A History of Japan^ Vol. XXI: The 
Beginning of the Modern State) (Tokyo: Chü5 Koronsha, 1966), 
p. 45.
15Mombusho, Gakusei 80-Nen Shi (A History of Eighty 
Years of the School System) (Tokyo: Okura-sho Insatsukyoku, 
1954), pp. 844-45.
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That we can deduce from the above emphasis on morals 
is that the Japanese political leaders were solely intent on 
rapid modernization and industrialization "without the risk 
of social upheaval which might attend the attempts to extend 
the democratic method in a nation which had emerged so sud­
denly and so tardily from feudal isolation.Proper under­
standing of the political history of modern Japan is almost 
out of the question without appreciating the role which the 
state-controlled education played in making the Japanese 
obedient subjects, hammering away at foreign threats, sharpen­
ing national consciousness, and indoctrinating the Japanese
about Japan's "national mission." Japan’s national mission
17had a host of implications.
In short, it embraced the strengthening of Japan
to meet the West on its own terms, Japan's expansion for the
sake of Pan-Asianism as opposed to Western imperialism, and
eventually the realization of Japan's "Divine Mission," based
on the elements of Japanes tradition, to rule the entire 
18world. Be that as it may, the political situation amid 
foreign threats in the mid-nineteenth century provided Japan 
a twisted justification that her national honor could be
^^Norman, op. cit., p. 102.
17For a fuller discussion of the effects of educa­
tion on the Japanese, see Kyoiku-shi Hensankai, op. cit.
18Mary Estes Lieberman, "Okawa Shumei and Japan's 
'Divine Mission,'" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University 
of California, 1956), Introduction.
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restored through aggressive expansionism in Asia by imitating
19the predatory methods of Western powers. The Japanese
believed that their success in expansionist policies would
not only enhance their national prestige in the eyes of the
20world, but also solve their economic problems.
Japan's hunger for national honor, the smallness
of her land, her population pressure, the pausity of natural
resources and raw materials for their industries, and the
need for overseas markets to sell her manufactured goods
contributed in a large measure to the justification of her
21expansion abroad. Viewed in a slightly different sense,
since the Japanese are known to be concerned with a sense of
22"shame" rather than that of "guilt" and they are accustomed 
to the identification of morality with power, the only thing 
that seemed to have mattered to them in international power
19Maruyama, Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese 
Politics, p. 18.
20In his study of Japanese nationalism, Hilary Conroy 
has discovered that the nature of Japanese nationalism could 
not be treated apart from Japan's economic insecurity and 
expansionism. See his "Japanese Nationalism and Expansionism," 
American Historical Review. LX, No. 4 (July, 1955), 818-29.
E. Herbert Norman has given a good account of the impact of 
industrialization on Japan. See his op. cit.. esp. pp. 104- 
135.
21Pukutake Tadashi, Nihon no Shakai (Japanese Society) 
(Tokyo: Yoshobo, 1952), p. 15.
22For a good study on the primacy of "shame" in Ja­
panese life, see Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the 
Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Co., 1946). Also see Edwin O. Reischauer, The United States 
and Japan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), 
pp. 142-77.
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politics during the heyday of imperialism and colonialism was
23either to conquer or to be conquered.
As already touched upon, the history of Japan had
not been innocent of expansionist policies. Yoshida Shoin
(1831-1860), for example, was already advocating Japan's
expansionism at the time of the Perry expedition. He preached
to the effect that exapnsion was the health of the State and
called for a course of conquest which included not only Korea
24and Formosa, but also the Philippines and Manchuria.
It can only be explained in terms of the callous
logic of imperialism that Japan launched into a career of
expansionism against neighboring countries in less than two
decades after her humiliation at the hands of Americans in
1853-1854. Japan's imitation of gunboat diplomacy against
Formosa and Korea in the 1870's was the bona-fide beginning
25of Japan's expansionism. Korea was subjected to humiliation 
at the hands of Japan in the same way in 1876 as the latter 
had been subjected to humiliation at the hands of the Americans
23Moruyama, Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese 
Politics, p. 140.
24 Delmer Brown, op. cit.. p. 75.
25  —Japan's exploitation of the Unyo incident in the
course of compelling Korea into signing the treaty of 1876 
belies Japan's assertion of noble aims and attitudes toward 
Korea. A Japanese writer recently declared that the Unyo 
incident had resulted from a deliberate Japanese scheme to 
intimidate Korea with a show of naval power. Thus it is 
evident that the Japanese provocation was responsible for 
the incident. See Yamabe Kentaro, Nikkan Heiqo Shoshi (A 
Short History of Japan's Annexation of Korea) (Tokyo: 
Yuhikaku, 1966), pp. 22-27.
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a little more than two decades earlier. Japan began to
2 g
practice the "transfer of oppression," by "Perryizing" her 
neighbor Korea. The 1876 Treaty of Kanghwa compelled Korea
to open up three ports and grant Japan extraterritorial
. ., 27privileges.
Japan's initial success in expansive policies led 
her to the notion that the prideful future of Japan would 
result from the sufficient military strength needed for expan­
sionism and the people's moral armament to rally behind the 
national goals. That the national education was to play a 
crucial role in mobilizing Japanese national will hardly needs 
illustration. A speech to Saitama Normal School delivered by 
a high-ranking Japanese official in February, 1885 illustrates 
the point very well. In part, it reads:
Our country (Japan) . . . must move from its third- 
class position to second-class, and from second- 
class to first; and ultimately to the leading position 
among all countries of the world. The best way to do 
this is (by laying) the foundation of elementary educa­
tion. ^ 8
In discussing the psychology of the Japanese, Maru- 
yama contends cogently that, due to the hierarchical nature 
of Japanese society, the Japanese tend to transfer the oppres­
sion coming from above in a downward direction in inter-per­
sonal relations. This "transfer of oppression" among indivi­
duals was extended to the international plane. As Maruyama 
writes, "as soon as the country (Japan) was unified it used 
its new strength to stage a small-scale imitation of Western 
imperialism. Just as Japan was subject to pressure from the 
Great Powers, so she would apply pressure to still weaker 
countries— a clear case of the transfer psychology." See 
his Thought and Behaviour, p. 18.
27Harold W. Sunoo, Korea: A Political History in 
Modern Times (Seoul: Kon-Kuk University Press, 1970), Ch. 10.
^®Karasawa Tomitaro, Nihon Kyoiku-Shi (History of
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What the above implied was that Japan, being keenly
99
sensitive to their international image,” indulged in national 
aggrandizement, by changing whatever stood in the way to the 
development of a respected, industrial, and strong Japan and 
by instilling a stronger national consciousness in the Japan­
ese people by dint of national education.
The characteristics of Japanese national consciousness 
took on a special significance in the wake of Japan's victory 
in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. The Japanese began to
attach for the first time in their national history "greatness"
31in addition to "uniqueness" to their country. The victory
Japanese Education) (Tokyo: Seibundo Shinko Sha, 1962), p. 231.
29A noted scholar of comparative culture, Kawabara 
Takeo, attributes the Japanese sensitivity concerning their 
international image to the historical fact that Japan was a 
late-starter in modernization and a late-comer in the imperial­
ist race. For a fuller exposition, see his "Nihonjin no Umda- 
shita Mono" (Things the Japanese Have Created), in Nihonhin 
to wa Nanika (What Does It Mean to Be Japanese), eds. lijima 
Soichi and Sabata Toyoyuki (Tokyo: Nihon Keijai Shinbunsha,
1973).
^^The promulgation of the Imperial Rescript on Educa­
tion on October 30, 1890 was the s,ingle most important document 
that framed education to serve the state. For the entire text 
of the Rescript, see Daniel C. Hotom, "The Political Philosophy 
of Modern Shinto: A Study of the State Religion of Japan,"
The Asiatic Society of Japan. Vol. XLIX— Part II (1922), p. 72.
31It took the victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 
1894-1895 for Japan at long last to begin to draw the respect 
of the Western World. With the victory she distinguished her­
self from the other nations in Asia by casting off the stigma 
of extraterritoriality that had been profoundly repugnant to 
her national feeling for four decades. For a fuller discussion, 
see Oka Yoshitake, Kindai Nihon Shisoshi Koza, Vol. VIII: Koku- 
minteki Dokuritsu to Kokka Risei (Studies on the History of 
Modern Japanese Thought, Vol. VIII: National Independence and
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in the war meant the end to Japan's lingering inferiority 
complex toward China, the beginning of Japan's new image as 
a World Power, and the first major overt step toward a career 
of insatiable "precaution-nationalism" and "prestige-nation- 
alism.
Japan harbored no illusion concerning the hard real­
ities of international power politics that one nation's hu-
33miliation meant another nation's honor. In the words of
Jean Jacques Rousseau, "Nations have all a kind of centrifugal
force by which they act continually against each other, and
tend, like the vorticies of Descartes, to aggrandize themselves
34at the expense of their neighbors."
the Reason of the State) (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 1961), pp. 
19-25.
32Max Sylvius Handman classified nationalism into 
four types: oppression nationalism; "irrendentism;" precau­
tion nationalism; and prestige-nationalism. See his op. cit., 
104-21. In discussing the career of Japanese imperialism, 
one American scholar considers the "prestige" aspect a very 
weighty factor. Robert T. Pollard, "Dynamics of Japanese 
Imperialism," Pacific Historical Review, VIII, No. 1 (March, 
1939), esp. 28-35.
The vitality of national honor in international 
politics is fully treated in Leo Perla, What is National Honor 
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1918). The vicious cycle of 
national honor and humiliation finds characteristic descrip­
tion in Arnold J. Toynbee, Nationality and the War (London:
J. M. Dent & Sons, 1915), p. 4:
If we beat Germany and then humiliate her, she will 
never rest til she has "redeemed her honour," by 
humiliating us more cruelly in turn. Instead of being 
free to return to our own pressing business, we shall 
have to be constantly on the watch against her.
^^Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (New 
York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1947), p. 70.
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Japan's unprecedented jubiliation over the conclusion 
of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which formally ended the Sino- 
Japanese War, was frustrated six days later by a sudden and 
cruel turn of events-— in the form of the so-called "Triple 
Intervention." The Triple Intervention was as much humiliat­
ing and galling to the Japanese national pride as the Perry 
arrival had been four decades e a r l i e r . T h e  humiliated Ja­
panese were conditioned to further sharpen their national con­
sciousness and came to value the gospel of national power with 
greater seriousness. As E. Herbert Norman describes the im­
pact of the Triple Intervention on Japanese national conscious­
ness :
The national consciousness (of the Japanese) which 
had been forced into existence by events surrounding 
the Restoration, matured in the heated struggle for 
treaty revision, was to be strengthened a hundred-fold 
by the famous Triple Intervention, of April 23, 1895.36
Despite the humiliating setback dictated by the Triple 
Intervention, Japan achieved what she had set out to do through 
the war with China. Japan's smashing victory over China placed 
her alongside the other great expansionist powers of the world. 
The Western world was rudely awakened to the fact that Japan 
became a power to be reckoned with. Among others, one by-
For a good discussion of the. Japanese identity and 
national pride in this period, see Kenneth B. Pyle, The New 
Generation in Meiii Japan; Problems of Cultural Identity, 1885- 
1895 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), esp. pp. 
163-87.
3 6Norman, on. cit., pp. 199-200.
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product of the Triple Intervention was that the Japanese 
people once more came to be fully convinced that their na­
tional dignity was in direct proportion to their national 
strength. That the securing of a status of equality with 
Western Powers was a national obsession was sufficiently il­
lustrated by the following passages.
We (Japanese) must remember that we are fighting 
(this war with China) before the whole world. Why 
do some Japanese say we fight in order to reform 
Korea, or to vanquish Peking, or to establish a huge 
indemnity? They should realize that we are fighting 
to determine once and for all Japan's position in the 
world. . . .  If our country achieves a brilliant vic­
tory, all previous misconceptions will be dispelled.
The true nature of our country and of our national 
character will suddenly emerge like the sun breaking 
through a dense fog.37
The heightened status of Japan, after the Sino-Ja­
panese War and Russia's undisguised grandiose ambitions in 
the Far East following the Triple Intervention pandered to 
a further aggravation of inveterate mutual mistrust between 
Japan and R u s s i a . T h o u g h  "Japan was humbled to the dust"^^
07
Pyle, OP. cit., p. 73.
O Q
Even as early as 1797, in making note of the Russian 
menace from the north, Ohara Kokingo stated:
The foreign threat is not a menace to a single clan, 
but is a threat to the entire body of the clans. It 
is, thus, necessary for us (Japanese) to try our utmost 
efforts to work out plans to defend ourselves together.
Ohara Kokingo, "Hokuchi Kigen" (Warnings from the North).
Quoted in Maruyama, Nihon Seiii Shisoshi Kenkvu. p. 340.
39Asada Keiichi, Expenditures of the Sino-Japanese 
War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1922), p. 33.
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by the Triple Intervention, Russia could not fail to duly 
appreciate Japan's growing military power and her expan­
sionist ambitions. In the words of Sergyey Yulievichi Witte 
who engineered the Triple Intervention:
We (the Russians) cannot allow Japan to sink her root 
deep into the Chinese continent and to possess an area 
like the Liaotung Peninsula which would seal the fate of 
Peking in certain circumstances. Based on this conclu­
sion, I have proposed the necessity of preventing the 
effectuation of the new treaty concluded between Japan
and China.40
No event in the immediate post-Triple Intervention 
years incensed the Japanese and aroused Japanese national con­
sciousness more than the Convention of March 27, 1898, by 
which Russia leased from China the southern tip of the Liaotung 
Peninsula— the very same peninsula that Russia, Germany, 
and France had compelled Japan to retrocede to China on the 
pretext that Japan's occupation of continental territory would 
be prejudicial to the peace of the Orient. The reaction of 
the Japanese to Russia's aggressive moves in China finds a 
representative expression in the following words:
Japan believed (in 1894) that the peace of the East 
could not be maintained unless the independence of Korea 
were secured, and she did not shrink from war to attain 
that end. Russia now occupies the place that China held 
in 1894, and the China of today is the Korea of that 
time. . . . Whatever reasons existed to fight China 
in 1894 exist with incomparably greater force to fight 
Russia today. There is no excuse, no palliation, for 
Russia's conduct in Manchuria. To look back upon the
40Quoted in Kajima Morinosuke, The Emergence of Japan 
As a World Power, 1895-1925 (Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. 
Tuttle Co., 1968), p. 25.
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events that are occurring now must make every Japanese 
thrill with indignation. If ever there was a time when 
the country should assert itself, now is the time.41
Russia's shrewd and ingenious means of aggrandizement 
at the expense of Japan not only re-taught the Japanese that 
there national honor and interests would be maintained and 
further enhanced only through the medium of a stronger mili­
tary strength, but also led the Japanese to claimor for a war 
with R u s s i a . T h e  elimination of extraterritoriality in the 
summer of 1899 marked a momentous watershed in the development 
of Japanese national consciousness. This achievement of 
"complete self-determination among the nations of the world" 
indeed inflated the Japanese national pride, on the one hand, 
and egged the Japanese on to harbor gashin-shotan'^  ^ (struggling 
against difficulties for the sake of vengeance) against the 
Western powers, in particular, against Russia which kept 
adding insults to Japan's injury, on the other.
Keenly realizing that her smashing victory over the 
disgraced China, which had been mercilessly humiliated in the
^^Quoted in Delmer Brown, on. cit.. p. 135.
^^Hara Keiichiro, ed., Hara Kei Nikki (Diary of Kara 
Kei) (9 Vols; Tokyo: Kenkensha, 1950-1951), II sequel, 142.
^^Holtom, "The Political Philosophy of Modern Shinto,
p. 30.
44Sumiya Mikio, Nihon no Rekishi, Vol. XXII: Dai 
Nippon Teikoku no Shiron (A History of Japan, Vol. XXII: The 
Crucible of Imperial Japan) (Tokyo: Chüô Koronsha, 1966), 
p. 321.
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Opium War more than half a century earlier, failed to extract 
from the West such a coveted respect that would measure up 
to her "national honor" and "the danger of playing the imper­
ial game single-handed against older and more experienced 
opponents, Japan assiduously pursued policies^^ that
47eventually culminated in the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902. 
This alliance with the most powerful Empire at the time clear­
ly bolstered Japan's national prestige internationally, on 
the one hand, and provided Japan greater confidence in dealing 
with Russia's aggressive activities in the Far East.
Japan's timely alliance of convenience w i t h  England 
for the sake of long-range strategic objectives and national 
interests and R u s s i a 's unabated exploitation in Korea and
Manchuria made a w ar between these two ambitious powers in- 
48
evitable. Simultaneously with the progress of scrupulous
Charles Nelson Spinks, "The Background of the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance," Pacific Historical Review, VIII,
No. 3 (September, 1939), 322.
^^Japan's policies of moderation during, and imme­
diately after, the Boxer Rebellion sufficiently suggest that 
Japan was keenly interested in insinuating herself into a fa­
vorable international opinion to enhance her national image 
and to facilitate her expansionist goals in due time. See, 
for example, Paul A. Varg, "The Foreign Policy of Japan and 
the Boxer Revolt," Pacific Historical Review, XV, No. 3 
(September, 1946), 279-285.
47That the Japanese behavior during the Boxer Re­
bellion was so highly judged occasioned a Western writer to 
state that it falsified 'the theory of the Yellow Peril."
See Herbert Paul, "The New Alliance," The Nineteenth Centurv 
and After, October, 1905, p. 522.
48For excellent and exhaustive treatments of various 
reasons and factors which were responsible for the inevitability
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diplomacy took place a dramatic increase in Japan's military 
strength. As the following table indicates, the strength 
of the Japanese armies had been doubled in the crucial decade.
TABLE 1
Comparative Fiaures of Japanese 49Armies
Before Sino-Japanese 
War of 1894-1895
Before Russo-Japanese 
War of 1904-1905
Generals 36 94
Higher Officers 
and Officers 4,235 8,480
Petty Officers 8,970 11,865
Trained Men 65,241 132,348
Untrained Men 185,000 425,000
Army Divisions 7 13
By the same token, the increase in Japan's naval 
forces for the same period had been even more impressive, 
as may be inferred from Table 2, following.
When the two competing nations failed to resolve 
differences through diplomatic negotiation, the long-antici-
of confrontation, contrast Asakawa Kanichi, The Russo- 
Japanese Conflict: Its Causes and Issues (Boston and New 
York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1904), esp. pp. 1-64 with Payson 
J. Treat, "The Cause of the Sino-Japanese War, 1894," Paci­
fic Historical Review, VIII, No. 2 (June, 1939), 149-57.
49William M. McGovern, Modern Japan: Its Political, 
Military, and Industrial Organization (New York: Scribner, 
1920), p. 176.
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TABLE 2
Comparative Fiaures of Japanese Naval Forces^^
Before Sino-Japanese 
War of 1894-1895
Before Russo-Japanese 
War of 1904-1905
Battleships 1 6
Armored Cruisers 4 8
Cruisers 7 20
Light Cruisers 9 9
Destroyers 0 19
Motor Torpedo Boats 24 85
pated armed conflict flared up. Japan's incredible victory
over such a Western Power as Russia made the whole world
wonder and marvel at the transformation of Japan which had
51taken place since the Perry visit in 1853. While the victory
^^Robert P. Porter, Japan; The Rise of a Modern 
Power (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1918), pp. 319-20.
^^Admiration for Japan's accomplishments in such a 
brief period of time finds a characteristic expression in 
the following words:
There is nothing in human history more astonishing 
than the swiftness and success with which, in the 
course of a very few years, Japan discarded the forms 
of an ancient and admirable civilization under which 
she had lived contentedly for many centuries and by an 
extraordinary effort of national will adopted, and 
adapted to her ovn needs, a totally different system.
Ramsey Muir, A Short History of the British Commonwealth,
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52over China made Japan merely "a minor power" which could 
not be ignored any longer, the victory over Russia established 
Japan as a full-fledged major military and political power 
in the world. Since Japan's dazzling victory against Russia 
was so momentous in terms of stimulating further Japanese 
national consciousness and enhancing Japan's international 
ranking, we should present some illustrations.
Immediately prior to the beginning of the Russo- 
Japanese War,
Nicholas the Second was so firmly convinced of it 
(Russia's victory) that he hesitated to make war on 
Japan, lest he should compromise the dignity of his 
"great" Empire by the easiest conquest of so small a 
State.53
It was obvious that the Russians, with the contempt bred of 
valor and vodka, thought that they could easily crush the ab­
surd impertinence of the yellow islanders. They failed, 
however, to realize that the yellow islanders could die 
but could not fail, for the Japanese religion was well-nigh 
inseparable from patriotism. "Patriotism and religion," as
Vol. II; The Modern Commonwealth (1763-1919) (New York:
World Book Co., 1923), p. 617.
52Spinks, OP. cit.. 317. Also Hugh Borton, in this 
connection, writes as follows: "In 1895 Japan was largely an
unknown quantity. Despite its victory over China, it was 
still considered by the Western powers as a backward, semi- 
feudal, inferior country." Borton, op. cit., p. 272.
53Herbert Paul, "Liberals and Foreign policy," The 
Nineteenth Centurv and After, November, 1905, p. 863.
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a Westerner has written, "has been so often at variance that 
country whose religion is patriotism has an obvious advan­
tage.
Japan's smashing military victories against Russia 
turned the latter's prewar arrogance into a humiliating em- 
barassment. General Staessel's last report to the Czar, dated 
January 1, 1905, a day before he surrendered at Port Arthur 
to General Nogi, contains the following passages:
We shall be obliged to capitulate, but everything is 
in the hands of God. We have suffered fearful losses. 
Great sovereign, pardon us. We have done everything 
humanly possible. Judge us, but be merciful. Nearly 
eleven months of uninterrupted struggles have exhausted 
us. Only one-quarter of the garrison is alive, and of 
this number the majority are sick, and, being obliged 
to act on the defensive without even short intervals for 
repose, are worn to s h a d o w s . 5 5
It is worth contrasting the distressing war situation
on the part of a divided Russia,which was devoid of pa- 
57triotism, with the self-sacrificing patriotism of a strongly 
united Japan. The Japanese soldiers went to the war, stern.
^^Herbert Paul, "The New Alliance," The Nineteenth 
Centurv and After, October, 1905, p. 523.
^^Quoted in "The Surrender of Port Arthur," The Inde­
pendent . January 12, 1905, p. 63.
^^For a convenient glimpse of Russia's political 
situation at that time, see Catherine Breschkovsky, "The 
Internal Condition of Russia," The Independent, January 5, 
1905, pp. 12-16.
57That the pitiful history of autocratic Russia had 
been incapable of fostering patriotism in the Russian people 
is well discussed by Joseph Conrad, "Autocracy and War," North 
American Review. CLXXXI, No. 584 (July, 1905), 33-55.
75
devoted, ready to die if their death might serve their coun­
try and enable her to maintain her independence and achieve 
her destiny. True to the spirit of Bushido, they valued 
their life little in comparison with their sense of duty to 
their Empire and its Mikado. It does appear that they were 
fully convinced that their victorious death would be the 
glory of Japan. Japanese contempt for death was well demon­
strated by General Nogi when he described the death of both 
his sons in the war:
One of my sons gave his life at Hanshan and the other 
at 203-Meter Hill. Both of these positions were of 
the greatest importance to the Japanese army. I am 
glad that the sacrifice of my sons' lives was in the 
capture of such important positions, as I feel the 
sacrifices were not made in vain. Their lives were 
nothing compared to the objects sought.5°
We are by no means stretching the fact too far when
we state taht Japan's dazzling victories over China and Russia
were largely attributable to the spiritual force which was
the manifestation of patriotism and loyalty of the Japanese 
59people. While the victory over China was a partial real­
ization of Japan's ambition, the victory over Russia was the 
consummation of his ambition. The sudden rise of Japan to a 
foremost place among the major powers of the world added anew 
a special meaning to her national consciousness. Prior to
^^"The Surrender of Port Arthur," op. cit., p. 63.
^^Cf. Okuma Shigenobu, "Japanese Problems," North 
American Review, CLXXX, No. 579 (January, 1905), 161-165.
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the Russo-Japanese War, Japan was popularly supposed to be
inferior in blood and energy to her great European opponent.
Japan's startling triumph over Russia did naturally issue in
a greater national pride of the Japanese and the revival of
Western concern about the Yellow Peril.
To be sure, the successful extension and broadening
of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, signed on August 12, 1905^^
was a second major diplomatic victory for Japan, which was
indicative of Japan's heightened international prestige. No
sooner had Japan attained her two most important diplomatic
62objectives— "equality and security" — than she launched 
into her long-awaited aggressive expansionism. Having properly
Even before the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese 
War, Western observers sounded warnings with amazing accuracy 
as to the Japanese menace to the Western Powers;
Whatever be the issue of the war, there is now a new 
factor in politics, and as the Pacific is probably the 
battlefield of the future, in half a century Japan may 
be a serious menace to Germany, to America, or even to 
Great Britain herself.
"Musings Without Method," Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, 
October, 1904, p. 569.
^^The Treaty of 1902 was limited and specific in 
scope, whereas the revised Treaty of 1905 was much wider and 
more comprehensive. In effect, the new Alliance acknowledged 
the sacrifice of Korean independence and condoned the Japan­
ese ambition for expansion. See British and Foreign State 
Papers, 1904-1905, p. 137; Chang Chung-fu, The Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1931), pp. 204-205; Walter Wallace McLaren, A Political 
History of Japan Purina the Meiii Era, 1867-1912 (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1916), 311-313.
62 _Viscount Ishii Kikujiro, "The Permanent Bases of
Japanese Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, XI, No. 2 (Jan­
uary, 1933), 220.
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disposed of her main rivals in the Far East, Japan embarked 
upon the policy of extinguishing Korea as a Sovereign State. 
As Walter W. McLaren explains:
. . . the policy of guaranteeing the independence of 
Korea initiated by Japan in 1885, in which she was fol­
lowed by the Western Powers, was devised for the purpose 
of securing the safety of that State until Japan was 
prepared to carry out her design of absorption. Both 
the time and the circumstances seemed ripe in 1905, 
and Japan moved in the direction of her ambitions.
Great Britain's acquiescence in the Japanese policy 
had been assured by the Treaty of Alliance in 1905, 
while that of the United States was plainly signified 
by the withdrawal of her diplomatic representative in
Seoul.63
What the above tells us is that the treaties between 
nations, like young girls, only last while they last. This 
logic of international power politics at the time led a 
Japanese writer to state bluntly: "It is always safe to count 
upon your own strength than to depend on the sense of justice, 
humanity, and responsibility of your a l l i e s . J a p a n ,  emerg­
ing as the predominant Power of the Far East in the wake of 
the war against Russia, had gained universal admiration for 
her rapid learning of Western civilization and her military 
strength. Partly out of the Russophobia of the major Powers, 
in particular, of the Anglo-Saxon World, Japan's emergence 
as the predominant Power in East Asia for one reason or anoth­
er succeeded in beguiling the unwary Western Powers into
^^McLaren, op. cit., p. 113.
^^Adachi Kinnosuke, "Probable Japanese Terms of 
Peace," North American Review, CLXXX, No. 582 (May, 1905), 686.
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believing that Japan would be an ideal countervailing force 
against Russia's expansive ambitions.
Japan's smashing military victories over China and 
Russia transformed Japanese nationalism from a fearful type 
to a confident t y p e . T h e  national consciousness of the 
Japanese people following the victory against Russia took on 
a new characteristic redolent of blinding national pride and 
condescension. Unburdened no longer by the fear for Western 
encroachment and interference, the growing feeling of national 
pride and confidence bred a sense of national mission which 
Japan felt obliged to carry out for the sake of the Asiatic 
peoples. As Paul S. Reinsch wrote in 1905:
With the last decade (1895-1905) there has dawned upon
That Japan was preferred to Russia as the ambi­
tious power in the Far East was no secret at the time. For 
example, see Herbert Paul, "The New Alliance," p. 523:
There is, of course, no danger of Japan taking Russia's 
place as a center of Asiatic disturbance. But as a 
rival power to Russia and a triumphant rival, she be­
comes a force in Asiatic politics which cannot be 
ignored.
President Theodore Roosevelt's favorable attitude toward Japan 
west so far as to wish that Japan would provide a balance 
of power in the Far East. Simeon Strunsky, "Theodore Roosevelt 
and the Prelude to 1914," Foreign Affairs. IV, No. 1 (October, 
1925), p. 149:
. . .  he (Roosevelt) had callously consented to the 
destruction of Korean independence. . . .there is little 
doubt that he had no sympathy to spare for a people in­
capable of defending its own liberties. If the possession 
of Korea was necessary to keep Japan satisfied and main­
tain peace in the Far East, sentimentality should not 
be allowed to stand in the way.
^^Delmer Brown, op. cit., p. 147.
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the Japanese mind an influence far transcending any 
former national experiences, — the feeling of a sacred 
mission by which the Island Nation is called to act as 
the guardian of Asiatic civilization, to summon the 
peoples of Asia to a realization of their unity, and 
to defend the ideals and treasures of Asiatic life ^_
against ruthless destruction through foreign invasion.
68This self-assigned sacred mission of Japan was
expanded even to include the notion that it behooved Japan to
play the leadership role in the "Moral World," by making a
unique contribution to civilization. It appeared that the
blinding national pride rendered the Japanese capable of
almost unbelievable national self-delusion. They apparently
believed that their country was destined to play a bridging-
69function to unite the Eastern and Western ideals. The 
Japanese experience seems to lend validity to the argument 
that "the sensitiveness and intensity of a nation's honor in­
creases directly with a recognition of its relative military
strength, and inversely with the consciousness of the strength
70of an opposing military power."
^^Paul S. Reinsch, "Japan and Asiatic Leadership," 
North American Review, CLXXX, No. 578 (January, 1905), 48.
68The sacred mission entertained by the Japanese 
may be likened to Britain's "White Man's Burden," America's 
"Manifest Destiny," France's "Civilizing Mission," and Bel­
gium's "Civilizing Action."
^^Watanabe Kunio, "Tozai Bummei no Shokusetsu-chi" 
(The_Connection Point of Eastern and Western Cultures),
Taiyo, January, 1905, reviewed in Japan Weekly Mail. January 
28, 1905.
7 0Perla, o p . cit., p. 125. Also contrast, in this 
regard, J. H. Defrost, "The Japan of 1904," The Independent, 
January 19, 1905, pp. 131-138 with Colonel the Earl of Erroll,
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Highly intoxicated in a tide of patriotism and
national pride after 1905 and steeped in taking advantage
of the political situation favorable to her aggrandizement,
Japan began to reveal the true nature of her imperialistic
designs in the Far East. Her progressive domination of Korea,
culminating in the annexation of the latter in 1910, and
the flagrancy of her exploitation in Manchuria and China soon
disabused other nations of Japan's limitless ambition for ex- 
71pension. Western nations' belated realization and distrust
of Japan's true intention and the former's demural at the
letter's aggressive policies were too impractical and in-
72effective to stem "the march of events" in the Far East.
"The Nation and the Army," The Nineteenth Centurv and After. 
LIX, No. 349 (March, 1906), 429-34.
71Japan, which was admired and respected in 1905 for 
her military prowess and her swift conversion to Western 
civilization, was subject to suspicion and distrust in 1910, 
evoking the panicky fear of a "Yellow Peril." For a good 
contrast, see Sydney Brooks, "Some Results of the War," North 
American Review, CLXXXI, No. 587 (October, 1905), p. 595:
The "yellow peril," as the Kaiser figures it, must 
always remain a mere nightmare; but that Japan will 
seek to rouse and harness the vast potential energy 
of China, to organize her resources and to shape her 
policy, seems not only natural, but necessary.
Congressional Record, XLVI, February 20, 1911, pp. 2989-2990:
We are short on providing equilibrium in the Atlantic 
and we have not a single battleship in the Pacific and 
our relative naval strength is steadily declining.
War is therefore a physical certainty. . . . Japan has 
been the one nation in the world with acuteness and 
ability to finance a war before it comes. Japan is 
hard up now, because the war is already financed.
7 2U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of 
the United States, 1915, pp. 134-37.
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Japan was agreeably surprised to find that the
immediate effect of her demonstration of military prowess
was to make herself both courted and feared. Since the
Japanese were not foolish in reading history or in observing
international politics, they fully "realized that however far
toward social perfection in the individual relations the
Western nations may have progressed, in international rela-
73tions the law of the jungle still holds good."
Having savored the usufruct of comparative military 
power in international politics and wallowed in the enhanced 
national pride following the military victories against China 
and Russia, the Japanese apparently came to the conclusion 
that they had to play the game in Far Eastern politics as 
her Western rivals were playing it.^^ By imitating the West­
ern precedents of power politics against her Asian neighbors 
Japan brought down on her the ill will and distrust not only 
of Korea, China, and the Wester powers, but also of a host 
of Asian peoples. Indeed, Japan, which in 1905 seemed to be 
the champion of Asia against Western encroachments in Asia,
came to be feared as an exponent of as selfish a policy as
75
the Western powers had ever attempted.
73
James Francis Abbott, Japanese Expansion and Amer­
ican Policies (New York; The Macmillan Company, 1916), p. 41.
”^ ^For example, see Kawai Kazuo, "Anglo-German Rivalry 
in the Yangtze Region, 1895-1902," Pacific Historical R e v i e w , 
VIII, No. 4 (December, 1939), 413-33.
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McLaren, op. c i t ., p. 315.
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Of course, Japan was intent on defending her aggress­
ive policies by pointing out the vital interests which she 
had in Korea and China, so near at hand, while the Western 
powers had only indirect interests in these regions. It 
seemed to be the contention of Japan that the security of 
no Western power would be jeopardized if Korea fell under 
foreign control or China was carved up among the great powers. 
The fact remained that the ascendance of Japan to the rank of 
the great powers by dint of military success and expansive 
policies further sharpened the centuries-old national con­
sciousness, on the one hand, and occasioned Japan to share with
- S ' " '
Russia the unenviable reputation of being a disturber of the
76peace in East Asia.
Emboldened by her military strength and by the ab­
sence of direct interference with her expansion on the
7 6That both Japan and Russia were to be distrusted 
and feared following the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese 
War by most peoples could be explained by the weakness of 
China and Korea and by the historical ambitions of Russia 
and Japan. We should not that the generally pro-Japanese 
attitutdes that prevailed during the Russo-Japanese War lay 
more in the antipathy against Russia than in the favorable 
position of Japan. No passage could represent this opinion 
better than that by Theodore Roosevelt:
While Russia's triumph would have been a blow to 
civilization, her destruction as an eastern Asiatic 
power would also in my opinion be unfortunate. It 
is best that she should be left face to face with Japan 
so that each may have a moderating action on the 
other.
See Henry Cabot Lodge, ed.. Selections from the Correspondence 
of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918 (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925), II, 153.
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77continent, Japan persistently pursued her ambitious
policies to become an unquestioned predominant power in the
Far East. For nearly a decade after 1905, Japan was free
from the fear of aggressive acts by foreign powers, enjoying
a national consciousness based on confidence and experiencing
one of the most remarkable periods of economic growth in her 
78history. This prideful period naturally led the Japanese 
to broach upon, and delve into, such Japanese nationalistic 
subjects as Bushido^^ and Kokutai®® in order to justify
77A thinly veiled acquiescence in Japanese Monroe 
Doctrine was implied when President Theodore Roosevelt went 
so far as to state that Japan had
a paramount interest in what surrounds the Yellow Sea, 
just as the United States has a paramount interest in 
what surrounds the Caribbean; but with, I hoped, no more 
desire for conquest of the weak than we have shown our­
selves to have in Cuba, and no more desire for a trucu­
lent attitude towards the strong than with reference to 
the English . . . (Roosevelt was inclined to believe 
that there was no) danger of Japan's becoming intoxi­
cated with the victory.
Stephen Gwynn, ed., The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil 
Spring Rice; A Record (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1929), I, 
417.
78For a detailed discussion of the economic growth 
of this period, see William W- Lockwood, The Economic Devel­
opment of Japan (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 
1954), pp. 18-37.
7Q
Alfred Stead, a Western war correspondent during 
the Russo-Japanese War, cogently called the Bushido the soul 
of Japan. He attributed the remarkable fighting spirit and 
discipline of the Japanese soldiers to Bushido. For_a mean­
ingful discussion of the relationship between Bushido and 
Japanese national efficiency, see his article, "The Soul of 
a Nation," The Times (London), October 4, 1904, p. 6.
80Kokutai had been such a symbolic and all-embracing
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Japan's "uniqueness" and greatness.
The prideful Japanese national consciousness was
further stimulated by the heightening national prestige in
the world and by the expansion of influence in the Far East
81during the First World War. Indeed, Japan's ambition to
become a full-fledged great power was at last realized when
Japan, as an ally of England, the United States, and France,
8 2emerged triumphant from the First World War.
While Japan's successive military victories and her
expanding influence in world politics catapulted her into the
ranks of the great powers, her fulsome ambition for expansion
did not fail to elicit suspicion and distrust from most of the 
83nations. Since political leaders in Japan believed that 
the Western powers were in no position to resist or interfere 
in Japan's expansive designs in East Asia during the First 
World War, they were determined to take maximum advantage of 
the political situation favorable for Japan's exploitation.
A memorandum presented on November 29, 1914 by the Black
political concept in Japan until 1945 that it will be dealt 
with at some length shortly.
PI
Hara Keiichiro, ed., Hara Kei Nikki (Diary of Hara 
Kei) (9 Vols., Tokyo; Kengensha, 1950-1951), VI, 175.
ft o
Ibid., VIII, 80.
83The fulsomeness of Japan's aggrandizement was most 
vividly revealed in the case of the ill-fated "Twenty-one De­
mands." The English translations of the original texts of 
the "Twenty-One Demands" are found in U. S., Department of 
State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915, pp. 160- 
51.
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Dragon Society advocating the solution of the Chinese ques­
tion may be said to be representative of the Japanese na­
tionalistic mood of the time. The memorandum reads in part;
. . . whether or not the Imperial Japanese Government 
can settle the Far Eastern Question and bring to reali­
zation our great Imperial policy depends on our being 
able to skillfully avail ourselves of the world's gener­
al trend of affairs so as to extend our influence and 
decide upon a course of action towards China which shall 
be practical in execution. . . . Now is the most oppor­
tune moment for Japan quickly to solve the Chinese 
question. Such an opportunity will not occur for hun­
dreds of years to come. Not only is it Japan's divine 
duty to act now, but present conditions in China favor 
the execution of such a plan. We should by all means 
decide and act at once. If our authorities do not avail 
themselves of this rare opportunity, great difficulty 
will surely be encountered in the future in the settle­
ment of the Chinese question. Japan will be isolated 
from the European Powers after the war and will be re­
garded by them with envy and jealousy, just as Germany is 
now regarded. Is it now, then, a vital necessity for 
Japan to solve at this very moment the Chinese Question?
The nature of Japanese nationalism for the period 
from 1905 to 1918 was markedly different from that that had 
preceded the end of the Russo-Japanese War and even from that 
that followed the end of thé First World War. Japanese 
nationalism of this period took on a proud and confident type. 
Superficial treatment of this period, however, could go so far 
as to contend that the Japanese were interested more in demo­
cratic ideals and internationalism than in Japanese nationalism.
Nevertheless, "nationalism," as Delmer Brown writes, "was
8 5stronger than it would at first appear to be."
fi4Ibid.. pp. 133-34.
85Delmer Brown, op. cit.. p. 169? for a detailed
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That Japan felt no immediate threat to her national 
security perhaps for the first time in her national history 
during the period from 1905 to 1918 does by no means imply 
that she relaxed her concern about essential factors that 
affected her national security, interests, and honor. Even 
as early as August, 1914, immediately after the outbreak of 
the First World War, Yamagata Arimoto believed that it was an 
age of racial conflicts. He opined that, after the cessation 
of hostilities in Europe, there would be a confrontation be­
tween white races and colored races in the East. Should such 
a situation occur it would be necessary for Japan to win the 
confidence of China to jointly cope with Western powers—  
the theme of a coalition on a racial basis was to prevail in 
countering the Western challenge.
As Yamagata presciently observed, no sooner had 
Japan attained her long-coveted great power status than she 
was confronted with other powers' distrust and jealousy. Also 
particularly disturbing following the end of World War I was 
the gloomy aspect of her national economy in contrast to the 
wartime-economic boom, as depicted in the following table.
The galling humiliation to which Japan was still
description of Japan's unflagging interest in national aggrand­
izement rather than international cooperation immediately be­
fore and after the end of World War I, see Hara Kei Nikki,
VIII, 62-118.
86Oka Yoshitake, Nihon Kindaishi Taikei, V: Tenkanki 
no TaishS. 1914-1924 (An Outline of Modern History of Japan, V: 
The Turning Point of Taisho, 1914-1924) (Tokyo; Tokyo Daigaku 
Shuppankai, 1969), pp. 27-28.
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TABLE 3
Growth of Trade of Japan With Foreign Countries,
R7Korea, and Formosa, 1885-1938
Annual Averace Imports Exports Balance of Trade
1885-1889 47 55 +8
1890-1894 84 86 +2
1895-1899 206 163 -43
1900-1904 308 274 -34
1905-1909 468 413 -55
1910-1914 650 606 -44
1915-1919 1,423 1,663 +240
1920-1924 2,440 1,915 -525
1925-1929 2,849 2,494 -355
1930-1934 2,212 2, 058 -154
1935-1938 3,868 3,772 -96
subjected even after her meteoric rise to the rank of world's
great powers was the question of racial discrimination. 88 The
87Lockwood, OP. cit., p. 313.
8 8That the racial question was a serious political 
issue even after the end of World War I is clearly manifested 
by the fact that it was repeatedly dealt with by Japanese 
political leaders. See, for example, Hara Kei Nikki, VIII, 
175, 181-82, 186, 204; also see in this connection, Raymond
88
89mixture of national ambition, national frustration, and 
economic difficulties was largely responsible for ultra­
nationalism, military risks and commitments which ultimately 
led Japan down the path of Pearl Uarbof and subsequent dis­
aster in 1945.
In the following, we will examine such powerful con­
cepts as Shintoism, Kokutai, and "Thought-Control" to come 
to grips with the political measures which were used by the 
government to intensify patriotism and extract unquestioning, 
subservient loyalties from the Japanese people.
Leslie Buell, "The Development of the Anti-Japanese Agitation 
in the United States," Political Science Quarterly, XXXVII,
No. 4 (December, 1922), 605-38.
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After the war Japan was ruefully aware of the real­
ity that "the world was to be ruled by the influence of 
England and America," compelling Japan to pursue her ambition 
250^ sufferance of Western powers. Kara Kei Nikki. VIII,
CHAPTER IV 
FORTIFICATION OF NATIONALISM: SHINTOISM
Shinto (the Way of the G o d s ) , or Kami-no-Michi, 
is the religious belief indigenous to the land of Japan.^ 
It consists mainly of nature worship, containing no theo­
logical doctrines. There was some spirit of ancestor w o r ­
ship which was apparently the result of early Confucian
influence, though the tradition of ancestor worship is be-
2
lieved to have existed in Japan itself. The medieval
-X 3Shinto is characterized as "Ryobu-Shinto" (Two-Sided S h i n t o ) ,
For a good treatment of the origin and the meaning 
of the term Kamino Michi, see Kume Kunitake, Nihon Kodai Shi 
to Shinto no Kankei (The Relations of Ancient Japanese 
History and Shinto)(Tokyo: Kodokan, 1907), esp. pp. 1-18;
Dr. Holtom has argued in his article "The Meaning of Kami" 
that the Japanese concept of Kami and the Maori word Mana 
have the same meaning— namely, that the power or influence 
which is not physical, but often manifests itself in a phys­
ical force. In Maori Mana means "authority," "prestige," 
"supernatural power," "efficiency," etc. See D. C. Holtom, 
"The Meaning of Kami," Monumenta Nipponica, III, No. 1 (1960), 
pp. 1-^ 27; II,' No. 2, pp. 32-33; IV, No. 2 (1941), pp. 25-68.
2
For a detailed discussion of Japanese ancestor wor­
ship, see, R. J. Kirby, "Ancestral Worship in Japan," Trans­
actions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, Vol. XXXVIII— Part 
IV (1911), 233-67.
_ ^D. C. Holtom, "The Political Philosophy of Modern
Shinto: A Study of the State Religion of Japan," Transactions 
of the Asiatic Society of Japan, Vol. 3fLIX— Part II (1922), 8.
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because of its alliance with the elements of Buddhism. The 
Shinto of the early modern period bears the stamp of Confucian 
influence as well as the reactions to it/* The Shinto for 
about two centuries prior to the Meiji Restoration in 1868 
is the revival of old ShintS. This period of Japanese Re­
naissance of old Shinto merits particular attention in that 
this movement marks "the beginning of the development of 
national consciousness."^
The Japanese interest in rediscovering the old Shinto 
was so significant as to merit the laborious treatment of no 
less a scholar than Sir Ernest M. Satow. As the beginning 
passage of his study read:
By 'pure Shinto' is meant the religious belief of the 
Japanese people previous to the introduction of Buddhism 
and the Confucian philosophy into Japan, and by its re­
vival the attempt which a modern school of writers has 
made to eliminate these extraneous influences, and to 
present Shinto in its original form. The very name of 
Shinto is repudiated by this school, on the ground that 
the word was never applied to the ancient religious 
belief until the introduction of Buddhism and Confucian­
ism rendered its employment necessary for the sake of 
distinction, and the argument that, because this belief 
is called by a Chinese name, it must therefore be of 
Chinese origin, is of no value whatsoever.6
The Shinto that had been refurbished by the awakening
For a good discussion of the Confucian influence in 
Japan, see Walter Dening, "Confucian Philosophy in Japan," 
Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, Vol. XXXVI— Part 
II (1908), 101-52.
^Holtom, O P . cit.. 9.
^Satow, "The Revival of Pure Shin-Tau," p. 1.
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of modern Japanese national consciousness came to be strongly 
combined with Japanese nationalism after 1868. Since it is 
both unnecessary and beyond the scope of this study to dwell 
upon the details of the historical development of Shinto, we 
will deal with only those aspects of Shinto that have been
7
responsible for the "distinct" Japanese national consciousness, 
political loyalties and patriotism, and the extreme nature 
of Japanese nationalism until 1945.
Sinto in Support of the Japanese State
Meiji Japan adopted Shinto as the State religion to
p
make it "an engine of government." Political leaders of 
post-Restoration Japan stimulated nationalism skillfully and 
forcefully in order to centralize the national power, to 
bring about the national unity needed for rapid modernization 
and to strengthen national defense against foreign encroach­
ments. It may be said that Japanese nationalism was a compound 
of Shinto, Emperor worship and B u s h i d o As already touched
7
A prominent Japanese depicted the distinctness of 
Germany and Japan in the wake of the end of World War I in the 
following words; "There are two self-intoxicated nations in 
the world, Germany and Japan." Quoted in Kagawa Toyohiko, 
Christ and Japan (New York: Friendship Press, 1934), p. 43.
®Cabot Coville, "Shinto, Engine of Government," Trans­
actions of the Asiatic Society of Japan. Third Series, Vol. I 
(December, 1948), 4.
^Alfred Stead went so far as to call Bushido "the 
soul of Japan." See his "The Soul of a Nation," The Times 
(London), October 4, 1904, p. 6; for a detailed account of 
Bushido, see Nitobe Inazo, Bushido, the Soul of Japan (New 
York: Putnam, 1905); for a recent treatment, see Kurt Singer,
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upon briefly, Bushido had existed in Japan for centuries, 
instilling in, and demanding of, the Japanese such qualities 
as self-sacrifice, discipline, loyalty, and obedience which 
were regarded by government leaders as ideal moral principles 
for the Japanese people as a whole during the period of 
modernization and national aggrandizement which began with 
the Meiji Restoration, and lasted until 1945.
Indeed, from the Restoration of 1868 until the defeat 
in 1945 did the State Shinto provide government leaders the 
ideological weapon with which to keep the Japanese people 
under control and to elicit unquestioning loyalties. According 
to the ideology of the State Shinto, the Japanese people 
existed to serve the State and to do what they were told.^®
The leaders of the Restoration movement, made up of mainly 
Confucian samurai and Shinto nationalists, were fully con­
vinced of the necessity of inventing a new religion in order to 
strengthen the authority of the Emperor and his regime. As 
early as February 10, 1868, the Meiji government issued an 
order which called for the formation of seven departments of 
government, of which the Jingikan, the Department of Shinto,
was given the highest position. This constituted the so-
11
called Saisei-ich, the unity of worship and government."
Mirror. Sword and Jewel: A Study of Japanese Characteristics 
(New York: George Braziller, 1973), pp. 149-68.
^^Kato Genchi, A Study of Shinto: The Religion of the 
Japanese Nation (London: Curzon Press, 1971), pp. 206-208.
^^Holton, OP. cit.. pp. 11-12.
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What the Department of Shinto emphasized most was the
—  12unity of education and the central ideas of Shinto. The 
Department of Shinto was intent on the suppression of Buddhism 
and the prohibition of Christianity. The Meiji government 
established Senkvoshi (The Office of Propagandists) to pro­
claim the political significance of the revived Shinto to the 
nation. In the first month of 1870, the Emperor issued a 
rescript specifying the relationship of Shinto to the Japanese 
State and the intentions of the government in that respect.
The rescript was of such political import as to merit quota­
tion at some length:
We solemnly announce: The Heavenly Deities and the
Great Ancestors (Amaterasu-Omikami) established the 
throne and made the succession sure. The line of Em­
perors, following one after the other, entered into 
possession thereof and transmitted the same and the 
innumerable subjects were of a single mind. Government 
and Education were made clear, above, and the manners of 
the people were beautiful, below. Beginning with the 
Middle Ages, however, there were sometimes seasons of 
decay and sometimes of progress. Sometimes the Way 
was plain, sometimes, darkened, and the period in which 
government and education failed to flourish was long.
But now, in the cycle of fate, (all this) is reformed. 
Government and education must be made plain that the 
Great Way of faith in the kami may be propagated. 
Accordingly, we newly appoint propagandists to proclaim 
this to the nation. Do you our subjects keep this 
commandment in mind.13
The rescript signaled a political suppression of Buddhism,
1 2
Yoshii Yoshiaki, Jinia Seido no Kenkvo (A Study of 
the Shrine System)(Tokyo: Kodokan, 1935), p. 358.
^^D. C. Holtom, The National Faith of Japan: A Study 
in Modern Shinto (London: Kegan, Paul, 1938), p. 55.
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for it was an alien religion and had flourished under the
aegis of the Tokugawa Shogunate. Buddhists were expelled
from the Ryobo Shinto shrines. Legislation was initiated by
the politically-minded Shintoists stipulating that the Buddhists
priests attached to the Shinto shrines should immediately give
up their offices and that all shrines should forego the use of
14Buddhist images as Shintai. Moreover, Buddhist decorations, 
scriptures, and statues were forcibly removed. At times things 
Buddhist were indiscriminately destroyed. In the extreme cases, 
they were even set on fire together with temples.
The problem encountered in the course of abolishing 
things Buddhist or persecuting Buddhists lay in the fact 
that the faith of the overwhelming majority of the Japanese 
was in the Meiji period, as it is tody, an inseparable mixture 
of elements drawn without distinction from both Shinto and 
Buddhism. It did not take long for those in power to realize 
that the forcible government attempt to separate Shinto from 
Buddhism was producing an unwholesome wound in the very vitals 
of national life.^^
Slowly the government was perforce led to relax its
^^Objects of worship, housed in Shinto shrines, in 
which the Kami were believed to dwell.
^^When it became clear that the movement for the 
separation of Shinto and Buddhism made headway, anti-Buddhists 
were on a burning and destruction spree against all traces of 
Buddhism, persecuting Buddhist priests andjmonks. See Kono 
Shozo, Jingishi Gaivo (An Outline of Shinto History)(Tokyo: 
Morie Shoten, 1927), p. 147.
l^ibid., pp. 148-49.
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anti-Buddhist policy. The Department of Religion (Kyobusho)
was established to control the affairs of both Buddhism and
Shinto on April 21, 1872, supplanting the controversial
— 17Department of Shinto. Under the new organization, both 
Shinto and Buddhist priests came to be called Kyodo Shoku 
(Teachers of Religion and Morals), who were to carry out 
public instruction. The official doctrine of this new system 
was called the "Great Teaching" (Dai-kyo) instead of Shinto 
or Buddhism. The underlying principles of the Great Teaching 
are formulated as follows:
"1. It should embody the principles of reverence for the 
gods and love of country.
2. It should make clear the Truth of Heaven and the Way 
of Humanity.
3. It should lead people to respect the Emperor and be 
obedient to his will."18
In an attempt to foster the principles of the Great 
Teaching, the government established a so-called Dai Kvoin 
(Great Institute of Instruction) in Tokyo, and the subordinate 
institutes called Chü Kvoin (the Intermediate Institutes of 
Instruction) in the rural districts. These institutes, in 
effect, were to further the ideas of Shinto shrines in which 
the four great Kami— the Sun-goddess and the three Great 
Deities of Creation— were worshipped. Priests of both Buddhism 
and Shinto were instructed to combine their efforts in teaching 
and preaching and overlook their private beliefs. The govern-
1 7Holtom, The National Faith of Japan, p. 59.
1 RQuoted in Ibid., p. 60.
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merit's ambition, however, was soon to be frustrated, for the
underlying principles of the Great Teaching, being no more than
the ideals of Shinto nationalism, clearly militated against
the Buddhist priests. In 1877, the Department of Religion
itself was abolished and legal control of Shinto and Buddhism
was provided for by establishing anew a bureau of Shrines and
19Temples in the Department of Home Affairs.
Failures in religious policies convinced the political
leaders that the question of national unity under the Imperial
Family could only be successfully worked out by the Shrine
Shinto. There is no denying, however, that, despite the
difficulties involved in religious policies. Shrine Shinto,
from the Restoration until 1875 when the Higher Institute of
Instruction was abolished, functioned largely as a national 
20cult in Japan.
The shifting religious policies in the first decade
after the Restoration indicate the new government's dogged
interest in making the best use of Shinto to bring about
national unification, on the one hand, and the intractable
problem involved in creating a political ideology out of a
religious belief that as been inextricably intertwined with the
21whole fabric of national life from time immemorial.
l^Ibid.. pp. 61-62.
Ibid., pp. 63-65.
^^How the all-embracing Shinto is to the national 
life of Japan is neatly depicted by Professor Kakehi; "To
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Determined to work out a dominating conception that 
would silence the political agitation by the liberal-minded, 
that would be in outward conformity with the political ideas 
of the civilized Western nations, and that would put Japan in a 
place of leadership, conservative government leaders searched 
for a constitutional framework which would facilitate the 
pressing tasks of national unification and speedy moderniza­
tion. In Mary, 1882, the Emperor ordered Ito Hirobuni to lead 
a mission of investigation to Europe to study and observe the 
various systems of government. The end-result of the mission's
22investigation was reinforcing of Ito's conservative convictions.
In addition to attending a series of lectures by 
Rudolph Gneist, Lorenz von Stein, and Albert Mosse, Ito had 
a meaningful conversation with Otto von Bismarck. Bismarck's 
political advice to Ito and the latter's whole-hearted accept­
ance thereof were to pave the way for Japan in the direction 
of Shintoism-Emperorism and military adventurism. Bismarck 
advised Ito to the effect that Japan should revive those 
elements of Shinto that exalt the authority and divinity 
of the Emperor. Ito was further impressed by the counsel that
understand Shinto is to gain insight into Japan and the inner­
most life of the Japanese; for under no circumstances may 
Shinto be ignored by them, for such would be tantamount to 
denying their national existence." Quoted in Taid O'Conroy,
The Menace of Japan (New York: H. C. Kinsey, 1934), p. 70.
22For a critical analysis of Ito's political convic­
tions influenced in no small way by Hermann Roesler, see 
Johannes Siemes, Hermann Roesler and the Making of the Meiji 
State (Tokyo: Sophia University, 1958), esp. pp. 9-14; also see 
Borton, op. cit., pp. 155-58.
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the mighty problems of the age would not be solved by speeches
and resolutions of majorities, but by blood and iron. The
iron Chancellor and German political philosophers reminded
Ito with emphasis that the Japanese nation enjoyed a great
advantage over Germany. The tradition that the Emperor of
Japan was divine was two thousand years old and only needed
to be revived. Ito and his associates returned home in August,
1883 with the conviction that "emperor-worship be made the
23foundation of the Japanese Empire."
Thus, the conservative political leaders, taking
advantage of ages-old Shinto, embarked upon "The Invention
of a New Religion" to lay an emotional foundation stone for
24the necessary reverence and obedience. The conservative
oligarchy attempted to do this by making the Emperor the
focal figure of ShintS. Forced to be not unmindful of the fact
that the freedom of faith existed in a civilized nation, the
Meiji oligarchy was compelled to do something with Shinto so
as to impress the world that the Japanese also enjoyed the
freedom of faith, on the one hand, and to make the Japanese
25honor the ancestors of the Emperor.
O O
Quoted in Douglas G. Haring, Blood on the Rising Sun 
(Philadelphia: Macrae Smith Co., 1943), p. 18.
^^How the Meiji oligarchy maneuvered to bring about 
a new religion in support of the State is cogently described 
by Basil H. Chamberlain who resided in Japan in those years 
of change. See his The Invention of a New Religion (London: 
Watts & Co., 1912).
^^Ariga Nagao, "Shinto Kokkyo Ron," Tetsugaku Zasshi, 
XXV, No. 280 (June, 1910), p. 702.
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As a means to kill two birds with one stone, the 
government divided Shinto institutions, Jinja (Shinto-Shrines) 
and Shinto Kyokai (Shinto-Churches). All Shinto bodies class­
ified under the latter division were separated from direct
relationship with the state and were obliged to depend upon
26private initiative for organization and support.
The main points of difference between the two divisions 
of Shinto can be seen as follows; First, Shinto churches, 
or Sect Shinto, is mainly concerned with the faith and acti­
vities of historical founders whereas Shinto Shrines, or 
State Shinto, is intent on perpetuating the authentic, tradi­
tional beliefs and rituals of the Japanese people, and declares 
that it has spontaneously developed in national life without 
the help of individual historical founders. Second, Sect 
Shinto is engaged in definite religious propaganda through 
religious preachers and teachers. It conducts such religious 
services as exhortation, prayer, and ritualistic adoration.
State Shinto, on the other hand, is engaged in celebrating 
ceremonies and festivals deemed suitable to the fostering of 
national consciousness or for the exaltation of national 
characteristics. Third, State Shinto is under the control 
of a special Bureau of Shrines in the Department of Home Af-. 
fairs, while Sect Shinto is controlled, together with other 
organized religions, by the Bureau of Religions in the Department
23-24.
^^Holtom, "The Political Philosophy of Modern Shinto,"
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27of Education.
Despite the official separation of State Shinto from
Sect Shinto, we note that there is one conspicuous point of
identity between the Shinto of the state and that of the people.
It is that the Kami of Sect Shinto and those of State Shinto
28are for the most part identical. Nevertheless, the govern­
ment pursued a high-handed policy in the separation of State 
Shinto and Sect Shinto, arguing that State ShintS was not a 
religion, but a system of national ceremonies and urging the
people to take part in these ceremonies as loyal subjects and
29out of reverence for the Imperial ancestors.
On February 11, 1889, the government proclaimed the 
Constitution of the Empire of Japan, which reaffirmed the 
position of State ShintS. Article I reads
The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed 
by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal.
And Article II reads;
The Emperor is sacred and inviolable.
The chief architect of the Meiji Constitution, Ito
27 Holtom, The National Faith of Japan, pp. 68-69.
^^Ibid.. p. 69.
Z^lbid., pp. 70-71.
^^George M. Beckmann, The Making of the Meiii Consti- 
tuion: The Oligarchy and the Constitutional Development of Japan, 
1868-1891 (Lawrence Kansas: University of Kansas Publications, 
1957), p. 151.
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Hirobuni, explained the Emperor system as the state religion in 
the following words:
When politics are committed to the blind councils of 
the people without an axis, they lose their control and 
the nation will become decadent. In Europe, since the 
institution of constitutional governments more than a 
thousand years ago, this form of government was not 
only familiar to the people, but also there was a reli­
gion as "an axis" which had penetrated into the minds 
of the people. In our country, however, religions are 
very weak and insignificant in terms of their influence. 
Thus none of them could be the "national axis." Buddhism 
once had a strong influence, but now this influence is 
waning. Shinto, ableit it is based on the teachings of 
our ancestors, cannot guide the minds of the people as 
a religion. Therefore, the only center of the Japanese 
nation is the Imperial Family. From this point of view 
most emphasis was placed on reverence for the Imperial 
House when the draft of the Constitution was made . . .31
The passage just quoted clearly indicates the intention 
of the oligarch: to make Emperiorism a state religion. But, 
the makers of the Meiji Constitution were so skillful in their 
wording that the Japanese people were given the freedom of 
religious belief and deprived of it simultaneously. As 
Article XXVIII of the Constitution reads:
Japanese subjects shall, within limits not prejudicial 
to peace and order, and not antagonistic to their duties 
as subjects, enjoy freedom of religious belief.32
The crux of the matter was that the participation in 
many of the rites of State Shinto, in particular, for school
31Quoted in Sumiya Mikio, Kindai Nihon no Keisei to 
Kirisutokvo (Formation of Modern Japan and Christianity) (Tokyo: 
Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1961), pp. 109-110.
32Beckmann, op. cit., p. 152.
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children, was interpreted as their duties as subjects. In 
effect, religious freedom was permitted only on condition that 
any Japanese subject had to be loyal to the Emperor on the 
basis of the Shinto faith.
33The promulgation of the Imperial Rescript on Education 
on October 30, 1890 was very important for strengthening the 
position of State Shinto. The Rescript had been the most im­
portant, all-embracing political justification to cope with
the rising tide of the utilitarian, even anti-moralistic,
34tendencies, and the blind exaltation of individualism, to
cultivate national morality, and to make the entire system of
— 35education subservient to the nationalistic values of Shinto.
As Sir George B. Sansom writes with cogency on the purpose of 
a Japanese university,
. . . the purpose of a university is to teach the arts 
and sciences essential to the state, and the educational 
system is conceived throughout not in a spirit of free
33The importance of the Rescript was so enormous 
that Dr. Holtom has written as follows: "The Imperial Rescript
on Education has come to be regarded as a part of condensed 
sacred scripture of the official cult, especially by advocates 
of the Nationalistic-ethical school of Shinto." Holtom, "The 
Political Philosophy of Modern Shinto," p. 77.
^^For a good treatment of the liberalizing trends in 
the first two post-Restoration decades, see Ironkawa, op. cit., 
pp. 109-40.
35The attitudes of the government was well described 
by Mori Arinori, who became the Minister of Education in 1885: 
that the object of Education was not to promote individual 
welfare, but to serve the purpose of the state. "In the 
administration of all schools, it must be kept in mind, what 
is done is not for the sake of the pupils, but for the sake 
of the country." Quoted in Sansom, The Western World and Japan, 
p. 459.
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inquiry but in conformity with strong nationalistic 
principles of a predominantly utilitarian trend.36
The Shinto-nationalists insisted that "national learning" must
be the basis of education and that the Shinto tenets concerning
the nature of the Japanese State should be the articles of
37universal belief.
The Rescript called for a return to national tradition 
and simplicity. It warned the Japanese lest they should go 
astray by Western ideas in moral and political philosophy. It 
stipulated the doctrines of ancestor worship, of duty to the 
State, of filial piety, and of loyalty to superiors as the 
foundations of national life. Its last paragraph claims that 
these doctrines date back to an ancient past and are valid for 
all times and in all places.
The Rescript posed a very delicate political problem 
to the Meiji oligarchy: (1) how to foster through the public
school system those nationalistic values of Shinto that were 
regarded as essential to a moral education; (2) how to make good 
the provision of religious freedom laid down in the Constitution 
so as to prove the existence of a truly modernized government; 
and (3) how to exercise a proper control over religious teaching 
conducted in various educational institutions established and 
operated by religious organizations. The action taken by the
3Gibid.
^^Kono Shozo, Kokumin Dotoku Shiron (History of Japanese 
National Morality)(Tokyo: Morie Shoten, 1933), p. 229.
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government to deal with the problem was to prohibit religious 
teaching in the schools on the one hand, and to claim that the
og
state Shinto was not a religion.
Since the schools were the most fertile ground for 
fostering the so-called national morality, the Rescript was 
solemnly read on the occasion of every school ceremony. Be­
fore reading the Rescript, the portrait of the Emperor was
39unveiled with utmost reverence. Thus, "the new Rescript," 
as Dr. Holtom states, "was to constitute the foundation of Japan­
ese ed u ca t io n.T ana ka  Yoshito, writing toward the end of 
the Meiji era, implied that Shintoism is Emperorism, and vice 
versa.
The Imperial Rescript on Education gives the essential 
elements of Shinto. That is to say, it expresses the 
last testaments of our Imperial Ancestors, which must 
be kept by our people.41
The promulgation of the Meiji Constitution confirmed 
the position of the Emperor as "sacred and inviolable," whereas
38Holtom, The National Faith of Japan, pp. 71-72.
O Q
In April, 1891, the Department of Education issued 
Shoaakku Setsubi Junsoku (Regulations Concerning Primary School 
Equipment), which stipulated that every school should possess a 
copy of the Rescript, the portraits of the Emperor and the Em­
press, and the national flag. See Kyoiku Hensankai, ed., Meiii 
Iko Kvoiku Seido Hattatsu Shi (A History of the Development of 
the Post-Meiji Educational System)(Tokyo: Seishin Shobo, 1964), 
III, 85-87.
p. 75.
41
4D —Holtom, The Political Philosophy of Modern Shinto.
Quoted in ibid., p. 78.
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the Rescript required the complete submission of the subjects
to the Emperor. In effect, loyalty was to be made the highest
42virtue of Emperorism. From its promulgation until 1945, 
the Rescript was the greatest single influence on the minds of 
the Japanese people. It was not only the most important source 
of nationalistic inspiration and the very foundation of national 
education, but also an object of unquestioning worship.
Convinced of the importance of political indoctrination 
early in childhood and of the utility of the educational system 
toward this end, the government exploited the school system 
as an agency for inculcating in the minds of the young definite 
ideas of the nature of the Shinto deities and human obligation 
to them. The scope of political indoctrination can be easily 
fathomed by the expansion of school enrollment, as represented 
in Table 4.
In 1911, Komatsubara Eitaro, the Minister of Education, 
issued orders in the form of naikun (unofficial instructions) 
to the effect that "school teachers should conduct their pupils 
in a body to local shrines and there do obeisance before the 
a l t a r s . T h e  obvious intention of the government was to 
promote Shinto nationalism, by imbibing the Japanese with a 
belief in the Emperor as the living incarnation of the Sungoddess 
and the manifestation of the absolute. Any failure to show due
^^Higashi Pushini no Miya, Koshitsu Shi no Kenkvü (A 
Study of the History of the Imperial House)(Tokyo: Iwanami 
Shoten, 1922), p. 128.
^^Holtom, The National Faith of Japan, p. 73.
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TABLE 4
Primary School Enrollment in Japan, 1880--1910
Year Bovs Girls Total
1880 58.72 21.91 41.06
1885 65.80 32.07 49.62
1890 65.14 31.13 48.93
1895 76.65 43.87 61.24
1900 90.55 71.73 81.48
1905 97.72 93.34 95.62
1910 98.83 97.26 98.14
Source; Government of 
(Tokyo, 1954)
Japan. Mombusho. Gakusei 
, p. 1036.
Hachi iunenshi
reverence for the Emperor or any attempt to question the factual 
basis of Japanese mythology was tantamount to a lack of know­
ledge of the duties and place of the person as a furtunate
44subject of the divine Emperor.
Though there can hardly be any question that the his­
tory of Japanese Imperial mythology was "a mere farrago of
44Reed, op. cit., pp. 48-49.
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childish nonsense,still it served its purpose quite well. 
"Ancient and impressive national beginnings, dim legends of a 
glorious decline from the gods," as Ernest T. Nash writes, 
"became registered in the national conscience through the purely 
political device of falsified historical w r i t i n g s . W e  should 
not, however, lose sight of the political utilitarianism of 
the Japanese imperial divinity. "Historical veracity," as 
Holtom rightly warns, "cannot be permitted to dim the purpose of 
the directors of the national life to use the text (Nihonai)
47
as an inspired revelation to world expansion." It seems 
quite misleading to attribute the Japanese national cult solely 
to the political intention of falsified historical writings. 
Shinto is rather in its origin a mental production of the Japan­
ese people as a whole. This is the reason why it had no parti­
cular founder as in the cases of other religion.
Seeing that Shinto is as old as the Japanese nation 
itself and will last as long as the nation endures, Lafcadio 
Hearn has written on the pervasive influence of Shinto at the 
fundamental level of national life:
. . . the value of a religion, from the sociological
^^W. G. Aston, Shinto: The Ancient Religion of Japan 
(London: Constable & Co., 1921), p. 18.
^^Ernest T. Nash, "Japan's Schizophrenia," Asia Maga­
zine. XLII, No. 9 (March, 1942), p. 527.
^^Daniel C. Holtom, Modern Japan and Shinto National­
ism (Rev. ed.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), pp. 
20-21.
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standpoint, lies in its conservatism. Various writers 
have alleged that the Japanese national religion proved 
itself weak by incapacity to resist the overwhelming in­
fluence of Buddhism. I cannot help thinking that the en­
tire social history of Japan yields proof to the contrary. 
Though Buddhism did for a long period appear to have 
almost entirely absorbed Shinto, by the acknowledgment 
of the Shinto scholars themselves; though Buddhist em­
perors reigned who neglected or despised the cult of their 
ancestors; though Buddhism directed, during ten centuries, 
the education of the nation, Shinto remained all the while 
so very much alive that it was able not only to dispossess 
its rival at last, but to save the country from foreign 
domination. To assert that the Shinto revival signified 
no more than a stroke of policy imagined by a group of 
statesmen, is to ignore all the antecedents of the 
event. No such change could have been wrought by mere 
decree had not the national sentiment welcomed it.48 
(Emphasis added.)
Seen in this sense, Shinto is much more than an influ­
ence. It is the underlying, pervasive way in which the Japanese 
have taken hold of life at the subconsious level of their 
lives. Dr. Holtom in some sense equates Yamato Damashii with 
the essential quality of ShintS. He writes as follows:
This Yamato Damashii. or national spirit of 
Japan, is no recent and transient achievement. It has 
marked Japanese psychology from most ancient times, 
and thus, deeply embedded in the spiritual depths of 
the race, its unchanging perpetuation throughout the
future is guaranteed.49
Since the Meiji oligarchy was primarily concerned with 
building a strong, respectful Japan and making the Japanese
48
Lafcadio Hearn, Japan: An Attempt at Interpretation
(New York: Grosset & Dunlap Publishers, 1904), pp. 412-413.
p. 80.
^^Holtom, "The Political Philosophy of Modern Shinto,"
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submissive subjects, the school system increasingly became a
medium for teaching the people what to think rather than how
to t h i n k . I n  a sense, the government of Meiji Japan pioneered
the idea of using the educational system for nationalistic
political indoctrination.^^ In classrooms and in army barracks,
Japanese young men were taught to worship the Emperor and to
52glorify Japan's military traditions. Writing about Japan's 
remarkable military victories against China and Russia, Professor 
Tanaka Yoshito attributed the victories to the unique quality 
of the Japanese spirit. He splurged upon the military successes 
as follows:
If Japanese and foreigners are the same, how does it 
happen that in the two great wars of recent times, 
namely in Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese wars, 
countries great in population, wide in area, rich in 
wealth, superior in military equipment, and great in 
number of soldiers— how does it happen that such a 
China and such a Russia went down before a Japan, limited 
in population, small in area, deficient in soldiers 
(from a numerical standpoint) and lacking in wealth?
. . . the result is due to the fact that over and above 
these matters of military equipment, numbers of soldiers, 
population, and area, there exists a unique and special 
something with which these things cannot be compared.
That is to say, in as much as there prevails among the 
people of our nation our characteristic Great Way, in a 
word, because there exists a Great Way unmatched in all 
the world, this result has come forth. In the face of
p. 73.
^^Borton, op. cit., p. 217.
^^Holtom, "The Political Philosophy of Modern Shinto,"
C O
Delmer Brown, op. cit., pp. 97-98; also see "A Policy
for the Unification of the National Faith," Yomiuri Shimbun. 
May 26, 1940.
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this, the strongest country in the world must shrink
back.53
Dr. Holtom enlarged upon the unique nature of Japanese 
characteristics :
Shinto is thus . . . simply the historical manifestation 
of the unique Japanese spirit. ShintS as the Great Way 
of Yamato Damashii underlies Japanese religion, ethics, 
politics, and education. . . . The success which has met 
the widespread propagation of this interpretation may be 
seen in the common experience of finding it repeated 
constantly as the typical school-boy interpretation of 
ShintS,— i.e. the essence of ShintS is in Yamato Damashii; 
its creed is in the Imperial Rescript on Education.54
What the above interpretation implies is that post- 
Restoration conservative leaders had single-mindedly pursued 
policies that would channel all the nationalistic values found 
in all aspects of national life into the stimulation and forti­
fication of ShintS nationalism.^^
Up until the end of the Second World War, the sovereign 
was described as the symbol of the infallibility of the Imperial 
authority. It is by no means stretching the historical evidence 
too far to state that Japan's national narcissism intoxicated 
with military prowess and the intensive political indoctrination 
gave rise to the popular belief that the Emperor was, by divine 
authority, the ruler of the universe. This idea was officially
^^Quoted in Holtom, "The Political Philosophy of Modern 
Shinto," pp. 82-83.
S^ibid.. pp. 83-84.
^^For a fuller treatment of this point, see ibid., pp.
84-98.
Ill
supported by the government and ultimately led to the conviction
that Japan was destined to rule over the entire world.
The self-ordained national mission for expansion was
one thing, and how Japan stood vis-a-vis the other powers of
the West or how she was perceived by other countries, in parti-
57cular by those in the West was quite another. The newly 
heightened international status of Japan toward the end of 
World War I by dint of military victories had not produced the
kind of respectable equality with the Western powers that Japan
58had assiduously tried to achieve. Her ambition for aggrandize 
ment was soon to be frustrated by the widespread and determined
The doctrine of Japan's benevolent destiny, that 
Japan was to expand, by a special divine commission, sover­
eignty and righteousness over ever-expanding territories, was 
propagated under the slogan of the so-called hakko ichi-u 
(The Whole World Under One Roof). For a good elaboration of 
this doctrine, see, D. C. Holtom, Modern Japan and ShintS 
Nationalism (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1947), esp. 
pp. 18-25.
57No less a personage than President Theodore Roosevelt, 
a serious admirer of Japan's military feat, commented on the 
frustrated psychology of the Japanese following the Japanese 
victory against Russia:
She (Japan) is a most formidable military power. Her 
people have peculiar fighting capacity. They are very 
proud, very warlike, very sensitive, and are influenced 
by two contradictory feelings, namely, a great self- 
confidence, both ferocious and conceited, due to their 
victory over the mighty empire of Russia; and a great 
touchiness because they would like to be considered as on 
a full equality with, as one of the brotherhood of 
Occidental nations, and have been bitterly humiliated to 
find that even their allies, the English, and their friends, 
the Americans, won't admit them to association and citi­
zenship.
58The rejection of the Japanese proposal for "racial 
equality" at the Peace Conference in Paris was a telling example
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59opposition. What is more, the favorable economic situation 
which Japan had enjoyed until immediately after the end of 
World War I was thrown into the d o l d r u m s . T h e  war-time 
economic boom of Japan collapsed in March, 1920, as demonstrated 
in Table 5.^ ^
The sluggish economic condition hardly constituted a 
fertile ground for Japan to put into practice the principles 
of fair play, justice, peace, humanitarianism, and internation­
alism which Japan was obliged to accept only in theory, if not 
with tongue in cheek. The debate among Japanese leaders
that Japan's international status based on military prowess 
was incapable of tearing down Occidental_racial prejudice. See, 
Imai Seiichi, Rekishi, Vol. XXIII; Taisho Demokurashii _(A His­
tory of Japan, Vol. XXIII; Taisho Democracy)(Tokyo: Chuo Koron 
Sha, 1966), pp. 193-98; also see, Borton, op. cit.. pp. 328-31.
59The end of the First World War compelled Japan to 
pursue her national interests through a moderate policy of 
cooperation with other powers, setting aside, at least for the 
time being due to the new international situation and the cur­
rency of Wilsonian ideals, the nationalistic policy of playing 
the lone wolf in the Far East, which was responsible for Occi­
dental suspicion, Chinese hostility, and Korean resistance with­
out appreciably enhancing Japanese interests in the region. For 
a fuller understanding of the political situation with which 
Japan was confronted at that time, see Imai, o p . cit., pp. 198-
203; Kara Kei Nikki, VIII, esp. pp. 285-332.
^^Imai, OP. cit.. pp. 246-48; also see G. C. Allen,
The Short Economic History of Modern Japan. 1867-1937 (London: 
Unwin Brothers, Ltd., 1946), pp. 93-94.
^^Lockwood, O P cit., p. 355.
^^The Osaka Mainichi carried an editorial to the effect 
that "the chiming of the clock announcing the arrival of the
year 1919 is the sound of the trumpet initiating a new war, a
peaceful struggle among the nations." Osaka Mainichi, August 2, 
1918; also see, for the early evidence of Japanese attention to 
the Wilsonian principles, Hara Kei Nikki, Vol. VIII (November 13,
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TABLE 5
Trade of Japan 
1903-1934
Proper with Foreign Countries 
(indices: 1910-14 = 100)
Raw Products Manufactured
Annual
Averaae
1903-04
All Industrial Food- Food- 
Classes Materials Stuffs Stuffs
E X P O R T S  
57 75 78 79
Partly Wholly 
Manufactured Manufactured
52 59
1905-09 67 84 75 96 54 67
1910-14 100 100 100 100 100: 100
1915-19 173 103 171 174 136 215
1920-24 138 46 75 99 133 190
1925-29 211 55 99 232 197 316
1930-24 283 41 137, 380 209 450
1934 368 40 158 496 229 620
I M P O R T S
1903-04 73 45 175 131 65 82
1905-09 92 65 111 104 88 160
1910-14 100 100 100 100 100 100
1915-19 119 149 999 91 106 35
1920-24 178 190 208 168 188 102
1925-29 217 253 277 204 226 91
1930-34 229 282 231 90 241 59
1934 245 314 206 69 310 64
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clearly indicated general reluctance to endorse President
Wilson's Fourteen Points in toto. Evidence shows that the
general response of Japanese leaders to Wilson's new approach
was one of disbelief and skepticism, coupled with the cynical
view that the United States was advocating this new approach
to serve her national interest.
The reality of international power politics in contra-
64distinction to the Wilsonian idealism and the manifestation 
of racial prejudice and discrimination in the West^^ were 
hardly an encouragement for the Japanese to stick to their 
reluctantly-accepted internationalist ideas and to give up 
their special sense of "national m i s s i o n . F o r c e d  by the
17, 1918), pp. 80, 86. 
63.Kara Kei Nikki, Vol. VIII, p. 107; the theme advanced 
by Albert Breton seems to lend validity to Japan's skepticism 
of Wilson's new diplomacy. See his, "The Economics of Nation­
alism," Journal of Political Economy, LXXII, No. 4 (August,
1964), 376-86.
^^For a sophisticated treatment of Wilsonian liberal- 
capitalist internationalism, see N. Gordon Levin, Woodrow Wilson 
and World Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968).
^^For a convenient glimpse of anti-Japanese feelings in 
America during this period, see Raymond Leslie Buell, "Develop­
ment of the Anti-Japanese Agitation in the United States," Pol­
itical Science Quarterly, XXXVII, No. 4 (December, 1922), 605- 
38. It is not difficult to imagine how repugnant the anti- 
Japanese racial feelings or policies in the West might have 
been to the Japanese sense of "samurai honor." "The Japanese 
nation is by nature the most ambitious of honour of all orient­
al nations, and will sacrifice life itself to maintain a punc­
tilio." Quoted in Maurice Callis, Land of the Great Stone Image 
(New York: Knopf, 1943), p. 126.
^®For a good discussion of the Japanese reluctance in 
accepting the new morality of .diplomacy based on peace and
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trends of a new era after the war, Japan, on the whole, 
accepted the new emphasis on economism and internationalism 
lest she should antagonize the United States and incur the 
hostility of world public opinion. As Prime Minister Takahashi 
Korekiyo who succeeded Hara Kei after the letter's assassination 
on November 4, 1921, said in his New Year's message of 1922 
that the First World War had issued in "fundamental changes 
in the foreign policies of the great powers." They had recog­
nized the impossibility of plotting expansion by force and the 
need to cooperate with one another to promote justice in inter­
national relations. He went on to state, however, that the 
competition among nations could not be stopped. "Armed compe­
tition has become obsolete, but economic competition is on the 
increase in intensity." The Japanese people must redouble 
their endeavor so as to produce and sell superior merchandise 
at competitive prices. Directing our national endeavors along
this line would be a contribution to the general welfare of
67mankind as well as to happiness and development at home.
This realization of new international imperatives led Japan to
accept the invitation to the Washington Conference. The eulogy
chanted at the end of the Washington Conference, however, was
68not to last very long. Borton writes on the situation of
cooperation, see Yoshino Sakuzo,_^Kokka Seikatsu no Isslin"
(A Renewal of National Life), Chuo Koron, XXXV (January, 1920), 
117-56.
67Tokyo Asahi, January 1, 1922.
^^Many observers believed that the armament race had
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this period so cogently that we may quote a passage:
But the conditions on the continent continued to be 
less assuring. Propinquity, availability of venture 
capital, and readiness to make the most of China's 
endemic political instability were too great temptations 
for Japan's nationalists to withstand. Before they moved 
to secure extension of their rights in China, however, 
they received unexpected support for their policies be­
cause of America's new exclusion law. Whatever success 
the Washington Conference may have achieved in easing 
international tension in the Pacific was soon to the 
dissipated by the effects of this exclusion law.
The contradiction surrounding the Wilsonian idealism 
vis-a-vis the on-going framework of international power poli­
tics, the anti-Japanese racial policies in occidental countries 
that were profoundly repugnant to "Japanese national honor," 
the deterioration of the trade situation, and Japan's preser­
vation instinct that Japan's livelihood was contingent upon 
70expansion. were, in a great measure, accountable for making 
the doctrine of Japan's national mission rear its head again.
come to an end and a new era of economic competition had begun. 
As theold policies had been buried in Washington, the major 
powers were obliged to do away with their particularistic, 
imperialistic principles and instead to promote the interna­
tionalization of economic relations. For a fuller_discussion 
of this point, see Horie Kiichi, "Buryokiteki Kyôsô kara Koku- 
sai Keizaiteki Kyoso e" (From_the_Military Competition to 
the Economic Competition), Chuo Koron, XXXVII, No. 2 (February, 
1922), 20-30.
^^Borton, OP. cit., p. 345.
^^In a brief but meaningful study on the role of Shinto­
ism in Japanese national life, K. Kanokoki argues that Shintoism 
inherently implies expansion. For his fuller argument, see his 
"Shintoism and Its Significance," The Smithsonian Institution, 
Annual Report of 1913, pp. 607-615.
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Since Japan's "national mission" was inseparable from the idea 
of expansion, the argument advanced by K. Kanokoki in 1912 
seems pertinent here:
Shintoism is originally the religion of the "plus"
(more). It was destin d to comprise in itself the 
preservation and expar Ion of national life. As such it 
has its roots deep in dark soil of the instinctive,
constantly-expanding ] £ It grew up with the national 
life. It is a real, t ar: me child of the blood of the 
national life. Herein 1 3S the difference between 
Shintoism and Judaism. The Jewish people were adopted 
by Jahveh (sic), while the Japanese religion grew up 
from the very beginning with the people. Shintoism is 
no accession . . .  If Shinto has any concern at all, it 
is the wellObeing of the nation in general . . . Patriot­
ism is Shintoism's own favorite child. To the Japanese 
patriotism means something more than it does to other 
peoples. Through its association with so many heroic 
and noble deeds and events which took place in the course 
of two millenniums patriotism gains a profound and 
exquisite, in short, a religious but not fanatical, 
significance.71
As if to substantiate the quotation just made, in 
November, 1914, Prime Minister Okuma Shigenobu publicly 
declared that the kernel of international politics laid in 
expansion and hegemony:
Those who are superior will govern those who are inferior. 
I (Okuma) believe that within two or three centuries the 
world will have a few governing countries and others 
will be governed by them and will pay homage to their 
might. We should from now on prepare ourselves to be­
come a governing nation.72
^^Ibid., p. 614.
7 p
Harley MacNair, The Real Conflict Between China and 
Japan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), p. 107.
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What interests us here is not the correctness of 
Okuma's prediction, but the general nature of international 
politics and the imperialistic ambitions held by Japan at that 
time.
No sooner had the high hopes for peace and internation­
al cooperation in the post-Washington Conference world been 
dashed by the realities of the 1920s than Japan reasserted 
her determination for expansion in a less aggressive manner so
as not to become isolated from the rest of the world politically
73
and economically. Mindful of the world-wide popularity of
Wilsonian principles, albeit hypocritical and unrealistic,^^
Japan was obliged to accept the new international morality that
the use of old methods of imperialistic expansion was out of 
75the question. Thus, she decided to substitute economic
for military conquest, financial influence for military domination
73Japan's outward conformity with the Wilsonian prin­
ciples belied her consistent interest in expansion. Japan 
argued in 1922 that her "special interests in China are eternal 
realities, and do not require the recognition of other nations." 
See U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1922, Vol. II, pp. 597-98.
'^ ‘^ When President Woodrow Wilson was reported to be 
reluctant to endorse the proposal of racial equality, he was 
denounced as selfish and hypocritical. This indignant reaction 
even led to a calling for a pan-Asianism. See Watanabe Mino- 
jiro, Koritsuteki Nihon no Koei (The Honor of the Isolated 
Japan)(Osaka: Osaka Mainichi Shimbun Sha, 1921), p. 158.
75
For Japan's efforts in peaceful diplomacy, see Amai 
Seiichi, "Shidehara Gaiko ni okeru Seisaku Kettei" (Policy- 
Making in the Shidehara D i p l o m a c y ) , Nempo Seiiiaaku (1959), pp. 
92-112; idem, Taisho D e m o k u r a s h i i , esp. pp. 193-211.
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and to achieve her national goals under the slogan of friend-
76ship, cooperation and co-prosperity.
Japan's reorientation of foreign policy in line with
the spirit of international peace and cooperation was not borne
out by her actual policies. Her determination for exploitation
77in Manchuria, Inner Mongolia and China had continued unabated.
As the history of modern Japan amply suggests, Japan's expansion 
on the continent on the grounds of economy, security, and 
"national mission" has been taken for granted by her people.
The Japanese argued that their right for expansion was created 
by the fact of "territorial contiguity."
It seems quite pertinent at this point to recall Japan's 
self-serving justifications given in process of producing the 
notorious Lansing-Ishii Agreement. Ishii Kukujiro explained to 
Robert Lansing what Japan meant by her "special interests" in 
China :
76It is worth noting that Japan was committed to 
aggressive policy even in the midst of the postwar Wilsonian 
"liberal-capitalist internationalism" is evidenced by many 
writings: Asada Sadao, "Japan's 'Special Interests' and the 
Washington Conference, 1921-1922," American Historical Review, 
LXVII^ No. 1 (October, 1961), 62-70; Gaimusho, ed. Nihon Gaiks 
Nenpvo Narabi Shuvo Bunsho (Chronology and Major Documents of 
Japanese Foreign Policy) (Tokyo: 1955), II, 91-92; Baba Akira, 
"Dai-Ichihi Shantung Shuppei to Tanaka Gaiko," Aziva Kenkvü,
X, No. 3 (October, 1963), 50-77; Chang Hon Kim, comp.
Ilbon Ui Kuktong Chimnvak Pisa (Secret History of Japan's 
Aggression in the Far East )(Seoul: Seoul Shinmun Sa, 1949); 
Tae Yong Pak, Ilbon Kuktong Chumnvak Pongnogi (Divulgence of 
Japan's Aggression in the Far East)(Seoul: Tongbang Munkwasa 
1960).
77Hugh Borton sees the period between 1919 and 1931 
as "portents of an unquenchable aggressive nationalism." See 
his, OP. cit., p. 339.
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The possession by Japan of special interests in China 
does not work the slightest disadvantage to China. The 
United States has a special interest in the territorial 
integrity of South and Central America, but South and 
Central America do not suffer in any way from it. On 
the contrary, they feel a sense of national security be­
cause of it. Central and South American states ought 
to feel thankful that the United States has this special 
interest in them. Should not China likewise feel happy 
that her territorial integrity is guaranteed by the exist­
ence of Japan's "special interests" in her? After all, 
the objective of our present discussions is the further­
ance of China's security by means of a joint Japanese- 
American declaration.'
We should, of course, take into consideration that this
first-class imperialistic, sophistry, unmistakably smacking of
crocodile tears, was uttered during the consummative years of
Japanese imperialism. What concerns us here is that there has
been a consistent tendency of Japan's inclination for expansion,
though the methods employed for expansion have varied depending
on the prevailing conditions. Throughout the modern period has
the problem of population density in Japan constituted a Japan-
79ese justification for overseas expansion and settlement.
Writing on Japanese colonialism in 1906, Togo Minoru, 
who had studied under Dr. Nitobe Inaz5, stated that it was 
absolutely necessary for Japan to engage in further colonization.
7 8Ishii Kikujiro, Diplomatic Commentaries (Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1936), p. 123.
79The increasing population pressure in modern times, 
especially in the postwar years, was regarded by militant 
nationalists and writers as a rationale for Japan's overseas 
expansion. See, for example, Togo Minoru, Nihon Shokumin Ron 
(A Theory on Japanese Emigration)(Tokyo: Bunbudo, 1906); Ishii 
Ryoichi, Population Pressure and Economic Life in Japan (London:
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He argued that:
Should Japan intend to aggrandize her power, expand 
her race, and become a leading country in the world, it 
is imperative that she seek territories overseas and 
colonize. The acquisition of territories might be 
achieved either through peaceful means or through war.
We should regard war as unavoidable necessities for the 
sake of protecting our r a c e . 80
Due to the currency of Wilsonian idealism, utterance of 
imperialistic language was shunned in the postwar decade. But 
the prolonged postwar economic difficulty tended to deepen the 
conviction that the survival of the Japanese Empire depended
81upon her special interests in Manchuria, Mongolia, and China.
In spite of his alleged principle of nonintervention in the 
affairs of other nations. Prime Minister Hara Kei had the auda­
city to publicly declare, less than two months prior to the 
opening of the Washington Conference (November 21, 1921), 
that Japan, in order to fulfill her national destiny, was en­
titled to what was essential to her economic existence. He
went on to state that no country had the right to compel another
82country to commit national suicide. Japan's insistence on
P. S. King and Sons, 1937); Yoshida Hideo, Kokubo-Kokudogaku 
(A Science of National Defense and Territories)(Tokyo: Daiua- 
mondo Sha, 1942).
®®TÔg5, OP. cit., p. 237.
B^Hara Kei Nikki. IX, 389.
Q O
For a fuller exposition of Hara's political thnking 
in this connection, see his, "Kokyu Heiwa no Senkets-Koan," 
(Essential Prerequisites for Permanent Peace), Gaiko Jiho, XXXIV 
(September, 1921), pp. 32-44.
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her rights and interests in China was further demonstrated when
Japanese Ambassador to Washington, Hanihara Masanao, made clear
to the United States Secretary of State on April 14, 1923 that
Japan's "special interests" in China "exist and will continue
to exist, with or without express recognition embodied in
8 3diplomatic instruments."
The increasingly deteriorating trade situation, the 
84social unrest at home, the humiliation resulting from racial 
policies in the West which impeded Japan's peaceful expansion, 
and the outburst of Chinese nationalism attendant upon the reun­
ification of China in 1928 frustrated Japan's peaceful diplomacy 
which had been forced on her. The failure of the new diplomacy 
dragooned Japan into re-adopting her old aggressive policy 
of continental expansion which had temporarily been overshadowed 
by the postwar rhetoric of internationalism.
The developments of the late 1920s, which demonstrated 
the ever-widening hiatus between image and reality, between 
aspiration and achievement, were sufficient to convince the 
Japanese that international cooperation and peaceful expansion 
were merely possiblities which existed more as a figment of 
the imagination than in reality and that the Wilsonian frame
Q O
U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States. 1922, II, 598.
84For a good brief summary of Japan's social unrest in 
the postwar decade, see Delmer Brown, op. cit., pp. 171-89.
^^Matsuoka Yosuke, Toa Zenkvoku no Dovo (The Trembling 
of the Entire East Asia)(Tokyo; Senshin Sha, 1931), pp. 2ff.
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work of postwar diplomacy had been based upon a wishful thinking
86as detached from reality as Marie Antoinette reputedly was.
Owing to the deepening of the Great Depression and be­
cause of the fact that internationalism inherently militated
— 87against Shinto-nationalism, revelation of the emptiness of
peaceful diplomacy resulted in providing grist to the Japanese 
militaristic-nationalistic mill. As the views advocated by 
militarists and nationalists came to be respected more and more 
in proportion to the devastating effects of the world-wide de­
pression.
By 1931, all indications seemed to suggest that the
Japanese were convinced that aggressive expansion was quite
justified not only in terms of satisfying national economic
needs but also in terms of fulfilling their national mission
based on Shintoism-Emperorism, spreading the benefits of the
8 B"divine country" throughout the world.
Seeing the futility involved in the slogan of interna­
tional cooperation. Pitman B- Potter argued that men's thoughts 
and sentiments had not caught up with the changes in conditions 
which had made international cooperation so much more important 
following the end of World War I and that unless the general 
psychological and even sociological causes of nations are basic­
ally changed, international cooperation is to remain an imposs­
ible possibility. See his, "Progress in International Coopera­
tion, " Political Science Quarterly. L, No. 3 (September, 1935), 
377-404; for a devastating attack on the illusion of internation­
al cooperation, see Francis Delaisi, Political Mvths and Econom­
ic Realities (London: N. Douglas, 1925}.
8 7 Kanokoki, op. cit.. p. 614; Hoitom, "The Political 
Philosophy of Modern Shinto," pp. 106-111.
®®Royal Jules Wald, "The Young Officers Movement in
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Thus, the militarists began to make maximum use of the 
Shinto ideology in their militarism. The militarists justified 
their aggressive policies with Emperor!sm and imperialism. They 
seemed to have adopted such a nationalistic view as declared by 
Viscount Oura who was the Minister of Commerce in 1908:
The majesty of our imperial house towers above every­
thing else in the world, and we take it for granted that 
it is as perdurable as heaven and earth. If it is con­
tended that our country needs a religious faith then, in 
my opinion, we must adopt the religion of imperialism, 
in other words, the worship of the e m p e r o r . 8?
Due to the nature of the overtly aggressive policy even 
at the risk of antagonizing the other great powers, the govern­
ment leaders in the militaristic era were more thoroughly 
apprized of the values of loyalty and patriotism than the 
Meiji leaders had been. It is important to note that the true 
value of Shinto lies more in the realm of the national mind than 
in that of ritualized ceremonies. As a writer puts it, "The 
legends, cosmology, and pseudo-history are not religion, and
its power is not in dogmas nore in forms of worship; it is a
90spirit of ancient Japan, Yamato-damashi." Thus it can be
Japan, CA 1925-1937: Ideology and Actions," (Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation. University of California, Berkeley, 1949), pp. 
31-40.
89Emil Lederer and Emy Lederer-Seidler, Japan in Trans­
ition (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1938), p. 150.
Q
George William Knox, The Development of Religion in 
Japan (New York: Putnam, 1907), p. 77.
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safely stated that the essential element in Shintoism was the
91religious patriotism it could instill in the Japanese people.
The seriousness of official interest in the fostering of Shinto
as a means to stimulate loyalty and patriotism in the Japanese
people in the post-Restoration Japan, in particular, during
the early 1930s when militarism was on the rise is well depicted
in Table.6. '
The political use of Shinto by the militarists from
the beginning of the 1930s until the end of the Second World
War had been spectacularly successful in bringing home the
Shinto-inspired rationale of "national mission" to the Japanese
and in deepening loyalty and patriotism. Indeed, "Shinto had
93been made into a handmaiden of the state." In this sense, 
Shinto was in truth nothing other than a national religion 
which provided justifications for nationalistic and expansive 
policies in international politics and dictatorial and militar­
istic policies at home until 1945. As Laficadio Hearn aptly
94
called it, Shinto was a "religion of loyalty."
Regardless of the veracity of the Japanese imperial
^^Kato Genchi, Waaa Kokutai to Shinto (Japanese Kokutai
and Shinto)(Tokyo: Kodokan, 1919), p. 221. 
p. 748.
^^The Japan Year Book, 1933, p. 847, and Ibid., 1937,
^^Floyd Hiatt Ross, Shinto: The W a v  of Japan (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1965), p. 146.
94Lafcadio Hearn, Ja 
(New York: Gorssett and Dunlap Publishers, 1904), Ch. XIV.
^^ pan; A n  Attempt at Interpretation
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TABLE 6
The Growth 
1880-
of Major Shinto Shrines 
1934 (Meiii Era)
Year
Grand 
Shrine 
of Ise
Govemment National 
Shrines Shrines
Prefectural
Shrines
Totals for 
Shrines Above 
District Grade
1880 1 55 68 369 493
1890 1 87 75 457 620
1900 1 93 75 538 707
1910 1 . 95 75 583 754
1920 1 105 75 688 866
1932 1 198
1934 1 197
divinity,Emperorism-Shintoism had produced a religious 
patriotism which was largely responsible for a smooth accultur­
ation^^ without going down before superior alien cultures and
95Being practical people, political leaders of modern 
Japan were scarcely concerned with the truth or falsity of 
the divine origins of Japan. , What mattered to them was not the 
historical fact, but the efficaciousness of the divine origins 
of the imperial lineage. As Nitobe Inazo has stated candidly,
"even the head of a sardine is good and sufficiently efficacious 
as a deity, if it is only believed in with sufficient sincerity 
and reverence." Quoted in Willard Price, Japan and the Son of 
Heaven (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1945), p. 102.
96Japan's highly developed ability to adopt foreign
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the remarkable national achievements as well as the national 
disaster suffered in the Pacific War. Due to the intensity 
and extensiveness of political indoctrination during the mili­
taristic era, at times, there is a tendency to put too much 
emphasis on the political indoctrination during the military 
totalitarianism in the discussion of Japanese loyalty and na­
tionalism, discounting or ignoring the historically rooted
97nationalistic mentality.
We should not let ourselves lose sight of the fact 
that Shinto has passed through a lengthy meandering course of 
development parallel with the national life of the Japanese 
race. Likewise, Yamato Damashii, symbiotic with Shinto, has 
been deeply embedded in the national life and political tradi­
tions of more than two milleniums. It needs little effort to 
marshall historical evidences to prove that the national 
spirit of Japan full of loyalty and patriotism has been
cultural attributes has been a very significant national 
characteristic which has rivetted the attention of nearly 
every writer on Japan. See, for example, Paul S. Reinsh,
"Japan and Asiatic Leadership," North American Review. CLXXX, 
No. 578 (January, 1905), 48-57, esp. 48-52; Arnold J. Toynbee, 
"The Far-East's Reaction to Western Civilization," Harper's 
Magazine, September, 1927, pp. 460-68; Edwin O. Reischauer,
The United States and Japan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univer­
sity Press, 1957), pp. 99-115; Emil Lederer and Emy Lederer- 
Seidler, Japan in Transition (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University 
Press, 1938), pp. 171-98; Jesse F . Steiner, "Social Change in 
Japan," Sociology and Social Research, XXXI, No. 1 (September- 
October, 1946), 3-11.
9 7 H. Byron Earhart, Japanese Religion: Unity and Di­
versity (Belmont, Calif.: Dickenson Publishing Co., 1969), pp. 
76-81.
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signally instrumental to what Japan has achieved. We also
have reason to assume that the Shinto-motivated national faith
is likely to have great bearing on the future of Japan as 
9 8well. What Lafcadio Hearn said about the national faith 
of Japan in 1904 seems still pertinent:
. . .  it (Shinto) is not even officially classified 
as a religion. . . . But as representing all those 
traditions which appeal to race-feeling, to the senti­
ment of duty, to the passion of loyalty, and the love 
of country, it yet remains an immense force, a power to 
which appeal will not be vainly made in another hour of 
national peril.99
In view of the religious and historical foundations of 
Japanese nationalistic psychology, it is rather absurd to see 
that the Shinto-motivated national spirit was wrought largely 
by the political indoctrination of the past century. What 
the political leaders of modern Japan did was the political 
exploitation of the already-existing Shinto spirit inseparably 
interwoven in the national life of the Japanese race. The 
longevity of the Japanese national spirit finds a representative 
expression in the following passage:
Our Japanese race thus passed through a great testing 
in the time of Jimmu Tenno. Thereby were fostered a 
spiritual stability that never yields no matter what the 
hardships, a strong racial capacity for unification, and 
a reverential and worshipful faith in the Emperor,
go
Holtom, Modern Japan and Shintrr Nationalism, p. 3.
99Hearn, op, cit., p. 414.
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exalted to a religious character. These have come down 
through two thousand six hundred years as the very core 
of the Japanese national spirit.100
The political exploitation of the State Shinto accel­
erated drastically in the 1930s and the early 1940s in propor­
tion as crisis accentuated in the consciousness of the military 
rulers the necessity of increasing totalitarian regimentation 
and widespread military control over the domestic life. The 
militarists resorted to Emperorism-Shintoism to whip up a 
greater patriotism and to vindicate and justify their military 
totalitarianism at home and aggressive imperialism abroad. To 
elucidate further the interconnection between the all-pervasive 
Japanese national spirit and the political indoctrination by 
the militarists, a passage of Holtom's again merits quotation:
. . .  in order to understand modern Japan and her signifi­
cant trends, we must deal first and foremost with a 
highly successful, rigorously centralized, religiously 
founded educational program whereby the national mentality 
is fixed in terms of forms that are governmentally ex­
pedient and necessary to military control. But these 
forms are not arbitrarily manufactured out of makeshift 
materials in the social and political life. They have 
come down out of an ancient past, they are erected on 
literary foundations that have the sanctity of holy 
scripture, and they survive as almost instinctive elements 
in the folkways.lOi (Emphasis added.)
Hand in hand with the Shinto ideology in stimulating loyalty and 
patriotism, in fortifying nationalism, and in mobilizing the
^^^Quoted in Holtom, Modern Japan and Shinto National­
ism. p. 13.
101Ibid.. p. 25.
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102Japanese for their "holy war" went the Japanese concept 
of Kokutai to which we now turn.
lO^ibid.. p. 19.
CHAPTER V
FORTIFICATION OF NATIONALISM: Kokutai^
Japanese Kokutai is, indeed, a puzzling and 
contradictory concept. No sooner had Japan been defeated in 
1945 than the Japanese Kokutai concept fell into disrepute. 
It appears that the postwar tendency of shunning or ignoring 
the Kokutai concept did not signal the death knell to the 
blatant, nationalistic concept based upon the mystical, 
poetic mythology of the Japanese Imperial Family.^
As many studies on the subject of national character
^Kokutai, generally translated by the phrase 
"national probity" but sometimes translated by such phrases 
as "national entity" as in Robert King Hall, ed., Kokutai No 
Honqi; Cardinal Principles of the National Entity of Japan 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949),
"national life," "national essence," "national substance," 
"state structure," " national body," " national constitu­
tion," was, if not still is, a concept immeasurably 
meaningful to the Japanese nationalistic thinking and 
totally enigmatic to Western national thinking.
^For an excellent, recent discussion of the Japan­
ese mythological system, see Obayashi Taryo, "The Origins of 
Japanese Mythology," Acta Asiatic (Bulletin of the Institute 
of Eastern Culture), Vol. 31 (1977), 1-23.
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amply indicate,^ the Japanese national characteristics or 
national character which the Japanese Kokutai concept 
embraced seems to deserve serious attention now as much as 
it did during the days of ultranationalism. ^ It is by no 
means the purpose of the present discussion to attempt a 
critical examinaion of the Japanese national characteris­
tics. We are here interested mainly in the fact that the 
Kokutai concept is closely interconnected with Yamato 
Damishii (the Japanese spirit), which constitutes the most 
essential basis for Japanese national consciousness and 
nationalism.
Some political writers fail to make a clear
^The subject of "national character" has inter­
ested, baffled, and irritated many writers, depending on 
their intellectual inclinations. All see to agree that it 
is an intractable subject, but too weighty a subject to 
ignore. As Gabriel A. Almond has stated, "Indeed, it is the 
failure to give proper weight to the cognitive and 
evaluative factors, and to the consequent autonomy of 
political culture, that has been responsible for the 
exaggerations and oversimplifications of the 'national 
character' literature of recent years." Almond, "Compara­
tive Political Systems," Journal of Politics, XVIII, No. 3 
(August, 1956), p. 396; Hamilton Fyfe, "The Illusion of 
National Character," British Journal of Psychology, XXXIII, 
Part 3 (January, 1942), 183-205; Otto Klineberg, "A Science 
of National Character,” Journal of Social Psychology, XIX 
(February, 1944), pp. 147-62; Monroe Berger, "Understanding 
National Character— and War," Commentary, II, No. 4 (April, 
1951), pp. 325-86; Geoffrey Gorer, "Themes on Japanese 
Culture," Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences, 
5 (1943), pp. 106-24.
^Among others, see, in this connection, Isaiah Ben- 
Dasan, The Japanese and the Jews (New York; Weatherhill, 
1972); Hasegawa Nyozekan, The Japanese Character (Tokyo: 
Kodansha International, 1965).
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distinction between the form of the state and the form of 
the government.5 it is difficult to distinguish between 
the two in some countries. In Japan, however, it is not 
only possible to make the distinction, but also imperative 
to make the distinction between the two, for a confusion in 
the two may well result in failure to understand the true 
nature of the Japanese state.®
According to a Japanese writer, the form of the 
state represents the type of organization which is a 
complete manifestation of the purpose of the state, whereas 
the form of government is a partial manifestation of that 
purpose. In other words, the former is a fundamental 
principle which is determined at the time of the foundation 
of the state and remains unchangeable, whereas the latter is 
a flexible principle which is formulated and changes in
^Professor Minobe Tatsukichi had argued that the 
state was a corporate entity which possessed a legal 
personality with the capacity for rights and duties. In a 
monarchy, the monarch, as well as the subjects, were 
contained within the state. Thus the Emperor was not 
synonymous with the state. The direct personal rule of the 
emperor was circumscribed by the constitution, making him 
one of the elements of the state. In short, he was an organ 
of the state. For a detailed discussion of Minobe's "organ 
theory," see Frank 0. Miller, Minobe Tatsukichi, Interpreter 
of Constitutionalism (Berkeley; University of California 
Press, 1965).
®For a fuller understanding of this point, see 
Reed, op. cit., Ch. X; Watanabe Hachiro, Kokutai no taigi 
[Essence of the Japanese Kokutai] (Tokyo: Shunyodo, 1933); 
Ikeoka Naotaka, Kokutai Kannen no Shin Kenkya [A New Study 
of the Concept of Kokutâïl (Tokyo; Dobunkan, 1933); Tanaka 
Chigaku, What is Nippon Kokutai? (Tokyo; Shishio Bunko, 
1936).
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accordance with the development of the state.^
Yamada Takao has stated that the form of government 
is limited in scope to juristic and political meaning, while 
the Kokutai is the form in which the sovereignty of the 
state functions or is exercised.® As Hegel tells us;
The political constitution is (1) the 
organization of the state and the process of its 
organic life in reference to its own self. In 
these processes, the state distinguishes within 
itself its elements, and unfolds them into self­
subsistence.
(2) It is a single, exclusive individual­
ity and, as such, is unrelated to another. It 
turns its distinctive features towards foreign 
states, and, in so doing, establishes its self- 
subsisting distinctions within itself in their 
ideality.9
The national polity, unlike the form of government, 
is definite and unchangeable. It is as permanent and 
enduring as the state itself. As an organic entity, the 
state possesses a life of its own and the spiritual force 
needed for the maintenance of the s t a t e . T h e  national 
polity of any state tends to possess a peculiarity or 
uniqueness of its own which distinguishes itself from all
^Watanabe, op. cit., p. 35.
®Yamada Takao, Kokutai no Honqi [The Fundamentals 
of Kokutai] (Tokyo: Hobunkwan, 1933), p. 3.
G^. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. by S. 
W. Dyde (London: George Bell and Sons, 1896), pp. 273-74.
^^Tanaka, op. cit., pp. 56-57; Hall, pp. cit., p.
59.
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other states. Seen in this sense, Kokutai is the product of 
the national spirit of the Japanese p e o p l e , j u s t  as 
Germany is the product of the German mind, spirit and 
temperment.
Since we generally believe that each people 
possesses a special sense of its national consciousness, we 
are here concerned not with the uniqueness of Japanese 
national identity but with the extraordinary nature of that 
uniqueness. As William Theodore de Bary has aptly observed, 
"If there is anything distinctive about the Japanese in this 
respect, it is not that they have some such identity but 
that they are so self-conscious about it."^^
When the Japanese refer to their own Kokutai, they 
put particular emphasis on the monarchial tradition based on 
its hereditary continuity in one family, the Imperial House. 
Since this idea has been maintained on historical ground, no 
juristic justification is needed in support of the 
K o k u t a i . I n  the words of Nitobe Inazo:
l^Kiyohara Sadao, Kokushi to Nippon 
Seishin no Kengen [The National History and the 
Manifestation of the Japanese Spirit] (Tokyo: Fuji 
Shoten, 1934), p. 38; Dr. D. C. Holtom sees the 
Japanese Kokutai as "the political and social 
organization expressive of the caracteristic 
traditions and psychology of the people." See 
his, "The Political Philosophy of Modern Shinto," 
p. 40, note 3.
l^Quoted in Joseph M. Kitagawa, "The 
Japanese Kokutai (National Community) History and 
Myth," History of Religions XI No. 3 (February, 
1974), p. 210.
13Ibid., 212.
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Kokutai . . . means the retention of the 
highest social dignity and political powers by the 
family which subdued the country and has ruled it 
from the beginning of our history. This family is 
conceived as embracing the whole nation. . . .
The Emperor is thus the representative of the 
nation and symbol of its unity. Thus the true 
nature of the bonds which unite men in government 
and subjection is, primarily, a mythical blood- 
relationship; secondarily, a moral tie; and 
thirdly, a legal obligation.
Kokutai may be stated as an outward expression of
the ideals and spirit of the Japanese people. Thus, the
explanations usually given by those unfamiliar with the 
deep-lying Japanese psychology tend to deal with the form 
rather than the content of Kokutai, resulting in either a 
partial or a superficial treatment of Kokutai. Because of 
the very nature of the Japanese Kokutai, it is impossible to 
deal with Kokutai apart from the spiritual background of the 
Japanese.
Ikeoka Naotaka explains Kokutai in terms of the 
characteristics of J a p a n . O n  account of the fact that the 
center of national authority is the Imperial family in
Japan, the Japaese nation has enjoyed an unbroken line of
sovereigns ever since the beginning of the Japanese state. 
The Japanese do take pride in the fact that for almost three
^^Nitobe Inazo, Japan ; Some Phases of Her Problems 
and Development (London: Ernest Benn, 1931), pp. 171-72.
l^Kitagawa, 0£. cit., p. 209.
l^ikeoka, op. cit., pp. 232-57.
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millenia, the soverien power has bee maintained by the 
single line of the Imperial Family without a change of 
dynasty. The continuity of the Japanese Imperial lineage 
finds no parallel in any other country in the whole world.
The basis of Japanese Kokutai draws upon the 
legendary Edict of Amaterasu-Omikami. Though the forms of 
government have undergone many changes since the founding of 
the Japanese state, there has been no change in Kokutai. 
The continuitu of Kokutai is attributable not only to the 
special nature of Japanese national history, but also to the 
remarkable unity that has been attained between the Imperial 
family and the people.
Yamada Takao has argued that the Imperial house 
could not be considered apart from the state and vice versa.
^^Fujiwara Hirotatsu, Kindai Nihon Seiji Shiso Shi 
Josetsu [Introduction to the History of Modern Japanese
Political Thought] (Kyoto; Sanwa Shobo, 1952), p. 32.
^®Hall, op. cit., pp. 106-07; also see Takada 
Shinji, Nihon Jukyo Shi [History of Japanese Confucianism] 
(Tokyo: Chihin Shokan, 1941), pp. 262-64.
•^ O^ne of Japan's most famous histories, the Dai
Nihon Shi, concerned mainly with the legitimacy of the
Imperial lineage, says the following in its introduction: 
"Since the beginning of emperors in the shape of men for 
more than two milleniums, the descendants of the gods in 
succession have continued the direct and sacred line; the 
traitor has never effected his usurpation attempt. The 
location of the Sacred Treasures is as radiant as the sun 
and the moon. How noble! How magnificent! Should we seek 
for the essential reason, in truth, it is due to the fact 
that the benevolent influence of the Ancestral Head has
solidified the popular will and has become the mighty rock 
foundation of the state." Dai Nihon Shi (Tokyo: Dai Nippon 
Yubenkai, 1928), I, pp. 3-4.
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According to his reasoning, the Imperial house, the state 
and the people constitute an inseparable national entity. 
In fine, it may be stated that the Imperial family forms the 
core of national or racial cohesion, standing out as the
head of the Japanese nation.2° are concerned
here mainly with the nationalistic aspects of Kokutai in 
recent times, we novr torn to an examination of the Kokutai 
concept in terms of national consciousness and political 
indoctrination.
A Brief Overview of the Kokutai Concept
Although the history of Japan suggests that the 
Japanese Kokutai concept has existed simultaneously with 
national history, the concept had existed without a term to 
depict it before the writing of Jinno Shotoki^^ [Record of 
the Legitimate Line of Divine Emperors] completed in 1339 by 
Kitabatake Chikafusa (1293-1354). In Jinno Shotoki, 
Kitabatake intended to emphasize not merely the rightful 
claims of the Southern Court to the throne, but also the 
uniqueness, greatness, and divinity of the Japanese Imperial 
lineage. He argued that the uniqueness of the Imperial 
institution made Japan superior not only to China, but also
ZOyamada, o£. cit., pp. 95-6.
j^^ For^  a detailed discussion, see Mozume Takami, ed., 
Kitabatake Chikafusa, Jinno Shotoki [Kitabataki Chikafusa, 
Record of the Legitimate Line of the Divine Emperors] 
(Tokyo: tokyo Kenbun Shoin, 1942).
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to India.22 Furthermore, it is of great import that he used 
the term Kokutai to describe the special relationship that 
existed between the Imperial family and the people. From 
that time on, the Kokutai concept became a favorite subject 
of discussion for nationalist writers.23
With the accumulation of writings on the subject of 
Kokutai, the Kokutai concept was greatly expanded to embrace 
all the unique qualities and ideals of Japan.2^ Kokutai 
finally took on an extremely mystic character.25 The advent 
and use of the term Kokutai resulted in the stimulation and 
exaltation of Japanese national consciousness. Aizawa
22Koyohara Sadao, Nihon Dotoky Shi [History of 
Japanese Morals] (Tokyo: Chibunken Shoten, 1937), p. 264.
23ibid., pp. 358-59.
2^The centralization of the political authority in 
the hands of theTokugawa Shogunate and the corresponding 
decline of the influence of the Imperial family, led 
Japanese classical scholars, Confucian scholars, and Shinto- 
ists to rise in support of the Kokutai concept. Among the 
Shintoists, Yamazaki Ansai (1618-1682) stood out among the 
classical scholars. Confucian scholars included, among 
others, Yamaga Boko (1622-1685) and Kumazawa Banzan (1619- 
1691). Scholars belonging to the Mito school of this period 
included, among others, Tokugawa Mitsukuni (1622-1700), 
Miyake Kanran (1675-1712) in the earlier period, and Fujita 
Yukoku (1774-1826), and Fukita toko (1806-1855) in the later 
period.
25oaniel C. Holtom calls the ridiculous arguments 
advanced in support of Kokutai, "primitive cosmogamy." A 
typical divine-country argument finds a representative 
description in Hirata Atsutane: "He declared that the
Japanese islands were produced first by the greatest of the 
ancestral kami and that the inferiority of the rest of the 
world was indicated by the fact that it was produced later 
out of sea foam and mud." Modern Japan and Shinto 
Nationalisms, p. 14.
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Seishisai (1782-1863), one of the leading exponents of the 
later Mito school, crystalized the ioi thought previously 
advocated by Fijita Yukoku and the Kokutai concept of Hirata 
Atsutane in his work Shinron^^  [New Proposals], which he 
wrote in 1925. The book was widely read by the politically 
conscious and thoughtful samurai in the last days of the 
Tokugawa rule, for it dwelt on the question of coping with 
foreign threats, which was then uppermost in the minds of 
the Japanese. The book turned out to be the "political 
manifesto" for the patriotic samurai, providing inspiration 
to a goodly number of samurai who were in serious quest of a 
proper answer to the challenge with which Japan was 
confronted.27
Aizawa's views on Kokutai were in the nature of an 
amplification of what Kirata Atsutane had advocated, namely 
that the Japanese nation was a vast family with the Emperor 
as its sovereign and national focus. Aizawa gained fame by 
linking the joi [Repel the Barbarians] thought with the 
sonno [Revere the Emperor] idea. What he argued in Shinron 
was, in effect, the preservation of Kokutai spiritually and
2®Aizawa Seishisai, Shinron [New Proposals] and 
Tekii-hen [Compilation of Advancing Along the Way]. Edited 
by Tsukamoto Katsuyoshi (Tokyo; Iwanami Shoten, 19410.
27por a good summary of Aizawa's proposals in 
connecton with the ominous challenge facing Japan during the 
last decades of the Edo period, see Tsunoda Tyusaku, William 
Theodore de Bary, and Donald Keene, Sources of Japanese 
Tradition (New York: Columbia University Press), pp. 591-
603.
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physically by virtue of the sonno joi thought.
Aizawa's views on Kokutai are well expressed in the 
following quotation:
I would respectfully state concerning the 
Land of the Gods, that being the source whence the 
sun rises, the place whence vital energy 
originates; and with the acceding of the Heavenly 
Sun, succession to its Throne generation after 
generation being changeless throughout eternity; 
it is by its very nature the chief country of the
earth, providing law and order for all lands. . .
By the grace of the Imperial Sovereign all
within the four seas are protected, and in eternal
tranquility under an everlasting reign, the land 
is free from disturbance. These things are not 
due to his subjugating the people through terror 
and seizing control for his time. Indeed, they 
are rather necessarily due to the fact that the 
whole nation with one accord looks up to him 
affectionately, and could not bear separation.28
What we see in the above passage is that Aizawa made 
an adept synthesis of Confucian teachings with Shinto 
beliefs, deriving the ideological characteristics of Kokutai 
from examples fond in national history. He was intent on 
demonstrating that the Mito thought was closely interrelated 
with Confucianism, the national learning school and 
patriotic theory.29
In general, the Mito school was very influential in 
defining rightful succession of the Imperial family by 
instilling in the people such loyalty to the Emperor that
2®Aizawa, op. cit. I, pp. 12-13. 
Z^Tsunoda, op. cit., p. 592.
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they eventually caused the downfall of the Tokagawa 
Shogunate, resulting in the restoration of political power 
to the rightful rulers of Japan. It is interesting to note 
that the outcome of the works of the Mito school was neither 
intended nor foreseen by the founder of the school, Tokugawa 
Mitsukuni (1628-1700), who ironically happened to be a
grandson of the first Tokugawa Shogun Ilyasu.^®
A cursory examination of Japanese history indicates 
that the scholars of the Mito school, Shintoists, and 
classical scholars all believed such ancient records as
Kojiki and Nihon Shoki. Thus, it appears that they had no
difficulty in regarding Japan as the "Divine Land."^^ The
Kokutai concept that prevailed among the classical scholars 
and Shintoists of the Edo period, was not significantly 
different from that which had been held by those in pre- 
Tokugawa times. It is worth quoting the following passage 
to emphasize the eternal quality of the Japanese Kokutai:
The Japanese national structure (Kokutai) 
is not the result of the interplay of the 
ordinary factors that are found in the evolution 
of other countries. At heart it is the expression
S^The Emperor Meiji was quite right when he said in 
a rescript in commemoration of the contribution which 
Tokugawa Mitsukuni made toward the eventual restoration of 
the Imperial rule; "You proved to be the originator of the 
movement for reverence and loyalty to the throne, thus 
making of yourself a wise forerunner of the Imperial 
Restoration of 1868." See Kuno, op. cit. I, p. 139.
31#. G. Aston, A History of Japanese Literature 
(Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle, 1972), pp. 164-69.
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of the purposes of the ancestral Kami who founded 
the state in the far-distant past. It has as its 
inner, unique, and most characteristic feature, a 
divine, immutable, and eternal quality. ^  its 
essential nature, it has never changed in the past 
and it will not change in all the future. 
[Emphasis added-T^
Toward the closing decades of the Tokugawa period, 
the movement of the Mito school resulted in intense loyalty 
to the Emperor and burning patriotism. As if to lend 
validity to Hegel's argument that the national constitution 
"turns its distinctive feature towards foreign states," the 
Kokutai concept was strengthened each time the Japanese 
people were conditioned to compare their country with other 
countries. The history of Japan amply testifies to the fact 
that the Kokutai concept was extraordinarily sharpened and 
reinforced during the times of national difficulty as in the 
cases of war with other countries or in the case of foreign 
pressure surrounding the advent of the "black ships," and 
the subsequent opening of Japan in the mid- nineteenth 
century. Internal conditions have also been conducive to 
the strengthening of the consciousness and awarenessof the 
Kokutai concept.33
^^Holtom, Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism, p.
17.
33por an interesting list of major political events 
in modern times that tended to strengthen Japanese national 
consciousness, the Kokutai concept, and Japanese national­
ism, see Yanaga Chitoshi, "Japan; Nationalism Succeeds and 
Fails," Current History, XIX (August, 1950),
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The concept of Kokutai after the Meiji Restoration 
of 1868 merits special attention in that the concept has 
been marked by vicissitudes.^^ The opening of Japan under 
foreign pressure almost naturally resulted in a period of 
looking down on things Japanese on the one hand, and 
worshiping European and American ideas on the other. This 
period of infatuation with things Western, of course, 
implied rationalism, utilitarianism, and liberalism, among 
others.35 This stampede of Western ideas scarcely offered a 
suitable atmosphere for the discussion or stimulation of the 
Kokutai concept. Since this period of worshiping the West 
was characterized by the clamor of minken [the rights of the 
people] at the expense of the kokken [the rights of the 
state], the discussion of Kokutai seemed not only childish
but also anachronistic.36
pp. 67-72.
3^In his sweeping explanation of Japan's modern 
history, Kato Shuichi has used the concept of the 
"alternating cycle of the periods of two different inclina­
tions, toward the West and toward the Japanese traditions." 
The Kokutai concept was forced into the background whenever 
the intellectual trend was in favor of Westernism. See his 
"Japanese Writers and Modernization," ed. by marius B. 
Jansen (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), 
p. 444.
35cf. Herbert Passin, "Modernization and the 
Japanese Intellectual: Some Comparative Observations,"
Ibid., pp 447-87.
36por a fuller accont of this turbulent period, see 
Robert A. Scalapino, Democracy and the Party Movement in 
Prewar Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press,
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Theories of natural rights of man, liberty, popular 
sovereignty, and the social contract fascinated the minds of 
a great majority of educated Japanese to such an extent as 
to regard the knowledge of these ideas as a necessary 
qualification for a civilized man. In the midst of this 
Westernizating frenzy, Shintoists and conservative scholars 
were so overwhelmed that they had to remain in the 
background until the turn of events smiled on their 
ideological position a g a i n . 3? Deeply concerned about
the direction of Westernization, the Meiji leaders had to 
take drastic political measures to circumvent the political 
agitation by the West-admiring liberals and to re-awaken 
Japanese national consciousness. As a means to satisfy the 
demands of the progressives and opposition politicians, the 
government issued an Imperial Rescript in October, 1881,38 
announcing the government's plan to open a Diet in 1889. 
This announcement of introducing a parliamentary government 
should be understood with a grain of salt, for the Rescript 
was intended more for the continuation of the oligarchic
1953), Ch. III.
3^In contrast to the confusion, uncertainty and 
superficial Westernism in the first post-Meiji decade, Japan 
entered a period of reaction to the blind Westernization, 
revival of national consciousness, and return to stability 
by the beginning of the 1900s. Delmer Brown, op. cit., pp. 
112-17.
38see Walter Wallace McLaren, "Japanese Government 
Documents," Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, 
1st Series, Vol. XLII, Part I (1914).
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rule than for a representative government as advocated by 
the progressive liberals. In a practical sense, the 
Rescript actually solidified the Emperor-centered oligarchy 
(faithful with the Kokutai concept) on the one hand, and 
disarmed the political opponents of political reasons for 
further struggle on the other. The concluding words in the 
Rescript clearly testify to this reasoning:
We perceive the tendency of Our people is 
to advance too rapidly and without that thought 
and consideration which alone can make progress 
enduring, and we can warn Our subjects, high and 
low, to be mindful of Our will, and those who may 
advocate sudden and violent changes, thus 
disturbing the peace of Our realm, will fall under 
Our displeasure.39
That the wording of the Rescript did not militate 
against those who advocated popular rights should not 
surprise us. Careful reading of Japan's modern history 
indicates that the popular rights movement of the first 
decade of the Meiji era tended to be a political weapon in 
the hands of dissident members for enervating the Satsuma- 
Choshu coalistion in the government. What the popular 
rights advocates were really after was not the defense of 
individual rights against the government's arbitrary 
measures, but the government's acceptance of the position 
that the national goal of Fukoku Kyohei [Right Country,
^^McLaren, "Japanese Government Documents," pp. 86-
87.
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Strong Army] could also be achieved through a representative 
form of government. It appeared that the question of 
political belief was a secondary matter in the popular 
rights movement.40 The post-Meiji liberalism was but a 
means to carry on the struggle for power. There is no 
shortage of evidence that indicates that even the most 
ardent advocates of popular rights were, at heart, 
conservatives in their values and attitudes. Regardless of 
political conviction, everyone was a strong advocate for 
Fukoku Kyohei. No one questioned that the national 
independence and solidarity should have precedence over all 
other matters. This view was as true of the ruling 
oligarchs as of their opponents. They only disagreed on the 
methods to be used in achieving the common national goal. 
Even such a progressive, liberal writer as Pukuzawa Yukichi 
contended that the Westernization of Japan was but a means 
to preserve Japan's national polity. He further maintained 
that the ultimate goal of all thought and action should be 
the preservation of the Japanese national polity.41
4®Itagaki Taisuke (1837-1919), who enjoyed the 
reputation of being the most ardent advocate for popular 
rights of his time, had argued only a year before he 
embarked upon his crusade for popular rights that the 
centralization of political power and authority in the 
national government should have priority over the establish­
ment of a parliamentary government. See Yoshino Sakuzo, 
ed., Meiji Bunka Zenshu [Complete Works on Meiji 
Culture](Tokyo; Nihon Hijoron Sha, 1927-1930), IX, 344.
4lReio Gijuku, ed., Pukuzawa Yukichi Zenshu
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Now that the advocates of liberty and popular 
sovereignty, following the issuance of the Rescript, were 
emptied of political objectives to which they could devote 
their ideological zeal, they were led to re-evaluate their 
position. The tapering off of "blind Westernization"^^ and 
the achievement of political goals slowly gave rise to the 
re-awakening of national consciousness once again. Thus, 
the discussion of nationalism, together with the Kokutai 
concept, reared its head again. Many scholars, regardless 
of their idealogical orientation, began to write about the 
special qualities of the Japanese state. Even Pukuzawa 
Yukichi, in a treatise, "On the Imperial House," supported 
the emperor system from a utilitarian point of view. He 
contended that the Imperial House was useful in the 
maintenance of national unity and in the control of the 
state.
It is also interesting to note the ideological 
conversion of Kato Kiroyuki (1836-1916) who had been one of 
the earliest advocates of natural rights, equality, and
[Complete Works of Pukuzawa Yukichi](21 Vols., (Tokyo: 
Iwanami Shoten, 1958-1964), IV, 209.
^^During this period. Western ideas were simply 
harped upon either as political catch-phrases or as 
intellectual jargon with little influence on the Japanese 
value system. See Maruyama, Nationalism in Post-War Japan, 
p. 2; also see Jackson H. Bailen, "Prince Saionji and the 
Popular Rights Movement in the 1880's," Journal of Asian 
Studies, XXI, No. 1 (November, 1961), pp. 49-64.
43Keio, op. cit., V., pp. 259-92.
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constitutional monarchy. Even in Kokutai Shinron [New 
Theory on the National Polity] which he wrote in 1874, he 
had even rejected the Kokuqaku agreement that each Japanese 
was born only to serve the Imperial will. He had further 
maintained that the government existed for the people and 
not vice versa. Indeed until his ideological conversion he 
had truly been an opponent of authoritarianism and a 
supporter of popular rights.44 %n 1877, he had abandoned 
his faith in natural rights in favor of the theory of social 
evolution under the influence of German political doctrines. 
By the latter part of 1881, his ideological position had 
been so completely changed that he argued that natural 
rights were unproven, and such rights as existed were 
inseparable from the existence of the state.45
This period of reaction against Western ideas had 
paved the way for the flowering of various nationalistic 
organizations which advocated and propagated, though in 
varying degrees, the Japanese national characteristics and 
virtues. This period of "the preservation of Japanese 
national essence" (1885-1895) bristled with many important 
political events that gave birth to intense n a t i o n a l i s m . 46
44yoshino, op. cit., V., p. 373.
45ïabata Shinobu, Kato Hiroyuki (Tokyo: Yoshikawa 
Kobunkan, 1959), p. 42.
46por a good account of the "Japanese National 
Essence" movement of this period, see Delmer Brown, op.
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With the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution in 1889, the 
opening of the Diet in 1890, and the issuance of the 
Imperial Rescript on Education in 1890, Japan was ready to 
embark upon a venture of constitutional government and an 
education policy that was to forcefully train the people to 
be nationalistic.
As a corrolary of this national self-awakening, the 
Japanese people came to appreciate once again their own 
national virtues and heritage. Thus, there emerged many 
writers^? who began to discuss the Kokutai concept, based on 
the Constitution and the Imperial Rescript on Education. No 
less an intellectual than Pukuzawa Yukichi stated that;
At present, the only duty of the Japanese 
people is to preserve the Kokutai. To preserve 
the Kokutai means the maintenance of independent 
political power. To maintain the independent 
nation, it is necessary to foster the education 
and knowledge of the people.
We can easily see from the quotation above that 
Pukuzawa's central theme was the preservation of the 
Kokutai, which he considered the ultimate goal of Japanese
cit., Ch. VI.
^^Pukuzawa Yukichi, Kato Hiroyuki, Ito Hirobumi, 
Kume Kunitake, and Inoue Tetsujiro, to name only a few. Por 
a fuller understanding, see Kenneth B. Pyle, The New 
Generation in Meiji Japan: Problems of Cultural Identity,
1885-1895 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), pp. 
118-43.
^®Keio, op. cit., IV, 32.
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political thought and action. To him, the introduction of
the Western civilization was the sine quo non whereby to
reach the end of the preservation of the Kokutai.
Fukuzawa's main concern was clearly stated when he said that 
"The nation's independence is the aim, the nation's
civilization is the means toward the aim."49
Furthermore, Fukuzawa's bitter reaction against the 
West and his concern with the maintenance of the nation's 
independence are well described in the following;
Wherever the Europeans come, the land ceases to be 
productive, and trees and plants cease to grow.
What is worse still is that the human race dies 
out. Should people clearly understand these facts 
of realities and realize that Japan is an Eastern 
country, they must be inevitably fearful for the 
future, albeit has Japan heretofore suffered no 
great harm from foreign intercourse.
That he also was not oblivious to the racial 
question in international politics merits another quotation:
Take, for instance, the cruel way in which 
the British ruled the Indians for some past years.
Their relations with the Indians could hardly be 
described as human intercourse. Yet, should one 
say that the Indians are treated in this manner 
merely because they are weak, then many weak 
peoples in the West would also be treated in the 
same cruel manner. The fact that they are not 
treated likewise proves that it is not the 
difference in strength but race that is the cause
49ibid. 
SOlbid.
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of difference in treatment.
Though the nationalism of this period was 
reactionary, it did strengthen the Kokutai concept and 
stimulate patriotism in a great measure.
Following this reactionary period came a truly 
momentous decade in Japan's modern history. Japan's victory 
in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) greatly enhanced 
Japan's national prestige on the one hand, and inflated 
Japanese national pride on the other. This new 
consciousness of "greatness" on the part of the Japanese was 
destined to play a harmonizing role between the West and the 
East.52 Japan's victory over Russia in 1905 further 
strengthened Japanese national consciousness to such an 
extent as to oblige many Japanese to expound the essence of 
the Kokutai. Among others, Kato Kiroyuki and Inoue 
Tetsujiro stood out as the most prominent advocates for the 
Kokutai.
Now that Japan's military victories were as
spectacular as they were unexpected, Bushido [the warrior 
code],
Sllbid.
52nany Japanese sincerely believed that their 
country had been able to hammer out an ideal synthesis of 
Confucianism, Buddhism, and Western technology, and they 
believed that the spread of this synthesis was one of 
Japan's proper missions. See Kiyohara Sadao, Meiji Jidai 
Shiso Shi [History of Thought in the Meiji Era](Tokyo; 
Daitokaku, 1921), pp. 317-22; Reinsch, 0£. cit., p. 48.
S^Delmer Brown, op. cit., pp. 152-56.
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which had been forced into the background for a few decades 
after the Restoration, was given a new lease on life.^^ 
Many nations of the world were conditioned to be curious and 
inquisitive about the causes of Japan's military success. 
The spiritual factor of the victories was unreservedly 
attributed to the Bushido spirit. Thus, the study of 
Bushido became a very serious, popular subject both at home 
and abroad. Writing in 1904 on the Japanese mind, Henry 
Dyer has stated:
. . .  to sum up briefly the qualities of the 
Japanese which have enabled them to make such 
wonderful developments in such a short time, I 
would mention as the most important factor, the 
intense loyalty of the people which compels them 
to make any sacrifice— even life itself— when they 
consider it necessary for the honor of their
country.55
While the Japanese were intoxicated with pride, 
making much of national virtues and characteristics such as 
the Japanese Kokutai and Bushido, two political incidents of 
great import shocked the whole nation. The arrest in 1910 
of Kotoku Denjro on charges of plotting against the life of
54por example, Nitobe Inazo, Bushido, the Soul of
Japan (10th rev. and enl. ed. ; New York: G. P. Putnam's
Sons, 1905); Alfred Stead, "The Soul of a Nation," The Times 
(London), October 4, 1904, p. 6.
55yenry Dyer, Dai Nippon: A Study in National
Evolution (London: Blackie and Son, 1904), pp. 49-50.
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the Emperor (and Kotoku's execution in 1 9 1 1 ),^6 and a heated 
nationwide controversy over the question of legitimacy of 
the Northern and Southern dynasties in the fourteenth 
century prompted thoughtful scholars and educators to deal 
with, and clarify, the Kokutai concept lest the nation be 
embroiled in an unending controversy inimical to the nation. 
Inoue Tetsujiro and other conservative scholars organized a 
society to facilitate the study of Kokutai. This society 
played a leading role in solidifying the Kokutai concept and 
guiding the direction of "national m o r a l s ."^7
Though the death of the Meiji Emperor in 1912 and 
subsequent political events of importance provided a 
suitable atmosphere to strengthen the Kokutai concept, the 
constantly changing situation at home and a b r o a d , ^8
88por a detailed discussion of Kotoku Denjiro, see 
Nishio Yotaro, Kotoku Shusui (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan,
1961).
S^Delmer Brown, op. cit., pp. 154-55.
SBpor a handy guide to the thoughts and activities 
of socialists and Christians that not only militated against 
the government leaders but also posed a disquieting 
influence in Japan in the early decades of this century, see 
Tabata Shinobu, Nihon no Heiwa Shiso [Pacifist Thought in 
Japan] (Kyoto: Minerva Press; 1972). Some of the major
political events that had great impact on Japan in this 
period include: the first World War, the Russian Revolution, 
the Washington Conference, the intensification of Chinese 
nationalism, and the London Naval Conference. For an 
exhaustive discussion on the implications of the London 
Treaty for the later political development in favor of 
militarists, see Harada Kumao, Saionji Ko to Seikuoku 
[Prince Saionji and the Political Situation](9 Vols.: Tokyo: 
Iwanami Shoten, 1950-1952), Vol. I, esp. pp. 191-239.
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prevented the Kokutai concept from making headway until the 
Manchurian Incident in 1931. A new national consciousness 
suddenly loomed large following the Manchurian Incident. No 
sooner had the Japanese been awakened to the new national 
consciousness than non-nationalistic ideas (liberal, 
socialist, and Christian) suffered a sudden decline.59 A 
modified fascism of sorts emerged to rivet the attention of 
the nation.
Conservative organizations replete with perfervid 
patriotism gained power in no time. These organizations 
were convinced that party politics had to be done away with 
in order to cope with the national crisis. In pursuing 
their chauvinistic policy they launched into a campaign of 
violent revolutionary direct action against the established 
order, which resulted in the demise of party cabinets.^0 In 
effect, the consequence of this campaign was virtually a 
reign of terror, culminating in the founding of the 
notorious Ketsumeidan [League of Blood Brotherhood] whose
^®The evidence of the new national consciousness is 
well manifested by the activities of key nationalist and 
secret societies. See Yanaga Chitoshi, Japan Since Perry 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1949) pp. 489-518.
A. Bisson, "Rise of Fascism in Japan," Foreign 
Policy Reports, October 26, 1932; Harada Kumao, "Ni-Niroku 
Jiken- Josubu no Ugoki," [The February Twenty-Sixth 
Incident— Changes in the Elite], Sekai, No. 50 (February, 
1950), pp. 59-69; idem, Saionji Ko to Seikyoku, Vol. II 
which is subtitled, "The Manchurian Incident and the End of 
Party Cabinets," for an exhaustive account of crisis-ridden 
politics that gradually eclipsed party politics, giving 
birth to a fullfledged militarism.
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creed was the use of terrorism against the "corrupt
political parties, slaves of the capitalists."®^ The Young
Officers and cadets who joined the Ketsumeidan and other
societies were responsible for the assassinations of Baron 
Dan Takuma of the Mitsui combines, and former Finance
Minister Inoue Junnosuke in February, 1932, and Premier 
Inukai Tsuyoshi on May, 1932.®^
Since the nation was so shocked by these assassina­
tions, the government began to exercise strict control not 
only over the left-wing organizations but also over the
right-wing organizations, for both sides were regarded as 
dangerous and harmful to the nation.®^
Having been deeply concerned about the political
implications of the Manchurian question, the Japanese 
government wished that the establishment of the new "state" 
of Manchukuo would put an end to Japan's international
predicament. Japan's recognition of Manchukuo on September 
18, 1932, pandered to the further worsening of the
Manchurian issue, making a Sino-Japanese dispute into a 
question involving the League of N a t i o n s .®^ Confronted with 
international opposition to her advances on the continent
®^Quoted in Kenneth W. Colegrove, Militarism in 
Japan (New York: World Peace Foundation, 1936), p. 38.
®2lbid., pp. 38-39.
®^Harada, Saionji Ko to Seikyoku, II, 245.
®4lbid., pp. 354-60.
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and unable to work a way to compromise, Japan withdrew from 
the League of Nations on March 27, 1933.65
Japan's isolated position and her claim that the 
international opinion was impervious to, and inconsiderate 
of, her legitimate rights in the Par East, again aroused 
Japanese national c o n s c i o u s n e s s . 66 The joint action by the 
West against Japan made Japanese nationalism a "fearful" 
type once again.
The anti-Japanese sentiment in China, however, had 
relatively little effect upon the development of a 
more intense form of nationalism in Japan, for the 
Japanese did not fear Chinese opposition. There 
was merely a sense of national pride in the 
military victories against the "bandits" in 
Manchuria. But when the Western nations began to 
take a stiffer attitude toward Japan's advances, 
fears were aroused that the Western powers might 
join forces against Japan. This development 
presented an entirely different situation, and 
consequently, as Japan's relations with the West 
worsened, nationalism became more intense and 
began ongo more to take on a "fearful" 
character.6/
This development of extreme nationalistic sentiment 
led to the wholesale abandonment of things Western. Thus 
dawned a period in which Yamato Damashii was to be daily 
conjured up and incessantly harped upon. The prevalence of 
Yamato Damashii then was testified to by the fact that a
GSjbid., III, pp. 35-47.
66ibid., p. 19.
6?Delmer Brown, op. cit., p. 193.
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great number of socialists and communists defected from 
their ranks to become advocates of the Japanese national 
consciousness. Those who defected argued that they "could 
not reconcile their patriotic sentiments with the Party's 
absolute loyalty to the Soviet Stalinist regimen."^8
This quotation tells us a political truism— that 
nationality outweighs ideology. According to the reasons 
for defection from the Japanese Communist Party given by 
"two important communists"— Nabeyama Sadachika and Sano 
Manabu, the reawakening of their national consciousness 
following the Manchurian Incident was so important as to 
neutralize their ideological creed:
Those events of national significance that have 
confronted our people since the Manchurian 
Incident . . . have awakened the Japanese 
consciousness inherent in all of us, communist or 
not. We are proud of the history of the Japanese 
people, who, as a great independent nation, have 
substantially contributed to the development of 
mankind, and we have come to believe in their 
superior quality. The critical world political 
situation faci^ Japan has aroused our national 
consciousness.
By the same token, it is quite important to note the 
great significance which Nabeyama and Sano attached to the
GBpaul F. Langer, Communism in Japan : A Case of
Political Naturalization (Stanford: Hoover Institution
Press, 1972), p. 14.
G^Quoted in George M. Beckmann and Okubo Genji, The 
Japanese Communist Party, 1922-1945 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1969), p. 264
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Japanese Imperial family;
The imperial system of Japan, unlike tsarism, has 
never been a system of exploitation and 
suppression. The Imperial household has been an 
expression of national unity; it has reduced class 
violence within the country, brought equilibrium 
to social life and ensured a smooth transition 
from one class to another at times of social 
change. . . . The overwhelming majority of the 
people respect and identify with the Imperial 
family. The Japanese people have the sense of 
being a great kinship group, of which the Imperial 
family is the head. . . .  To that extent, the 
Japanese Imperial family has a popular foundation. 
. . . With the slogan, "Overthrow the Imperial 
System," the Communist Party flouts the feelings 
of the people and, for this .reason, is alienated 
from them.'O
Though the above quotations clearly demonstrate the 
undeniably strong sense of Japanese nationality, it would 
also serve us well to be attentive to the fact that the 
modest advance toward a system of parliamentary democracy 
and the advent of various brands of socialist and leftist 
politics were not the only characteristics of the twenties 
in Japan. The third decade was also marked by the 
beginnings of a conservative and nationalist reaction which 
was soon to overwhelm the liberal trends in J a p a n . A s
70lbid.
^^Marayama Masao cogently calls the decade prior to 
the Manchurian Incident the preparatory period of fascism. 
"It was in 1915-20 and thereafter that we have the rapid 
development of near-fascist groups. The Genyosha and 
Kokurynkai may be regarded as exceptions." Marayama Masao, 
Nihon Fashizumu no Shiso no Undo [The Movement and Thought 
of Japanese Fascism] (Tokyo: Hakujitsu Shoin, 1948), p. 104.
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Richard Storry puts it:
The 15th May Incident had a significance for the 
modern Japanese nation second only to that of the 
Manchurian Incident eight months earlier. After 
15th May, 1932, liberalism as a factor in official 
life, was a spent force.
The strong sense of Japanese national consciousness, 
Japan's ambitious creation of Manchukuo as a major step to 
realize the ideas of Japanese expansion on the Asian
mainland, and the claim of a "Japanese Monroe Doctrine" led 
Japan to a completely isolated position that militated
against almost all the nations of the world: Japan came to 
be hated by the Chinese, feared by the Soviets, and censured
by the Anglo-Americans.
Confronted with the world's denunciation and
indulged in the continental expansion, the commitment to
Manchukuo and to the "Asian Monroe Doctrine" became Japan's
immutable national policy. This policy ensued a fateful
consequence. Japan was perforce thrown into an armaments
race with two of the wealthiest nations in the world. The
Japanese sense of urgency was quite acute, for Japan had to
^^Richard Storry, The Double Patriot: A Study of
Japanese Nationalism (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 
1957), p. 124.
^^For a fuller discussion, see Tokyo Asachi, 
September 14, 1933.
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expand both her army and navy, whereas the United States 
could concentrate on the strengthening of naval power, and 
the Soviet Union could build up the ground f o r c e s . ^4
The intensification of power politics and the 
Japanese concern about national security instilled 
apprehension and determination; apprehension about Japan's 
future and determination to pursue the Japanese Monroe 
Doctrine. The progressively worsening world-wide depression 
and the hostile international environment, albeit generated 
largely by Japan, herself, pandered to a further 
fortification of Japan's sense of national m i s s o n . ^ 5
Japan once again, as in the days of her forced 
opening, came to ponder such slogans a; Sakuma Shozan's 
"Eastern Morality and Western Technology, " Since all the 
Japanese clearly understood that their country's sudden 
elevation to the ranks of the world's great powers was 
attributable to rapid industrialization and military sinews, 
the importance of military buildup to pursue the expansion 
on the continent was never questioned.^® The Japanese
a representative writing that depicts 
graphically the Japanese national mood against international 
interference in "Japan's pursuit of rightful interests" and 
Japan's determination to embark upon an armaments race with 
Western Powers in the early thirties, see Renmei no Kiki to 
Nichibeisen [The Crisis of the League of Nations and the 
Japanese-American War] (Tokyo: Chuseido, 1932).
75lbid., p. 1-16.
7®lbid. , pp. 445-50. For a good glimpse of the
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leadership decided to take advantage of the "Eastern 
morality" or of the Japanese spirit.
Thus the Japanese political leaders, riding the 
crest of a heavily chauvinistic national mood, came to 
believe that a strong Japan had to possess not only 
armaments and military bases, but also an unswerving 
national unity, loyalty, and a strong sense of national 
mission.77 The internal affairs of extreme nature 
perpetrated by the young officers and Japan's worsening 
relations with the outside world, however, made Japan's 
"two-fold problem"7® rear its ugly head once again. The 
control of dangerous thoughts and the drive for spiritual 
mobilization became the most powerful means of controlling 
the Japanese people and pursuing the expansive policies.
The national education system was to be greatly 
manipulated and abused by the government leaders for 
political indoctrination. Toward this end, the political
Japanese obsession with the continental expansion, see, 
among the many writings by Kita Ikki and Okawa Shumei, the 
letter's Nihon oyobi Nihonjin no Michi [The Ways of Japan 
and of the Japanese] (Rev. ed., Tokyo; Gyocki Sha, 1930).
77por a brief but important discussion of Japan's 
national mission, see Matsumoto Sannosuke, "National 
Mission," in The Emergence of Imperial Japan, ed. Marlene 
Mayo (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Co., 1970), pp. 59- 
67.
78Ibid., p. 61.
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leaders decided to put the centuries-old Kokutai^^  concept 
to maximum use to elicit loyalty and patriotism from the 
people on the one hand, and to keep the people under the 
strict control of the government on the other. In the wake 
of a series of nationalist "incidents" ranging from the 
Manchurian Incident in 1931 to the February Mutiny in 1936, 
and the controversy over "the Question of Clarification of 
the National Polity [Kokutai Meicho Mondai] the government 
efforts for the regimentation of the people and for the 
realization of Japan's national mission culminated in the 
issuance in March, 1937, of a leading ideological test, 
Kokutai no Hongi [Principles of the National Polity], which 
was prepared by the bureau of "thought control" in the 
Ministry of Education.
Through a full-scale political indoctrination of the 
Japanese by virtue of the all-embracing Kokutai no Hongi, 
Japan regained a questionable internal peace again. As 
Storry cogently writes, "The price of peace at home was, of 
course, armed expansion a b r o a d . "80
Since no one can doubt the success of the Kokutai no 
Hongi in political indoctrination from the day of its
79lt is worth noting that, prior to the full-scale 
use of the Kokutai concept to drum up ultra-nationalism, the 
nationalists engaged themselves in the clarification of the 
Kokutai concept to exorcize the liberals and the "dangerous 
thinkers" of their aberration. Storry, o£. cit., pp. 162- 
69.
80lbid., p. 193.
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issuance until Japan's defeat in 1945, it may not be amiss 
to see what the Kokutai Hongi intended to mean to the 
Japanese.
The unbroken line of Emperors, receiving the 
Oracle of the Founder of the Nation, reign 
eternally over the Japanese Empire. This is our 
eternal and immutable national entity. Thus, 
founded on this great principle, all the people, 
united as one great family nation in the heart and 
obeying the Imperial Wil, enhance indeed the 
beautiful virtues of loyalty and filial piety, 
this is the glory of our national entity. This 
national entity is the eternal and unchanging 
basis of our nation and shines resplendent 
throughout our history. Moreover, its solidarity 
is proportionate to the growth of the nation and 
is, together with heaven and earth, without end. 
We must, to begin with, know with what active 
brilliance this fountainhead shines within the 
reality of the founding of our nation.81
Even though this quotation may seem totally chimeric 
and ridiculous to rational thinking and an educated mind, it 
did work and it worked marvelously, to boost ideological 
conformity and national chauvinism. The formal ethics 
(Shushin) course in school and the "thought education" for 
the Japanese people might have impoverished intellectual 
life on the one hand, but must have offered emotional 
comfort on the other.
Be that as it may, until 1945, all Japanese were 
harping upon the theme of loyalty and patriotism, duly 
satisfying the political aspirations of the militarists and
81Ibid., p. 82.
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nationalists— the "thought control" at home and the pursuit 
of expansionist policies abroad. Since the society was so 
thoroughly regimented by the Kokutai concept, no one dared 
to object to the chauvinistic trend. As Arthur M. Young 
writes :
The mildest accusation of disloyalty to the
Kokutai seems to have been enough to disturb the 
self-confidence of a Japanese official or
politician at any date between, let us say, the 
close of 1931 and the beginning of the Pacific 
War. Moral courage was displayed, it is true, by 
a few men in public life . . . but dedication to 
principle, to a rationally thought-out and
accepted personal point of view, was a very rare
phenomenon.
Many studies reveal that from the late 1920's, 
internal control was achieved in spite of radicalism and 
liberalism. The newly-gained awareness of the individual's 
place in society was an insignificant factor in stemming 
Japan's national chauvinism which was running berserk. 
Regardless of the merits and demerits of political 
indoctrination, Japanese national consciousness was 
inculcated to a degree unprecedented in the history of
Japan.83
Once the militarists were firmly in the saddle, they
B^Arthur M. Young, Imperial Japan, 1926-1938 (New 
York: W. Morrow & Co., 1938), pp. 179-80.
B^Charles N. Spinks, "Indoctrination and Re- 
Education of Japan's Youth," Pacific Affairs, XVII (March,
1944), pp. 63-64.
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never had to grapple seriously with the political opposition 
that could claim to be more truly nationalist, thanks to the 
exploitation by the government leaders of the supreme symbol 
of the nation's identity, the Emperor himself.®^ 
Nevertheless, the political leaders in the 1930's, who could 
assert the state's power in the name of the Emperor at home, 
were in no position to cope with problems abroad by relying 
upon the same symbol in confronting foreign, especially 
Chinese, nationalists.
Their own extreme form of nationalism that, in some 
respects served so well at home, was not effective as a tool 
of foreign p o l i c y . The government leaders, however, were 
comitted to the sumbol, for it alone vouchsafed the 
justification for reshaping the world order as well as 
explaining the Japanese national polity.
By the same token, the commitment of the Japanese 
leadership in the late 1930's to the idea that their country 
was truly the Emperor's State, and their success in 
suppressing contrary ideas did pander to the deepening of
B^Matsumoto Sannosuke, "The Significance of 
Nationalism in Modern Japanese Thought," The Journal of 
Asian Studies, XXXI (November, 1971), p. 52.
85por a detailed treatment in this connection, see 
James B. Crowley, "A New Asian Order: Some Notes on Prewar 
Japanese Nationalism," in Japan in Crisis : Essays on Taisho 
Democracy, eds. Bernard S. Silberman and H. D. Harootunian 
(Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp.
270-98.
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militaristic chauvinism.®® The threats posed by the border 
incidents with the Soviet Union, the war with China, and the 
sense of national insecurity resulting from Japan's defiance 
to international pressure, gave birth to the need for 
national mobilization. The government was forced to resort 
to the policy of "thought control" to keep the people 
patriotic and supportive to the government policies.
Since the question of thought control had been such 
an important political factor until 1945, we will discuss 
the aspect of thought control in the following pages.
®®James B. Crowley, "Intellectuals as Visionaries of 
the New Asian Order," in Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan, 
ed. James W. Morley (Princeton, N.J.; Princeton University 
Press, 1971), p. 373.
CHAPTER VI
FORTIFICATION OF NATIONALISM; "THOUGHT-CONTROL"
Twenty-four centuries ago, Thucydides declared: "It
is a habit of mankind to entrust to careless hope what they 
long for, and to use sovereign reason to thrust aside what 
they do not f a n c y . M a n ' s  habits do change slowly. When 
we take up the subject of Japanese militarism in the 1930's 
and early 1940's, the so-called "ultranationalism" is 
usually considered an abnormal product of militarists.^
^Thucydides, The History of the Peloponesian War, 
trans. by Richard Crowley and R. C. Feetham (London: Dent, 
1910), p. 241. In 1944, Frederick Hertz boldly stated: "Two 
incentives govern men: fear of punishment and hope of
reward." See his Nationality in History and Politics : A
Study of the Psychology and Sociology of National Sentiment 
and Character (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), p. 
225; in this connection, see also Norman Angell, "Human 
Nature and the Atomic Age," Free World, X, No. 6 (December,
1945), 74-76. For the Japanese "guilt feeling" in the
immediate post-defeat years, see, for example, Yomiuri 
Shimbun, December 5, 1947.
^Writing in 1956, Maejima Shozo critized the 
widely-accepted view that Japanese fascism since World War I 
was caused by a military clique. See his Nihon Fashizumu to 
Gikai [Japanese Fascism and the Diet] (Kyoto: Horitsu
Bunkasha, 1956). For a further discussion in this regard, 
see Kinoshita Hanji, Nihon Fashizumu no Shiso to Undo [The 
Thought and Movement of Japanese Fascism] In a collection
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It is a rather shallow misreading of Japanese 
history to simply attribute the wartime ultranationalism to 
militarism, to write off the political significance of the 
pre-1945 ultranationalism as a frantic abnormalcy produced 
in an emergency period, and to naively discount the 
effectiveness of the "thought-control" system as entirely 
resultant from the ubiquitousness of raw policy power.^
As already discussed at length, it can be safely 
stated that Japan's state, social structure, and national 
psychology are unique and peculiar to that country. This 
unique character was more responsible for bringing about 
Japan's ultranationalism than the incessant indoctrination 
by the militarists.^ By the same token, the thought- 
control system would have been far less effective had there 
not been a long tradition of loyalty, patriotism, and a
called Sonjo Shiso to Zettai Shugi [Sonno joi Thought and 
Absolutism], Tokyo University, Tokyo Bunka Kenkyujo (Tokyo: 
Hakujitsu Shoin, 1948).
^Throughout the many centuries of their national 
history until 1945 the Japanese people had scarcely ever 
been free from some form of thought-control. Even in the 
"liberal" 1920's, political leaders and nationalistic 
societies were concerned about "dangerous thoughts." See, 
for example, Harry Emerson Wildes, "Japan Returns to 
Feudalism," The Nation, CXXIII, October 27, 1926, pp. 436- 
38; Walker G. Matheson, "Japan Damns 'Dangerous Thoughts'," 
The Nation, CXXVII, November 7, 1928, pp. 504-505.
^Umetani Noboru, Meiji Zenki Seijishi no Kenkyu [A 
Study of the Early Meiji Period] (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1963), p. 
129; a representative writing on the Japanese sense of 
national mission based on the imperial system can be found 
in Japan Advertizer, May 9, 1919.
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hierarchical value system in Japan's national history. As 
Herbert Passin cogently writes:
Since the individual's fundamental identity is 
with his vertically stratified functional group, 
which lives in a dangerous world surrounded by 
other similar groups— rivals or enemies, but at 
least strangers— loyalty is and has always been 
one of the principal values of Japanese society.
The loyal individual, who willingly sacrifices 
personal interests, has alwyas been one of the 
admired heroes of Japanese history. Although 
personal loyalty has often been converted into 
institutional loyalty— that is, loyalty between 
statuses rather than between individuals— in the 
preferred form, there is a strong personal, 
emotional element. Leaders should act like 
leaders just as followers should act like 
followers.5 (Emphasis added.)
Seen in this light, the aspects of ultranationalism 
and thought-control indeed deserve closer attention if we 
are to come to grips with the wartime Japanese national 
consciousness greatly sharpened by the "notorious" thought- 
control system and to duly fathom the postwar Japanese 
national consciousness innocent of political
indoctrination.®
The thought-control system is dwelt upon here not in 
order to rake the "shameful" experience or conjure up
^Herbert Passin, "Japanese Society," International 
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, VIII (1968), p. 247.
Gpor a good discussion on the Japanese psychology 
of nationalism, see Maruyama Masao, Nihon no Nashionarizumu 
[Japanese Nationalism] (Tokyo: Kawade Shabo, 1953); Idem,
Senchu to Sengo no Aida [During the War and Post-War] 
(Tokyo: Misuza Shobo, 1976).
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distressful memories of wartime extremes, but in order that 
we should realize the underlying currency of Japanese 
national consciousness that did seem to have provided grist 
to the nationalistic mill that was in need of regimenting 
the people, controlling their thinking to ward off dangerous 
foreign thoughts, and mobilizing the entire population for 
Japan's national objectives at home and abroad.?
As usually seen by many observers, the Pacific War 
was, indeed, the most traumatic national experience of the 
Japanese in modern times, if not in their entire national 
history.® Looking back at the war with China, the alliance 
with the Axis, the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, the 
exploitation of other Asian peoples, the maltreatment of 
prisoners of war, the extreme chauvinism, the shrill
For a fuller understanding of these aspects, see, 
for example, Kisaka Junichiro, "Nihon Fuashizumu to Jinmin 
Shihai no Tokushitsu" [Japanese Fascism and Special Features 
of Leading the People], Rekishigaku Kenkyu, Special Number 
(October,- 1970), 117-122; Maruyama Saneo, "Gunkoku Shihaisha 
no Seishin Keitai" [The Spiritual Make-up of the Leader of a 
Militaristic State], Choyru [Current], May 1949, pp. 15-37; 
lizawa Shoji, Sodoin [General Mobilization] (Tokyo: Takayama 
Shoin, 1938); Joseph S. Roucek, "Japanese Totalitarianism," 
World Affairs Interpreter, XIV, No. 2 (Summer, July 1943), 
133-153.
®For more information on this period, see Guchi 
Tsutomi, Nihon no Rekishi, Vol. XXIV: Fuashizumu no Mi chi 
[A History of Japan, Vol. XXIV: The Road to Fascism] (Tokyo: 
Chuo Koron Sha, 1967); Thomas R. H. Havens, Valley of 
Darkness ; The Japanese People and World War Two (New York: 
W. W. Horton & Co., 1978); lenaga Saburo, The Pacific War; 
World War II and the Japanese, 1931-1945 (Translation of 
Taiheiyo Senso, 1st American ed.; New York; Pantheon Books, 
1978).
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patriotism, the thought-control, the suffering, the 
destruction, and the humiliating defeat, postwar Japanese 
writers tend to feel either guilty or ashamed of their pre- 
1945 excesses.9 This "guilty mentality" led much of postwar 
writings about "the frenzy of an 'emergency period'"^® to be 
emotive or polemic. In many cases, Japanese intellectuals 
seem to be overly "pathological"^^ or critical in dealing 
with the political history of the militaristic era.
By the same token, non-Japanese observers in the 
postwar decades, infatuated with the hatred of war and 
oppression, have tended to treat everything Japanese linked 
to Japanese nationalism as an exceptional phenomenon 
produced by the Tojo Hidekis.^^ Seen from the standpoint of 
the longevity of Japanese nationalistic feeling, neither the
^Donald Keene, "Japanese Writers and the Greater 
East Asia War," Landscapes and Portraits : Appreciations of 
Japanese Culture (Tokyo: Kodansha International, Ltd.,
1971), pp. 300-321; Hani Goro, "Daitoa Senso Koteiron 0 
Hihansuru" [Criticizing the Affirmation of the Greater East 
Asia War], Chuo Koron, July, 1965, pp. 165-187.
l^Maruyama Masao, Thought and Behavior in Modern 
Japanese Politics (Expanded ed.; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1969), p. 23.
lllbid., p. xii.
l^on account of his hard-line attitude against the 
United States and his premiership during much of the 
Pacific War period. To jo Hideki is mistakenly regarded by 
many observers in the West as Japan's Hitler. For fuller 
understanding, see Yanaga Chitoshi, "Recent Trends in 
Japanese Political Thought," Pacific Affairs, XIII, No. 2 
(June 1940), p. 131; Omori Harris, "Will Japan Crack Up?" 
Harper's Magazine, May 1943, p. 643.
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pathological national repentance on the part of the Japanese 
nor the unrealistic liberal optimism held by non-Japanese 
would help us understand the major forces that constitute 
the national vitality of Japan.
It would not be amiss to recapitulate that the 
Japanese are inclined to prefer continuity to radical
change, treasuring their long-cherished tradition. As
Robert M. Maclver has written, "Nations are enduring 
realities, and though its expression is always changing, the 
spirit of a nation is unquenchable."13 Despite the fact 
that "the spirit of a nation" endures, in general, and that 
the Japanese are extremely nationalistic, in particular, 
many critics of the pre-1945 Japanese ultranationalism tend 
to write to the effect that the militarism did not have the 
support of the learned class. In railing against the pre- 
1945 ultranationalism, Maruyama Masao, for example, rather 
over-stated the feelings of the Japanese intellectuals in 
the following words:
In Germany and Italy the learned class positively 
hoisted the banner of fascism, and the university 
students played a major role. Not so in Japan. .
. . The intelligentsia student class as a whole
never supported the fascist movement. . . .  In 
Germany, leading scholars and professors laid the 
foundations for Nazism. But what happened in 
Japan? Of course there were scholars who 
shouldered the banner of militarism or fascism.
^^Robert M. Maclver, "The Fundamental Principles of 
International Order," International Postwar Problems, I, No. 
1 (December, 1943), 17.
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But it seems that in most cases the feeling that 
fascism was stupid prevailed in their minds, if 
not on the surface.
In contrast, Ike Nobutaka argues that "pseudo­
intellectuals" rather than intellectuals influence opinion 
and politics in Japan.^5 By the same token, many observers 
of Japanese politics do not see as Maruyama Masao does. No 
less a Japanese libertarian scholar than Fukuzawa Yukichi 
proved to be very nationalistic, arguing that Japan's
aggressive policies in East Asia were for the sake of
enlightenment. Westernization, and "world c u l t u r e .  
Fukuzawa's case amply demonstrates that historically 
liberalism has not always been incompatible with either 
imperialism or authoritarianism. Basically, Fukuzawa was
not different from other Japanese in that he was also
interested in "authority at home and prestige abroad.
^Maruyama Masao, Thought and Behaviour in Modern 
Japanese Politics, pp. 59, 63? idem, "Nihon ni Okeru
Nashonarizumu Sono Shisoteki Haikei" [Intellectual 
Background of Nationalism in Japan], Chuo Koron, January, 
1951, pp. 295-304.
Nobutaka, "The Political Role of Japanese 
Intellectuals," Transactions of the Asiatic Society of 
Japan, 3rd series, vol. 5 (December 1957), 106-118.
^^Fukuzawa Yukichi, Fukuzawa Yukichi Zenshu 
[Complete Works of Fukuzawa Yukichi] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 
1959), XIV, 500.
l^Mikisa Hane, "Nationalism and the Decline of 
Liberalism in Meiji Japan," in Robert Sakai, ed. Studies on 
Asia (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963), pp. 69- 
BO. William Alfred Baker's "Justice-Order Dichotomy" can be
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Writing in 1952, Marius B. Jansen argues that 
Japan's modernization was not only motivated by a defense 
mentality, but also by a defense-in-depth concept whereby a 
renovated Japan should lead other Asian countries, 
concluding that Meiji liberalism at its best was 
inextricably linked with chauvinism.Jansen goes on to 
write to disabuse use of the naivete involved in writing 
about the liberal aspects of the Meiji period; "Close study 
of this relationship between chauvinism and radicalism 
should serve to guard against facile acceptance of the Meiji 
democratic movement.
By all accounts, Japanese ultranationalism is "deep- 
r o o t e d ."20 As Arnold J. Toynbee reminds us, "Human ideas do 
not spring into the world fully-grown and shining, like 
Athena; they trail the infection of evil things from the 
p a s t ."21 That the Japanese are like anybody else is well 
described by Louise M. Rosenblatt;
instrumental to a better understanding of the 
shifting nature of Fukuzawa's thought. William A. 
Baker, "Ideology Reconsidered; On Behalf of 
Justice-Order Dichotomy," (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Syracuse University, 1971).
l®Marius B. Jansen, "Oi Kentaro; 
Radicalism and Chauvinism," Far Eastern Quarterly, 
XI, No. 3 (May, 1952), 305.
l^Ibid., 316.
20owen Lattimore, Solution in Asia 
(Boston; Little, Brown and Company, 1945), p. 49.
2lArnold J. Toynbee, Nationality and the 
War (New York; E. P. Dutton and Co., 1915), p. 8.
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Despite the political innovations and economic 
achievements of this nation [America], he [Walt 
Whitman] felt that the ideas and attitudes 
governing men's and women's day-to-day lives were 
largely those inherited from the old w o r l d . "  ^
It goes without saying that the Peace Preservation 
Law of 1925^3 did not give birth to the thought-control 
system for the first time in Japan. Of course, the Peace 
Preservation Law of 1925 and the elaborate thought-control 
system constructed on it represented a bench mark in the 
sophistication of the thought-control system in J a p a n . 4^
The spread of Communist and anarchist ideas, an 
attempt to assassinate the prince regent, and the advent of 
an illegal Communist party in the early 1920's not only 
shocked the Japanese, but also made it necessary for 
government leaders to engineer new techniques of controlling 
leftists and "dangerous thoughts." The state of ideological 
unrest posed by radical leftists seemed so ominous and 
startling to government leaders and the common people as to 
facilitate the passage of stricter laws. In 1925, the
^^Louise M. Rosenblatt, "Whitman's Democratic Vistas 
and the New 'Ethnicity'," Yale Review, LXVII, No. 2 
(December, 1977), 190.
23por a detailed writing, see Richard H. Mitchell, 
"Japan's Peace Preservation Law of 1925: Its Origins and
Significance," Monumenta Nipponica, XXVIII (Autumn, 1973), 
317-345.
^^Albert A. Altman, "A Recently Discovered Document 
on Early Meiji Press Censorship Legislation," Gazette, XVII, 
No. 4 (1971), 220.
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government enacted the Peace Preservation Law which provided 
for ideological limits for individuals and o r g a n i z a t i o n s . 25 
It should be pointed out that the tight controls by 
government bureaucracies were not strongly resented by most 
of the Japanese people. The near absence of resentment can 
be explained by the fact that the led shared with the 
leaders the value system based on a basically hierarchically 
ordered society in which the individual could express 
himself by serving the collective b o d y . 26 To all intents 
and purposes, Japan is a united nation. By the same token, 
"to the Japanese, national unity is an end in i t s e l f . " 2 ?  
Indeed, Japanese history bristles with telling examples of 
national unity.
25sy the time of the advent of the Peace 
Preservation Law of 1925, there had been numerous government 
measures for the promotion of proper thinking and the 
suppression of ideas injurious to the Kokutai and the 
established order. Representative control measures include 
the following, to name just a few: the constant harping on 
the Kokutai and the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890; 
the Newspaper Ordinance of 1875; the Publications Law of 
1887; the Newspaper Law of 1887; the Public Peace Police Law 
of 1900; the creation of the Higher Police in 1904 and of 
the Special Higher Police of 1911; and an Imperial Message 
issued in November 1923 to keep people from all dangerous 
ideas and to suppress their social criticism. See Okudaira 
Yasuhiro, Political Censorship in Japan From 1931 to 1945 
(Institute of Legal Research (mimeographed)); Philadelphia, 
Pa." University of Pennsylvania, 1962), pp. 3- 12.
26por a sophisticated discussion of the vertical 
concept of Japanese society, see Nakane Chie, Japanese 
Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California, 
1970).
2?Hugh Byas, "The Japanese Problem," Yale Review, 
XXXII, No. 3 (March 1943), 456.
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A British war correspondent during the Russo- 
Japanese War attributed the remarkable fighting spirit of 
the Japanese soldiers to Bushido which he called the soul of 
Japan. His acute observation of Bushido runs as follows:
As a system of national ethics, it is politically 
admirable, since it promotes discipline and union, 
sinks the individual in the States, and affords no 
room, or no apparent room, for sectarianism of 
dissent. It has no forms and no ritual, and is 
broad based on vital forces and eternal truths. . 
. . Better far would it be for Japan that she 
should lose her material attributes of power than 
this wonderful moral force [Bushido] that creates, 
sustains, and renews it.28
The "enviable" state of Japanese national unity vis- 
a-vis the thought-control should be seen in terms of 
Japanese national objectives. Many writings on Japan point 
out that
Japan's foreign policy has been oriented primarily 
toward the achievement of three broad objectives: 
economic self-sufficiency, security from foreign 
attack, and the attainment of a greater measure of 
influence in world affairs.
We should not be blind, however, to the reality that
^®Alfred Stead, "The Soul of a Nation," The Times 
(London), October 4, 1904, p. 6.
29u. S. Department of State, "Japan; Free World 
Ally," Department of State Publication 6516, Far Eastern 
Series 74 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 
1957), p. 3. Also, see in this connection, Matsumoto 
Sannosuke, "The Significance of Nationalism in Modern 
Japanese Thought : Some Theoretical Problems," Journal of
Asian Studies, XXXI, No. 1 (November, 1971), 51-52.
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all nations more or less pursue such objectives, though in 
varying degrees, just as Japan does. Writing in 1949, Otto 
Klineberg declared that it is a "way of life" that men want 
security, national prestige and economic gain. As the
UNESCO preamble says: "War begins in the minds of men."^®
It may not be amiss to enlarge upon essential aspects with 
which all nations are concerned before we dwell upon the 
aspects of the "thought-cn^trol."
Edward Krehbiel argued in 1915 that "the nation is
something spiritual rather than external. . . .a matter of
self-interest." He goes on to argue that the nation is
interested in "extranational commercialism and national 
commercialism."31 This argument implies that the nation is 
conditioned by national interest and national pride. A 
study by D. P. Aberle and others concludes that three 
conditions are inherent in any society: 1) scarcity of
means; 2) frustrations of expectations; and 3) imperfections 
of socialization.32 This conclusion is supported by many 
scholars. In his study on nationalism in 1921, Max Sylvius 
Handman claimed that "nationality is the attitude towards
30otto Klineberg, "The Unesco Project on 
International Tension," International Social Science 
Bulletin, I, No. 1 (Paris, 1949), 11-21.
3lEdward Krehbiel, "Nationalism," Annual Report of 
the American Historical Association for the Year 1915, pp. 
219, 221.
32p. P. Aberle, ^  al, "The Functional Prerequisites 
of a Society," Ethics, LX, No. 2 (January, 1950), 100-111.
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one's people engendered by having ideas concerning welfare, 
its honor, and its position among other people."33
Drawing upon the above arguments, we will examine 
the socio-political situation in Japan following the end of 
World War I which led Japan to embark upon the course of 
ultranationalism. Ultra-nationalism coupled with militarism 
in turn gave birth to the thought-control system on an 
unprecedented s c a l e . 34
The Japanese economy was undergoing a recession when 
the First World War broke out, and the situation 
deteriorated because the war initially reduced foreign 
trade. The progress of the war, however, contributed to the 
increase of Japanese exports due to the inability of the 
belligerent nations to supply goods to foreign m a r k e t s . 35 
This resulted in tremendous economic expansion, increased 
circulation of currency, greater demands for goods, and 
inflationary p r i c e s . 36 Should we take the year of 1914 as
33fiax Sylvius Handman, "The Sentiment of
Nationalism," Political Science Quarterly, XXXVI, No. 1
(March, 1921), 104.
34narada Kumao, Saionji Ko to Seikyoku [Prince
Saionji and the Political Situation] (9 vols.; Tokyo;
Iwanami Shoten, 1950-1952), II: 429, III: 14.
35Ibid., II 413, IV 77, 79, 265, 275.
36william W. Lockwood, "Economic and Political 
Modernization: Japan," in Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A.
Rustow, eds.. Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey 
(Princeton, N. J. : Princeton University Press, 1964), p.
133.
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index 100, the price index rose to 144 in 1916, and by 1918 
it went up to 230. The rapid increase in prices, however, 
was not followed by higher wages. Consequently, real wages 
declined from index 100 in 1914 to 68 by 1918, engendering 
tremendous economic pressure. The most pressing problem 
with which the Japanese government was confronted was the 
price of rice, which doubled between January, 1917, and 
July, 1918. This situation contributed to the outbreak of 
riots throughout Japan in the summer of 1918.3?
Japan, beleaguered by economic difficulties, was to 
see the advent of the first real party government headed by 
Hara Kei. The long struggle for party government led by the 
advocates of popular rights had finally achieved its goal, 
which, ironically enough, was realized by cooperating 
closely with genro officialdom. Though Hara's accession to 
power was a landmark for parliamentary government, Hara had 
neither circumvented established practice nor neglected to 
pay proper deference to the elder statesmen.38
The ruthless suppression by the Hara government of 
the peaceful demonstration staged on March 1, 1919 by the 
Koreans calling for independence was a telling example of
3?For a fuller discussion of this, see Alan H. 
Gleason, "Economic Growth and Consumption in Japan," in 
William W. Lockwood, ed.. The State and Economic Enterprise 
in Japan (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press).
3®a pictorial account of this period can be found in 
Harada, op cit., I 52-195.
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how nationalistic the Japanese were regardless of the 
political persuasion of the government in power. "It was in 
1919-1920 and thereafter," argues Maruyama Masao, "that we 
[Japanese] have the rapid development of near-fascist 
groups. The Genyosha and Kokuryukai may be regarded as 
exceptions."39 The government leaders of Japan became 
increasingly concerned about the independence movements 
abroad largely encouraged by the Wilsonian concept of self- 
determination and the ominous social unrest at home 
resulting from the labor movement as well as the alien 
ideologies. By the 1920's, Japan was already experiencing 
the characteristic malaise of a modern industrial state. 
New values based on individualism and internationalism began 
to erode old loyalties and solidarities which had served 
Japan well in maintaining social order and keeping the 
Japanese under control. 0^
Besides the above problems both at home and abroad 
that were troubling Japan, the Japanese government was faced 
with the increasingly worsening political situation stemming 
from the Great Earthquake of 1923, the looming spectre of 
the Communist-led unions, the Saionji-led Japanese
Maruyama Masao, Nippon Fashizumu no Shiso to Undo 
[The Thought and Movement of Japanese Fascism] in a 
collection called Sonjo Shiso to Zettai Shugi [Sonno Joi 
Thought and Absolutism] Tokyo University, Tokyo Bunka 
Kenkyujo (Tokyo: Hakujitsu Shoin, 1948), p. 104.
^^Mitani Taiichiso, Taisho Demokurashi Ron [Taisho 
Democracy] (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1974), pp. 10, 34.
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delegation's failure in Versailles in 1919 to convince the 
major powers to include a clause on racial equality in the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, and Japan's failure in 
obtaining a ratio of 10-10-7 at the Washington Naval 
Disarmament Conference of 1921.^1
As if to add an insult to injury, in 1924, the 
United States Congress passed an immigration act that 
annulled the "Gentlemen's Agreement" of 1908, and prohibited 
persons who were not eligible for citizenship from entering 
the United States at all. The Exclusion Act of 1924 
exasperated the long-simmering Japanese resentment against 
racial policies of Western nations.42 These measures
4^A good discussion of how Japan earned the 
suspicion of Western powers after the Russo-Japanese War, in 
particular, and during and after World War I, and of Japan's 
"wounded pride" resulting from Western powers' opposition to 
Japan's "Monroe Doctrine" in Asia, is found in Ira Klein, 
"Whitehall, Washington, and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 
1919-1921," Pacific Historical Review, XLI, No. 4 (November
1972), 460-83.
42The prejudice in the U. S. Senate was so strong in 
1921 that the State Department had to withhold much of the 
information pertaining to a proposed treaty intended to end 
the "glaring" discrimination against the Japanese race and 
to stem the growing anti-Japanese prejudice in the United
States. See New York Times, February 8, 1921. For a more
detailed discussion of the American racial prejudice and
discrimination, see, for example, Raymond Leslie Buell, "The 
Development of the Anti-Japanese Agitation in the United
States," Political Science Quarterly, XXXVII, No. 4 
(December, 1922), 605-38; Fred H. Matthews, "White Community 
and 'Yellow Peril'," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, L 
(1964), 612-33; Roger Daniels, The Politics of Prejudice;
The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the Struggle 
for Japanese Exclusion (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1962).
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aggravated Japanese-American relations, which were at this 
time already coming into conflict in the Far East because 
Japanese adventures in Manchuria and China were at 
loggerheads with the United States' concept of the open door 
in China.43
Doggedly determined for national aggrandizement, on 
the one hand, and extremely sensitive to slights and insults 
by the foreign powers, on the other, the Japanese leaders 
were conditioned to work out measures to cope wih social 
unrest, to control "Dangerous thoughts," and to expand the 
Japanese empire.44
In 1923, the government arrested the Communist 
leaders upon acquisition of the party membership list 
through an informer. As a means to curb socialist and 
Communist activities, the government established the High 
Police Bureau in many prefectures. The mission of this 
bureau was to combat advocates of dangerous thought. In 
1925, the government drafted the "Peace Preservation Law," 
which made it illegal to advocate either change in Kokutai 
or the abolition of private property.45 & movement was
43New YorK Times, January 30, 1921.
44n6w York Times, April 29, 1934. For a Japanese 
version of national defense and territories, see Yoshida 
Hideo, Kokubo-Kokudoqaku [Science of National Defense and 
Territories] (Tokyo: Daiyamondo Sha, 1942).
45por a convincing discussion of the Japanese 
Communist movement and the reaction by government
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started to sharpen the vigilance against "dangerous thought" 
and guide people's thinking in the proper direction. For 
example, the Kokuhonsha [National Foundation Society] was 
organized to rectify the drifting thought trend and to 
uplift the national spirit. 6^
General Tanaka Giichi assumed the premiership in 
April, 1927, when a financial crisis and a serious economic 
depression struck J a pan.4? The gradually worsening economic 
situation engendered social ills that intensified leftist 
and rightist agitations.^® As a book by the Royal Institute 
of International Affairs stated;
When times become harder, and the satisfaction of 
his interests meets with more obstacles, or when 
his nation is obviously very far from the ideal, 
the nationalist tends to lose his interest for all 
nations except his own, to become more vigorous 
and to advocate ruthless measures. °
authorities to it, resulting in the "famous" Peace 
Preservation Law of 1925 and other measures taken to ward 
off dangerous thought, see Hugh Byas, "The Communist 
Movement in Japan," The Contemporary Review, CXLI (February,
1932), 190-97.
4®For vivid accounts of this aspect, see Harada, op. 
cit. , I: 127; II; 7, 9, 51, 272, 369; III; 154, 235, 238, 
291; VII; 277.
4?For a good discussion of the impact of the 
economic depression on Japan, see C. K. Webster, "The Far 
Eastern Crisis," The Contemporary Review, CXLIII (April,
1933), 394-401.
4®Harada, op. cit., I; 3-4.
^^Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
Nationalism (London; F. Cass Co., 1963), p. 262.
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The unhealthy economic situation, coupled with Chiang Kai- 
Shek's control of the Nationalist Party in China and his 
decisive steps to unify China under his leadeship, prompted 
Prince Minister Tanaka to adopt a bellicose posture toward 
China and stimulated nationalistic sentiments among the 
military and right-wing nationalists. In an attempt to 
justify and pursue his aggressive and nationalistic 
policies, Tanaka sought to turn the Japanese people against 
the soft policies which former Foreign Minister Shidehara 
had pursued. The Tanaka Government and subsequent 
governments in Japan fostered sentiments hostile to the 
decadent liberals and traitorous Communists. Tanaka was 
very aggressive in fighting "dangerous thought," making 
maximum use of the Peace Preservation Law.50
For Japan, each passing day of this period meant a 
vicious cycle of a worsening economic situation, frustration 
in its aggrandizement on the Asian continent, and Western 
hostility toward Japan's aggressive policies. The acute 
economic consequences for Japan of the World Depression 
could never be over-emphasized, for the World Depression and 
Japan's difficult economic situation led the Japanese "to 
support the plans of the militarists who were concerned with
S^Harada, op. cit., I: 4-5, 7-8, 11; II: 64-65, 185;
III: 55.
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questions of security and prestige."51 How seriously Japan 
was affected by the World Depression could be better 
fathomed in the light of the following statement;
So much has been written on the present economic 
crisis that we must have got over it long ago, had 
wise counsels and good advice been any use. Yet 
the crisis continues its course and only one thing 
appeas to be certain: world politics in the widest 
sense of the word is bound to be governed by the 
depression we are passing through, for the next 
ten years or twenty years. No country will be 
free in its political discussions and actions as 
long as the menace of bankrupcy looms over the 
greater part of the world. It is an ill wind that 
blows no one any good.52
Convinced as ever of its national mission deeply 
rooted in the matchless Kokutai concept and of its need for 
a supply base on the Asian continent, Japan was dragooned 
into defying the w o r l d .53 The defiant expansionists, 
contemptuous of the Western Powers' objections to Japan's 
expansionist policy, developed as the ideological foundation 
of Japanese expansion the mission of reawakening Asia, with 
Japan the deliverer, the guide, and the hero of the Eastern
51c. K. Webster, "The Far Eastern Crisis," The 
Contemporary Review CXLIII (April, 1933), 397.
52&iexander Hoyos, "The World Crisis," The 
Contemporary Review CXLI (May, 1932), 575.
S^Matsuoka Yosuke, "Japan's Interests, Rights, and 
Responsibilities in the Par East," New York Times, April 29, 
1934; James A. B. Scherer, Japan Defies the World (New York; 
The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1938); Joyce C. Lebra, ed., Japan's 
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II 
(Kuala Lumpur and New York: Oxford University Press, 1975).
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w o r l d . 54 As a Japanese writer has written,
We need not wait for neighboring countries to 
become enlightened. We must dissociate ourselves 
from the ranks of other East Asian countries and 
take part in civilized countries of the West. We 
should not give any special treatment to China and 
Korea, but deal with them in the same manner as do 
the Western powers.55
It is quite interesting to note that the Japanese 
wallowed in this type of self-justification for their 
expansion in the midst of their national humiliation heaped 
on them through the policies of racial discrimination in the 
West. Japan opined that there would be anarchy should China 
topple down the Manchu regime, that the Western powers would 
be tempted to step in so as to take advantage of the 
disorder, and divide China into pieces. Should such an 
eventuality take place, Japan was determined that it could 
not stand idly by, hands in sleeves, but would have to join 
the crowd for the p r i z e . 5 6
Government leaders in Japan, however, realized that 
they had to come up with an effective means to deal with the 
ideologically unhealthy situation for the sake of national 
solidarity needed for pursuing aggressive policies.
54Rinoshita, op. cit., p. 18.
^^Oka Yoshitake, "Kokumenteki Dokuritsu to Kokka 
Risei" [National Independence and the Reason of State] in 
Kindai Nihon Shiso Shi Koza [Studies in Modern Japanese 
Intellectual History] VIII (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1961), p. 25.
56ibid., pp. 19-20.
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Commenting on the tumultuous era of the Go-ichi-go 
Incident,Kodama Yoshio noted:
What existed under the name of democracy 
was a narrow and selfish individualism 
based on a distorted concept of liberalism 
that sought the best for the individual 
professing this belief at the sacrifice
of others.58
Another Japanese writer explains why the political situation 
in Japan developed as it did in the early 1930s in the 
following words :
Indeed, the accumulation [of harmful influences of 
liberalistic civilization] had become so
intolerably large in both internal and foreign
affairs that at last the nation revolted and its 
dissatisfaction found expression in the form of
the Manchurian Incident of 1931. . . .  It called 
for a re-examination and a return to what is
really Japanese in politics, economics and indeed 
all activities of the people. 9^
5?The Go-ichi-go refers to the assassination 
incident that took place on May 15, 1932, in which Japanese 
naval officers and army cadets, chiefly led by Naval 
Lieutenant Koga Kiyoshi and Tachibana Kosaburo, a radical 
agrarian reformer, succeeded in assassinating Prime Minister 
Inukai. The assassination of Inukai by civilian and 
military extremists put an end to party government in Japan.
5®Kodama Yoshio, ^ Was Defeated (Tokyo: Radio Press, 
1959), p. 43.
5^Toshio Shiratori, "The Three Power Pact and 
Tomorrow," Contemporary Japan (December, 1940), p. 1518.
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The ascendancy of militarism in Japan following the 
Manchurian Incident in September, 1931 and the assassination 
of Prime Minister Inukai on May 15, 1932 not only put an end 
to party government in Japan, but also put Japan on the road 
to war by dint of the enthusiastic support which the 
militarists gathered to their causes from the general public 
and from the political c i r c l e s . A s  the military won one 
"glorious victory" after another on the Asian continent 
after the Manchurian Incident, the Japanese public, in 
response, rendered the military adventurers unrestrained 
support, condemning Shidehara's "cowardly" policies. The 
Japanese press went so far as to label Shidehara's endeavors 
to settle the Manchurian issue peacefully as acts of 
treason.61 The fact that the public sanctioned "patriotic" 
young men who assassinated business and political leaders 
implies that the ultimate responsiblity for Japan's acts of 
aggression and its involvement in the China and Pacific wars 
can by no means be ascribed to a handful of military 
extremists. It should not go unnoticed that the aggressive 
policies abroad and the regimentation policies at home to 
rally the Japanese people around national goals enjoyed 
considerable support from political leaders and the general
G^Harada, op. cit., II 283-294. 
Gllbid., II: 208.
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public.62
As the miserable aspects of the depression deepened, 
the flames of nationalism, militarism, and imperialism were 
stoked by the economic and social frustrations felt by the 
masses. The Japanese blamed the selfish, decadent, and 
corrupt politicians and business leaders for their 
hardships. The militarists and ultranationalists embarked 
on rectifying the liberal trends through inculcating the 
Kokutai concept in the Japanese and advocating economic 
relief through expansion a b r o a d . 63 Joining hands with the 
militarist, right-wing civilian nationalists like Okawa 
Shumei, Kita Ikki, and Inoue Nissho went so far as to argue 
for revolutionizing the existing political, social, and 
economic systems to transform Japan into a totalitarian 
state.
There may have been, of course, some disagreements 
among radical nationalist thinkers as to the best means to 
bring about a new order65 and as to how to analyze the ills 
that plague Japan. Nevertheless, they all shared mystical 
notions about the superiority of the Japanese national 
character, the Kokutai, and the sacredness of the imperial
62ibid., V: 109-110.
63lbid., II: 43, 218, 358. 
G^Ibid., IV: 154, 162, 209.
65Ibid., VIII; 182-183.
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institution, which was the source of all v a l u e s . ^ 6  it 
should be pointed out that all nationalists agreed on the 
necessity of stressing spiritual rather than material 
values. By and large, ultranationaliste favored expansion 
into the Asian continent, development of a mighty military 
force, and creation of a totalitarian state. Thus, they 
were opposed to liberal, individualistic values as well as 
the democratic parliamentary concepts that had been 
introduced into Japan since the opening of Japan.Suffice 
it to say that all ultranationalists basically rejected 
Western and urban culture in favor of traditional agrarian 
ways of life and values.®®
The victory of the militarists and radical 
nationalists in the 1930s was the victory of traditionalism 
(or Japanism) over Western liberalism.®® The militarists as 
well as the radical nationalists believed that the use of 
force was necessary to return Japan to its true character 
and values, which had been "corrupted" by the "false" ideas 
imported from the West and by the wicked-minded advisers to 
the Emperor and to extend the "benefits of the Imperial Way"
66ibid., II; 299-304, 306-307.
6 7 Ibid., II: 22-23, 122-123, 310, 329, 333-335.
®®Ibid., IV: 348, 355. 
6®lbid., II: 82.
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throughout the w o r l d .
Aside from the mystical notion about Japan's special 
mission, the Japanese regarded their nation as the champion 
of Asia against the Western world. Okawa Shumei (1886- 
1957), for instance, claimed that one nation representing 
the East had to fight one nation representing the West in 
order to realize a new world order. Okawa argued that 
"Heaven has chosen Japan as the champion of the East."^l 
General Araki Sadao, then Inspector General of military 
education, who was an ardent advocate of "Japanism" and the 
"Imperial Way" took frivolous alien ideology, egotistical 
foreign ideas, capitalism, Marxism, and materialism to task. 
General Araki argued that each Japanese should always be
mindful that he is a J a p a n e s e .
The appearance of numerous books^^ on the Kokutai 
concept in the thirties was a telling indication that the 
nationalists were intent on making use of the Kokutai
^Opor a fuller understanding of Japan's national 
mission as expounded by the government in the thirties, see, 
for example, Mombusho, Shogaku Kokushi Kyoshi Yosho 
[Teacher's Manual of National History for Primary Schools], 
V (Tokyo: Mombusho, 1931), pp. 1-12.
^^Harada, op. cit., II: 218.
^^Ouchi Tsutomu, Fashizumu e no Michi [The Road to 
Fascism] (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1967), p. 400.
a convenient reference, see Harold J. Wray, 
"Changes and Continuity in Japanese Images of the Kokutai 
and Attitudes and Roles Toward the Outside World; A Content 
Analysis of Japanese Textbooks, 1903-1945," (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation. University of Hawaii, 1971).
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concept in eliciting national pride, in imbuing the Japanese 
with patriotism, and in keeping the Japanese supportive of 
government p o l i c i e s . T h e  publication on March 30, 1937 of 
the Kokutai no Honqi was one of four significant milestones, 
along with the 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education of 
Emperor Meiji and the Shinmin no Michi of 1941, in the 
history of the thought control and nationalistic 
indoctrination in Japan before 1945. The Shushin texts 
[books for ethics courses] constituted the fourth, and are 
in many ways the expression of the other t h r e e .
Training in Kodo [Principles of Benevolent Imperial 
Rule] dominated all educational activities, fostering the 
national spirit and strengthening the faith in the national 
polity [Kokutai].^6 We should now address our main concern; 
Was Japan's success in thought control and nationalistic 
indoctrination largely attributable to the totalitarian 
system of regimentation or to the force of national 
consciousness? Many writers?? ascribe Japan's policies and
?4por a fuller understanding, see Harada, op. cit., 
IV: 265, 300-301, 303, 305, 350-353; V: 302; also see C.
Burnell Olds, "Japan Harnesses Religion in the National 
Service," Foreign Affairs, 21 (April 1943), 535-47.
?^Robert King Hall, Shushin: The Ethics of a
Defeated Nation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949),
pp. 20-21.
?®Tokuji Yamashita, "Educational Reform in Japan," 
Contemporary Japan (May, 1940), pp. 609-614.
??Yanaga Chitoshi, "Japan : Nationalism Succeeds and
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behavior up to 1945 mainly to international power politics, 
Japan's international humiliation, and economic 
difficulties. If we accept Reinhard Bendix' statement that 
"each country must cope socially and politically with the 
disruptive impact of ideas and practices . . . ,"78 could 
more objectively see why the militarists imposed the thought 
control system on the Japanese and why the Japanese complied 
with the harsh regimentation of unprecedented scale without 
much protestation. Party men were as subservient to the 
militarists as the masses. As Robert A. Scalapino puts it, 
"The greater proportion of party men had actively 
participated in the digging of their own g r a v e s . "79
The blind obedience of the Japanese to the 
militarists perhaps can best be explained in terms of 
Japanese national consciousness and the value system that 
governs custom and social relations. As already discussed 
at length elsewhere, for the Japanese, patriotism is 
religion, whereas loyalty is the highest aspect of Japanese
Fails," Current History, 19 (August, 1950), 67-72; Eugene
Staley, "Economic Development in the Orient; Some Problems," 
Pacific Spectator, I, No. 2 (Spring, 1947), 144-61.
7®Reinhard Bendix, "The Mandate to Rule: An
Introduction," Social F o r c e s , LV, No. 2 (December, 1976), 
255.
79Robert A. Scalapino, Democracy and the Party 
Movement in Prewar Japan (Berkeley: University of California
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moral thought.®® The importance of "loyalty" is well 
described by John H. Schasr:
Loyalty thus has both instrumental and affective 
components. . . . Over and above these matters 
stands the dominant fact that no political system 
can long endure or enjoy much stability unless its 
citizens, and especially the elites, place a high 
value on political loyalty . . . loyalty is both a 
product of the individuals direct identification 
with and involvement in the nation's history, 
symbols, institutions, and destiny, and, 
indirectly, a product of the individuals' private 
satisfactions.
According to Satomi Kishido, "The Japanese idea of 
loyalty is not prompted by any anticipation or expectation 
of compensation or reward whatsoever. It is purely and 
solely the result of national consciousness."®^ Sidney 
Verba would like to call this type of loyalty "a rain-or- 
shine commitment."®® Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba
®®For a detailed discussion of the Japanese national 
ideals, see Hibino Yutaka, Nippon Shinto Ron or the National 
Ideals of the Japanese People, translated with an 
introduction by A. P. McKenzie (Cambridge; Cambridge 
University Press, 1928).
Gljohn H. Schaar, "Loyalty," International 
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, IX (1968), 484-85.
®®Satomi Kishido, Discovery of Japanese Idealism 
(New York: Dutton, 1914), p. 70.
®®"It is only such a rain-or-shine commitment that 
will allow a system to survive the many kinds of crises that 
are likely to arise during processes of rapid social 
change." Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in 
Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, eds.. Political Culture and 
Political Development (Princeton, N. J. : Princeton
University Press, 1965), p. 259.
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have called this kind of affective attachment to a political 
system "system affect."®^
In her sophisticated writing in 1946 on Japanese 
society, Ruth Benedict went so far as to state that "a great 
part of Japanese indoctrination has been devoted to making 
Chu [loyalty] supreme."®® This Japanese loyalty has been 
cultivated by the ancient customs of Bushido which stress 
the group rather than the individual and individual duties 
rather than individual rights,®® As R- P. Dore neatly 
states,
Thus all the private virtues were subsumed under 
the general virtue of patriotic loyalty, and the 
rescript [the Imperial Rescript on Education of 
1890] became until 1945 ±he basic text of the new 
religion of patriotism.®'
More briefly, as Josiah Royce put it: "Japanese
loyalty has led . . .  to a wonderful and cordial solidarity
®^Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic 
Culture (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965), p. 63.
®®Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword : 
Pattern of Japanese Culture (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 
1946), p. 209.
®®Yanaga Chitoshi, "The Military and the Government 
in Japan," American Political Science Review, XXXV, No. 3 
(June, 1941), 531-33.
®^R. P. Dore, "Education," in Robert E. Ward and 
Dankwart A. Rustow, eds.. Political Modernization in Japan 
and Turkey (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 
1964), p. 191.
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of national spirit."®®
When the militarists and the radical nationalists 
were ensconced in power, they had to pursue policies of 
expansion to fulfill Japan's "national mission," defying 
Western Powers. Representative Japanese thinking in the 
thirties may be shown in the following example. In April, 
1932, Hiranuma Kiichico, founder of the Kokuhonsha (National 
Foundation Society) explained the ideals of the Kokuhonsha 
to the foreign press. The ideals were alleged to contain 
four essential principles: 1) the unique, religious
character of the Japanese nation; 2) any condition that 
militates against the moral principle on which the Japanese 
nation was founded would have to be rectified; 3) Japan's 
special mission in Asia— Japan must use militarism as a 
means of self- defense against any force obstructing the 
achievement of Japan's highest ideal; and 4) there are 
distinct differences between Japanese nationalism and 
European fascism.®9
Japan's abrogation of the Washington and London 
Naval Agreements after the United States and Great Britain 
refused to agree to Japanese demands for parity®® and the
®®Josiah Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty (New York: 
The Macmillan Co., 1930) p. 75.
®®Japan Advertiser, April 21, 1932.
®®For an inside view of the power struggle in Japan, 
see Harada, og. cit., III: 165-174; IV: 312-314; IV: 316-
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departure at the end of 1935 of the Japanese delegation from 
the London Conference catapulted the three powers into a 
naval arms race.®^ Confronted with the worsening relations 
with Western powers and determined not to be found 
incompetent to meet any situation including war with Western 
powers, Japan embarked upon a massive national defense 
program in which all phases of military and economic 
planning were coordinated.®^
In order to achieve what the "special mission" 
called for, the militarists were determined to rally the 
people around their aggressive policies. They relied on 
both positive and negative approaches. On the positive 
side, political indoctrination was thoroughly undertaken for 
the stimulation of national consciousness and for the 
enhancement of patriotic loyalty, making full use of the
317; Kase Toshikazu, Journey to the Missouri (New Haven, 
Conn.; Yale University Press, 1950), pp. 17-18; Yale Candee 
Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy: A Study of
Civil-Military Rivalry, 1930-1945 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1957), 96-97.
®^U. S.. Department of State, Papers Relating to the 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1935, III, 828
(hereafter cited as Foreign Relations).
®^Foreign Relations, 1935, III 836. Japan's reasons 
for continued aggressive policy were geographic location, 
security, and economic needs. For various statements in 
this regard, see Saito Hiroshi (then Japanese Ambassador to 
Washington), Japan's Policies and Purposes : Selections from 
Recent Addresses and Writings (Boston: Marshall Jones Co., 
1935), esp. pp. 21-22, 120; Japan Advertiser (Tokyo), April 
28, 1927; Japan Chronicle (Kobe), July 9, 1927.
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august, all-embracing Kokutai c o n c e p t . O n  the negative 
side, the militarists constantly harped upon foreign 
aggression to elicit the fears of their people, on the one 
hand. On the positive side, the militarists enforced the 
thought control system to rid Japanese society of dangerous 
thoughts which the militarists believed to be inimical to 
the national solidarity.
Writing in 1948, Charles E. Merriam listed hatred, 
custom, terror, and propaganda as factors producing 
loyalty.94 The militarists in Japan must have been 
attentive to these essential factors in their loyalty- 
stimulation campaign. The culturally determined blind 
obedience to the persons in positions of authority95 and the 
psychologically structured fear of ridicule and ostracism9®
93gee Robert King Hall, Kokutai no Hongi; Cardinal 
Principles of the National Entity of Japan (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949), pp. 8-9: "The
Kokutai no Hongi is a literary expression of ideas equaly 
aberrant but sincerely held by a very great majority of the 
Japanese. It is futile to argue that 'intelligent' Japanese 
could not possibly believe such propaganda. . . . Loyalty 
to the Emperor and to the traditions of the Imperial Line 
becomes not a duty but the object of life itself."
94charles E. Merriam, "Some Aspects of Loyalty," 
Public Administration Review, VIII, No. 2 (Spring, 1948), 
81-84.
9^Maruyama Saneo, "Gunkoku Shihaisha no Seishin 
Keitai" [The Spiritual Makeup of the Leaders of a 
Militaristic State] Choryu, May, 1949, pp. 15-37.
9®Weston LaBarre, "Some Observations on Character 
Structure in the Orient: The Japanese," Psychiatry, VIII,
No. 3 (August, 1945), 334.
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in a great measure subserved the success of the thought 
control system. William W. Lockwood seems quite right when 
he calls the public mood of the pre-World War II period 
"creative obedience.
The militarists simply availed themselves of the 
national consciousness and what Almond and Verba would like 
to call "cooperative competence"®® deeply rooted in the 
Bushido tradition which were readily malleable to 
regimentation and national service. "There can be little 
doubt that without the wide diffusion of nationalist feeling 
Japan's history in the prewar period would have been 
impossible."®® We should not be blind to Thomas Jefferies 
Betts' warning, which merits quotation at length.
. . . with our own philosphies reeling, for once 
we were disinclined to evaluate or to interpret an 
alien ideology. It has become enough to look and 
record. With regard to the Orient we are in an 
era of observation, of analysis; and in the spirit 
of the times we attach more weight to quantitative 
results than to qualitative interpretations. . . .
One tragedy of present frictions is that they are 
seated in depths of the human soul beyond the 
reach of scientific research.
®?William W. Lockwood, "Economic and Political 
Modernization; Japan," in Ward and Restow, op. cit., p. 124.
®®Almond and Verba, op. cit., p. 167.
®®Fukiwara Hirotatsu, "Nationalism and Ultraright 
Wing," Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, 308 (November, 1956), 82.
lOOThomas Jeffries Betts, "Changing Attitudes on the 
Orient," Virginia Quarterly Review, X, No. 3 (July, 1934), 
pp. 444, 447.
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Claiming that for Japanese "continuity and wont are 
of greater importance than what is right and just," Kurt 
Singer has stated the following, which warrants a lengthy 
quotation, for his words cannot be bettered.
Throughout their history the Japanese have shown a 
preference for what promised greater power and 
prestige for the nation . . . they have tended to 
eliminate everything, however great, if it was 
felt to threaten the continuity of Japanese life, 
to imperil the structure of their political 
structure, and to alienate the individual from his 
congenital group. There is a perfect logic in 
organic matter in these processes of assimilation 
and exclusion . . . they carry into the future the 
whole past of their race, in the minds incapable 
of forgetting. . . .  To deny that they [the 
contents of the Samurai laws] had a decisive 
influence on the formation of the Japanese
character and of Japanese thought and society is 
to allow oneself to be blinded by one's own 
skepticism. . . .  If the past state and future 
possibilities of Japan are to be gauged correctly, 
it is of paramount importance to distinguish these 
processes from the political and propagandist 
fictions produced at the beginning of the
twentieth century. The Emperor-myth and the
samurai tradition are genuine; but in recent 
decades they have been explited as tools of
nationalist and imperialist propaganda and thereby 
discredited. Yet it would be not only against 
historical truth, but also detrimental to sound 
political judgment, to mistake them for phenomena 
of the same order of flimsiness as such purposive 
paper-myths as 'the White Man's Burden' . . . 'the 
Nordic Race.'^®^
Singer concludes his argument by saying that
^O^Kurt Singer, Mirror, Sword, and Jewel: 
A Study of Japanese Characteristics (New York: 
George Braziller, 1973), pp. 63, 99-100, 147, 157, 
165.
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It would be a serious mistake to believe that it 
was governmental propaganda that made the modern 
Japanese ready to fling their lives away and 
suffer what appears i n t o l e r a b l e . ^ 2
In a similar context, Herbert W. Richardson tells us 
that if a myth or symbol is to be powerful and influential, 
it must be a "vague symbol," which
is open to continued conceptual specification; 
hence it is incapable of providing direction to a 
total cybernetic society. It is conceptually 
imprecise, but symbolically p r e c i s e . ^ 0 3
Given the intensity of nationalism the world over, 
and the indispensability of national consciousness for 
national s u r v i v a l , t h e  extraordinary nature of Japanese 
national consciousness can be neither blamed nor explained 
away. Envying the Japanese patriotic loyalty in the wake of 
the Russo-Japanese War, Herbert Paul stated: "Patriotism and 
Religion have been so ofte% at variance that a country whose 
religion is patriotism has an obvious advantage.
Suffice it to say that what we see in Japan is a
lOZlbid., p. 166.
lO^Herbert W. Richardson, Toward an American 
Ideology (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 24.
^®^Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (New 
York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1947), p. 44; H. Powys
Greenwood, "Nationalism and Peace," The Contemporary Review, 
CSLVIII (February, 1935), 149-56.
^^^Herbert Paul, "The New Alliance," The Nineteenth 
Century and After, LVIII, No. 344 (October, 1905), 523.
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"power-oriented nationalism, " not "people-oriented 
n a t i o n a l i s m . "106 in the following pages we will examine the 
impact of Japan’s defeat in the Pacific War and its 
subsequent political reorientation on Japanese national 
consciousness.
lOe^hristian Bay, "The Theoretical Preparation of a 
Research Project on Nationalist Attitudes," International 
Social Science Bulletin, II, No. 2 (Summer, 1951), 246.
PART TWO 
FORCED POLITICAL REORIENTATION
CHAPTER VII 
DEFEAT AND OCCUPATION
Even in the midst of the euphoria and exuberance of 
Allied victories over Germany and Japan, acute observers 
found a disturbing thought occasionally intruding. As a 
study immediately prior to Japan's surrender states,
If a repetition of the present catastrophe is to 
be prevented, Japanese militarism must be
destroyed, in spirit and in deed; and an essential 
preliminary to this destruction will be the
relegation of the armed forces to their
appropriate influence in the State through 
constitutional reform. But it is very doubtful if 
the militarist obsession of the Japanese 
imagination can be removed by external pressure, 
since this is a symptom of a national disease 
which demands pathological, rather than surgical 
treatment . . . the most effective antidote will 
be the liberation of thought and the re-education 
of the younger generation, in an atmosphere of 
social and economic security.^
Their concern about German and Japanese nationalism 
was quite justified. And it was obvious to almost everyone 
that the victory and the subsequent military occupation
^Royal Institute of International Affairs, Japan in 
Defeat (London; Oxford University Press, 1945), pp. 223-24.
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could not offer a satisfactory solution to the nationalistic 
feelings of defeated nations.2
Riding the crest of denouncing the extreme 
nationalisms during, and immediately after, the Second World 
War, however, many opined that the "trouble-making" nations 
could be re-educated by forced political reorientation.^ 
The foremost concern set forth in the Potsdam Declaration  ^
of July 26, 1945, and the United States Initial
Post-Surrender Policy for Japan  ^of August 29, 1945, was the 
elimination of militarism and ultranationalism in Japan.
2por some of the representative writings expressing 
negative views on the educability of a defeated nation, see 
Talcott Parsons, "The Problem of Controlled Institutional 
Change: An Essay in Applied Social Science," Psychiatry, 
VII, No. 1 (February, 1945), 79-101; Ernest Beaglehole,
"Character Structure, Its Role in the Analysis of 
International Relations," Ibid., III, No. 2 (May, 1944), 
453-62; Hugh Eyas, "The Japanese Problem," Yale Review, 
XXXII, No. 3 (March, 1943), 453-73; Douglas G. Haring,
"Aspects of Personal Character in Japan," Journal of Asian 
Studies VI, No. 1 (November, 1946), 12-22; C. I. Thompson, 
"Indoctrinating Democracy," Forum, CVI, No. 3 (November, 
1945), 209-15; Addison Gulick, "The Problem of Right and
Wrong in Japan and Some of Its Political Consequences," 
Journal of Social Psychology, XXVI (Spring, 1947), 3-20;
Economist, July 30, 1949.
^For wide-ranging views on the military occupation 
and democratization following the Second World War, see Carl 
J. Friedrich and Associates, American Experiences in 
Military Governments in World War II (New York: Rinehart,
1948).
4por the complete text of the Potsdam Declaration, 
see Department of State Bulletin, Publication 2367, XII, No. 
318, July 29, 1945, pp. 137-38.
^Ibid., No. 326, September 23, 1945, pp. 423-27.
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A prevailing assumption of the Occupation planners was 
that the democratization of Japan would do away with the 
rabid Japanese national consciousness, and would, in turn, 
result in a safeguard against a re-emergence of 
ultranationalism in Japan.®
The unprecedented defeat and foreign occupation 
dealt a severe shock to the Japanese national pride.? 
Emperor Hirohito first visited General Douglas MacArthur on 
September 27, 1945, and he said to the general:
I came to you General MacArthur to offer myself to 
the judgment of the Powers you represent as the 
one to bear the sole responsibility for every 
political and military decision made and action 
taken by my people in the conduct of the war.®
Given the Japanese national pride and their 
obsession with "face," it is not difficult to fathom how 
unbearably humiliating it must have been for the Japanese to 
know that their "inviolable" Emperor called on General 
MacArthur to utter the words quoted above and to place 
himself at the mercy of the Supreme Commander of the Allied 
Powers. The shock and humiliation stemming from the defeat.
®See Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 
Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to 
September 1948 (2 vols.; Washington, D. C. : Government
Printing Office, 1949).
?See Yomuiri Hochi, August 16, 1945; U. S.
Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, VI, 631-32.
®Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous with
History (New York: Knopf, 1956), p. 286.
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however, seemed to have solidified rather than demoralized 
the Japanese will to confront the formidable challenge.^ 
Humiliated but undaunted by the defeat, the Japanese decided 
to cope with the situation willingly and cooperatively in 
order to improve their national image in the world and to 
make the Occupation as brief as p o s s i b l e . T h e  Japanese 
adroitly exercised their national trait of "situational 
e t h i c s a g a i n  as they had following the Perry mission in 
1853.
The sudden about-face of the Japanese in welcoming 
the Occupation forces did not mean a change of any 
permanence.The complete, outwardly willing submission of 
the Japanese people to the Occupation and the display of 
enthusiasm for democratic concepts belied the unchanged 
nature of the Japanese nationalistic feeling. The willing, 
cooperative attitudes of the Japanese toward the Occupation 
appeared to be a strategic withdrawal until the arrival of a
®Anne Johnstone and William Johnstone, What Are We 
Doing in Japan, Institute of Pacific Relations Pamphlet No. 
19 (New York: American Council, Institute of Pacific
Relations, 1946), p. 21.
l^Various opinion surveys by Japanese news agencies 
substantiate this point. See Allan B. Cole and Naomichi 
Nakanishi, comp, and eds., Japanese Opinion Polls with 
Socio-Political Significance, 1947-1957 (Williams College:
The Roper Public Opinion Research Center, 1959), pp. 86-89.
l^Kawai Kazuo, Japan's American Interlude (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 4.
^^W. Macmahon Ball, Japan: Enemy or Ally? (New York: 
The John Day Co., 1949), p. 181.
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favorable moment.
Given the general assumption that the Japanese 
nationalistic feeling remains basically the same, it is 
rather surprising that the serious nature of Japanese 
nationalism to which operation planners were once so 
attentive was relegated to an insignificant political 
factor. In other words, the Occupation's initial 
apprehension of Japanese nationalism simply lapsed upon "the 
loyal cooperation of the Japanese people, to use John 
Foster Dulles' phrase, the changes in the form of 
government, and the writing of the postwar constitution.
While the democratization by fiat had many positive 
results in the realms of rationality, it appears to have had 
little effect on national consciousness to which Japanese 
nationalism is inseparably linked. In short, there are 
strong indications that the democratization effort by the 
Occupation was capable of forwarding a host of democratic 
causes, but incapable of making the Japanese less 
nationalistic.15 John Foster Dulles was quite right when he
13%. V. Smith, "Consent and Coercion in Governing," 
Pacific Spectator, I, No. 3 (Summer, 1947), 315-25.
l^Quoted in the U. S. Department of State, "Japan: 
Free World Ally," Department of State Publication 6516, Far 
Eastern Series 74 (Washington, D. C. : Government Printing 
Office, 1957), p. 10.
l^Rath Benedict claims that "strong national habits 
do not pass away within one man's lifetime." The 
Chrysanthemum and the Sword : Pattern of Japanese Culture
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stated the following on June 22, 1953;
Japan, in the century since Perry's landing, by 
adopting modern techniques, has become one of the 
world's great industrial and mercantile nations. 
At the same time it has preserved and enriched its 
cultural heritage.16
We will examine below the force of Japanese national 
consciousness vis-a-vis defeat and occupa­
tion.17
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1946), p. 70.
16u. S. Department of State, Centennial Celebration 
of the Opening of Japan, 1853-1953, Publication 5093. Par 
Eastern Series 59 (July, 1953), foreword.
l^Many studies point out the Japanese capacity to 
accept foreign culture without losing its own coherence and 
continuity. See, for example, Robert N. Bellah, 
"Intellectual and Society in Japan," Daedalus Cl, No. 2 
(Spring, 1972), 89-115; Daniel C. Holtom, Modern Japan and 
Shinto Nationalism (Rev. . ed.. New York: Paragon Books,
1963).
CHAPTER 'VIII
NATIONAL RESOLVE IN DEFEAT
At the time of the forced opening of Japan in the 
1850's, it was as though the Japanese said to their 
unwelcome visitors (Americans): "We did not ask to become
part of your system, but now we have emerged from our 
seclusion, we are determined to rival, if not to surpass, 
your civilization.!
Sensing Japan's determination not to be outdone, 
many serious observers foretold a possibility of World War 
II as early as 1904.
The sudden rise of Japan to a foremost place among 
the military nations of the world is an event 
which cannot be matched save in the remote past. .
the achievement of Japan is the more 
remarkable, since she is popularly supposed to be 
inferior in blood and energy to her great 
opponent. But, whatever be the issue of the 
[Russo-Japanese] war, there is now a new factor in 
politics, and as the Pacific is probably the 
battlefield of the future in half a century, Japan 
may be a serious menace to Germany, to America or 
even to Great Britain herself.^
!"Musings Without Method," Blackwood's Edinburgh 
Magazine, vol. CLXXVI, No. MLXVIII (October, 1904), p. 572.
^Ibid., p. 569
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The price of Japan's aggressive ventures to 
establish hegemony over the whole of East Asia was paid in 
dire defeat,^ but while losing its empire Japan saved the 
essentials of Kokutai.  ^ Trained to fear nothing, not even 
death, and to esteem life as lightly as a straw, the 
Japanese demonstrated a unique national characteristic in 
surrender as well as in battle: "When ordered to fight they 
had fought. When ordered to welcome the Americans, they had 
welcomed them."^
The patriotic loyalty of the Japanese was abundantly 
manifested even in the period when Japan's defeat was 
imminent.
We, subjects of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor, 
shall offer everything we have for the sake of His 
Imperial Majesty; we shall extend the august
^George B. Sansom, "Japan's Fatal Blunder," 
International Affairs, XXIV, No. 4 (October, 1948), 543-54.
4por accounts of Japan's desperate endeavors to 
make its surrender conditional so as not to prejudice the 
status of the Emperor, see U. S. Department of State,
Foreign Relations, 1945, VI, 632-633, 647; U. S. Department
of State, The Axis in Defeat: A Collection of Documents on 
American Policy Toward Germany and Japan, Department of 
State Publication 2423 (Washington, D. C. : Government
Printing Office, 1945), pp. 27-33; Togo Shigenori, Jidai no 
Ichimen: Taisen Gaiko no Shuqi. Togo shigenori Iko [One
Aspect of the Times : Notes on the Second World War
Diplomacy, Being the Posthumous Memoirs of Foreign Minister 
Togo] (Tokyo: Kaizosha, 1952), p. 345; New York Times,
September 6, 1945.
^Herrymon Maurer, "The U. S. Does a Job," Fortune, 
March, 1947, pp. 134, 348-54.
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virtue of His Imperial Majesty to all corners of 
the world; we shall certainly win this war by 
embracing and protecting the Imperial Throne; we 
shall resolutely and absolutely worship His 
Imperial Majesty the Emperor; in reverent 
acceptance of His Imperial Edict we shall abide by 
it.G
Yet, when the Japanese heard the Imperial Rescript 
on unconditional surrender on August 15, 1945, the entire
nation was stunned and shocked more by the Rescript than by 
the appearance of the atomic bomb. As Kodama Yoshio 
describes, the moment,
At the news of unconditional surrender, some 
people were dumb-struck into senselessness, others 
were roused to overpowering indignation. But what 
man, born a Japanese, could oppose the words of 
the Emperor which had been spoken in tears? The 
entire nation in solemnity, tears brimming in 
their hearts, submitted obediently to the command 
to surrender.'
Perusal, and reading between the lines, of the the 
Imperial Rescript® on August 15, 1945, that announced
Japan's acceptance of unconditional surrender seem to shed 
light on the real attitude of the Emperor and of the 
Japanese government after Japan's defeat became inelutable.
^Quoted in Audrey G. Menefee, "Japan's Faltering 
Home Front," Far Eastern Quarterly, XIV, No. 3 (February 14, 
1945), 37.
^Kodama Yoshio, I Was Defeated (Tokyo; Radio Press, 
1959), p. 177.
®Robert 0. Ballou, Shinto: The Unconquered Enemy 
(New York: The Viking Press, 1945), p. 193-95.
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Indeed, the Rescript is intriguing and mystifying. It was a 
euphemism of first rate when the Emperor merely decided to 
"effect a settlement of the present situation by resorting 
to an extraordinary measure." The Emperor presented Japan's 
unconditional surrender as striving "for the common 
prosperity and happiness of all nations." It must be 
pointed out that the passages quoted above make no reference 
to a forced surrender. By the same token, the Emperor 
attempted in the Rescript to justify Japan's acts of 
aggression by stating that he "declared war on America and 
Britain out of our [Japan's] sincere desire to ensure 
Japan's self-preservation and the stabilization of East 
Asia." There is no hint whatsoever that Japan was dragooned 
into accepting unconditional surrender. Instead, the 
Rescript states that "the war situation has developed not 
necessarily to Japan's advantage, while the general trends 
of the world have all turned against her interest." A 
passage in the Rescript argues to the effect that the 
acceptance of the Postdam Declaration enables Japan "to 
safeguard and maintain the structure of the imperial state." 
The Rescript admonished the Japanese to strive for the 
enhancement of "the innate glory of the imperial state, . . 
. by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is 
insufferable."
What can be detected from the wording of the 
Rescript is that the defeat in war and the forced
215
unconditional surrender were too much for Japanese national 
pride to swallow, and that the Japanese attempted to make 
their surrender least humiliating in a face-saving manner.^ 
The watchword of the Japanese people following the surrender 
was "Gambari masho" [Let's strive persistently]. In effect, 
Gambari masho was tantamount to "Gashin-Shotan" [literally 
"to sleep on kindling and lick gall," but actually meaning 
"struggle against difficulties for the sake of vengeance"]. 
True to their obsession with national honor, the Japanese 
were single-mindedly determined to overcome the humiliation 
suffered in the defeat and to win over once again the 
confidence of the world.
In welcoming Americans, the Japanese minister of 
education made a speech, using "words no more adroit than 
revealing, no more prudent than wise." His speech reads in 
part as follows :
We Japanese may find it difficult to be a model 
conquered people, seeing that for more than two 
thousand years of our national life we have never 
been conquered before. Though utterly
inexperienced at the business, our intentions are 
honorable. We shall do our best to be a model 
conquered people. Do you kindly coach us if you 
see us falling short. You Americans may be in a 
position little less embarassing than our own.
You may find it difficult to be a model conquering 
power, seeing that in your one hundred fifty-odd
^Japan's humiliation is well contrasted with 
America's rejoicing over the surrender of Japan. See New 
York Times, Editorial, August 19, 1945: "Not since the
ending of the war of 1861-65 has this nation [America] been 
through such a moving experience."
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years of your national life, you have never formed 
the habit of conquering other peoples. I know 
that your intentions are honorable, and I do not 
feel that you will make the mistake we Japanese 
made in the heyday of our conquest— that trying to 
inflict bodily upon the conquered our own way of 
life. . . .1^
To be sure, the Japanese are capable of being
patient when the going is rough. Historically accustomed to
"situational ethics," the Japanese are quite capable of a
sudden change at a strategic point in history. The Japanese
welcome rendered to the Occupation forces was not to mean a
Japanese attitudinal change of permanent n a t u r e . A  few
days after the surrender, an official Tokyo broadcast said
the following words, which may be quoted here;
We have bowed to the enemy's material and 
scientific power. However, in spiritual power we 
have not lost yet. We do not think the way we 
have thought is wrong. . . . Let us unite 
together and work once again to bring our nation 
up to the stand as a strong and admirable nation.
We have lost, but this is temporary.
By the same token, the newly-named Japanese prime 
minister in the wake of the surrender. Prince and General
^^Quoted in T. V. Smith, "Consent and Coercion in 
Governing," Pacific Spectator, I, No. 3 (Summer, 1947), 324- 
25.
l^W. Macmahon Ball, Japan: Enemy of Ally? (New York; 
The John Day Co., 1949), p. 181.
^^Quoted in Ann Johnstone and William Johnstone, 
What Are We Doing With Japan, Institute of Pacific Relations 
pamphlet No. 19 (New York; American Council, Institute of 
Pacific Relations, 1946), p. 21.
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Higashikuni Naruhiko, a member of the royal family, seemed 
determined not to be less nationalistic in his first speech 
to the Japanese people delivered on August 18, 1945. He
stressed the necessity of achieving the surrender terms in 
order to regain the respect of the international community. 
He urged his people not to fall into the slough of despond 
and defeatism, but make a solemn resolve and make every 
effort to restore Japan to be once again in a position of 
respect and power. He believed that the Japanese people 
would "endure the innumerable difficulties in order that the 
tradition of the Yamato race, which will surely rise, can be 
preserved.
Responding to their prime minister's plea, the 
Japanese people, equipped with a love for neatness in life 
and a sense of devotion to their country, began courageously 
and sacrificially the staggering job of cleaning up the 
debris of war devastation.^^ Indeed, the Japanese knew how 
to comply with the lesson that the highest test of character 
is to learn from the past, to admit one's mistake and to act
on that admission.
15New York Times, August 18, 1945.
l^For an interesting discussion of Japanese 
character in meeting national difficulties, see "Nippon 
Psychs Up to Fight Back," Forbes, CXIV, No. 12, December 15, 
1974, pp. 17-20.
l^The Japanese faced the reality, believing that 
"there is a reason for victory just as much as there are
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Now that "in Japan the constant goal is honor" and 
"they [the Japanese] need terribly to be respected in the 
world,"16 the national feelings following the defeat were 
channeled into a strong national determination to cope with 
the humiliation and economic difficulties.1^ Japan's 
history bristles with heightened nationalistic feelings in 
the time of national exigencies. As Okuma Shigenobu wrote 
during the Russo-Japanese War, "All these changes, great as 
they were and formidable, were due to the patriotism of the 
[Japanese] people and their determination to do the best for 
their country."!®
Even during the immediate post-surrender period of 
"utter depression,"!® there were strong indications that the 
Japanese "national repentance"^® was situational, and that
causes for defeat. We had neglected to guage our 
limitations and we did not know enough our adversary." 
Yomiuri Hochi, August 16, 1945.
!®Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword 
(Boston; Houghton Mifflin Co., 1946), pp. 171-173.
!^Yanaga Chitoshi argues that Japan's nationalism 
has been spurred by international humiliation and economic 
difficulties. See his "Japan: Nationalism Succeeds and
Fails," Current History, 19 (August, 1950), 67-72.
!®Okuma Shigenobu, "Japanese Problems," North 
American Review, CLXXX, No. 579 (February, 1905), 163.
!®Fujiwara Hirotatsu, "Nationalism and the Ultra­
right Wing," The Annals, CCCVIII (November, 1956), 76-84.
^®The Imperial Rescript of August 17, 1945 calling 
the Japanese armed forces to conform with the surrender 
conditions gave no inkling of a sense of error or of guilt.
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their extraordinary national consciousness, as opposed to 
the pre-surrender militarist chauvinism, still obtained in 
Japan. Prime Minister Higashikuni Naruhiko's address to the 
Diet on September 5, 1945 might have been a representative 
expression of the general attitudes of highly-placed 
Japanese. He stated that "the termination of the war has 
been brought about solely through the benevolence of our 
sovereign," that the Emperor's termination of hostilities
was a benevolent act, that the Emperor's mind was "as deep
and broad as the ocean, " and that the terms of the Potsdam 
Declaration had been accepted with the understanding that 
they would not prejudice "the prerogatives of His Majesty as 
the sovereign ruler."21 Moreover, Japanese leaders had the 
effrontery to make numerous remarks which were indicative of 
their attitudes. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
asked Americans for "fair" treatment to facilitate the
condition of future friendship; Prime Minister Higashikumi 
suggested that America forget in exchange for the Japanese 
forgetting of the atom bomb; and To jo Hideki declared that
Quite the contrary, the Emperor praised his soldiers, using 
the following words; ". . .although the fighting spirit of 
the imperial army and navy is as high as ever, and with a 
view to maintain and protecting our noble national polity, 
we are about to make peace with the United States. . . .  At 
the same time the loyalty and achievement of your officers 
and men of the imperial forces will for all time be the 
quintessence of our nation." Ballou, op. cit., p. 197.
21n6W York Times, September 6, 1945; Yomiuri Hochi, 
September 6, 1945.
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history would absolve him of the responsibility for the 
Pacific W a r . 22
Indeed, the watchword of "gambari masho" was fully 
manifested. Following the broadcast of the Imperial 
Rescript of August 15, 1945, a Japanese Cabinet statement
stressed the continuity of Japanese national ideals;
The people must be concerned now with the defense 
of the national structure [Kokutai]. . . .  The 
government . . . will fight all hardships and 
always conform with the Imperial Will, absolutely 
to recover the national prestige and answer the 
will of our ancestors. (Emphasis added.
In a similar vein, calling for peaceful cooperation 
with the Occupation, Prime Minister Higashikuni repeatedly 
made reference to the preservation of the Kokutai:
When the whole Empire unites as one and advances 
overcoming the present difficulty in perfect order 
and unity, in full observance of the Imperial 
wishes, the whole world will be surprised at the 
greatness of Japan's polity, transcending victory 
and defeat. It is at this time of difficulty and 
adverse fortune Üiat the true value of our polity
will be revealed.24
It may be fairly safe to assume that the attitudes of
22gee, Ballou, 0£. cit., esp. pp. 193-200; Ivan I. 
Morris, Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan (Westport, 
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1974), pp. 22-58; Tojo Hideki, Tenno 
ni Sekinin Nashi [The Emperor Is Not Responsible] (Tokyo: 
Yoyosha, 1948).
23guoted in Delmer M. Brown, Nationalism in Japan 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1955), p. 240.
24guoted in Ibid.
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most Japanese toward the victor nations manifested during the 
period between August 15, 1945, when Japan accepted the
Potsdam terms of surrender, and September 10, 1945, when the 
salient aspects of the Unites States Initial Post-Surrender 
Policy for Japan^S were revealed, were of greater bona fides 
than those observable during the Occupation.^® On the very 
day when the Constitution of 1947 went into effect, Shimizu 
Cho, the Emperor's constitutional advisor and chairman of the 
Privy Council which approved the new constitution, drowned 
himself at Atami. His suicide note states; "I have decided 
to die so that I from the spiritual world may help to protect 
our national polity and wish the safe-being of His M a j e s t y ."2? 
There were others who followed suit. This was, in a great 
measure, a manifestation of the Japanese cultural psychology
2®Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Political 
Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948 (2 
vols.; Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949), II,
423-26. Cited hereafter as Political Reorientation.
2®For a glimpse of the Japanese attitudes of this 
period, see Lawrence E. Salisbury, "Regeneration of Japan," 
Far Eastern Survey (September 12, 1945), pp. 249-51;
"Japan's Submission," Spectator (September 7, 1945), p. 209; 
The Rt. Rev. Bishop S. Heaslett, "Japan In Defeat," 
Spectator (November 30, 1945), pp. 508-9; idem, "Japanese
Patriotism," Spectator (September 21, 1945), p. 262; Andie 
L. Knutson, "Japanese Opinion Surveys: The Special Need and 
the Special Difficulties," Public Opinion Quarterly, IX, No. 
3 (Fall, 1945), 313-19; Ernest R. Hilgard, "The Enigma of 
Japanese Friendliness," Public Opinion Quarterly, X, No. 5 
(Fall, 1946), 343-48.
^^Tokujiro Kanamori and Yamaura Kan-ichi, eds., 
Nihon Seihi Hyakunen Shi [History of One Hundred Years of 
Japanese Politics] [Tokyo: Jiji Shimpo Sha, 1953), p. 457.
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fostered and nurtured through the knightly code which taught 
that "death was better than disgrace."28
W. Macmahon Ball does not seem to have erred by 
stating that
There were to be two keynotes of this strategy [the 
Japanese scheme of coping with the Occupation]: 
complete outward compliance with the orders of the 
conquerors, combined with lasting spiritual 
resistance to the conqueror's will.
It should not go unnoticed that
Even the pro-American government of Prime Minister 
Yoshida came out shortly after the end of Occupation 
with the statement that one of the immediate tasks 
of the nation was to 'rectify the mistakes of the 
Occupation'.^8
Against the backdrop of the defeated nation of Japan 
replete with submerged national feelings coupled with gashin 
shotan,31 the Occupation embarked upon a political revolution 
on an unprecedented scale, believing that Japanese 
"nationalism, social institutions, economy, and politics were
2®Sir George S. Sansom, Japan; A Short Cultural 
History (Rev. ed.; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1962), 
p.287.
Z^Ball, op. cit., p. 47.
88yanaga Chitoshi, Japanese People and Politics (New 
York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), p. 8.
^^Ruth Benedict writes: " . . .  revenge ranks high in 
Japanese tradition as a 'good thing' under circumstances of 
insult or defeat." See her op. cit., p. 161.
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sorely shaken by defeat.
S. Department of State, "Japan: Free World
Ally," Department of State Publication 6516, Far Eastern 
Series 74 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 
10.
CHAPTER IX
DEMOCRATIZATION BY FIAT
The mood of the victor surrounding the anticipated 
occupation of a defeated Japan was redolent of vengeance. 
Typical expressions representative of this mood are found in 
the following passages. President Franklin Roosevelt stated 
on December 24, 1943;
. . . essential to all peace and security in the 
Pacific and in the rest of the world is the per­
manent elimination of the Empire of Japan as a 
potential force of aggression. . . .  For too many 
years we have lived on pious hopes that aggressor 
and war-like nations would learn and understand 
and carry out the doctrine of purely voluntary 
peace. The well-intentioned but ill-fated 
experiments of former years did not work. It is 
my hope that we will not try them again. . . .  It 
is my intention to do all that I humanly can as 
President and commander-in-chief to see to "it that 
these tragic mistakes shall not be made again. . .
I believe . . . that the other three great 
nations [Great Britain, China, and the Soviet 
Union] who are fighting so magnificently to gain 
peace are in complete agreement that we must be 
prepared to keep the peace by force. . . .  I do 
not think any insoluble differences will arise 
among Russia, Great Britain and the United States. 
. . .  I may say that ' I got along fine' with 
Marshal Stalin. . . .  I believe he is truly 
representative of the heart and soul of Russia; 
and I believe we are going to get along very well 
with ’ him and the Russian people very well
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— very well, indeed.^
Were President Roosevelt alive today, he would not 
be inclined to repeat the statement quoted above. By the 
same token. President Truman's Radio Address on September 1, 
1945, begins with the following passages:
My Fellow Americans: The thoughts and hopes of all 
America— indeed of all the civilized world— are 
centered tonight on the battleship Missouri.
There on that small piece of American soil 
anchored in Tokyo Harbor the Japanese have just 
officially laid down their arms. They have signed 
terms of unconditional surrender. Four years ago 
the thoughts and fears of the whole civilized 
world were centered on another piece of American 
soil— Pearl Harbor. The mighty threat to 
civilization which began there is now laid at 
rest. It was a long road to Tokyo— and a bloody 
one. We shall not forget Pearl Harbor. The 
Japanese militarists will not forget the U. S. S. 
Missouri. The evil done by the Japanese warlords 
can never be repaired or forgotten. But their 
power to destroy and kill has been taken from 
them. Their Armies and what is left of their Navy 
are now impotent.%
Having shouldered the preponderant share of 
defeating Japan, the United States was catapulted into a 
position to dominate the Occupation of Japan, which Herrymon 
Mauer called "potentially the most successful cultural
liiThe Text of President Roosevelt's Address on 
Christmas Eve, December 24, 1943." New York Times, December 
25, 1943, p. 8.
U^. S. Department of State, The Axis in Defeat: A 
Collection of Documents on American Policy Toward Germany 
and Japan, publication 2423 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1945), p. 38. Cited hereafter as The Axis 
in Defeat.
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diffusion in history."3 Determined not to forget Pearl 
Harbor and mindful of the strong national consciousness of 
the J a p a n e s e , 4 planners of the Occupation were intent on 
reforming the Japanese society in such a way as to deprive 
Japan of its trouble-making proclivities.^  The
Occupationaires apparently assumed the Occupation through 
democratization efforts would be capable of transforming 
Japan into a democratic country denuded of the traditional 
sentiments of Japanese nationalism.®
Arguing that without a reliable democratic Japan 
peace is unthinkable in the Far East and the Pacific, David 
Dempsey produced an impressive list of basic political and 
economic evils of Japan.? as we read in the United States
^Herrymon Mauer, "The U.S. Does a Job," Fortune, 
March 1947, p. 134.
^See, for example, Otto D. Tolischus, "The Savage 
Code That Rules Japan," New York Times Magazine, February 6, 
1944, pp. 5, 36-37; Hans Simons, "The Conditions of Uncon­
ditional Surrender," Social Research, X, No. 4 (November, 
1943), 399-416; Royal Institute of International Affairs,
Japan in Defeat (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945).
^Political Reorientation, II, 423-426.
®Hugh Borton, "American Occupation Policies in 
Japan," Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, 
XXII (January, 1948), 37-45; idem, "Preparation for the
Occupation of Japan," Journal of Asian Studies, XXV, No. 2 
(February, 1966), 203-212.
^David Dempsey's list includes: 1) Japan should be 
stripped of her conquests; 2) State Shinto should be elim­
inated; 3) Organized Mikado-worship should be done away 
with; 4) Control of education should be in Allied hands; 5) 
The State Police should be abolished; 6) Democracy should be
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Initial Post-Surrender Policy For Japan of 29 August 1 9 4 5 ,& 
the ultimate objectives of the Occupation were to punish, 
demilitarize, and democratize Japan so that "Japan will not 
again become a menace to the United States or to the peace 
and security of the world." Implied assumptions were: 1)
The thoroughness of defeat convinced the Japanese people 
that a forced political reorientation in Japan would be 
inevitable; 2) The democratization of Japan would mean a 
collapse of ultranationalism; and 3) A democratized Japan 
would be a peace-loving, cooperative nation in the 
international community.^ In effect, the Occupation "tried 
sys tematically to cleanse those nations [Germany and Japan, 
which were in the still glowing ashes of destruction] of the 
militaristic and nationalistic elements that had brought 
them to war. In other words, the Occupation attempted to 
transform the Japanese ultranationalism of the recent past
instituted, with real power coming from the people; 7) The 
power of the Zaibatsu should be broken; 8) Agrarian reform 
should be instituted; 9) Freedom of communication should be 
restored; and 10) Political leaders should be trained. See 
his "Occupation Policy: Germany and Japan," Antioch Review, 
VI, No. 1 (Spring, 1946), 153.
^The Axis in Defeat, pp. 107.
^Ibid., p. 108. For a critical view on the 
objectives of the Initial Policy planners, see Herbert 
Passin, The Legacy of the Occupation— Japan. Occasional 
papers of the East Asia Institute (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1968).
lOjohn D. Montgomery, '"Guided Missiles': 
Reflections on the Politics of Foreign Aid," Far Eastern 
Survey, XXVIII, No. 6 (June, 1959), 85.
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into internationalism through what John D. Montgomery called 
"a programmed installation of democracy. Imposing 
democracy on defeated nations was based on the belief that 
victory allows the victor the right to guide the course of 
world history, meaning imposing his standards on the 
vanquished.12
Democratization encapsulated the most important 
positive objective with which the Allied Occupation policy 
was concerned in dealing with a defeated Japan.
The Japanese people shall be encouraged to develop 
a desire for individual liberties and respect for 
fundamental human rights, particularly the 
freedoms of religion, assembly, speech, and the 
press. They shall also be encouraged to form dem­
ocratic and representative organizations.
There were, however, negative aspects in the 
Occupation policy that had to precede democratization.14 
Demobilization, demilitarization, deindustrialization, and 
decentralization were regarded as constituting essential
11John D. Montgomery, Forced to Be Free (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 4.
12prime Minister Winston Churchill argued to this 
effect in his speech to the House of Commmons on August 20, 
1940. See Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol. 
364, No. 105 (August 20, 1940), p. 1170.
l^The Axis in Defeat, p. 108.
14jbid.
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conditions for the democratization of Japan.
The obvious purpose of these negative policies was 
to rid Japan of her "obnoxious f e a t u r e s . T h e r e  were 
strong indications, as Robert King Hall observed, that "The 
military authorities . . . concentrate their attention more 
on the removal of obstacles than on positive democratic 
measures."17 The attempt to eliminate the obnoxious fea­
tures involved the physical as well as non-physical aspects. 
When the Japanese people^® decided to be a "model conquered 
people,"19 it was a foregone conclusion that the elimination 
of the physically obnoxious features would be relatively 
easy. As Merle Fainsod notes in this regard:
Clarity there was on what was to be destroyed or 
eliminated. But much more difficult was the 
realization that political reconstruction carries
ISpolitical Reorientation, I, Introduction.
l^Carl J. Friedrich, "Military Government and 
Democratization: A Central Issue of American Foreign
Policy," in American Experiences in Military Government in 
World War II, ed. by Carl J. Friedrich et al. (New York: 
Rinehart, 1948), p. 3.
l^Robert King Hall, "Japan: Are All Gods Equal?,"
Yearbook of Education, 1950, p. 568.
IBchanning Liem characterizes the Japanese as a 
"sadistic people," fearing and worshipping power. Liem
further argues that "the Japanese do not question the right 
or wrong of the mighty. They simply worship the powerful." 
See his "Re-education of Japan," Forum, CVI, No. 3
(November, 1945), pp. 194-195.
^9guoted in T. V. Smith, "Consent and Coercion in 
Germany," Pacific Spectator, I, No. 3 (Summer, 1947), 324- 
25.
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other imperatives— encouragement to groups that
have repudiated Naziism and militarism, and the 
creation of conditions that make it possible for 
such groups to orovide constructive leadership in
new directions.0
Keenly mindful of the Japanese trait of "situational 
ethics," many observers looked askance at the willing 
compliance of the Japanese with the Occupation directives. 
Jesse F. Steiner's observation merits quotation;
Throughout recent decades, in so far as the 
government could control institutional changes, 
the invasion of foreign ways and ideas have been 
guided in directions that would advance national 
interests. . . . The response of the Japanese to 
contacts with Western civilization tended to 
follow well-established patterns of social 
change. . . . Accustomed as the Japanese have 
been to governmental control so widely extended as 
to hamper freedom of thought as well as of action, 
it is not surprising that they have shown great 
docility in adjusting themselves to defeat. Their 
prompt acceptance of the Emperor's decision to 
surrender has been duplicated by their efforts to 
carry out the most drastic orders of their 
conquerors. . . .  But the prompt obedience of the 
Japanese to Allied directives during the first 
year of defeat gives no assurance that the social 
and political reconstruction of Japan will take 
the precise form desired by the foreign powers. 
The experience of the Japanese in adopting and 
integrating foreign cultures in the past gives 
reason to believe that in this emergency they will 
endeavor to bring about the desired ends by 
putting new wine in old bottles.
Merle Fainsod, "The Development of American Mil­
itary Government Policy During World War II," in Carl J. 
Friedrich et at., op. cit., p. 51.
21jesse F. Steiner, "Social Change in Japan," 
Sociology and Social Research, XXXI, No. 1 (September- 
October, 1946), pp. 5, 9, 10.
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From the outset of the Occupation, there were 
conflicting views as to the feasibility and validity of 
imposing democracy by military fiat on a defeated Japan 
whose cherished cultural sentiments, values, and traditions 
militated against democratic i d e a l s . ^2 Optimistic 
Occupationaires^^ assumed that the elimination or 
suppression of Japanese ultranationalism by dint of official 
policies would bring about a disappearance of the unique 
nature of Japanese national c o n s c i o u s n e s s . 24
General MacArthur as Supreme Commander for the 
Allied Powers set the tone of the Occupation based on his 
firm conviction "that the entire human race, irrespective of
22jt is of interest to contrast General Douglas
MacArthur's rosy picture of the accomplishments wrought by 
the Occupation revealed in his testimony in May, 1951, with 
the negative interpretation by Robert B. Textor. See
General MacArthur's Testimony, U. S. Senate, 82nd Congress, 
1st Session, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services 
and the Committee on Foreign Relations, Military Situation 
in the Far East, May 3-5, 1951, Pt. I, pp. 309-318; Robert 
B. Textor, Failure in Japan (New York; The John Day Co., 
1951).
23see, for example. General Douglas MacArthur,
"Japan: An Economy of Survival," Fortune, June, 1949, 74ff; 
Claude E. Strait, "Japan Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow," 
Religion in Life, XVIII, No. 2 (Spring, 1949), 274-284;
Robert E. Ward, "The Potential for Democratization in Prewar 
Japan," in John D. Montgomery and Albert 0. Hirschman, eds.. 
Public Policy (Yearbook of the Graduate School of Public 
Administration, Harvard University; Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1968), Vol. XVIII, pp.. 105-143.
24por a fuller understanding of this point, see 
Nakajima Fumio, Nihon Seishin to Seio Seishin [Japanese 
Spirit and Western Spirit) (Tokyo: Yoyo Shobo, 1947);
Nishimura Shinji, Nihon Minzoku Riso [The Ideals of the
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geographical limitations or cultural tradition, is capable 
of absorbing, cherishing and defending liberty, tolerance, 
and justice, and will find maximum strength and progress 
when so blessed."25 General MacArthur's conviction needs to 
be seen with some qualifications. It is, indeed, a truism 
that liberty, tolerance, and justice are ideals worth 
fighting for and dying for. Yet the capacity to absorb, 
cherish, and defend them is not necessarily inherent in 
every national society.
To impose alien ideas and institutions on a 
culturally dissimilar society constituted the main charge 
with which critics gainsaid the Occupation policy. As 
Daniel Lerner explains, "A code [or culture], since it 
requires the transformation of millions of individual life 
histories through generations, cannot simply be transferred 
from one society to another."2? Many writers on 
acculturation and social change seem to agree that the field 
of material culture is the first and easiest transfer 
between societies, that the field of social organizations is 
a more difficult and slower transfer, and that the field of
25political Reorientation, II, 785.
2^Ernest Eaglehole, "Character Structure, Its Role 
in the Analysis of International Relations," Psychiatry; 
Journal of the Biology and Pathology of International 
Relations, VII, No. 2 (May, 1944), 145-162.
2^Daniel Lerner, "The Transformation of 
Institutions," in Transfer of Institutions, ed. by William 
B. Hamilton (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1964), p.
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beliefs, values and ideas is the slowest and most difficult 
transfer, facing the greatest obstacles.28 in a similar 
vein, Robert A. Scalapino notes;
. . .  it was always easier to borrow foreign 
technology than to adopt successfully a foreign 
ethical-political system. The former contains a 
high quotient of universalism, while the latter is 
strongly particularistic because of the myriad of 
variables out of which it is constructed.2=
What the implies is that Japan would only grow more 
efficient in her use of things Western, and that her ancient 
patterns of mind would remain basically unchanged. To state
2®William H. R. Rivers, The History of Melanesian 
Society (Cambridge; University of Cambridge Press, 1914); 
Robert Redfield, Ralph Linton, and Melville J. Herskovits, 
"Memorandum on the Study of Acculturation," American 
Anthropologist, XXXVIII, No. 1 (January-March, 1936), 149-
52; Melville J. Herskovits, "Some Comments on the Study of 
Cultural Contact," American Anthropologist, XLIII, No. 1 
(January- March, 1941), 1-10; Talcott Parsons, "The Problem 
of Controlled Institutional Change; An Essay in Applied 
Social Science," Psychiatry, VIII, No. 1 (February, 1945), 
79-101; Margaret M. Lam, "Acculturation and War," Sociology 
and Social Research, XXX, No. 4 (March-April, 1946), 255-
263; Raymond W. Firth, Economics of the New Zealand Maori 
(2nd ed.; Wellington, N.Z.; R. E. Owen, Government Printer, 
1959); idem, "Notes on the Social Structure of Some South- 
Eastern New Guinea Communities," Man, LII (June, 1952), 86- 
89; Bert Landheer, "The Concept of 'Social Change' in 
Sociological Theory," International Journal of Comparative 
Sociology, I, No. 1 (March, 1960), 76-88; Bert F. Hoselitz, 
"Advanced and Underdeveloped Countries; A Study in Devel­
opment Contrast," in Hamilton, op. cit., pp. 27-58; Reinhart 
Bendix, "Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered," Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, IX, No. 3 (April, 1967), 
292-348.
29Robert A. Scalapino, "Ideology and Modernization—  
the Japanese Case," in Ideology and Discontent, ed. by David 
E. Apter (New York; The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 99.
234
this differently using the phrases suggested by Gabriel A. 
Almond and Sidney Verba, whatever progress Japan may make 
would result in an increase in "output affect," without 
entailing a diminution of "system affect."^0 in other
words, the Japanese are accustomed to advanced technical 
civilization to promote national interests and to satisfy 
individual "comfort instinct," retaining their long- 
cherished "cultural instinct." It may be pointed out that 
the "comfort instinct" belongs to the realm of universality, 
whereas the "cultural instinct" to that of particularity.31 
In anticipation of Japan's defeat, Hugh Byas
expressed his concern over the future of Japan. An undeni­
able physical destruction and a complete defeat would teach
the Japanese the lesson that a war does not pay more than an 
outside interference in the postwar Japan's domestic 
affairs. Byas went on to state:
3*^Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic 
Culture (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965), Ch. III.
l^Many dealt with this point using various phrases. 
For example, Almond and Verba's "output affect and system 
affect," Deutsch's "objectively 'rational' behavior and 
subjectively convenient behavior," Lifton's "flux and 
inertia," and Schweigler's "instrumental and sentimental." 
See respectively, Almond and Verba, op cit., pp. 63ff; Karl 
W. Deutsch, "The Growth Nations: Some Recurrent Patterns of 
Political and Social Integration," World Politics, V, No. 2 
(January, 1953), 181; Robert J. Lifton, "Youth and History: 
Individual Change in Postwar Japan," Daedalus, XCI, No. 1 
(Winter, 1962), 172; Gebhard L. Schweigler, National
Consciousness in Divided Germany (Beverly Hills: Sage
Publications, 1975), p. 144.
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To all intents and purposes, Japan is a united 
nation. . . . Japanese liberalism has obediently 
kept step with Japanese militarism since the first 
shot was fired in Manchuria in 1931. . . .  To the 
Japanese, national unity is an end in itself. . .
The difficulties are not of legal creation 
only; they exist in the minds of the people; they 
are the product of conditions going far back in 
history. The problem of democracy in the East is 
not that of writing constitutions but of 
instructing vast masses of people in self- 
government . . . her predatory traditions will 
revive if they get a c h a n c e .
A similar concern was expressed about the Japanese 
mind by Robert 0. Ballou in 1945:
The submergence of the individuals and the 
destruction of armies are simpler matters than the 
destruction of ideas. In the war against Japan 
the United Nations are fighting not only against 
an army, a navy, and an air force, but also 
against an ideological force which was more than a 
thousand years old when Pan-Germanism was born, 
and which is more powerful in conditioning a 
people than Nazism could ever be, because it has 
behind it the strength of an ancient and undying 
religious reverence.
Many writers stressed similar viewpoints. Monica 
Hunter Wilson argued that it would be out of the question to 
understand existing institutions without a knowledge of the 
past, adding that any culture can only be fully understood
^^Hugh Byas, "The Japanese Problem," Yale Review, 
XXXII, No. 3 (March, 1943), 456, 462, 467.
^^Robert 0. Ballou, Shinto: The Unconquered Enemy
(New York: The Viking Press, 1945), p. 4.
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in its historical c o n t e x t . I n  a similar vein, Robert N. 
Bellah argued that "the Japanese tradition must be studied 
in order to discover those elements that can provide 
fruitful soil for the development of democratic institutions 
in J a p a n . "35 Arguing that the division of history into 
epochs, like the distinction between tradition and 
modernity, is a construct of definite, but limited, utility, 
Reinhart Bendix tells us;
Even if the "vicious cycle of poverty" is broken, 
subsequent changes of the social structure will 
vary with the preindustrial conditions of the 
country, the particular impetus of the 
development, the path which modernization takes, 
the significant differences that persist in 
developed economies, and finally with the impact 
and timing of dramatic e v e n t s . 3 °
Before, and after, Japan's surrender, not a few 
observers were of the opinion that a victory of one 
government's military forces over those of another 
government would not of itself wholly determine the 
character of the new equilibrium. "Victory merely renders 
the defeated government powerless for the time being to use 
force on the molar level as a government against the
3^Monica Hunter Wilson, "Methods in the Study of 
Culture Contact," Africa, VII (1934), 336.
35Robert N. Bellah, Beyond Belief (New York: Harper
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victor."37 Otto D. Tolischus was quite right when he stated 
that
It is obvious, therefore, that neither vengeance 
nor punishment, however widely and dramatically 
inflicted, will end the scourge of Nazism and 
Nipponism unless there is a complete extermination 
of the doctrines which inspire them. And this 
ideological extermination is more important than 
any physical extermination of the guilty.38
Despite the arguments advanced by many acculturation 
writers to the effect that the aspects of tradition lying on 
the non-material level are very resistant to change and the 
fact that the imposition of democracy upon the Japanese by 
military fiat is "sheer n o n s e n s e , t h e  Occupation, 
influenced by America's "sense of m i s s i o n , "^0 embarked upon a
^^Lowell Juilliard Carr, "A Situational Approach to 
Conflict and War," Social Forces, XXIV, No. 3 (March, 1946), 
302.
33otto D. Tolischus, "The Savage Code That Rules 
Japan," New York Times Magazine, February 6, 1944, p. 37.
3®Addison Gulick, "The Problem of Right and Wrong in 
Japan and Some of Its Political Consequences," Journal of 
Social Psychology, XXVI (Spring, 1947), 3-20: Gulick tells 
us that imposing democracy on a defeated Japan is "sheer 
non-sense, for the simple reason that democracy is par 
excellence the unimposable variety of government," arguing 
that "the political and social fabric of the [Japanese] 
nation, together with the structure of family life, all are 
built directly on unilateral loyalty of the inferior to the 
superior. Throughout recorded history, the Japanese ethical 
concepts have consistently disparaged the desire for 
individual welfare as inimical to the idea of loyalty."
"America's 'sense of mission' has not always been 
a comfortable companion to her pragmatic philosophies and
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Herculean task of eradicating the Japanese spirit to bring 
about democracy in Japan. Hugh Tinker argues that the 
Anglo-American thinking in foreign aid "is influenced by two 
strongly opposing traditions. There is a tradition of 
compassion, manifested in so much missionary and 
humanitarian enterprise. But there is also a firm tradition 
in self-help, to which the Darwinian doctrine of the 
survival of the fittest gave an added ruthlessness."41 jn a 
sense, the Occupation was the culmination of many decades of 
Japanese-American relations in which America played a 
tutorial role of sorts, with Japan as disciple. The 
Occupation reaffirmed that role. But because of the context 
of relations it created was, on the whole, unpleasant for 
Japan— dependence, helplessness, subordination— the
ambivalent attitudes were intensified.^2 in view of the 
extreme obsession of the Japanese with their national 
honor43 and the Japanese sensitivity to their international
her materialistic achievements." John D. Montgomery, op. 
cit., p. 85.
^^Hugh Tinker, "The Human Factor in Foreign Aid," 
Pacific Affairs, XXXII, No. 3 (September, 1959), 289.
^^Herbert Passin and John W. Bennett, "The American 
Educated Japanese; 1. The Student in America; Theory; 
Background; Images," The Annals (September, 1954), 105.
43"The Japanese nation is by nature the most 
ambitious of honor of all Oriental nations, and will 
sacrifice life itself to maintain a punctilio." Quoted in 
Maurice Collis, Land of the Great Stone Image (New York: 
Knopf, 1943), p. 126.
239
r a n k i n g , 44 i g  not too difficult to fathom how galling the
Occupation must have been to the Japanese feeling.
It would serve us well to recall that, until the 
forced unconditional surrender on August 15, 1945, Japanese 
ambition was fostered by the idea that no Oriental country 
came near her in power. The presence of white peoples in
Asia was resented not because of an inherent xenophobia
among the Japanese people but because it posed an obstacle 
to Japanese domination of Asia. When the Allied Occupation 
of Japan is seen in the light of Japan's national mission
that she deserved to be a dominating power in Asia, the
primary problem of a defeated Japan facing the Occupation 
was the Japanese mind, not shrinking her e m p i r e . *5
Arguing that "The life of a people, its 
institutions, beliefs, and arts are but the visible 
expression of its individual soul," Gustave LeBon stated;
To the Japanese mind, the national soul is 
indispensable as an integral part of the state 
which is no less a spiritual existence than a 
social, economic, and political existence.4°
44iîerbert Passin argues that the Japanese harbor an 
extraordinary concern for international ranking, and tend to 
treat foreign nationals by the yardstick of the perceived 
rank of their country. See his, "Socio-cultural Factors in 
the Japanese Perception of International Order," Japan 
Institute of International Affairs Annual Review, V (1969- 
1970), 51-75.
4^Willis Church Lamott, "What Not To Do With Japan," 
Harper's, June, 1945, p. 585.
4^Gustave LeBon, Psychology of Peoples (New York:
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Moreover, LeBon notes that there are three influences that 
govern the individual and direct his conduct: 1) ancestors; 
2) the influence of immediate parents; and 3) the influence 
of the environment. LeBon goes on to state very bluntly 
that "Reason is incapable of transforming men's 
conviction."47
Writing on the problems involved in "controlled 
institutional change"^® with a special reference to the 
German people, Talcott Parsons argues that a permanent 
change of character structure is dependent upon 
institutional change. But he hastens to add that the 
typical character structure of the German people, albeit an 
independent factor of great significance, is supported by, 
and closely interdependent with, an institutional structure 
of German society. Parsons further argues that the 
interdependence is so significant that any permanent and 
far-reaching change in the orientation of the German people 
cannot rest on a change of character structure alone, but 
must involve institutional change as well. Otherwise, the 
existing institutional conditions would keep on breeding the
The Macmillan Co., 1898), Introduction.
47ibid., p. xvii.
4®Talcott Parsons, "The Problem of Controlled 
Institutional Change: An Essay in Applied Social Science," 
Psychiatry, VIII, No. 1 (February, 1945), 79-101.
241
same type of character structure in the new generations. He 
goes on to claim that "a direct attack on character 
structure as such is less promising than one through other 
forces which operate on the institutional system which, 
through changes in that, may serve to create conditions 
favorable to a change in character structure."49
Parsons enlarges on his point by arguing that it is 
necessary to analyze the uniformities of human behavior in 
terms of the structure of motivational forces, on the one 
hand, and that of the situation in which they have to 
operate, on the other. Parsons goes on to argue that the 
structure of the situation depends upon "the stability of 
motivational structure of the members of the society at 
large." Arguing further that in an integrated system "self- 
interested elements of motivation and disinterested moral 
sentiments of duty tend to motivate the same concrete 
goals."50 Parsons continuing arguments are especially so 
germane to our concern that they merit quotation at some 
length :
Human behavior may be influenced either through 
the situation in which people must act, or through 
"subjective" elements— their sentiments, goals, 
attitudes, definitions of situations. . . . The 
changes of successful influence do not depend 
mainly on the apparent "reasonableness" of what is 
transmitted but on its relation to the functional
49lbid., p. 79.
50Ibid., p. 80.
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equilibrium of the system on which it impinges.
This in turn depends on at least three factors: 
the functional significance of the manifestations 
it attempts to displace; the potential functions 
of the new patterns which are put forward; and the 
appropriateness of the source and manner of 
influence, that is, the definition of the 
situation of "being influenced" from the point of 
view of the recipients. (Emphasis added.)
There seems to be a grain of truth in the statement 
that "rational adaptation to realistic situation a
functional component of human social behavior."5% This 
statement seems to fit well with Japanese "situational 
ethics" sufficiently demonstrated in Japan's modern history 
and the Japanese national trait of continuously advancing 
"output affect" without sacrificing "system affect."
In the light of the various arguments presented 
above, we will examine the pros and cons of the Occupation. 
In working for the objectives drawn upon the outlines 
stipulated in the Potsdam Declaration^^ of July 26, 1945, 
and the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for 
Japan of August 29, 1945, the Occupation carried out a
complex of policies that directly or indirectly attacked the 
Japanese spirit and ideals that were believed to have been 
responsible for Japan's misdeeds perpetrated in the pre-
S^Ibid., pp. 84-85.
52lbid., p. 52.
S^The Axis in Defeat, pp. 27-28.
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surrender d e c a d e s . 54 Among the earliest and most important 
measures undertaken by the Occupation were those that were 
to undermine the Japanese spirit which had been blamed for 
Japanese ultranationalism. The education system was the 
first object of a t t a c k . 55
Barely a month after the surrender, the Occupation 
issued an order banning the teaching of all militaristic and 
ultranationalistic ideology and requiring the Japanese 
authorities to remove all teachers and textbooks associated 
with such ideology "in order to eliminate from the 
educational system of Japan those militaristic and 
ultranationalistic influences which in the past have 
contributed to the defeat, war guilt, suffering, privation, 
and present deplorable state of the Japanese p e o p l e . "56 A. 
subsequent directive specifically prohibited all courses in 
morals [Shushin],5^ Japanese history and geography, for
54u. S. Department of State, Occupation of Japan; 
Policy and Progress, Publication No. 2671, Far Eastern 
Series 17 (Washington, D. C. : Government Printing Office, 
1946), p. 33. [Hereafter cited as Occupation of Japan.]
55por an exhaustive treatment of the Occupation's 
education policy, see Robert King Hall, Education for a New 
Japan (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949).
56Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Documents 
Concerning the Allied Occupation and Control of Japan 
(Tokyo, 1950), II, 224.
57por a detailed discussion of this subject, see 
Robert King Hall, Shushin: The Ethics of a Defeated Nation 
(New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College,
Columbia University, 1949).
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these textbooks had been published by the Ministry of 
Education.58 The next major step taken by the Occupation 
attacking the ideological front took place on December 15, 
1945. On this date, the Occupation issued a directive which 
was specifically aimed at abolishing government support of 
State Shinto, which in fact was a direct attack on 
ultranationalistic ideology in general.
Among the stated aims in disestablishing the state 
religion was the prevention of a recurrence of the 
perversion of Shinto theory and beliefs into militaristic 
and ultranationalistic propaganda designed to delude the 
Japanese people and lead them into wars of aggression.59
The directive in question was not limited to State 
Shinto, but extended to the "propagation and dissemination 
of militaristic and ultranationalistic ideology in . . . the 
doctrines, practices, rites, ceremonies, and observances of
58it is interesting to note that the educational 
purge was announced on October 30, 1945, on the fifty-fifth 
anniversary of the promulgation of the Imperial Rescript on 
Education. The Rescript, exploited by government leaders 
and nationalists to the fullest extent, had been until the 
surrender the single most important political document which 
Ruth Benedict aptly called "the true holy writ of Japan." 
Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (Boston; 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1946), p. 209. Also see Political 
Reorientation, II 585.
59s c APIN 448 of December 15, 1945. ["SCAPIN"
denotes directives of the Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers.] Quoted in Political Reorientation, II, 467-69.
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any religion, faith, sect, creed, or philosophy."®^ 
According to the very sweeping terms of this
disestablishment directive, no government agency or official 
was to take part in the spread of Shinto teachings or in the 
support of the Shinto establishment, no public funds were to 
be allocated for Shinto institutions, no Shinto doctrines 
were to be taught at schools, and school trips to Shinto 
shrines were prohibited.®^
By the same token, the government was prohibited
from circulating such famous nationalist commentaries as 
Kokutai no Honqi [The Fundamental Principles of the National 
Constitution] and Shinmin no Mi chi [The Way of the
Subjects].®2 The directive also made a frontal attack on
certain nationalistic symbols. It prohibited the official 
use of terms whose connotation in Japanese is inextricably 
connected with State Shinto, militarism, and 
ultranationalism. Among these it specified Hakko Ichiu [The 
Eight Corners of the World Under One Roof] and Dai Toa Senso
®0%bid. 
61Ibid.
®2por a detailed discussion of these famous 
nationalist commentaries, see chapters on "Kokutai" and 
"Thought Control" of this dissertation. The Way of the 
Subjects [Shinmin no Michi], was issued by the Ministry of 
Education to all schools and community organizations in 
August, 1941 as a handbook for young persons. This 
remarkable nationalist commentary attacked individualism, 
liberalism, utilitarianism, and materialism in one breath, 
and offered an elaborate rationale for Japan's overseas 
activities.
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[Greater East Asia War]. Kamidana [The Traditional God- 
Shelves] were prohibited in all public buildings and ordered 
to be removed immediately. 3^
Finally, the directive carefully spelled out the 
meaning of the ubiquitous term "militaristic and 
ultranationalistic ideology":
(i) The doctrine that the Emperor of Japan is 
superior to the heads of other states, because of 
ancestry, descent or special origin. (ii) The 
doctrine that the people of Japan are superior to 
the people of other lands, because of ancestry, 
descent, or special origin. (iii) The doctrine 
that the islands of Japan are superior to other 
lands because of divine or special origin. (iv)
Any other doctrine which tends to delude the 
Japanese people into embarking upon wars of 
aggression or to glorify the use of force as an 
instrument foil the settlement of disputes with 
other peoples.
Thus, the term was defined to encompass virtually 
the entire set of notions upon which the supposed uniqueness 
of Japanese Kokutai had rested. This directive of 
disestablishing State Shinto was in line with the spirit of 
the Potsdam Conference:
The Potsdam conference recognized the primary 
importance of education as a means of establishing 
and strengthening democratic tendencies among the 
Japanese people. Only a democratically educated 
Japanese people would be able to stimulate and
G^Until the surrender, all Japanese subjects were 
encouraged to install Kamidana and Shinto talismans in their 
houses as a token of loyalty.
^^Political Reorientation, II, 467-469.
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defend political progress and build a frame of 
mind conducive to peaceful cooperation with other 
nations. . . .  On the basis of this recognition 
the Allied powers on September 14, 1945, set up a 
special policy for an educational program. This 
policy, based upon the broad outlines of the 
Potsdam Proclamation, established that the goal of 
educational programs would be the re-education of 
the whole Japanese population. (Emphasis 
added.)
The Occupation's educational policy attempted to 
bring about a spiritual revolution of the entire Japanese 
people. But an observer tells us that "reform measures 
which are not executed with the initiative of the people 
concerned do not e n d u r e . "GG appears that the
Occupationaires failed to see that
artifacts can be objectively proved better or 
worse, while constructs cannot be so demonstrated.
This is why the conclusion that things are 
diffused more readily than ideas, encountered 
again and again in the [cultural contact] 
literature, has at times seemed obvious.
Melville J. Herskovits cogently notes that
whether contact is on the basis of equality, or 
force reflects the desire of a stronger people to 
impose their way of life on an unwilling, weaker 
folk, the fact that the receiving group can find 
in the traditions of the donors something
GSg. s. Department of State, Occupation of Japan, 
op. cit., p. 33.
®®Tsuru Shigeto, "A New Japan?: Political, Economic, 
and Social Aspects of Postwar Japan," Atlantic Monthly, 
CXCV, No. 1 (January, 1955), p. 105;
G^Herskovits, op. cit., p. 2.
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understandable in terms of their own patterns 
makes for a lack of resistance and accelerates 
acceptance.
In a similar vein, Hans Simons argues that
one cannot mobilize a nation to a mounting effort 
to preserve itself if one does not satisfy what it 
conceives as . its own national interest. . . . 
Victory therefore has to bring moral
satisfaction.
There was no shortage of critics who took to task 
the Occupation's policy of imposing democracy on Japan. 
Both Occupation supporters and critics seem to have made a 
mistake by oversimplifying the unique nature of Japanese 
political culture. Both sides regarded the Japanese as a 
homogeneous people. While Occupation supporters took on the 
notion that the Japanese, like any other people, long for 
individual liberties, critics impugned the Occupation's 
democratizing policy on the grounds that the Japanese 
people, on account of their ultranationalism and 
hierarchical concept of social structure,^0 had an aversion 
to human rights as preached by the Occupationaires.
Put bluntly, the Occupationaires claimed that "sound 
ideas [well tested in the crucible of Western experience]
68ibid., pp. 5-6.
G^Hans Simons, 0£. cit., p. 401.
^Opor a good discussion of the hierarchical concept 
of social structure in Japan, see Nakane Chie, Japanese 
Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970).
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cannot be stopped" in any cultural setting, whereas the 
critics argued that the Occupation efforts to democratize 
Japan by means of physical demobilization and re-writing of 
her constitution are all necessary, but these efforts would 
be rendered futile unless a moral demobilization of the 
Japanese people takes place.
Many believed that the real problem confronting the 
Occupation was not the destruction of physical aspects such 
as reducing Japan's empire, destroying her military 
capability, preventing her rearmament, or introducing
democratic institutions, but the elimination of "the 
Japanese spirit," which was believed to have been
responsible for her ultranationalism in the pre-surrender 
d e c a d e s . 72 There was an implied assumption on the part of 
the Occupation that the "moral demilitarization" of the 
Japanese people could be achieved through the "Purge
Program,"73 by disfranchising the undesirables "who had
73-For a typically critical viewpoint, see W. 
Macmahon Ball, "Reflections on Japan," Pacific Affairs, XXI, 
No. 1 (March, 1948), 3-13.
72Delmer M. Brown, Nationalism in Japan (Berkeley: 
University of Caifornia Press, 1955), pp. 243-248.
73gee U. S. Department of State, The Axis in Defeat, 
p. 110; Hans H. Baerwald, The Purge of Japanese Leaders 
Under the Occupation (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1959); Kinoshita Hanji, "Purge" Policy and After, 
Conference paper, 12th Institute of Pacific Relations 
Conference, Kyoto, 1954, p. 40: Kinoshita writes: "The purge 
system, an important means to democratize and demilitarize 
Japan, dealt a near fatal blow, for a time at least, to
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played an active part in formulating Japan's policy of 
aggression" and by eliminating a host of patriotic organ­
izations that had pandered to Japan's ultranationalism.
Just as history is often cited to claim that the 
Japanese are a conservative people as well as to claim that 
they are a progressive people, the work of the Occupation is
evaluated as a success by panegyrists^^ of the Occupation
76and a failure by critics. From the outset, many a critic 
doubted the value of the Occupation, especially in the area 
of "spiritual revolution" on the part of the Japanese people, 
A noted authority of Japan, Sir George B. Sansom, said in 
1948;
leaders in various circles. But the effect of the blow 
was temporary, since the Emperor system, nucleus of old 
militaristic Japan, was allowed to remain in force."
'^ P^olitical Reorientation, p. 413; Occupation of 
Japan, pp. 73-74; Kinoshita, op. cit., on pages 22-23 
gives a monthly total for the number of groups dissovled 
during the period in 1946-1947. The first postwar rightist 
group to be dissoved was the New and Powerful Mass Party 
(Shinei Taishuto) in December 1947; 29 in 1950; and 9 in 
1951.
75por General Douglas MacArthur’s sanguine view on 
democratic reforms, see Nippon Times, September 3, 1946; 
also see Robert E. Ward, "The Potential for Democratization 
in Prewar Japan," in Pacific Policy, ed. by John D. 
Montgomery and Albert O. Hirschman (Yearbook of the Graduate 
School of Public Administration, Harvard University; 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968) vol. XVIII, 
pp. 105-43.
^^Gulick, pp. cit., 3-20.
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Perhaps they [the Japanese], of all Asiatic 
peoples, are the most likely material for the 
ambitious experiment in democratization which is 
now taking place; but these heady doctrines can 
stimulate without nourishing, so that in Japan, as 
elsewhere in Asia, it is likely that the form of 
government ultimately developed will be something 
which only superficially resembles its Western 
model.'?
Despite the views expressed by many observers?® to 
the contrary. General MacArthur was so confident in his 
performance that he could describe the first year of the 
Occupation as follows;
A spiritual revolution ensued almost overnight, 
tore asunder a theory and practice of life built 
upon 2,-000 years of history and tradition and 
legend. . . . This revolution of the spirit among 
the Japanese people represents no thin veneer to 
serve the purpose of the present. It represents 
an unparallelled convulsion in the social history 
of the World.
??Sir George B. Sansom, "Conflicting Purposes in 
Japan," Foreign Affairs, XXVI, No. 2 (February, 1948), 305.
?®Beaglehole, 0£. cit., p. 155; Sidney Shallet, "The 
Occupation of Japan," Forum, October, 1945, pp. 162-164; C. 
I. Thompson, "Indoctrinating Democracy," Forum, November,
1945, pp. 209-215; idem, "Can Democracy Be Transplanted?," 
Forum, January, 1946, pp. 414-418; idem, "Will A 
Constitution Guarantee Democracy?," Forum, December, 1945, 
318-322; Andrew Roth, "Japan Unchanged," New Statesman and 
Nation, April 6, 1946, pp. 240-241; Douglas G. Haring, 
"Aspects of Personal Character in Japan," Journal of Asian 
Studies, VI, No. 1 (November, 1946), 12-22; A Member of the 
RAF, "Military Occupation Can't Succeed," Harpers, November,
1946, 385-390; David Nelson Rowe, "The New Japanese 
Constitution— II," Far Eastern Survey, XVI, No. 2 (February 
12, 1947), 30-34; Economist, July 30, 1949; Romney Wheeler, 
"We Are Kidding Ourselves in Japan," American Mercury, 
December, 1950, pp. 712-719.
? N^ippon Times, September 3, 1946.
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General MacArthur's ultra-sanguine statement does 
not seem to be capable of holding water.®® What is missing 
in the optimism of Occupation supporters seems to be a clear 
understanding of the "underlying propensities"®^ of the 
Japanese people.®2 Nevertheless, attentive to the 
difficulties involved in suppressing, if not eliminating, 
Japanese ultranationalism, the Occupation was intent on "the 
re-education of the whole Japanese population" so as to 
inculcate in the Japanese people "a frame of mind conducive
®®"We can find, for example, in the words of 
Machiavelli that there are three ways of treating a 
conquered people if we do not wish to fight them again. We 
can obliterate that conquered people as Rome did Carthage. 
We can send wise governors who by becoming citizens of and 
part of that country govern it as natives and yet are 
friendly. Or we can punish the conquered country quickly 
and lightly, get out, and maintain friendly relations." It 
is quite self-evident that a year's time is not enough to 
overhaul the Japanese mind. See Boyd C. Shafer, "History, 
Not Art, Not Science, But History; Meanings and Uses of 
History," Pacific Historical Review, XXIX, No. 2 (May,
1960), 167.
®^Almond and Verba, op. cit., p. 23.
®2por a fuller understanding of the Japanese 
mentality, see, Oshima Shotoku, Demokurashii to Kokuminsei 
[Democracy and Japanese National Character] (Tokyo: 
Shibindo, 1949); Geoffrey Gorer, "Themes in Japanese 
Culture," Transactions of the New York Academy of Science, V 
(1943), 106-24; Alvin Johnson, "The Japanese Mentality,"
American Journal of Economics and Sociology, V (October,
1945), 41-42; T. V. Smith, "The Re-Education of Conquered
Peoples," Proceedings of the National Conference of Social 
Work (1947), 25-28; John Bowley, "Psychology and Democracy," 
Political Quarterly, XVII, No. 1 (January-March, 1946), 61- 
76; Robert King Hall, "The Battle of the Mind: American 
Educational Policy in Germany and Japan," Columbia Journal 
of International Affairs, II (Winter, 1948), 59-70.
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to peaceful cooperation with other nations."^3
The Occupation seemed convinced that only when the 
Japanese have become a democratically educated people, "the 
nations of Asia and the world would be able to return 
singlemindedly to the habits of p e a c e . Overly concerned 
with the demilitarization of, and forcible imposition of 
democracy on, Japan, the Occupation seemed to have given 
less than due attention to the fact that the former involved 
only the physical aspect, whereas the latter involved both 
the institutional and human factors.^5 George B. Sansom 
rightly tells us that "the form of government is far less 
important than the spirit in which it is worked."®®
Being ill-prepared for the Occupation®^ and being 
placed in the absurd position of having to impose democracy 
on Japan,®® the Occupation policy between 1945 and 1947 was
®®Occupation of Japan, p. 33.
®4lbid., p. 85.
®®As for the implication of human factors, Edwin M.
Martin writes: " . . .  the existence of institutions copied
from democratic models neither provides democratic
institutions nor makes Japan a democracy. The spirit and 
purposes of the people who operate them are the only true 
measure of final achievement." See his The Allied 
Occupation of Japan (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1948), p. 47.
®®Sir George B. Sansom, Japan in World History (New 
York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1951), p. 90.
®7passin. The Legacy of the Occupation— Japan.
®®J. Hampden Jackson, The World in the Postwar
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intended to be punitive and curative: demilitarization and 
democratization were the order of the day. In effect, 
Occupationaires theorized that Japan, once denuded of 
ultranationalism, would become a democratic country. 89 &
sense, the democratization of Japan by the Occupation was 
believed to mean a "psychological disarmament"®® of the 
Japanese people. This argument seems to raise two 
questions: First, can the forced political reorientation of
Japan be so thorough as to create a new political culture in 
which the Japanese are devoid of their traditional national 
consciousness? Second, can the Japanese democracy induced 
by the Occupation be a stable one®^ even after the 
disappearance of Japanese "system affect" which has hitherto 
been the single most important political factor redounding 
to Japan's remarkable stability and swift modernization?
It is the generally accepted assumption that there 
must be a reasonable degree of "system affect" for a 
political system to be stable. Given the strong 
nationalistic sentiments obtaining in Japan, it seems out of
G^Ibid., p. 84.
®®Alfred C. Oppler, "The Problem of Japan's Legal 
and Judicial System," Washington Law Review, XIV, No. 3 
(August, 1949), 290.
®^For a sophisticated discussion of stable 
democracy, see Harry Eckstein, A Theory of Stable Democracy 
(Center of International Studies, Princeton University,
1961).
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the question to try to supplant the centuries-old systems
affect of the Japanese people with alien ideas which are
basically repugnant to their long-cherished manners and 
92customs. As Sir Rabindranath Tagore states, "You can
borrow knowledge from others, but you cannot borrow temper- 
93ment." Alien ideas forced on an unwilling people are
neither likely to be accepted nor absorbed into the value- 
94system.
95It may have been an inevitable political necessity
92 Robert N. Bellah, "Intellectual and Society in 
Japan," Daedalus, Cl, No. 2 (Spring, 1972), 101-102; Josepha 
M. Saniel, "The Mobilization of Traditional Values in the 
Modernization of Japan," in Religion and Progress in Modern 
Asia, ed. by Robert N. Bellah (New York: The Free Press,
1965), p. 145; K. G. Collier, "The Inheritance of Values," 
Sociological Review, XL (1948), 97-112.
93Sir Rabindranath Tagore, Nationalism (Westport,
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973), p. 70.
94Landheer, op. cit., p. 76.
^^Despite the pious pronouncements that America was 
intent on saving the world with democracy, the reality pointed 
to the plain fact that the Occupation was undertaken more for 
the promotion of ^erican interests than for the spread of 
democratic ideals to other countries, especially nations of 
non-Caucasoid peoples. Joseph M. Jones argues that "the United 
States has no foreign policy except the rule of expediency."
See his "A Modern Foreign Policy," Fortune, October, 1943, 
p. 117. For other writings seconding this argument, see Textor, 
OP. cit., esp. pp. 197-226; M. N. Roy, "Democracy and Nation­
alism in Asia," Pacific Affairs. XXV, No. 2 (June, 1952), 
140-146; Richard A. Falk, "Beyond Internationalism," Foreign 
Policy, XXIV (Fall, 1976), 65-113.
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for the Occupation to attempt to rid the Japanese 
of their perfervid nationalistic sentiments which 
had been the fulcrum for maintaining national unity 
and social stability in Japan. In effect, the Occu­
pation was attempting to transform a militaristic, 
nationalistic Japan into a peace-loving, democratic 
country by taking away from her the strong national­
istic sentiments which would play a paramount role 
in developing and maintaining a stable democracy. 
Speaking of how to deal with the question of Japanese 
loyalty. General Ken R. Dyke, the former New York 
advertising man whose task it was to re-educate 
the Japanese, stated that "the 'punitive phase' of 
our Occupation is well along." But he added with 
emphasis that the "'constructive phase' is barely 
under way. . . . Don't, let us pull out the basic 
threads which are good."®^
Dyke seemed to have realized that Japanese loyalty would 
be of service in bringing about, and maintaining, a stable 
democracy in Japan. Writing on political development, 
Lucian Pye observes that:
The real problem in political development is 
therefore the extent to which the socialization 
process of a people provides them with the nec­
essary associational sentiments so that they 
can have considerable conflict without destroying 
the stability of the system. When these senti­
ments are lacking, a polity cannot even endure 
moderate levels of controversy. In short, it 
is associational sentiments which make it poss­
ible for organizations to endure, and even 
thrive upon, many forms of controversy.97
^^Quoted in Walter Sullivan, Jr., "Enlightening 
the Japanese Mind," Part II, Free World, XI, No. 5 (May,
1946), pp. 52, 54.
^^Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality, and Nation 
Building (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1962), 
p.52.
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As already discussed in great detail, Japanese 
nationalistic sentiments are more than skin-deep.^®
Japanese nationalism seems to have laregely been influenc­
ed, as pointed out elsewhere, basically by three factors: 
national security, economy, national mission. The changes 
attendant upon Japan's modernization have had little effect 
on the three major factors that have been, in the main,
Q Q
responsible for the unique nature of Japanese nationalism. 
Indeed, no other factor has played a more important role 
in the national life of Japan than her nationalism.^®®
Q Q
For an excellent overview, see Brown, pp. cit.,; 
Tsukui Tatsui, Nippon Kokka Shugi Undo Shiron (Historical 
Essay on the Japanese Nationalistic Movement) (Tokyo: Chuo 
Koron Sha, 1942).
99yanaga Chitoshi, Japanese People and Politics, 
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1956), pp. 93-96.
^®®See Kenneth B. Pyle, "Introduction: Some Recent
Approaches to Japanese Nationalism," Journal of Asian 
Studies (November, 1971), 5-16.
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demilitarized, Japan is incapable of becoming again a 
military threat "for at least 10 0 years;" 2) The defeat and 
the subsequent Occupation have completely overhauled the 
hearts and minds of the Japanese people; and 3) The only 
actual danger for Japanese democracy now comes from the 
"extreme Left" for the "extreme Right" has been destroyed or 
converted.101
It is of interest to contrast these affirmative 
views with the observation made in 1956 by Professors Harold 
S. Quigley and John E. Turner:
. . . the reformist or tutorial phase of 
Occupation policy was at best a labor for 
Hercules, at most a utopian dream. Only Americans 
would have undertaken it. That we did so is at 
once a tribute to our physical vigor, to our zeal 
as missionairies of democracy, and a demonstration 
of our self-confidence, rooted in good intentions, 
inexperience, and inadequate study. . . . Having 
fought two wars to save the world for democracy, 
she now attempted to save it with democracy. . . . 
We refuse to acknowledge that power can corrupt 
our leaders, while highly sensitive to that danger
lOlThe Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to the 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Occupation of November 3, 
19 45, instructed him to arrest and hold as suspected war 
criminals among others: "(2) All commissioned officers of
the Gendarmerie (Kempei) and all officers of the Army and 
Navy who have been important exponents of militant 
nationalism and aggression. (3) All key members of 
ultranationalistic, terroristic and secret patriotic 
societies. . . . "  Political Reorientation, II, 432. For a 
glimpse of pious hopes entertained by many as to how baleful 
nationalisms could be rectified, see, for example, "The Text 
of President Franklin Roosevelt's Address on Christmas Eve," 
New York Times, December 25, 1943: ". . .we intend to rid 
them [the Axis] once and for all of Nazism and Prussian 
militarism and the fantastic and disastrous notion that they 
constitute the 'Master Race.' . . . "
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in the leaders of even friendly nations. We are 
impatient for results and rec^tive to optimistic 
evaluation of accomplishment.^
We can hardly dispute Ralph J. D. Baraibanti's 
statement on the limits of the Occupation's capability; 
"Reform in the institutional aspects of Japanese society is 
our stated aim, and attitudinal change our highest hope."1^3 
However, in General MacArthur's opinion," to effect an 
attitudinal change was no problem at all. Boldly arguing 
that the increasing number of the Japanese people, under 
"the stimulus of religious tolerance and freedom, have moved 
to embrace the Christian faith as a means to fill the 
spiritual vacuum left in Japanese life by the collapse of 
their past faith. . . . "  General MacArthur went so far as 
to state:
To fill the vacuum left by the devastation of war 
and defeat and the discrediting of popular
reliance upon myths, beliefs, and legends from 
Japan's past, the Occupation has brought to the 
understanding of the Japanese people new and
totally different concepts of right and wrong in 
human behavior and a knowledge of the mode of life 
based on the transcendent and immutable Christian 
principles and ethics. . . . The institutions and 
laws and even many customs are being redesigned 
best to serve the requirements of popular
sovereignty and individual dignity. Christian
^Harold S. Quigley and John E. Turner, The New 
Japan: Government and Politics (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1956), pp. 93-94.
lO^Ralph J. D. Braibanti, " The Role of 
Administration in the Occupation of Japan, " Annals, CCLXVII 
(January, 1950), 155.
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missionaries are ministering to the spiritual 
welfare of the people. . . .  As a result of these 
moral influences the Japanese are coming to live 
by the tenets of the Christian faith and there is 
daily evidence of a profound and beneficial 
influence upon the moral viewpoint and ethical 
standards of the race. This is the greatest 
challenge and opportunity Ct^istianity has had 
throughout the Christian era.^®^
Indeed, this is a sanguine statement of first rate 
by a matchless orator, but belies the r e a l i t y . As if not 
to be outdone by General MacArthur, writing in the spring of 
1949, Claude E. Strait stated that
If America will listen to this appeal [for the 
Christianization of the Japanese people], Japan 
will become a shining example for the entire Par 
East, perhaps for the whole world. . . .  We have, 
however, already witnessed changes which seem 
nothing less than miraculous.
Occupation supporters were so unsparing in their praise of 
General MacArthur's performance as to state:
MacArthur, op. cit., p. 202; Mainichi, 
April 30, 1949.
^General MacArthur was not alone in 
making sanguine pronouncements of the Occupation. 
Robert E. Ward described the performance of the 
Occupation in words no less sanguine than those of 
MacArthur: "This particular solution [the
Occupation's policy of taking advantage of 
democratic potential obtaining in Japanese 
society] undoubtedly had a good deal to do wih 
smoothness and efficiency of Japan's postwar 
transition to democracy." See his op. cit. , p. 
141. For a similarly affirmative view, see also 
Nippon Times, October 16, 1945. For opposing
viewpoints, see, for example, John M. Maki, 
Japanese Militarism; Its Cause and Cure (New York: 
Knopf, 1945); Toyama Shigeki, Imai Seiichi, and 
Fujiwara Akira, Showa Shi [A History of the Showa 
Era] (Tokyo; Iwanami Shoten, 1955).
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. . .  he [General MacArthur] sought to encourage 
in the Japanese the realization that Allied policy 
was not in conflict with their own interests. , .
He has so timed and tempered changes as to 
avoid violent conflict with their legitimate 
longings. . . . For it [General MacArthur's 
methodology] has brought into direct alignment 
both these objectives and the well-being and 
asperations of the Japanese people. History will 
thus record him as a supersalesman of the
democratic c o n c e p t . 1 0 6
Quite contrary to General MacArthur's interpretation 
of the post-surrender developments in Japan, historical 
evidences seem to indicate that the Japanese may be expected 
to be impelled less by the democratic concept and 
doctrinaire gospels of political rights than a desire for 
social and economic improvement. It is true that net only 
the habit of political subservience, so long ingrained into 
the Japanese people, cannot be eradicated at one stroke by 
military fiat, but also democracy cannot be created among 
unwilling people whose deepest feelings run counter to
democratic p r i n c i p l e s . 1^7
It is the quantitative conception of democracy that 
prevented many observers from realizing that democracy is 
working in the United States and Great Britain not because 
of their forms of government but because of their long
IQ^Political Reorientation, pp. xix, xxix. 
l^^Beaglehole, 0£. cit., p. 155.
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democratic tradition.Douglas G. Haring bluntly states 
that "Ideas cannot be exported in boxes and dumped on an 
unwilling p e o p l e . "1^9 Writing on the basis of historical 
evidences, a Western observer comments on the fallacy of 
military occupation:
The occupation of a country, though it may 
castigate the vanquished, degrades the victor. 
However righteous his crusade when he sets out, a 
soldier in a foreign country always ends up in the 
wrong. The defeat of an occupation begins when 
the war that brought it ends.^^"
Not only did the idea of imposing democracy on a defeated 
Japan run counter to the known theories of accultration and 
political development,111 but also Americans did not live up
lO^Thompson, "Will a Constitution Guarantee 
Democracy," p. 319.
lO^Douglas G. Haring, ed., Japan's Prospect 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1946), p. 276.
ll^A Member of the RAF, "Military Occupation Can't 
Succeed," p. 386.
lllThe war and the Occupation no doubt accelerated 
the process of acculturation of the Japanese, but the 
cultural changes did not go beyond the mere adoption of 
physical traits or complexes. Societal pressure and 
personal fear were potent forces in effecting these cultural 
changes, which are only "forced accomodations to a temporary 
situation. . . . [T]he subjective aspect of culture is the 
lease disposed toward any metamorphic change." Lam, op. 
cit., p. 262; according to Lucian W. Pye, ". . . the 
problems of political deelopment revolve around the 
relationship between the political culture, the 
authoritative structure, and the general political process . 
. . the problems of equality are generally related to the 
political culture and sentiments about legitimacy and 
commitment to the system . . . "  See his, "The Concept of
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to their ideal aims. The Soviets had a clear idea as to 
what they wanted from Eastern Europe: They wanted machinery 
and security, and their means were communization. The 
Americans were uncertain as to what they wanted from Japan: 
They wanted security, and their means were democratization, 
but what first appeared as a need for security against a 
recurrence of Japanese aggression turned, after 1949, to a 
need to use Japan as a bulwark against Communist expansion 
in Asia. American policy in Japan was swayed by American 
national interests and outside circumstances.The 1947 
Constitution, regarded as the epitome of all the 
ideological, political, and economic reform, was a perfectly 
democratic constitution,the authorship of which was 
doubtlessly American, albeit there had to be a pretense that 
it was J a p a n e s e . The Jiji Shimpo editorialized that it
Political Development," Annals, CCCLVIII (March, 1965), pp. 
1, 12.
ll^For a detailed discussion of the Occupation's 
performance, see Baron E. J. Lewe VanAduard, Japan: From
surrender to Peace (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954).
ll^Maruyama Masao, Nationalism in Post-War Japan 
(Eleventh Conference, Institute of Pacific Relations, 
Lucknow, India, October 3-15, 1950), p. 7; Political
Reorientation, I 90-91.
U n political Reorientation, II: 619; In the course 
of persuading the Japanese with regard to the clauses on the 
renunciation of war and rearmament, the Supreme Commander 
reportedly said to Prime Minister Shidehara Kijuro: "Since I 
have hitherto helped you, I hope you will help me this 
time." See Mainichi, April 7, 1952; also see in this
connection, Asahi Evening News, February 15, 1958; Kawai
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was reminded by the new constitution of the guest who 
expected to be served Japanese food after he had smelled the 
aroma of bean sauce coming from the kitchen, but was forced 
to change his chopsticks for a knife and fork when he saw 
that Western dishes were served.
As Delmer M. Brown keenly observed: "American policy 
tin Japan] was geared to American interests rather than 
American i d e a l s . it is a truism that "man can hardly be 
prejudice-free, because he cannot fully control himself and 
he cannot control his surroundings. The "philosophy" of 
the Occupation policy was quite untenable. Americans 
advocated freedom of speech and of press while maintaining a 
rigorous censorship. They insisted that militarism be 
eliminated from politics while ruling every aspct of public 
life through their own military government. They advocated 
the American way of life as the model of pacific, civilian 
virtue while exemplifying it by warriors under dictatorial
Kazuo claims that the MacArthur Constitution, dictated by 
the Occupation did not have a firm ground that was palatable 
to the Japanese background. See his, "Sovereignty and 
Democracy in the Japanese Constitution," American Political 
Science Review, XLIX, No. 3 (September, 1955), 663-672.
ll^scAP, Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, 
Press Translations and Interpretations, March 13, 1946.
^^®Brown, op. cit., p. 273.
H^Shafer, op. cit., p. 159.
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rule of the Supreme Commander.
Speaking of the contradiction involved in the 
"reverse course" of the Occupation policy, Passin states
The ironic result of the tension between the 
early Occupation's democratization objectives and 
our strategic objectives is that American policy 
is opposed by the Japanese left in the name of our 
democratic reforms and ideas. Thus it is the left 
that defends the "American-imposed Constitution," 
and particularly its war-renouncing Article IX 
against our conservative friends.
The affirmative interpretations of the Occupation 
policy seemed to be the result of what Chalmers Johnson 
called "ideological proclivities of American leaders at the 
t i m e , " 1 2 0  insufficient attention paid to the strength of 
Japanese culture and tradition spanning over two thousand 
years, and ignoring of the rabidity of Japanese national 
consciousness. It is apparent that optimistic observers 
failed to distinguish what was destructible from what was 
i n d e s t r u c t i b l e . 121 As Margaret M. Lam cogently states:
liftPassin, The Legacy of the Occupation— Japan, 
pp. 5-6, 38.
^^^Ibid., p. 39. For arguments on the basis of 
American National interest, see David K. Eichler, "The Future 
of the New Japan," Yale Review, XLI, No. 2 (December, 1951),, 
161-180; Richard L. Sneider, "Japan: An Experiment in the 
Development of a Democratic Society," Journal of International 
Affairs, II, No. 1 (Winter, 1948), 21-36.
120chalmers Johnson, Conspiracy at Matsukwa (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1972), p. 13.
l^lgee Passin, The Legacy of the Occupation— Japan.
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War itself cannot facilitate the process of 
acculturation where profound sentiments, sacred 
traditions, emotional values, and mental attitudes 
are deeply intrenched in the household 
organization and personality make-up of an 
individual. Acculturation is a time-consuming 
process; it proceeds at its own pace; it cannot 
readily be forced. Postwar plans for the 
rehabilitation of the Japanese may well take 
cognizance of these f a c t s .
The Occupation's attempt to rid the Japanese of 
their nationalistic sentiments by fiat was a clear case of 
the "oversimplification of national c h a r a c t e r . "^^3 Robert 
King Hall's words seem quite befitting for us to quote here: 
"All American efforts to change the nationalist prejudices 
and the religious mythology of Japan may founder on the 
inherent contradiction of imposing democracy by military 
intervention."^24
l^Z^am, op. cit., p. 263.
123gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political 
Systems," Journal of Politics, XVIII, No. 3 (August, 1956), 
391-409. for detailed discussion on National Character, see 
M. ginsberg, "National Character," British Journal of 
Psychology, XXXII, Part 3 (January, 1942), 183-205; Alex
Inkeles, "National Character: The Study of Modal Personality 
and Sociocultural Systems," in Handbook of Social 
Psychology, Alex Inkeles and David J. Levinson, eds. 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., Inc.,
1954).
^^^Hall, "Japan: Are All Gods Equal?," p. 568.
CHAPTER X 
"HUMANIZATION" OP THE EMPEROR
Even in the last few days prior to Japan's surrender 
when the Japanese were desperately mapping out the best 
possible surrender terms,^ the Japanese spirit surrounding 
the Kokutai and the Emperor system was well demonstrated. 
As the Japanese Offer of Surrender on August 10, 1945, reads 
in part:
In obedience to the gracious command of His 
Majesty the Emperor who, ever anxious to enhance 
the cause of world peace, desires earnestly to 
bring about a speedy termination of hostilities 
with a view of saving mankind from the calamities 
to be imposed upon them by further continuation of 
the war. . . . The Japanese government are [sic] 
ready to accept the terms enumerated in the joint 
[Potsdam] declaration . . . with the understanding 
that the said declaration does not comprise any 
demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His 
Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler.^
Ipor detailed accounts of Japanese maneuverings to 
end the war, see Japan, Gaimusho, Shusen Shiroku [A 
Documentary History of the Surrender] (Tokyo: Gekkansha, 
1952); Togo Shigenori, Jidai no Ichimen: Taisen Gaiko Shuki, 
Togo Shigenori Iko [One Aspect of the Times: Notes on the 
Second World War Diplomacy, Being the Posthumous Memoirs of 
Foreign Minister Togo] (Tokyo: Kaizosha, 1952).
^The Axis in Defeat, p. 29.
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The United States official message in response to 
Japan's desideratum of not prejudicing the status of the 
Emperor was precisely imprecise to avoid any prior 
commitment. The message was intentionally ambiguous on the 
critical question of guaranteeing Emperor Hirohito's 
position and on whether or not the United States would 
maintain in the long run even a modified imperial system. 
The message did not even make clear that there would be an 
Emperor for at least a brief period. The message stated 
that the Emperor's authority "shall be subject to the 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. . . . The ultimate 
form of government shall be established by the freely 
expressed will of the Japanese people.
It is worth noting how the Emperor felt about the 
worsening war situation even before the advent of the atom 
bomb. The Emperor is said to have told one of his trusted 
advisers confidentially; "I wish the war would come to an 
end s o o n ."4 Furthermore, the Emperor steeled hkmself for 
swallowing the humiliations stemming from Japan's 
unconditional surrender. The Emperor concluded that even
^U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations, 
1945, vol. IV, 631-632. (Cited hereafter as Foreign 
Relations).
^Suzuki Kantaro Denki Hensan linkai, Suzuki Kantaro 
Den [Biography of Suzuki Kantaro] (Tokyo: Suzuki Kantaro 
Denki Hensan linkai, 1965), p. 240.
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though hfc could not bear the thought of seeing his trusted 
troops disarmed and of handing over his subjects as war 
criminals, nevertheless "in order to save the people from 
complete destruction and in order to work for the general 
welfare of mankind," he had to support Foreign Minister Togo 
Shigenori's argument at the Imperial Conference of August 9, 
1945, that an opportune time had arrived for Japan to end 
the war by accepting "the unconditional terms of the Potsdam 
Declaration."5
Immediately after Japan's surrender. General 
MacArthur enunciated a very important policy in respect to 
establishing the principle of religious freedom and the 
elimination of militarism and ultranationalism from the 
field of religion.G As an initial step to humble the 
Emperor and to disabuse the Japanese of the falsity of the 
divine Emperor myth, it was purposefully arranged that the 
Emperor should call upon the Supreme Commander, General of 
the Army Douglas MacArthur, at his Tokyo headquarters at the 
United States Embassy building on September 27, 1945. This 
fact alone was totally unprecedented. The Supreme Commander 
made it clear that he would neither go out to receive the 
Emperor on his arrival, nor see him off when he left. 
Maruyama Masao depicted the Emperor's humiliating initial
^Gaimusho, Shusen Shiroku, pp. 588-599. 
®New York Times, September 10, 1945.
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encounter with the Supreme Comander in the following words:
. . . the former [the Emperor] was dressed in his 
visiting suit, standing before the latter [the 
Supreme Commander], much taller and appearing in 
his Army uniform, with neck open. This photograph 
was published in all the newspapers of Japan the 
next morning. This interview, as shown in the 
press, was epoch-making in the psychology of the 
Japanese people, impressing upon their mind the 
decided defeat of the nation and a feeling of 
self-derision. Of course, it must be admitted 
that there exists a certain affection for the 
Emperor among the people, especially those above 
middle age. But it is unthinkable that the 
Emperor might be able to restore his former 
"charismatic" authority upon the nation.'
Less than three months after the Emperor's call on 
the Supreme Commander, the Occupation followed up its 
attempt at destroying the Emperor myth and the ideological 
foundations of ultranationalism by issuing a directive 
specifically designed to prevent the Japanese government 
from exploiting state Shinto for nationalistic 
indoctrination.8 The usefulness of this directive of 
trying to disestablish the Japanese state religion is quite 
questionable if we are to understand "the image of Shinto as 
the living spiritual roots of the Japanese people." As a 
writer pithily explains: "Shinto is like the air the
Japanese breathe: They are not always conscious of its
presence, but their existence as Japanese depends on its
^Maruyama, Nationalism in Post-War Japan, p. 11. 
^Political Reorientation, II, 467-69.
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always being t h e r e . A  noted authority on the subject of 
Shinto, Dr. Daniel C. Holtom, argues very forcefully:
If it were true that the content of national 
culture could be determined chiefly by injunction, 
then December 15, 1945, the day on which the
Allied Supreme Commander in Tokyo ordered the 
disestablishment of Shinto as the state religion 
of Japan might well mark the end of an age. We 
know, however, that genuine cultural change, 
involving as it does the modification of the 
persistent habits and thoughts of a whole people, 
is a slow evolutionary process, and that only the 
conditions within which it operates can be 
affected by shifts in external control. . . . 
Shinto is not "abolished.
Of course, the Occupation's ambition to make Shinto 
incapable of further breeding nationalistic sentiments among 
the Japanese was one thing, and it was quite another that 
the Shinto-fostered Japanese psychology might be doggedly 
résistent to the Occupation's attack on the Japanese
ideological fondations. The Occupation was further intent 
on shattering the Emperor myth by requiring the Emperor
himself to issue a New Year's statement denying his
divinity.Toward the end of the statement, the Emperor
^Stuart D. B. Picken, Shinto, Japan's Spiritual 
Roots (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1980), p. 9.
l^Daniel C. Holtom, "New Status of Shinto," Far 
Eastern Survey, XV, No. 2 (January 30, 1946), 17.
^^Political Reorientation, II, 470. Holtom tells 
us: "We cannot overlook the fact, however, that there are
deep roots of Shinto which reach down into the national 
soil. Such things can be treated as manufactured and 
extraneous only at the risk of fundamental misunderstanding.
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declared that the ties between the throne and the people
have always stood upon mutual trust and affection. 
They do not depend upon mere legends and myths. 
They are not predicated on the false conception 
that the Emperor is divine, and that the Japanese 
people are superior to other races and fated to 
rule the world.
Reading between the lines of the New Year's
. . .  It has been the common presupposition of most 
Japanese writers on Shinto that saisei ichi [the oneness of 
church and State] was the chief characteristic of their 
national structure (Kokutai) and the traditional 
manifestation of the instinctive faith of the people . . . 
in our dealing with Japan it would be well to remember that 
Shinto, while having fundamental political affiliations, is 
not a political party but a religion. . . . Not all of 
State Shinto was 'manufactured.' At its center flowed the 
oldest and most cherished stream of Japanese culture—  
something that will not easily be altered or destroyed." 
See his op. cit., pp. 18, 20.
^^Ibid. The Nippon Times of January 5, 1946
cogently explained the difference between the Japanese and 
the Western conception of the Emperor's nature: " . . .  even 
in recent years, when the divinity of the Emperor was most 
strongly stressed, the Japanese never regarded the Emperor 
as a god in the sense that a Western thinks of God. God in 
the Oriental sense is not a supernatural being possessed of 
attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence, 
the Creator and Ruler of the Universe. To the Oriental the 
distinction between the secular and the divine is very 
slight. . . . Not only the Emperor but all human beings are 
therefore, in a sense, gods. The Emperor, as head of the 
Shinto religion, is by reason of his priestly office, 
endowed with greater sacrednes than other people, but his 
divinity is more a difference in degree than in kind." For 
a similar interpretation, see Yanaga, Japanese People and 
Politics, pp. 131-134. For a different interpretation of 
the Japanese divinity, see Daniel C. Holtom, "The Meaning of 
Kami: Ch. I, Japanese Derivation," Monumenta Nipponica, III, 
No. 1 (January, 1940), 1-27; idem, "The Meaning of Kami: Ch. 
II, Interpretations by Japanese Writers," Ibid., III, No. 2 
(July, 1940), 32-53; idem, "Kami Considered as Mana," Ibid., 
IV, No. 2 (July, 1941), 25-68.
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statement seems to suggest that the forced issuance of the 
Imperial Rescript renouncing the Emperor's divinity was not 
to mean an end to the national significance of the Emperor 
system.13 As pointed out by Holtom, the claim that the bond 
between the throne and the people was based simply on mutual 
trust and affection involved a "tremendous idealization of 
history."14 There are strong indications that it was the 
deliberate policy of the conservative leaders at the time to 
minimize the significance of the divinity-renouncing 
rescript and other fundamental changes in the Japanese 
Kokutai wrought by the Occupation.1^ Despite the 
Occupation's attack on the ideological props of Japanese 
ultranationalism, what substantive changes have really taken 
place seems to be a moot question.1^
l^See Kobayashi Shiozo, "On the Emperor-as-Sumbol in 
the Constitution of Japan: Note on Its Difference from the 
Emperor-as-God and the Emperor-as-Human Being,"' Waseda 
Political Studies, No. 6 (1968), 25-40.
l^Daniel C. Holtom, Modern Japan and Shinto 
Nationalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), p. 
177.
l^Maruyama Masao, "Nihon no Shiso" [Japanese 
Thought] in Gendai Nihon no Shiso, Vol. XI [Contemporary 
Japanese Thought, Vol. XI], ed. by Iwanami Shoten, 1957), 
pp. 25-26ff.
l^Writing in 1958, Robert Trumbull observed: ". . . 
the bulk of Japanese, outside the extreme Leftist fringe, 
seem to hope that New Concept will be as enduring as the 
imperial structure. . . . Educated Japanese never seriously 
hold that Hiroshito was divine— that the imperial line had 
descended unbroken since Jimmu, great-grandson of Amaterasu, 
the sun goddess, established the throne in 666 B.C." See
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According to the Japanese psychoanalyst Miyagi 
Onaya, many decades of political indoctrination engendered 
in the Japanese psyche something that might be called an 
"Emperor Complex." Professor Miyagi argues that the Emperor 
Complex affects the way of thinking and feeling of the 
Japanese people, governing their behavior. Miyagi maintains 
that the Emperor Complex can neither be forgotten in the 
study of the Japanese psychology, nor can it be overlooked 
in any examination of the Japanese culture and of such 
questions as the democratization of Japan. Miyagi concludes 
that, in spite of the post-surrender ambitious policy of the 
Occupation in "humanizing" the Emperor and democratizing the 
thrown, many generations of Emperor worship have etched an 
indelibile mark in the Japanese psyche which will not be 
easily eradicated.
This very "Emperor Complex" of the Japanese people 
taxed the intellectual scrutiny of many students of Japan as 
well as Occupation planners before and after Japan's 
surrender. The unrealistic understanding^® obtaining in
his "A New Role of the 'Son of Heaven'," New York Times, 
November 23, 1958.
l^Miyagi Onaya, "Tenno o do Omouka?" [How Is the 
Emperor Thought Of?], Shukan Asahi, LXII, No. 1 (January 6, 
1957), p. 26.
l®The usual mistake in understanding the role of the 
Japanese Emperor has been analyzed in great detail by Allan 
Robert Brown, focusing on the perception held by Americans 
during the 1940's. Brown concludes that the American image
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foreign lands of the role of the Japanese Emperor led to a 
plethora of conflicting heated arguments as to whether the 
Emperor should be punished and the Emperor system abolished 
lest Japan become once again a menace to world peace, or 
whether the Emperor should rather be exploited to facilitate 
the enormous job of occupying and democratizing Japan.
The haters of the Japanese Emperor system argued 
that the present political and legal system in Japan, of 
which the Mikado is the center, should be thoroughly 
d e s t r o y e d . Writing in the New York Times, Sun Fo argued:
To fight this war to a decision means that the 
common victory must be decisive in such a way as 
to preclude any resurrection of a militarist and 
aggressive Japan. Japan must be so beaten and 
crushed and so pulverized that she will not dare 
to entertain an aggressive thought for a hundred 
years. . . .  To ensure that such a catastrophe 
[as World War II] shall not happen again to our
was not entirely consistent with political reality and that 
the Emperor's role was defined in greatly oversimplified 
terms and was too literally interpreted. See his "The
Figurehead Role of the Japanese Emperor: Perception and
Reality," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford
University, 1971).
l^See, for example. New York Times, December 10, 
1942; Edward Hunter, "Can We Make Use of Hirohito?," Nation, 
March 4, 1944, pp. 278-280; Owen Lattimore, "The Sacred Cow 
of Japan," Atlantic Monthly, CLXXV, No. 1 (January, 1945), 
45-51; Mary Katharine Strong, "Shall We Retain the Japanese 
Emperor? No!," Forum, October, 1945, pp. 145, 150-157; Lin 
Hu, "How to Deal With Japan," Foreign Affairs, XXIV, No. 2 
(January, 1946), 253-61; "Red-Blood War for Blue- Blooded
Peace," Editorial, Philadelphia Record, December 6, 1944; U. 
S. Congress 78th Cong., 2nd sess., September 8, 1944,
Congressional Record, Appendix, XC, Part II, A4753-54;
Willard Price, "No More Mikados," Free World, X, No. 3 
(September, 1945), 40-42.
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country [China] and that the blood that has been 
spilt shall not have been let in vain, the 
Mikadoship must be abolished when the military 
cancer is cut from the body of Japan. ®
On September 18, 1945, Senators Richard Russell, J. 
William Pulbright, John McClellan, and Glen Taylor argued 
that Hirohito be tried as a war c r i m i n a l . A  survey on 
American opinions on how to handle Hirohito showed that most 
Americans wanted Hirohito executed, imprisoned, or tried as 
a war criminal; 33% advocated execution; 17% a trial; 11% 
imprisonment; 9% exile; and 4% no action. 2^
On the other hand, rather objectively-minded 
realists,23 sensing the value of using the Emperor in 
maintaining order following Japan's surrender, argued that 
relying on the power of the Imperial Rescript is a better 
approach in cleansing Japan than an outright attempt at
20gun Fo, "For Ousting of Emperor," New York Times, 
October 10, 1943.
2^U. S. Congress, 79th Cong., 1st sess.. 
Congressional Record (1945), 8680.
22poreiqn Relations, VI (1945), 588-89.
23y. s. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign 
Relations, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., December 12-13, 1944,
Nominations— Department of State, Hearings (Washington, D. 
C. : Government Printing Office, 1944), pp. 12-20; Alice R. 
Craemer, "Shall We Retain the Japanese Emperor? Yes!," 
Forum, October, 1945, pp. 144, 146-50; Willard Fleisher,
What to Do with Japan (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co.,
1945); John Gaette, "Can We Use Hirohito!," Free World, X, 
No. 3 (September, 1945), 42-44.
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v e n g e a n c e . 24 Helen Mears argued that a forcible removal of 
the Emperor would deprive the Japanese of the basis of 
stability, making Japan incapable of weathering the trials 
of the post-surrender period.25 Writing in 1943, Geoffrey 
Gorer observed that, after Japan's defeat, it would be 
desirable to retain the Emperor system to facilitate the 
work of the Allied Occupation. As Gorer further observes.
The Emperor has remained a permanent figure, if 
with widely varying powers, during all the 
different phases of Japanese history; the 
different realities have all taken place under the 
symbolic leadership of the Emperor. For most 
Japanese, a constitution without an Emperor would 
be inconceivable' and his forcible removal by 
foreigners would produce a state of psychological 
confusion and disorientation which would be 
completely antagonistic to the goal envisaged. 
Because an Imperial Rescript can do more than many 
regiments, the power of Imperial Rescript is a 
political device with which it would be short­
sighted to do a w a y . 25
Gorer goes on to argue that the two major problems 
facing the Occupation were: to understand elements in
Japanese culture that are conducive to democratization; and 
to eliminate factors and elements that are responsible for
24in her study of Japanese culture, Ruth Benedict 
argues that "revenge ranks high in Japanese tradition as a 
'good thing' under circumstances of insult or defeat." See 
her Chrysanthemum and the Sword (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Co., 1946), p. 161.
25nelen Mears, "The Emperor System," Yale Review, 
XXXIII, No. 2 (December, 1943), 575.
25ceoffrey Gorer, "The Special Case of Japan," 
Public Opinion Quarterly, VIII, (Winter, 1943), 575.
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aggressive imperialism and militant nationalism. General 
MacArthur seemed to have fully recognized this aspect of 
Japanese culture. In effect, the Supreme Commander for the 
Allied Powers ended up killing two birds with one stone when 
he availed himself of the immeasurable influence of the 
Emperor in effectuating the surrendering and implementing 
Occupation policies. The Supreme Commander needed the 
authority of the Emperor to bring about a trouble-free 
surrender, on the one hand. Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Commander was intent on destroying the Emperor myth so as to 
rid the Japanese of the "Emperor Complex," on the other.2?
The silent partnership between General MacArthur and 
Emperor Hirohito made the Occupation the most unusual, the 
most peaceful, and perhaps the most successful military 
occupation in history. One was a "prophet"^® of American 
democracy, whereas the other was the "highest priest" of the
2?Many believe that the trouble-free surrender was 
attributable to the immense prestige and authority of the 
throne and the issuance of the Imperial Rescript of August 
15, 1945, announcing the unconditional surrender. See Abe 
Yoshishige et aJ., Tenno no Insho [Impressions of the 
Emperor] (Tokyo: Sogensha, 1949), p. 7; Okubo Genji, The
Problems of the Emperor System in Postwar Japan (Tokyo: The 
International Publishing Co., 1948), p. 7; U. S. Strategic 
Bombing Survey, Naval Analysis Division, Japan's Struggle to 
End the War (Washington, D. C. : Government Printing Office,
1946), p. 5.
^®In a statement to the press on March 17, 1947, 
General MacArthur said: "I believe it [democracy] is man's
greatest idea, except Christianity, and believe it will 
control the world and lead us toward a Utopia." Quoted in 
William P. Woodard, The Allied Occupation of Japan 1945-1952 
and Japanese Religion (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972), p. 356.
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Japanese nation. Yoshida Shigeru believed that General 
MacArthur thought that the Throne was still important to the 
Japanese people, and reconstruction of Japan was dependent 
on the Japanese people rallying to the Imperial symbol, 
albeit Japan had lost the war. As Yoshida writes, "I have 
no hesitation in saying that it was the attitude adopted by 
General MacArthur towards the Throne, more than any other 
single factor, that made the Occupation a historic 
succe s s ."29 Yoshida's statement implies that the apparent 
"smoothness" of the Occupation was solely due to the 
prestige enjoyed by the Emperor among the Japanese people. 
Yoshida made no secret of being an ardent supporter of the 
Imperial regime.
Although not a few writers are inclined to believe 
that the directive for the "Disestablishment of State 
Religion" of December 15, 1945, the Imperial Rescript of
January 1, 1945, denying the imperial divinity, and the new 
Constitution effectively put an end to the traditional 
Emperor worship, there seem to be sufficient indication that 
in reality it was not quite so.^O It should be understood
29yoshida Shigeru, The Yoshida Memoirs ; The Story of 
Japan in Crisis, trans. by Yoshida Genichi (Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 1973), p. 51, 135.
2^See, for example, Nippon Times, November 17, 1946; 
Japan, Naikaku Kambo, Naikaku Seido 70-nen Shi [A Seventy- 
Year History of the Cabinet System] (Tokyo: Okurasho
Insatsukyoku, 1955), I, 622; General MacArthur's comment on 
the Imperial Rescript of January 1, 1946, denying the
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that the authority of the Imperial House is neither enforced 
nor superimposed but traditionally acknowledged as the 
natural basis of the people's solidarity. The loyalty to 
the Emperor does not depend on a personal conviction or a 
fantastic belief in his supernatural power. It is the 
extension of the concept of filial piety to the Imperial 
family, supported by tradition and emotional a p p e a l . A l l  
that the Imperial Rescript accomplished in denying the 
imperial divinity was "a repudiation of the basic racial 
theories of the modern Japanese state."^2
As early as April, 1944, Nathaniel Peffer made an 
acute observation:
There has in truth been an unwarranted 
exaggeration in this country [America] of the 
power of the Emperor. He does not rule; he 
reigns. There is no evidence that acts of Japan 
in recent years have been on his decision; there 
is some basis even for inferring that they have 
not. In any case, it can be said that the final 
disposition of the Emperor will not determine what
imperial divinity reads: "The Emperor's New Year's Statement 
pleases me very much. By it he undertakes a leading part in 
the democratization of his people. He squarely takes his 
stand for the future along liberal lines. His action 
reflects the irresistible influence of a sound idea. A 
sound idea cannot be stopped." Political Reorientation, II, 
471. For a contrasting view, see Yanaga, Japanese People 
and Politics, p. 129.
S^Tsuda Sokichi, Nihon no Koshitsu [The Imperial 
Household of Japan] (Tokyo; Waseda Daigaku Shuupanbu, 1952), 
p. 7.
^^King, "Japan: Are All Gods Equal?," p. 571.
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sort of country Japan will be in the future.
Quite contrary to the ambitious goals which the 
Occupation intended to achieve through democratizing the 
State Shinto and humanizing the Emperor, these two 
"important" measures proved to be only
a great score for The Boss [General MacArthur], 
which made quite a stir in the Tokyo press but has 
had small diminishing effect on the numbers of 
faithful who pause daily before Nijubashi Gate of 
the Imperial Palace to bow in deepest reverence. .
. . There is a basic fallacy in the reasoning 
behind a national policy which would give an Army 
the job of democratizing an essentially militarist
civilization.34
According to W. Macmahon Ball, despite all 
the efforts to democratize him,
the Emperor is still the political sovereign and 
still the Son of Heaven in the hearts and minds of 
the overwhelming majority of the Japanese people. 
I [Ball] think it is probable that his real 
political power is even stronger than before the 
war. He is all that the Japanese people have to 
hold onto.
Since the Emperor has never claimed himself as a god, he 
simply made public, albeit under duress, the self-evident 
fact about his person, but there is no denying that his
^^Nathaniel Peffer, "Occupy Japan," Harper's 
Magazine, April, 1944, pp. 385-90.
34Robert B. Cochrane, "MacArthur Era: Year Two,"
Harper's Magazine, September 1947, pp. 279-80.
3^Ball, "Reflections on Japan," p. 7. For a similar 
argument, see Russell Brines, MacArthur's Japan (New York: 
J. B. Lippincott Co., 1948), p. 84.
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repudiation of divinity had a profoundly negative effect on 
the thought deifying the Emperor. Consequently, the people 
felt free and enlightened.^® Of course, the Japanese 
people's reverence toward the Emperor was changed somewhat, 
but remained as deep as before.
It may be stated that the lack of publicity and 
fanfare for the imperial institution is deceptive. Although 
the Emperor might often appear to be not much in the minds 
of his subjects, he is nevertheless there in the 
subconscious— as the father symbol that he has largely 
become. The postwar acceptance of the Emperor without the 
outward show of former days is part of the emerging psyche 
of the postwar Japan. As a symbol— from the head of State 
to the symbol of state— the Emperor, who never had powers in 
a real sense, performs much the same duties as in pre­
surrender d a y s . 38 As an American journalist noted in a 
Tokyo dispatch nearly two years after the Emperor had denied 
his divinity,
Japanese Emperor worship is like a stout tree that 
bends before a Western breeze but does not break.
The carefully planned 'democratization' of the 
Emperor bids fair to make him an even greater
3®Nihon Dokusho Shimbun, August 13, 1956.
3^See Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru's letter to 
General MacArthur, Political Reorientation, II, 679; 
Kobayashi, op. cit., pp. 25-40.
38tjew York Herald Tribune, December 17, 1947.
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symbol of Japanese nationalism than ever before.
The post-surrender experience in Japan seems to bolster the 
usual argument that the content of a national culture cannot 
be determined by injunction.
39gee Tsurumi Shunsuke, "Nihon Shiso no Tokushoku to 
Tenno-sei," [Characteristics of Japanese Thought and the 
Emperor System], Shiso, No. 336 (1952), 44-53; Tansho
Yamazaki, Tennosei no Kenkyu [A Study of the Emperor System] 
(Tokyo: Teikoku Chiho Gyosei Gakkai, 1959), pp. 389-90;
Douglas Gilbert Haring, "Japanese National Character," Yale 
Review, XLII (Spring, 1953), 375-92; Kishimito Hideo,
"Modernization Versus Westernization in the East," Journal 
of World History, VII, No. 4 (1963), 871-74.
CHAPTER XI 
DEMOCRATIZED TRADITIONAL MENTALITY
There is no question that' the attempt in Japan by 
the American Occupation was one of the most ambitious 
political experiments of all time. This attempt in 
pursuance of the spirit and provisions of the Potsdam 
Proclamation of July 26, 1945 was to "remove all obstacles 
to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies 
among the Japanese people," and to establish "freedom of 
speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for 
the fundamental human r i g h t s . I t  is needless to state 
that the Occupation was successful in a number of respects. 
It would be naive, however, to assume that in the brief time 
span of a little over six and one-half years from September, 
1945, through April, 1952, the basic character, ideas, and 
attitudes of the Japanese people, or their institutions and 
way of life, could be reformed so radically as to bring
^U. S. Department of State, The Axis in Defeat, p.
28.
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about a democratic society overnight.^
A host of the militaristic and undemocratic features 
of Japanese national life were, indeed, suppressed if not 
liquidated, but traditional concepts and modes of thought 
and action which had been nourished and nurtured through 
centuries could not be eradicated by the forcible policies 
of the American Occupation.  ^ Of course, democratic ideas 
and processes were encouraged but always within the 
restrictive and sometimes stultifying framework of military 
fiat. During the second half of the occupation period the 
exigencies of the international situation forced a "reverse 
course" in Occupation policy. Security was given precedence 
over democratization, which was now very much in the 
background.^
Though the new Constitution of Japan guaranteed the
2por sophisticated arguments on the dualistic 
nature of social change, see Bert Landheer, "The Concept of 
'Social Change' in Sociological Theory," International 
Journal of Comparative Sociology, I, No. 1 (March, 1960), 
76-88; M. Ginsberg, "National Character," British Journal of 
Psychology, XXXII, Part 3 (January, 1942), 183-205.
^Economist, July 30, 1949.
^Many writers argue that American policy in Japan 
was geared to American interests rather than American 
ideals. See, for example, "Ersatz Democracy for Japan: Ü. 
S. Policy Shifts from Passive Tolerance to Active Support of 
the Old Guard," Amerasia, X (October, 1946), 111-24; Wang
Yun-shen, "Japan— Storm Center of Asia," Pacific Affairs, 
XXI, No. 2 (June, 1948), 195-99; Ohe Seize, "The Socio-
Political Experiment in Postwar Japan," Ethics, LXVI (July, 
1950), 250-61; Howard B. Schonberger, "The General and the 
Presidency: Douglas MacArthur and the Election of 1948,"
Wisconsin Magazine of History, LVII (Spring, 1974), 201-19.
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fundamental rights of the individual, the people did not 
really feel or appreciate the meaning of such rights. What 
is more, the Japanese were not yet in a position to assert 
the newly-given rights effectively.^
Despite the arguments by many to the contrary, not a 
few people, including General MacArthur, claimed that the 
American Occupation did democratically overhaul the Japanese 
people. As General MacArthur stated in his address to the 
United States Congress on April 19, 1951,
The Japanese people since the war have undergone 
the greatest reformation in modern history. With 
a commendable will, eagerness to learn and marked 
capacity to understand, they have, from the ashes 
left in war's wake, erected in Japan an edifice 
dedicated to the primacy of individual liberty and 
personal dignity, and in the ensuing process there 
has been created a truly representative government 
committed to the advance of political morality . .
. Japan is now abreast of many free nations of the 
earth and will not again fail the universal trust.
That it may be counted upon to wield a profoundly 
beneficial influence over the course of events in 
Asia is attested by the magnificent manner in 
which the Japanese people have met the recent 
challenge of war, unrest, and confusion. . . .  I 
know of no nation more serene, orderly, and 
industrious— nor in which higher hopes can be 
entertained for future constructive service in the 
advance of the human race.®
General MacArthur's panegyric eloquence with regard
^Takahashi Akira, "Development of Democratic Con 
sciousness Among the Japanese People," International Social 
Science Journal, XIII, No. 1 (1961), 78-91.
®U. S. Congress, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., April 19, 
1951, Congressional Record, XCVII, Part 3, 4124.
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to the Occupation's performance in democratizing Japan seems 
largely unmatched by realities. Writing in 1945, John M. 
Maki stated that "the war against Japan is a war against 
people and a war against ideas. . . . Defeat of the people 
will mean victory in the war; but only the defeat of the 
ideas will make possible a peaceful Japan."?
We will examine in the following pages to what 
extent and in what respects the Japanese attitudes have been 
altered by the Occupation, drawing greatly on various 
postwar opinion surveys. We will be mindful of the general 
understanding that the dominant values of Japanese society 
at large include hierarchy, harmony, and groupism, which 
can, on the whole, be considered repugnant to 
individualism.8 As for the "Emperor Complex" of the 
Japanese, though both qualitative and quantitative changes 
in the Japanese attitude toward their Emperor have occurred 
as Table 7 shows,^ we should be circumspect lest we misread 
the Japanese people's affective sentiments toward the 
Emperor.
?John M. Maki, Japanese Militarism; Its Cause ^nd 
Cure (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945), p. 1.
^Quigley and Turner, The New Japan, p. 13,
^Nihon Dokusho Shimbun, August 13, 1956, p. 3.
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Attitudes
TABLE
Toward
7
the Emperor
Prewar Postwar
Absolute Emperor 92 (54%) 1
Human Emperor 16 ( 9%) 63 (37%)
Indifferent 35 (20%) 16 ( 9%)
Critical 28 (16%) 92 (54%)
Regardless of age, the Japanese seem very attached 
to their own history and they retain the utmost respect for 
the forms of civil authority and for the person of the 
Emperor. The Emperor seems to remain, at the very least, 
the symbol of the nation, not merely on paper, in Article I 
of the new Constitution, but in the hearts and minds of the 
p e o p l e . T h e  mystical emperor-based state has been 
replaced by a constitutional monarchy existing by the grace 
of the popular will. As a survey of the attitudes of 
postwar Japanese youth has shown, that the Emperor still 
enjoys the widespread support is based not so much on
national random sampling of 3,080 Japanese 
conducted by Yomiuri Shimbun reveals that the Emperor 
system: "Should be retained (90%); Should be abolished (4%); 
Don't know (6%)." See Allan B. Cole and Naomichi Nakanishi, 
eds., Japanese Opinion Polls with Socio-Political 
Significance, 1947-1957 (The Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, Tufts University and the Roper Public Opinion 
Poll Research Center, Williams College, 1958), p. 439-40.
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personal popularity as on acceptance of the Emperor 
s y s t e m . A s  Table 8 shows,1^ the studies conducted by 
Nihon Yoron Chosa Kenkyujo [the Japanese Institute of Public 
Opinion] amply reflected the basically unchanged 
conservative attitudes that obtained in Japan even in the 
wake of her surrender.
TABLE 8
Support for, and Opposition to1, the Emperor System
December 1945 February 1946
Support for the Emperor System 
Support for the Prewar
91.3% 95.4%
Emperor System 
Support for the Emperor
15.9% 12.6%
as a Symbol of Japan 
Support for an Emperor System 
with the People Possessing
45.3% 60.2%
Sovereignty 28.4% 22.6%
Opposition for the Emperor System 
Support for a Republic with 
a President as Chief
8.7% 4.6%
of State
Support for a System
Resembling that of the
3.7%
Soviet Union 2.9%
" "
As depicted in Table 8, a higher percentage (95.4% 
as opposed to 91.3%) favored some form of Emperor system
lllbid./ p. 453.
l^Nihon Yoron Chosa Kenkyujo, Tenno [the Emperor] 
(Tokyo: Tenno Arubamu Kankokai, 1952), p. 300.
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after the issuance of the Imperial Rescript of January 1, 
1946, in which the Emperor denied his divinity. Other 
opinion surveys from the immediate post-surrender days to 
the present continue to demonstrate that an overwhelming 
percentage of the Japanese are in support of the Emperor 
s y s t e m . F o r  example, of 2,000 Japanese polled in May, 
1946, by Mainichi Shimbun^^, 85% were opposed to the
abolition of the Emperor system, whereas only 11% were in 
favor of abolition; 4% expressed no opinion. Since this 
poll seems to be suggestive of the sentiments toward the 
Emperor, detailed breakdown of the returns seems warranted. 
To Question #1: "Do you recognize and approve of the Emperor 
system? (Chapter 1, Articles 1 and 2 of the draft 
Constitution)," responses were 85% favorable, as shown in 
Table 9.
13gee, for example, Hugh H. Smythe, "The Japanese 
Emperor System," Social Research, XIX, No. 4 (December, 
1952), 485-93; Idem and M. Watanabe, "Japanese Popular
Attitudes Toward the Emperor," Pacific Affairs, XXVI, No. 4 
(December, 1953), 335-44; Ishida Takeshi, "Popular Attitudes 
Toward the Japanese Emperor," Asian Survey (April, 1962), 
29-39; Shimizu Shin, "Tenno ni taisuru Yoron no Shindoko," 
[New Tendencies in Public Opinion Concerning the Emperor], 
Yoron Chosa Ropoto (February 21, 1952), pp. 4-16; Osaka
Yoron Chosa Kenkyujo, "Tenno-sei to Seikyoku" [The Emperor 
System and the Political Situation], Osaka Yoron Jiho (July 
20, 1949), p. 1; Hayashi Shigeru and Imai Seiichi, "Tenno no 
Seijiteki Chii" [The Political Position of the Emperor], 
Shiso (June, 1952), 12-31.
^^Cole and Nakanishi, o£. cit., p. 431.
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Table 9 
Opinion on the Emperor System
,(Total“ l,702; 85%)
By Occupation—
Private entrepreneurs 91%
Businessmen (financiers) 90%
Medical doctors 90%
Public officials 89%
Miscellaneous 89%
Agriculturalists 88%
Religious workers 86%
Company employees 82%
Judicial and legal personnel 82%
Scholars and educators 81%
Writers 70%
Students 68%
Farmers and labor movement workers 55%
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To Question 2; "Should we adopt a republican form of 
government by abolishing the Emperor system?", responses 
were more mixed, as shown in Table 10.
Table 10
Emperor System or Republican Government
Favoring abolishing Emperor system for a republic government
(Total— 215; 11%)
By Occupation
Farmers and labor movement workers 48%
Students 20%
Company employees, private
entrepreneurs, writers 16%
Medical doctors, agriculturalists 10% each
Scholars and educators 9%
Judicial and legal personnel 7%
Public officials, miscellaneous 6% each
Financiers, religious workers 5% each
Undecided (Total— 74; 3.4%)
Favor Emperor system in some form (Total 1,738; 87%)
Favor Emperor system
as per Government draft 1,702
Favor Emperor system
as per own individual plan 22
Favor republican government with
the Emperor as a symbol 14
Moreover, the results of other polls seem to 
indicate that there has hardly been any lessening in the 
popularity of the Emperor system. For instance, of 966 
Japanese randomly selected for a survey by Tokyo Shimbun, 
only 5.2% wanted to abolish the Emperor system entirely. 
All the postwar opinion surveys do see to show that there is
^^See "Tokyo Poll Shows Liking for Emperor." New 
York Times, February 3, 1959.
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little desire for change on the part of the Japanese, either 
for a return to the prewar Emperor system or for a complete 
abolition of the t h r o n e . Commenting on the result of the 
election in April,. 1946, Kodama Yoshio states;
This victory of the conservative parties was not 
because they had succeeded in regaining of the 
confidence of the people; the people had simply 
supported their platform of the defense of the 
Emperor system.^'
The following remark by Miss Yamagishi Teruko, a middle 
school girl, may very well be representative of the postwar 
Japanese attitudes toward the Emperor :
We agreed that since Japan was very different from 
other nations, and the Emperor is the father of 
the Japanese people, we owed him reverence. We no 
longer bow to him, but we worship him in our
hearts."18
Let us now examine some of the salient traits of 
Japanese national character. Speaking of the unique nature 
of Japanese civilization, a Western observer succinctly 
claims that "Japanese adopted foreign patterns to fit their
l^ishida Takeshi, Kindai Nihon Seiji Kozo no Kenkyu 
[A Study in the Political Structure of Modern Japan] (Tokyo: 
Miraisha, 1956), p. 303. Also see Cole and Nakanishi, op. 
cit., p. 453.
l^Kodama Yoshio, I Was Defeated (Tokyo: Radiopress, 
1959), p. 197. For the election result, see Cole and 
Nakanishi, o£. cit., p. xiv.
18guoted in Weldon James, "Democracy, So Sorry," 
Colliers, January 25, 1947, p. 63.
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needs while retaining their own identity. . . . Japan 
managed to retain unchanged its most fundamental 
institutions and b e l i e f s . Many observers of Japan 
consider that Japan is socio-economically modern, but 
politically feudalistic. Nearly four years after Japan's 
surrender, the Economist claimed that
fundamentally, the great mass of the Japanese 
people, despite General MacArthur's confident and 
ringing tributes to their new-found perspicacity, 
appear to remain as backward and sluggish 
politically as they were before the war.^O
Argues Douglas Gilbert Haring,
In contrast with Japan's technological 
florescence, revision of patterns of human 
relations [in Japanese society] proceeds slowly. .
. . The key to attainment of new patterns of 
human relations is production of new types of 
persons who will neither submit nor repudiate 
happiness.
In a similar vein, Robert A. Scalapino and Masumi Junnosuke 
argue as follows.
in comparison with the startling rapidity that has 
characterized socio-economic change in postwar 
Japan, political change has been extremely slow 
and uneven. Traditional patterns of organization
19,'Ray Downs, Japan Yesterday and Today (New York: 
Bantam, 1970), p. 42.
20Economist, July 30, 1949.
2^Douglas Gilbert Haring, "Japanese Character in the 
Twentieth Century," Annals, vol. 370 (March, 1967), pp. 133, 
142.
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process are omnipresent. Any society undergoing a 
very rapid transformation faces serious problems 
in keeping its various elements in balance. . . . 
The paradox of Japan's being an open society made 
up of closed components must be ended.
It is interesting to contrast the passage just cited 
above with Robert N. Bellah's argument that progress 
requires some balance between continuity and change. 
Bellah's argument seems to warrant quotation.
A society that gives itself up to continuous 
rearrangements without regard to its own inner 
continuity of structure may be in as serious 
trouble as a society incapable of any 
rearrangement at all. . . progress requires some 
balance between structural continuity and 
structural change, between memory and receptivity, 
so that the society will become neither rigid nor 
disorganized. Naturally, the success or fad,lure 
of a given society will depend very much on the 
nature of its inner structure, its deepest values 
and commitments. The degree to which the inner 
structures and values can provide identity, 
continuity, and coherence while actually 
encouraging profound changes is the degree to 
which they are conducive to progress.
On the evidence of history, Japan is quite capable 
of assimilating alien culture without losing its own 
coherence and continuity. Furthermore, we could argue, in 
the case of Japan, that industrialization does not seem to
^^Robert A. Scalapino and Masumi Junnosuke, Parties 
and Politics in Contemporary Japan (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1964), p. 153.
23pobert N. Bellah, "Epilogue; Religion and Progress 
in Modern Asia," in Robert N. Bellah, ed., Religion and 
Progress in Modern Asia (New York: The Free Press, 1965), 
pp. 170-71.
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dissipate particularism.^'^ Cullen T. Hayashita disputes the 
general assumption that the traditional Japanese patterns of 
life "such as the paternal relations, the permanent 
employment practices, and the emphasis on ascriptive status" 
are bound to wither away with the increased 
industrialization and modernization.^5
On the surface, Japan is democratic. It retains, 
however, many deeply-ingrained personal values that seem to 
contribute to the traditional, non-democratic prewar social 
patterns.26 Though Japan is the most Occidental of the 
Oriental countries, it is quite evident that the external 
signs of Western influence and the political democratic 
structure established by the postwar Occupation are not 
matched by internalized values, which many believe are the 
foundation upon which a democratic society rests. In 1970, 
Donald Keene claimed that "there is no such thing as an 
individual in Japan."2?
The forcible democratization of Japan has resulted
2^New York Times, November 6, 1970.
25cullen T. Hayashita, "The Koshinjo and Tanteisha: 
Institutionalized Ascription as a Response to Modernization 
and Stress in Japan," in Toyomasa Fuse, ed.. Modernization 
and Stress in Japan (Leiden, the Netherlands; E. J. Brill, 
1975), pp. 84, 93.
26por a detailed discussion in this connection, see 
Hayashi Chikio, "Nihonjin no Kokuminsei" [The Japanese 
National Character], Jiyu (January, 1960), 58-72.
2^New York Times, November 6, 1970.
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in a democracy devoid of individualism which constitutes the 
basis of Western society. A Japanese writer goes so far as 
to argue that "Japan's postwar democracy has form and fabric 
but no heart."28 The Japanese have thus far failed to 
enliven their social solidarity with the individualism 
needed to give it moral fiber.29 it is commonly pointed out 
that the Japanese overstress duty, Western people rights. A 
report based on the nation-wide surveys conducted in 1953 
and 1958 reveals that 50% responded that life should be 
family- and state-centered, and 37% individual-centered. 
Also revealed in the report is that 38% favored the 
promotion of the public interest, whereas 29% favored the 
achievement of self-gratification.20 Table 11 seems to 
substantiate further that in Japan the public interest 
outweighs individual rights.21
28Takabatake Michitoshi, "Citizens' Movements;
Organizing the Spontaneous," The Japan Interpreter, IX, No. 
3 (Winter, 1975), 317.
29Arguing that the democratization of Japan remains 
doubtful unless Japanese become capable of truly 
appreciating the concept of individualism, Takagi Yasaka 
opines that "Japan's spiritual revolution will remain
incomplete until Christianity is integrated in the Japanese 
code of morality." See his "Defeat and Democracy in Japan," 
Foreign Affairs, XXIV, No. 4 (July, 1948), 645-52.
20iîayashi, Jiyu, p. 66.
2lTokei Suri Kenkyujo, Tokyo, Kokuminsei Chosa
linkai, "Kokuminsei no Kenkyu— 1978 nen Zenkokku Chosa" [A
Study of the Japanese National Character— the Sixth Nation- 
Wide Survey], Research Report General Series 46 (March, 
1979), p. 70. Tokei Suri Kenkyujo (The institute of
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Table 11 
Individual Rights vs Public Interest
Individual
Rights
Public
Interest
Other Don't
Know
I (1953) —— - - —
II (1958) — — — — - —
III (1963) 29% 57% 1% 13%
IV (1968) 33% 57% 1% 9%
V (1973) 37% 51% 1% 11%
VI (1978) 32% 55% 2% 11%
One of the questions in the national character
surveys was concerned with goals in life. As Table 12 seems 
to indicate,32 the Japanese people's goals in life appear to 
remain basically the same except for some of the symptoms 
often mentioned in theories of "Mass society."33
Statistical Mathematics] is a government-supported but 
autonomous agency located in Tokyo which has conducted a 
series of nation-wide surveys on "Japanese National 
Character" at five-year intervals beginning in 1953, and 
repeated in 1958, 1963, 1968, 1973 and 1978.
32Ibid., p. 25
33por a good overview of the various contending 
theories of "mass society," see Leon Bramson, The Political 
Context of Sociology (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1961), esp» pp. 27-72. Also see Erich Fromm, Escape 
from Freedom (London: Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1942); Gustave 
LeBon, The Crowd (London: Ernest Benn, 1947); Karl Mannhein, 
Diagnosis of Our Time (London: Routledge, Kegan Paul: 1943); 
idem, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (New York;
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TABLE 12 
Goals in Life
I II III IV V VI
1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978
1) Get rich 15% 17% 17% 17% 14% 14%
2) Fame 6% 3% 4% 3% 3% 2%
3) Live on taste 21% 27% 30% 32% 39% 39%
4) Enjoy daily life 11% 18% 19% 20% 23% 22%
5) Honest life 29% 23% 18% 17% 11% 11%
6) Service to
public interest 10% 6% 6% 6% 5% 7%
7) Other 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
8) Don't know 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(2,254) (920) (2,698)(3 ,303)(3,055)(2,032)
Judging from Table 12, the Japanese interest in 
"getting rich" has remained relatively the same for a 
quarter of a century, in which period the Japanese people 
first tasted the miserable state of a war-ruined economy, 
and later enjoyed the affluent living standards resulting 
from Japan's position as the second strongest capitalist 
economy in the world. That the categories of "Live on 
taste" and "Enjoy daily life" have steadily been on the 
increase seems to imply that in Japan there is less a change 
from acquisitive to post-industrial values than a gradual 
change from a collectivity orientation to individuation. 
This obvious trend toward individuation in Japan needs to be
Harcourt Brace, 1950); Jose Ortega y Gasset, Revolt of the 
Masses (New York: Pelican, 1950); David Riesman,
Individualism Reconsidered (Glencoe: Free Press, 1954);
idem. The Lonely Crowd (New York; Doubleday, 1953).
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carefully interpreted in that the individuation in Japan 
takes on a notion which is quite different from that usually 
found in other advanced, industrial societies which were, 
once "made up of small 'organic,' close-knit communities 
that were shattered by industrialism and modern life, and 
replaced by a large impersonal 'atomistic' society which is 
unable to provide the basic gratifications and call forth 
the loyalties that the older communities knew."34 
Instead of experiencing the disorganization of society 
created by industrialization and by the demand of the 
individuals for equality, the individuation in Japan seems 
to make headway without abandoning indiscriminately all the 
traditional values.35 Despite the imposed reforms to bring 
about equality and individual rights, Japan is still 
characterized as a hierarchical society.35 in 1971, Ishida 
Takeshi singled out as the characteristics of the Japanese 
the group conformity and lack of individualism.3? Unlike
34üaniel Bell, "The Theory of Mass Society," 
Commentary (July 1956), p. 77.
35ihat the growth of individualism in Japan does not 
eclipse the traditional sense of collaterality is fully 
discussed in William Caudill and Harry A. Scarr, "Japanese 
Value Orientations and Culture Change," Ethnology, I, No. 1 
(January, 1962), 53-91.
35por a detailed exposition of this hierarchical 
concept of Japanese society, see Nakane Chie, Japanese 
Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles, Calif.: University of
California Press, 1970).
3?lshida Takeshi, Japanese Society (New York: Random
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the general assumption that Japanese society will or should 
become the same as that of the West when Japan is completely 
modernized,
the persistence of social structure can be seen 
clearly in the modes of personal social relations 
which determine the probable variability of group 
organization in changing circumstances. . . . 
Social tenacity is dependent largely on the degree 
of integration and the timmee span of the history 
of a society.38
The most salient aspect of Japanese personal social 
relations is manifested in a massive semiunderground network 
of organizations, called the Oyabun-Kobun systems,39 which 
extend from the smallest rural villages to the highest 
echelons of the national government. Taking the Oyabun- 
Kobun [Parent-Child] system to task as the biggest threat to 
American democratic aims in Japan, one of the Occupation's 
experts sums up the Oyabun-Kobun system in the following 
words :
The Oyabun-Kobun system is not just a system of 
corrupt or illegal activities. It is profound. 
Its profundity lies in its widespread extent 
throughout Japan and its tremendous historical 
depth. . . .  Its essential characteristics lies 
in the hierarchical relationship between a set of 
individuals. The point is that the Japanese 
people expect that this is the natural form of
House, 1971), p. 127.
3®Nakane, o£. cit., p. ix.
39yanaga, Japanese People and Politics, pp. 68, 110-
112.
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social relations. . . . The entire programs of 
the SCAP [Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers] 
to instill democracy in Japan will be a farce 
unless this system is first a b o l i s h e d .
The Oyabun-Kobun system, however anachronistically 
feudalistic it may appear, is so important in Japanese 
social life that it merits further discussion. Though the 
Oyabun-Kobun system may be repugnant to Western thinking, 
the system seems to have been very conducive to the 
maintenance of social harmony, and forms of civil authority, 
preventing such undesirable societal s y m p t o m s a s  
alienation, atomization of the individual, anomie, and the 
absence of authority attendant upon industrialization and 
liberalization of a society. It is interesting to see the 
Japanese Oyabun-Kobun system in the light of the master- 
slave relationship in the traditional feudal society. 
Professor Yanaga tells us;
The boss system as a method of control based on 
the Oyabun-Kobun relationship is in operation in 
some form in practically all major segments of 
Japanese society. It is a system based upon 
simulated patrimonial principles in which persons 
in authority assume obligations of protecting and 
looking after the welfare of their subordinates 
much as foster parents do, and subordinates 
reciprocate with personal loyalty based on their 
feeling of duty and obligation. In the feudal 
period, this relationship was highly developed in
^Oguoted in Christian Science Monitor, November 1,
1947.
^Ipor a cogent treatment of social ills plaguing 
modern society, see Fromm, op. cit.
303
the craft guilds and all sorts of apprenticeship 
systems. ^
It is appropriate to examine the Oyabun-Kobun 
system, which is as strongly in operation in the post-1945 
Japan as ever before, vis-a-vis the moral "degradation" 
attendant upon industrialization. Writing in 1857, Orester 
A. Brownson commented on the changed personal relations 
wrought by industrialization in the following words:
Between the master and the slave, between the lord 
and the serf, there often grow up pleasant 
personal relations and attachments; there is 
personal intercourse, kindness, affability, 
protection on the one side, respect and gratitude 
on the other, which partially compensates for the 
superiority of the one and the inferiority of the 
other; but the modern system of wages allows very 
little of all this: the capitalist and the workman 
belong to different species, and have little 
personal intercourse. The agent of the man of 
business pays the workman his wages, and there 
ends the responsibility of the employer. The 
laborer has no further claim on him and he may 
want and starve, or sicken and die, it is his own 
affair, with which the employer has nothing to do. 
Hence the relation between the two classes becomes 
mercenary, hard and a matter of a r i t h m e t i c . ^
The Japanese version of social change has always 
occurred in subtle ways, grafting Western institutions onto 
Japan's essentially feudal social structure should doing so 
have definite utility values without disrupting its social
42yanaga, op. cit., p. 111.
^^Orester A. Brownson, Works (Detroit: T. Nourse,
1884), pp. 116-17.
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and cultural values. When the "Civil Liberties Directive"
was issued by the Occupation, the general public seemed
surprised and pleased. The Japanese press spoke of it in
tones of restrained approval. This welcome of the Civil
Liberties Directive was interpreted in the foreign press as
a dramatic change in Japanese thinking and in their notion
of individual rights.4*
As many of the postwar opinion surveys clearly
demonstrate, a goodly number of the Occupation-imposed
reforms were gladly accepted by the Japanese if they were
believed to possess instrumental utility in the enhancement
of national status and of the people's well-being, whereas
not a few of the imposed reforms were rendered futile if
they were repugnant to Japan's cultural instinct. As shown
in Table 13, the Oyabun-Kobun mentality still obtains in 
45Japan.
^^Yomiuri editorial, November 18, 1945.
^^Hayashi Chikio, "Kokuminsei no Kenkyu" [A Study of 
Japanese National Character], Kyoiku Tokei, No. 30 (1954),
31.
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TABLE 13 
Attitudes Toward Superiors
Act ethically 13.4%
Careful about behavior toward superiors 26.5%
Obedient 22.9%
No answer 12.1%
Others 25.1%
TOTAL 100.0%
It may be pointed out that the Japanese adoration 
that verged on idolatry for General MacArthur in the 
immediate post-surrender days was a single indication of the 
Japanese mentality that is ready to respect the superior and 
the powerful. Denouncing the subservient feudal mentality 
of the Japanese toward the Supreme Commander, Jiji Shimpo 
counselled the Japanese people as follows.
The way to express the gratitude of the Japanese 
people toward General MacArthur for the wisdom 
with which he is managing postwar Japan and for 
his efforts to democratize the nation is not to 
worship him as a god but to cast away the servile 
spirit and gain the self-respect that would not 
bow its head to anybody. Only thus would General 
MacArthur rest content that the Occupation aims 
had been achieved. ”
The passage cited above seems to imply two things : 
one confirms the Japanese mentality which is heavily 
nurtured and influenced by the Oyabun-Kobun relationship;
46Jiji Shimpo, October 11, 1946.
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the other is that the Jiji Shimpo was interested in 
disabusing the Japanese of the national pride rather than in 
expressing gratitude of the Japanese for the forced 
democratization of Japan. The survey conducted in 1968 by 
Tokei Suri Kenkyujo [the Institute of Statistical Mathe­
matics] on "Japanese National Character" reveals that the 
Japanese thinking is still influenced largely by Bushido.4? 
The following question was asked in the 1968 survey to find 
out the preference for leadership type: "Supposing you are 
working in a firm. There are two types of departmental 
chiefs. Which of the following types would you prefer to
work under?"48
^^Bushido [the Way of the Warrior] accepted by all 
classes of the Japanese people has had a profound influence 
on Japanese thinking and behavior not only during feudalism 
but even subsequent to the demise of the feudal system. 
"The duties dictated by bushido were by no means one-sided. 
We find these duties in a typical oath and pledge exchanged 
by lord and retainer in Southern Kyushu late in the 
fifteenth century: the retainer swears that he will serve 
the lord, 'with single devotion and without a second 
thought,' whereas the lord, acknowledging the promise of 
loyalty, replies that 'I will regard your important affairs 
as my own and we will mutually rely and be relied upon; if 
despite this understanding a calumny or an evil report 
should arise, we should mutually explain ourselves, with 
complete frankness." See Asakawa Kanichi, Documents of 
Iriki (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1927), pp. 
295-96.
^®Hayashi Chikio et al, "A Study of Japanese 
National Character," Annals of the Institute of Statistical
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Type A; A man who always sticks to the work rules and never 
demands any unreasonable work, but on the other hand, 
never does anything for you personally in matters not 
connected with the work.
Type B; A man who sometimes demands extra work in 
contravention of the work rules, but on the other hand, 
looks after you well personally in matters not connected 
with the work.
Table 14 
Preference for Leadership Type
A 11.9%
B 85.5%
No answer 2.3%
Other 0.7%
Total 100.0%
Table 14 demonstrates that an overwhelming number of 
Japanese still prefer particularism to universalism and 
qiri-ninjo^^ to rationality. It may be pointed out that the 
Japanese obsession with "face" or honor is inextricably tied 
in with the demands of Giri. In a negative sense, giri is 
practised to prevent disgrace or shame to one's name.
Mathematics, Supplement I (1959), p. 25.
49The concept of airi-ninio defies clear definition but 
may be understood as the gamut of human obligational relation­
ships, having a universal need for respecting and expressing 
human feelings. Giri (a debt of gratitude), a pervasive force 
in the behavior of all classes of Japanese people, finds its 
sanctions in the mores, customs and folkways, but not in laws. 
For a fuller exposition of this concept, see Ruth Benedict,
The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 
1946), pp. 114-76.
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whereas in a positive sense it becomes a desire for fame and 
prestige. We should be reminded that in feudal society loss 
of honor, either by insult, dereliction of duty, failure, or 
cowardice, called for vendetta or suicide, which are 
regarded as means of redressing a wrong or a d i s g r a c e . ^ 0
In order to measure how strongly giri-ninjo was 
still practised, the following question was asked in 1958: 
"Imagine this situation. Mr. M was orphaned at an early age 
and was brought up by Mr. A, a neighbor. The A's gave him a 
good education, sent him to university and now Mr. M has 
become the president of a company. One day he gets a 
telegram asking him to come at once to Mr. A because Mr. A 
is seriously ill. This comes just at the moment when he is 
going to an important meeting which will decide whether his 
firm is to go bankrupt or to survive." Results seem to 
indicate that in Japan giri is considered more important 
than personal career. About 53% of the respondents answered 
that Mr. M should go to the ailing benefactor, while 40% 
responded that Mr. M should attend to his official 
business.
The concept of giri-ninjo influences not only the
5®Nakane Chie tells us that the concept of Giri- 
ninjo occupies a very "important position in the social life 
of the Japanese." For a detailed discussion of giri- ninjo, 
see Nakane Chie, Tekio no Joken [Conditions of Adaptation] 
(Tokyo: Kodansha, 1972), pp. 148-58
I^fiayashi et al. Annals (1959), pp. 6-7, 27.
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interpersonal relations, but also the relationship between 
the individual and the technical civilization in a very 
positive way, preempting ill symptoms of modern society. 
The six consecutive surveys on the Japanese National Char­
acter reveal that a greater number of respondents are 
convinced that the development of science and technology 
does not necessarily mean the loss of the richness of human 
feeling. Queried if the richness of the human feeling is 
bound to be adversely affected by the "mechanization" of 
society, an overwhelming number of respondents answered that
the richness of human feeling is not necessarily to be lost
52as Table 15 shows.
S^Tokei Suri Kenkyujo, Tokyo, Kokuminsei Chosa 
linkai, op. cit. (March, 1979), p. 66.
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Human
Table 15 
Feeling vs. Mechanization
Year Lost Not Lost Undecided Other Don't Know Total
1953 17% 58% 8% 1% 1.6% 100%
(2254)
1958 21% 52% 10% 1% 16% 100%
( 920)
1963 18% 49% 19% 1% 13% 100%
(2698)
1968 22% 56% 13% 1% 8% 100%
(3033)
1973 31% 42% 20% 1% 6% 100%
(3055)
1978 25% 53% 15% 1% 6% 100%
(2032)
We now turn to the question of ancestor worship.
which has been a major fulcrum in maintaining the strong 
family system and the essential basis for loyalty and 
patriotism to the Japanese nation. Since "the family is the 
unit and basis of all social relations," democratization, be 
it educational, social, labor-related, or political, is, 
claims Wagatsuma Sakae, out of the question, unless the 
family itself is democratized. Wagatsuma goes on to argue 
that "the law concerning family life is one in which the 
element of spontaneous growth in the social life of a race 
is the strongest. It must, therefore, be regarded rather as 
a natural phenomenon that the family life of Japan "hasn.'t
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been reformed immediately in response to the revision of the 
civil code."53
As Table 16 clearly r e v e a l s , 54 the democratization 
of Japan for more than three decades since Japan's surrender 
has had little effect on the well-known Japanese ancestor 
worship. Table 16 is based on the question: "Would you say 
you were on the whole more inclined to honor your ancestors 
than the average, or less?"
Table 16 
Ancestor Worship
Year More Medial Less No Answer Others Total
1953 77% 15% 5% 2% 1% 100%
(2254)
1973 67% 21% 10% 1% 1% 100%
(3055)
1978 72% 16% 10% 1% 1% 100%
(2032)
Also revealed in this connection is that most
Japanese are still inclined to forego anything that might 
hurt the honor of their f a m i l i e s . 5 5  All things considered.
53lbid., p. 425.
54ïokei Suri Kenkyujo, op. cit. (March, 1979), p.
42.
55nayashi et al., op. cit., p. 20. Professor Edwin 
0. Reischauer describes the concept of Japanese "face" in 
the following words; "The shame-conscious Japanese may place
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"programmed installation of democracy" seems to have become 
more a matter of form and procedure than of principle or 
ideology. Democracy in Japan has, in a sense, been adopted 
less as a principle than an overt pattern of behavior. Put 
differently, democratization in Japan does not seem to have 
penetrated the mode of traditional thinking.^6
In 1956, Pujiwara Hirotatsu claimed that "Pride of 
racial purity surrendered itself to the dollar and the 
boastful use of species of Japanese-American speech."5? 
Fujiwara's argument apparently based on a superficial 
observation seems unsound. Japan was already in the 1951-
a heavy emphasis on 'face' and on success, but their highest 
respect goes not to the man who displays wealth and 
authority or even the man who has been successful in amass­
ing riches and power, but to the man who has rendered great 
services to the state and taken little in return for him­
self, thereby demonstrating his superior self- discipline 
and willpower." See his The United States and Japan (rev. 
ed.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 
177.
^^Though written in 1918, Ozaki Yukio's scathing 
attack on the Japanese traditional mentality might be as 
valid now as then. At one point, Ozaki writes: " . . .  the 
customs and usages of feudal times are so deeply impressed 
upon the minds of men here [in Japan] that even the idea of 
political parties, as soon as it enters the brains of our 
countrymen, germinates and grows according to feudal notions 
. . . political parties . . . are really affairs of personal 
connection and sentiments, the relation between the leader 
and the members of a party being similar to those which 
subsisted between a feudal lord and his liegemen, or to 
those between a 'boss' of gamblers and his followers in 
their country." Ozaki Yukio, The Voice of Japanese Democ­
racy, trans. by J. E. DeBecker (Yokohama: Kelly and Walsh, 
Ltd., 1918), pp. 93-94.
S^Fujiwara Hirotatsu, "Nationalism and the 
Ultraright Wing," Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, vol. 308 (November, 1956), p. 
82.
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1960 conservative period following the 1949-1950 cold war 
period, as some scholars are inclined to characterize the 
post-1945 years.58 Paying undue attention to the excesses 
of liberalism, confusion of hedonism with democracy, and 
confusion of liberty with license is bound to court mis­
understanding.59
Leaving aside any question of political ideology, 
the Japanese attachment- to the imperial and national 
traditions remain very strong. Even the young Japanese 
preserved intact the sense of continuity with the country's 
most distant past and retain a most lively awareness of 
Japanese history even in its mythological aspects. For con­
temporary Japanese youth, Japan is still a nation with a 
past. It would, indeed be a serious mistake to assume that 
the Japanese youth feel their own culture alien to them, or 
that they have lost their attachment to, and confidence in, 
the national traditions.58 That the Japanese remain very 
much the same now as in the pre-surrender years can be best 
explained by the continuing trend that has been keeping the 
conservatives of the Liberal Democratic Party in power as
58iriye Akira, Mutual Images ; Essays in 
American-Japanese Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1975).
59Takahashi Akira, "Development of Democratic 
Consciousness Among the Japanese People," International 
Social Science Journal, XIII, No. 1 (1961), 81.
58Mainichi Shimbun, April 7, 1952.
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Table 17 shows.
Table 
Political Part
17
y Support
1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978
Liberal Democratic 41% 38% 43% 41% 33% 34%
Democratic Socialist — —— 3% 4% 3% 3%
Japan Socialist 23% 31% 22% 22% 17% 14%
Japan Communist 0% 0% 0% 2% 3% 3%
Clean Government
(Komeito) ----- —  — 2% 4% 4% 4%
New Liberal Club ----- ----- —— ----- ----- 1%
Supports None 19% 20% 22% 21% 33% 34%
Others 5% 1% (a) 2% 2% 2%
Don't Know 12% 10% (a) 4% 5% 5%
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(2254) (2369) (2698) (3033) (4594) (3945)
(a)These two categories together comprised 8%.
In the midst of hectic democratization, the 
discerning reporter of the New York Times Lindesay Parrott 
remarked on the outcome of the crucial election of January 
23, 1949; "What the election means is that power in Japan, 
in so far as power exists apart from General MacArthur, now 
has passed to the group that represents business, the 
conservative countryside, and that section of the prewar 
Japanese civil service that has not been eliminated for
militarist leanings."^2
Whether or not the defeat and the Occupation
G^Tokei Suri Kenkyujo, April 7, 1952. 
®^New York Times, January 25, 1949.
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deprived the Japanese of their traditional racial feeling, 
it should not go unmentioned in that the deep-lying racial 
consciousness of the Japanese has a bearing on the Japanese 
mentality. Results of various surveys®^ on nationalities 
most "liked" and "disliked" by the Japanese reveal that on 
the whole the Americans are most liked, whereas the Russians 
are most disliked.
National security concerns more than any other 
factor may be responsible for these findings. It is 
interesting to note that these findings do seem to 
substantiate the general assumptions that the Japanese 
suffer feelings of both inferiority and superiority. As 
Table IB clearly s h o w s , ^4 the consistent Japanese preference 
for such Western peoples as Americans, English, Germans, 
French and Italians seems to reflect the lingering 
inferiority complex of the Japanese toward Western, white 
peoples. The Japanese disliking of the Russians, however, 
is attributable not only to the Soviet threat to Japan's 
national security, but also to the Japanese prideful feeling 
stemming from Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 
1904-1905.
Table 18 clearly shows that the Japanese have 
preference for Western peoples, apparently despising their
G^Cole and Nakanishi, op. cit., pp. 648-49; Hayashi, 
Kyoiku Tokei No. 30, p. 52.
G^Hayashi, Kyoiku Tokei No. 30, p. 52.
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racially congenial Asiatics.
Table 18
Japanese Preference for Nationalities
314 Citizens of Tokyo Surveyed in 1953
Order Peoples
Percentage 
of "Like"
1 Americans 59.2
2.5 English 43.4
2.5 Germans 43.4
4 French 41.8
5 Indians 30.4
6 Italians 26.9
7 Chinese 25.9
8 Micronesians 15.8
9 Russians 8.5
10 Koreans 6.3
The Japanese preference for Western peoples is 
rather ironical in that Japan's "pride" has been humiliated 
and her ambition frustrated not by Asiatic peoples, but by 
Western powers in modern history. The surrender in 1945 was 
Japan's greatest national humiliation. That the Japanese 
dislike Chinese, Koreans, and Micronesians as much as they 
do Russians, whose country has long been believed by the 
Japanese to be a serious threat to Japan's security, seems 
to imply that the Japanese are inclined to respect the 
powerful and to despise the weak and humiliated peoples. 
Koreans, Chinese, and Russians had their share of national 
humiliation wrought by the expansionist Japan. This is the 
very mentality that Professor Maruyama Masao calls the
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mentality of "transfer of oppression."®^
Table 19, based on three surveys,®® seems to show 
that the Americans are the most liked people and the Koreans 
the most disliked people according to the Japanese 
preference. Except for the survey conducted in 1938, the 
Koreans have remained Japan's most disliked people. It 
hardly needs any intelligence to see why the Koreans ranked 
third in 1938, outranked only by Germans and Italians, who 
together with the Japanese constituted the Axis, on the 
Japanese scale of preference for nationalities.
Table 19 
Ranking of Nationalities
1285 344 Public
Citizens Officials & 122 Rightists
of Tokyo Housewives Surveyed
Surveyed Surveyed in 1951
Ranking in 1938 in 1951 members leaders
1 Germans Americans Americans Indians
2 Italians French English Chinese
3 Koreans English French Germans
4 Indians Germans Indians French
5 Americans Italians Germans Americans
6 French Indians Italians English
7 Negroes Chinese Chinese Italians
8 English Russians Koreans Russians
9 Chinese Koreans Russians Koreans
10 Russians
®^Maruyama Masao, Thought and Behavior in Modern 
Japanese Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963),
p. 18.
66Hayashi, Kyoiku Tokei No. 30, p. 52.
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The juxtaposition of the most liked Americans and 
the most disliked Koreans seems to confirm two of the 
salient characteristics of the Japanese. While the Japanese 
continue to harbor an inferiority complex toward 
Westerners,67 not in terms of national capability, but in 
terms of racial consciousness, they continue to retain their 
national "arrogance" toward peoples in the Third World in 
general or the peoples in Asia, in particular.68
In view of the fact that the Japanese persecuted and 
exploited the Koreans more than any other people during 
their heyday of aggression, it is truly strange that the 
Koreans are still Japan's most disliked people. This may be 
a clear manifestation of "the inner arrogance of 
J a p a n i s m , " 6 9  resulting from the Japanese culture which is 
said to be conditioned not by the sense of guilt, but by 
that of shame. Knowing the Japanese mind, many students of 
Japan hold gloomy views regarding a possible change of heart
67por an interesting discussion of the 
idiosyncrasies and shortcomings of the Japanese people, see 
Kawasaki Ichiro, Japan Unmasked (Rutland, Vermont: Charles 
E. Tuttle Co., 1969).
68japan's persistent interest in expansion still 
worries many countries, leading China to view Japan as "the 
quintessential imperialist villain." Chalmers Johnson, "How 
China and Japan See Each Other," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 50, 
No. 4 (July, 1974), p. 712.
69prank Gibney, Japan : The Fragile Superpower (New 
York: W. W. Norton, 1975), p. 332.
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of those who were responsible for the past misdeeds, albeit 
the new Constitution of Japan "contains some of the finest 
words in the vocabulary of freedom." Already in 1946, many 
discerning observers noticed that the Japanese leaders were 
using the Cold War to their a d v a n t a g e . I t  may not be too 
far-fetched to state that the thing that still matters most 
to the Japanese is p a t r i o t i s m . As B. H. Chamberlain 
stated many decades ago, for the Japanese people "patriotism 
comes before everything, before Christianity, before
humility, before even fair play and truth.
The Japanese appear to be submissive when they are 
weak and arrogant when they are strong. As Kawai Kazuo 
stated in 1953, "When the Japanese were prostrate, they 
gratefully welcomed American aid and advice. Today they 
have bounced back far enough to take delight in snapping 
their fingers at the A m e r i c a n s . Kawai went on to
expatiate,
. . . it has become the fad to take a
supercillious, condescending attitude toward 
American culture. The Americans are uncouth, 
simple-minded, brash, materialistic, arrogant, and
^^Andrew Roth, "Japan Unchanged," New Statesman and 
Nation, April 6, 1946, pp. 240-241.
7^Gibney, o£. cit., pp. 65, 300.
72guoted in Karl Loewith, "The Japanese Mind," 
Fortune, December, 1943, p. 240.
^^Kawai Kazuo, "The New Anti-Americanism in Japan," 
Far Eastern Survey, XXII, No. 12 (November, 1953), 153.
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selfish. . . . The Japanese, in common with other 
Orientals struggling to get ahead in a world still 
largely dominated by the white race, suffer from a 
national and racial inferiority complex. Although 
most Japanese fail to recognize the truth of this 
statement, and would indignantly deny it, they 
feel unsure of themselves in this essentially 
white man's world. They thus waver between 
excessive shyness and excessive aggressiveness. 
What appears to be their over-assertiveness is 
really an attempt to compensate for secret fears 
and doubts. Even the ultra-nationalistic 
megalomania of the wartime period was a perverted 
response to an inner need of the Japanese to 
reassure themselves of their own adequacy, rather 
than an expression of genuine belief in Japan's
"divine mission.
In spite of the Occupation-induced democratic 
reforms, Japanese adaptation to democracy was a static type 
of adaptation which, with no real inner change of character 
structure, externally modified behavior to meet the 
challenging situation in the post-surrender period.^5 Japan 
is cosmopolitan, at least outwardly, but retains touches of 
xenophobia. Japanese national prejudice against Koreans has 
long been well-known. The Japanese massacre of hundreds of 
Koreans in the wake of the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923 
was a case in point. The survey on Preference for 
Nationalities conducted in September, 1951, by Izumi Seiichi 
reveals the relative strength of anti-Korean prejudice among
74lbid., 154-156.
^^New York Times, November 6, 1970.
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the J a p a n e s e . 76 izumi points out that Japanese racial 
prejudice against Koreans is on the whole not based on any 
idea that Koreans are qualitatively abnormal, but on a well- 
established stereotype of hatred.
It is not only to Koreans but also to other races 
that Japanese feel superior as the memory of their surrender 
in 1945 fizzles into oblivion. Table 20 , based on surveys 
on Japanese National Character,77 shows that Japanese feel 
progressively superior to Westerners as time distances 
itself further from Japan's defeat in 1945.
7^Hayashi, Kyoiku Tokei No. 30, pp. 50-53.
77Tokei Suri Kenkyujo, Tokyo, Kokuminse Chosa 
linkai, "Kokuminsei no Kenkyu— 1968 nen Zenkokku Chosa" [A 
Study of the Japanese National Character— the 1968 Nation- 
Wide Survey], Research Report General Series 33 (April,
1969), p. 152.
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Table 20 
Perception of Racial Superiority
Superior Inferior Same Undecided Other D.K.(a) Total
1953 20 28 14 (b) (b) 15 100%
(2254)
1963 3 14 16 27 1 9  100%
(2698)
1968 47 11 12 21 1 8  100%
(3033)
(a)Don't Know
(b)Together these responses comprised 23%.
It is significant to note that on the whole there is 
hardly any difference in response among various age groups. 
It is particularly significant that 53% of the respondents 
with college education feel that the Japanese are superior 
to Westerners, whereas only 42% of the respondents with 
primary school education feel that the Japanese are 
superior. As Table 21 clearly demonstrates,^® regardless of 
age and educational level, Japanese are becoming quite 
confident in themselves.
7®Ibid. For a fuller analysis of the results of 
various surveys on "racial comparison," see Nishihira 
Shigeki, Nihonjin no Iken [The Japanese Opinion] (Tokyo: 
Seishin Shobo, 1958), pp. 66-78.
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Japanese vs.
Table
Other
21
Nationalities
Sex Superior Inferior Same Undecided Other D.K. Total
Male 53 11 14 18 1 3 100%
(1427)
Female 41 12 11 24 1 11 100%
(1606)
Age
20-24 47 9 16 24 1 3 100%
( 376)
25-29 46 13 11 23 1 6 100%
( 398)
30-34 46 13 16 18 0 7 100%
( 399)
35-39 47 10 15 21 1 6 100%
( 389)
40-44 49 11 11 21 0 8 100%
( 344)
45-49 50 10 12 23 5 100%
( 243)
50-54 45 11 11 23 1 9 100%
( 222)
55-59 48 14 13 16 2 7 100%
( 205)
60+
Educational
45
Level
13 8 20 1 13 100%
( 457)
Primary 42 15 9 18 0 16 100%
( 494)
Middle 47 14 10 19 1 9 100%
(1202)
High School 47 9 15 25 1 3 100%
(1019)
College 53 6 17 22 1 1 100%
( 309)
Paying attention to the Japanese confidence which, 
in some sense, rather verges on national arrogance, many
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observers believe that Japan in a brief time span of a 
quarter of a century advanced from a position of 
discipleship in democratization to a position of confident 
partnership smacking of condescension toward Western 
peoples. As Kiuchi Nobutane writes,
But these predictions . . . usually fail to reckon 
with Japan's complete changeability. And Japan is 
capable of making, for better or worse, a complete 
turnabout at strategic points of history. . . . 
Neither the post-Meiji Westernization nor the 
post-World War II Americanization, however, 
completely eliminated Japanese tradition. After 
being eclipsed for some time, tradition was 
quietly resurrected in places where it could 
strike a new balance and harmony with the imported 
alien culture. . . . They I the Japanese] can no 
longer see a model in America, and indeed they 
realize that they can no longer find any foreign 
model to follow. So, at last, after a century of 
interlude, Japan once again finds itself free and, 
for the time being, alone, standing at a 
crossroad. (Emphasis added.
What Kiuchi argues is that the Japanese are superbly 
adept in "situational ethics." We could argue that since 
the circumstances and supports of life in Japan have 
drastically altered since Japan's surrender, ideas and 
attitudes toward life have, indeed, changes as well, but 
only to a certain extent. "It is," Nakane Chie argues, 
"Japanese nature to accept change with little resistence 
and, indeed to welcome it and value change; but a 
superficial change of outlook, as facile as changes in
^^Kiuchi Nobutane, "Japan Will Have to Slow Down," 
Fortune, February 1971, p. 98.
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fashion, has not the slightest effect on the firm 
persistence of the basic nature and core of personal 
relations and group dynamics.
As the inclement conditions caused by defeat and the 
blasts of the Occupation typhoon in the early post-surrender 
period wore off, nationalistic sentiments made steady 
headway.81 There was a revival of many of the major 
symbolic nationalist functions; the national flag of the 
Rising Sun was once again proudly waved on every possible 
occasion; the national anthem, patriotic songs, and military 
marches became once more popular; and Japanese again began 
to flock to the Shinto shrines.8% It should be remembered 
that Shinto, as already dwelt upon at great length, could be 
regarded as a sacred form of Japanese nationalism in the 
pre-1945 era.83 Even today, popular interest in Shintoism 
can be considered a barometer for a certain aspect of 
Japanese nationalistic feeling. Attendance at Shinto 
shrines has steadily increased since Japan's regaining
88Nakane, Japanese Society, p. 148.
8lNihon Jinbun Kagakkai [The Japanese Society of 
Humanistic Science], ed., Shakaiteki Kincho no Kenkyu [A 
Study of Social Tension] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1953), p. 308.
8^Mainichi Shimbun, April 7, 1952.
83Daniel C. Holtom, Modern Japan and Shinto 
Nationalism: A Study of Present-Day Trends in Japanese
Religion (Rev. ed.; New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 
1963), p. 212.
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independence.
Family and group visits to Shinto shrines consti­
tute a popular form of holiday outing in Japan, and often 
have no religious, let alone nationalistic, significance. 
Yet the increasing popularity since 1953 of such shrines 
as the Great Shrine at Ise, the Meiji and Yasukuni Shrines 
in Tokyo, the Kashiwara Shrine near Nara, and Atsuta 
Shrine in Mie Prefecture, which were traditionally associ­
ated with the expression of nationalistic feeling, cannot 
be simply dismissed as a result of improved economic con­
ditions. There is no denying that this growing popularity 
is to some extent indicative of a renascent form of Japan­
ese nationalism and of a growing mood of nostalgia for
86prewar patterns.
The postwar public opinion surveys on the Japanese 
national character reveal that the majority of the people
85In the inclement years of 1946 and 1947 when Shinto­
ism was severely suppressed by the Occupation the number of 
daily visitors to Shinto shrines barely amounted to a few 
dozen and the total cash offerings meant no more than a 
handful of pennies. Following the Occupation's relenting in 
its attitude toward Shintoism, the number of Japanese visit­
ing the Yasukuni Shrine increased drastically. In October,
1948, the Emperor revived the custom of paying personal visits 
to the Yasukuni Shrine. Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine had 
been suspended in November, 1945. See Japan Times, April 23, 
1957.
Okawa Shumei, for instance, claimed that the growing 
popularity of visiting the Meiji, Ise, and Yasukuni Shrines 
was an indication that Japanese national pride was springing 
up spontaneously among the Japanese, in spite of all the efforts 
of politicians and cynical intellectuals to denigrate Japan's 
traditions. See his "Seiji no Fuhai to Nihon Kakumei" (The 
Corruption of Politics and the Japanese Revolution), Nihon 
Shuho, April, 1953, pp. 3-12.
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think either that it is better for a newly-appointed prime
minister to visit the Grand Shrine at Ise, or that such a
87visit is up to him. As Table 22 shows, more Japanese 
favored a new prime minister’s visit to Ise in 1953 when 
the memory of the Pacific War was still very vivid.
87Tokei Suri Kenkyujo, Tokyo, Kokuminsei Chosa linkai, 
"Kokuminsei no Kenkyu— 1973 nen Zenkokku Chosa" (A Study of 
the Japanese National Character— the 1973 Nation-wide Survey), 
Research Report General Series No. 38 (March, 1974), p. 36.
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Table 22 
New Prime Minister's Visit to Ise
1953 1958 1963 1968 1973
He must visit 7% 5% 4% 3% 4%
Visiting is better 50 33 28 28 21
Visiting is up to him 23 27 41 33 48
Not visiting is better 6 12 9 14 10
He must not visit 2 5 5 6 5
Others 2 2 3 6 3
Don't know 10 16 10 10 9
Total 100%
(2254)
100%
(1443)
100%
(2698)
100%
(3033)
100%
(3055)
The conservative politicians revival of the pre-1945 
tradition of personally visiting the Grand Shrine at Ise to 
apparently "report to the gods" on all major developments in 
the country can be seen as a symbolic way of expressing 
Japan's renascent nationalism. It appears that the 
"emotional foundations of Shinto have not altered,"®^ 
despite the fact that Shinto has been "democratized" by 
decentralizing the administration of shrines and by its 
divorce from the government and the school.
The record-breaking success of the film Emperor
85Herrymon Maurer, "The U S. Does a Job," Fortune,
March, 1947, p. 185.
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Meiji and the Great Russo-Japanese War, produced in 1957, 
consisting of a series of emotive episodes surrounding the 
Russo-Japanese War, is indicative of postwar Japanese 
nationalism. To the question, "What was your motive for 
coming to see this film?" the most common answer from people 
of middle age and over was that they longed to see the story 
of the Russo-Japanese War in which the whole nation devoted 
itself to a single cause. To the question, "Why would you 
like other people to see this film" many young people born 
after 1945 answered that it would enable others to 
understand the horrors of war. However, people of middle 
age and over replied to the effect that "I want others—  
selfish young people— to see this film so as to make them 
understand the beautiful state of affairs in which the 
people united their efforts by casting aside personal 
interests."86 in reactions like these, a clear connection 
seems to emerge between nostalgia for pre-1945 non-political 
patterns on the one hand, and intolerance for the egoism 
associated with postwar foreign-style liberalism and 
democracy on the other.8? Results of the nation-wide
86Asahi Evening News, May 39, 1957.
^^Many claimed that a rash democratization falsely 
caused the youths to liken democracy to license, and that 
too many people think that democracy is selfishness, or to 
make more money, or to be too free. As the anti-Communist 
policy of the Occupation became more intensified, the anti- 
Communist stance of the ultraright wing became so naked and
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surveys on the Japanese National Character show that the 
post-surrender democratization, in some sense, made Japanese 
very money-conscious. However, the number of Japanese who 
feel that "money is not everything," overwhelmingly 
outnumbers those who feel that money is everything.®®
What we can deduce from the Occupation-imposed 
reforms on the one hand and the revival of traditional 
sentiments of nationalism on the other is that many of the 
traditional values seem to assume a new charm, and many of 
the reforms wrought by the Occupation appear as unnecssary 
and uncongenial innovations.®® We can also state that 
"American policy [in Japan], more often than not, has the 
effect of strengthening the status quo to the benefit of 
ultra-conservatism and the detriment of liberal forces among 
the people."®®
The American Director for the Fulbright Program in 
Japan is quoted to have said: "Frankly, the Japanese here 
are fed up with what they call democracy. It means to them 
that children should be allowed to do anything they wish.
bold as to claim that the policy of the Occupation went 
further than permissible in the name of democracy. See 
Nihon Jinbun Kagakkai, 0£. cit., p. 308.
®®Tokei Suri Kenkyujo, Research Report No. 46, pp.
82-83.
®®Cole and Nakanishi, op. cit., p. 488.
®®Lawrence E. Salisbury, "Support of the Status 
Quo," Far Eastern Survey, October 24, 1945, p. 297.
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They have tried that, and have found that it didn't work." 
A Japanese professor described the general atmosphere of 
reaction: "We shall go back. We are going back now, but we 
shall not go back all the way."®^ In effect, the Japanese 
are amenable to those of the Occupation-imposed reforms that 
would serve the "principle of instinctivism," while they 
are resistant to those that are deemed repugnant to their 
cultural sentiments. In other words, reforms for the 
furtherance of "comfort instinct" are gleefully accepted and 
rationalized by the Japanese, whereas reforms in defiance of 
"cultural inertia" are not. To put it in terms of "system 
affect" and "product affect" advanced by Gabriel A. Almond 
and Sidney Verba, the Occupation-instigated reforms have 
been quite conducive to product affect, while they have been 
unable to influence system affect.
As Harry Eckstein writes, "externally imposed change 
does not reflect on intrinsic durability and should be 
disregarded. Systems thus changed can best be treated in 
the manner of 'continuing' cases, the durability score being 
extrapolated from the known duration."Although all
B^Oslo L. Derby, "Impressions of Education in 
Postwar Japan," Institute of International Education News 
Bulletin XXXII, No. 7 (April, 1957), pp. 25-28.
^^Furukawa Tesshi, History of Japanese Ethical 
Thought (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1952).
S^Harry Eckstein, The Evaluation of Political 
Performance: Problems and Dimensions (Beverly Hills: Sage
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Japanese lives are nowadays much Westernized, the vast 
majority of participants preferred Japanese things for their 
emotional significance. . . . Nevertheless, the emotional 
appeal of things Japanese is growing stronger and stronger, 
with an associated growth of Japanese self-confidence and 
p r i d e . "94 Suffice it to say that consciousness of 
individual rights remains largely superficial. In many 
respects, the individual is as dependent on the group as 
ever, but group pressure is exercised in a more implicit 
manner than b e f o r e . 95
It may very well be that Japan will only grow more 
efficient in her use of things Western (rationalization of 
product affect), and that her traditional pattern of mind 
(system affect) will remain essentially u n c h a n g e d . 96
Publications, 1971), p. 32.
94"japanese-ness," Japan Quarterly, XVI, No. 3 
(July-September, 1969), p. 267.
96por detailed discussions on the relationship 
between group pressure and the individual in Japan, see 
Ishida Takeshi, Gendai Soshiki—ron [Contemporary
Organization Theory] (Tokyo:' Iwanami Shoten, 1961); 
Nishihira Shigeki, o£. cit., pp. 167-93.
96por a good distinction between modernization and 
Westernization, see Kishimito Hideo, "Modernization Versus 
Westernization in the East," Journal of World History, VII, 
No. 4 (1963), 871—74. Also see John H. Douglas, "Pioneering 
a Non-Western Psychology," Science News, CXIII, No. 10 
(March 11, 1978), pp. 154-58; Nakajima Fumio, Nihon Seishin 
to Sei Seishin [Japanese Spirit and Western Spirit] (Tokyo: 
Yoyo Shobo, 1947); Takashima Zenya, "The Social 
Consciousness of the People in Postwar Japan," Annals of the 
Hitotsubashi Academy, I (April, 19510, 91-103.
PART THREE
NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS AFTER THE OCCUPATION
CHAPTER XII
PERSISTENCE OF JAPANESE NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS
As examined in the previous chapter, despite the 
great surface changes wrought by the American Occupation, 
there are indications that Japan will remain in many ways 
Japanese.1 As clearly demonstrated through postwar 
developments in Japan, for Japanese, unity in the face of 
national difficulties is an obsession and the idea of 
national breakdown is deeply abhorrent. Moreover, the great 
conflict in Japanese life is between the individual's 
personal inclination and his social duty, a battle in which 
duty always and virtuously t r i u m p h s . ^
Arthur M. Knapp commented on the spiritual force of 
the Japanese in 1897 in the following words.
The soul of Japan— the instinct of loyalty, the 
impulse of self-devotion, the spirit of
unquestioning obedience to duty, the worship of
^Hilary Conroy, "Young Japan's Anti-Americanism," 
American Quarterly, VII, No. 3 (Fall, 1955), 247-56.
^In this connection, see Nakamura Hajime, "Some 
Features of the Japanese Way of Thinking," Monumenta 
Nipponica, XIV (1958-1959), 31-72.
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the beauty of self-sacrifice for itself alone, in 
a word, the very flower and cream of civilization- 
-is no mere tradition and has been no ephemeral 
experience. It is the vital force in the nation's 
present life as it has been the glory and pride of 
its immemorial past.^
Even many of the postwar writings on Japan seem to 
conclude that the strength of Japan lies in the Japanese 
national sense of solidarity. In 1948, W. Macmahon Ball 
wrote to the effect that
"the Japanese today disown Hideki Tojo and his 
friends, not for being militarist, but for their 
blundering miscalculation of chances. . . .  It 
has often been remarked that Japan, under the 
Occupation, has become very pro-American. I 
[Ball] do not believe that the Japanese, at 
bottom, are either pro-American or pro-Russian.
They are pro-Japanese."
Japan has eagerly accepted materials and 
institutions which could be fitted to Japanese requirements, 
but has not allowed the entry of ideas that would undermine 
the Japanese value system and sentiments. The duality of 
social change in Japan has enabled Japan to become a 
materially very advanced country, but has hardly affected 
the long-enduring Japanese national consciousness. It is 
commonly understood that national consciousness is 
inseparably interconnected with loyalty, patriotism, and
^Arthur M. Knapp, Feudal and Modern Japan (2 vols.; 
Boston: Page, 1897), 167.
W^. Macmahon Ball, "Reflections on Japan," Pacific 
Affairs, XXI, No. 1 (March, 1948), p. 4.
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nationalism.5
Many studies establish that the diminution of 
national consciousness by fiat is not possible any more than 
the cultivation of national consciousness by official 
directives is out of the question. However, once national 
consciousness is firmly rooted in a national society, it 
seems to become further strengthened in crisis.® Since the 
subjective and objective elements that are believed to have 
been conducive to the rise, stimulation, and fortification 
of Japanese national consciousness over the period of many 
centuries have remained essentially unchanged, we turn now 
to such problems as Japanese national pride, national 
security concerns, and racial feeling which seem to have 
been some of the most essential ingredients of Japanese 
nationalism.^
As a study reveals, the national pride of a people
^Boyd C. Shafer, Nationalism; Myth and Reality (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1956), p. 5.
®For a fuller understanding of the persistent 
nature of national sentiments, see John Stuart Mill, 
Representative Government, 1861 (London: Longmans, Green and 
Co., 1907), pp. 120-24; David Thomson, "Must History Stay 
Nationalistic?" Encounter, XXX, No. 6 (June, 1968), 22-28; 
Hugh Seton-Watson, "Unsatisfied Nationalism," Journal of 
Contemporary History, VI, No. 1 (1971), 3-14.
?Cf. Matsumoto Sanosuke, "The Significance of 
Nationalism in Modern Japanese Thought: Some Theoretical
Problems," Journal of Asian Studies, XXXI, No. 1 (December, 
1971), esp. 51-53; U. S. Department of State, Japan: Free 
World Ally. Publication 6516, Far Eastern Series 74 
(Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 3.
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is a reflection of perceived "greatness" and honor found in 
their country.® The extraordinary obsession of the 
Japanese with their national honor® and the Japanese 
sensitivity to their ranking^® among nations were partially 
responsible for their pre-1945 imperialist policies to 
gratify their national pride. Though Japanese national 
pride was humbled and humiliated by the defeat in 1945, the 
Japanese were not deprived of their national consciousness. 
As Ivan Morris writes, "The pre-1945 form of Japanese 
ultranationalism has virtually disappeared, but nationalist 
sentiment remains a powerful force.
No sooner had the agony of defeat and of humiliation 
been dulled by the lapse of time than the unique Japanese
®K. G. Collier, "The Inheritance of Values," 
Sociological Review, XL (1948), 97-112.
® " The Japanese nation is by nature the most 
ambitious of honour of all Oriental nations, and will 
sacrifice life itself to maintain a punctilio." Quoted in 
Maurice Collis, Land of the Great Stone Image (New York: 
Knopf, 1943), p. 126; also see, for a good discussion of the 
constancy of Japanese national pride, see George R. Packard, 
III, "Japan's New Nationalism," Atlantic Monthly, CCXI, No. 
4 (april, 1963), 64-69.
l®Herbert Passin argues that the Japanese harbor an 
extraordinary concern for international ranking and tend to 
treat foreign nationals in accordance with the perceived 
rank of their country. See his, "Socio-cultural Factor in 
the Japanese Perception of International Order," Japan 
Institute of International Affairs Annual Review, V (1969-
1970), 51-75.
l^New York Times, July 18, 1965.
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national consciousness reared its head.^^ In fact, no 
astute observer seriously believed that the American 
Occupation could alter the nationalistic sentiments of the 
Japanese. Writing in 1950, Ike Nobutaka stated.
The eventual revival of ultra-nationalism is 
postwar Japan was, from the beginning, a foregone 
conclusion. Few people seriously believed that 
the forces which dominated the Japanese political 
scene in the 1930s were dissipated and gone 
forever. The real question, therefore, was not 
whether they would be revived but the form that 
such a revival would take.13
Many Japanese believed that the Occupation's 
"humanization of the Emperor" had the effect of depriving 
individuals of any public value or entity that might morally 
bind t h e m . 14 Mishima Yukio denounced the Occupation's rash 
democratization of Japan in the following words.
Is it right to protect life to let the soul die? 
There can be no army without values higher than 
life. We'll show you men [Occupationaires] now 
one value that's higher than life. It is not 
freedom, and it's not democracy. It is Japan.
l^See Frank Gibney, "The View From Japan," Foreign 
Affairs, L, No. 1 (October, 1971), 97-111.
13jke Nobutaka, "'National Socialism' in Japan," 
Pacific Affairs, XXIII, No. 3 (September, 1950), 311.
l^Matsumoto Sannoshuke, "A Re-evaluation of Postwar 
Ideals," The Japan Interpreter, VII, Nos. 3-4 (Summer- 
Autumn, 1972), 304; also see "Japanese Restoring Ethical
Education; Ü. S. Barred Courses as Nationalistic," New York 
Times, November 17, 1957.
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The country whose history and tradition we love.^^
Despite the changed status of the Emperor, in 
postwar Japan, the loyalty and devotion to the Emperor still 
retains wide acceptance and his symbolic role as head of the 
national collectivity radiates an importance of tremendous 
magnitude. In a group-oriented society like Japan, the need 
for a symbolic head who pulls together the entire nation and 
points up the goals of the national collectivity may very 
well be more important than in an individually-oriented
society.16
Though the American Occupation was largely incapable 
of enervating Japanese national consciousness,1^ it seems to 
have been very successful in inculcating ameliorative 
inclinations guided by rationality in the Japanese people.1® 
Since the sentimental inertia of the Japanese deeply rooted 
in national culture has hardly been affected by the 
Occupation reforms, Japanese national consciousness is 
likely to be further sharpened as Japan's national economy
l^Quoted in Ibid., p. 305.
l^Tsurumi Shunsuke, "Nihon Shiso no Tokushoku to 
Tenno-sei" [Characteristics of Japanese Thought and the 
Emperor System], Shiso, No. 336 (1952), 44-53.
l^Abe Shinnosuke, "The Emperor of Japan," Radio 
Japan, I., No. 2 (February, 1957), pp. 7-9.
l®William P. Woodard, The Allied Occupation of Japan 
1945-1952 and Japanese Religion (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972),
p. 280.
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continues to enhance its international image and stimulate 
the Japanese national pride.
1. Growing National Pride 
Losing "face" in Japan is tantamount to losing 
everything. Though the surrender in 1945 was the greatest 
national humiliation ever experienced by the Japanese,the 
Japanese people refused to be overwhelmed by their wounded 
national pride resulting from the surrender. As Emperor 
Hirohito's address before a special session of the Diet on 
September 4, 1945 reads in part.
It is our desire that our people will surmount the 
manifold hardships and trials which attend the 
termination of the war, and make manifest the 
innate glory of Japan's national polity, win the 
confidence of the world, establish firmly a 
peaceful state and contribute to the progress of 
mankind.
The passage quoted above clearly shows Japan's 
wounded national pride, on the one hand, and Japanese 
national determination to weather through the unbearable 
situation with dignity for a speedy recovery of their
l^Tansho Yamazaki, Tennosei no Kenkyu [A Study of 
the Emperor System] (Tokyo; Teikoku Chiho Gyosei Gakkai, 
1959), pp. 389-90.
20guoted in Leonard Mosley, Hirohito: Emperor of
Japan (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1966), p. 
334.
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national prestige, on the other. When the Japanese realized 
that the Occupation's "reverse course" was under way and 
that the Cold War was becoming very serious, the post­
surrender shock and bewilderment of the Japanese were 
replaced by traditional patterns of Japanese thinking which, 
immediately after the surrender, had seemed to have been 
wiped out forever. "To the extent that Japanese ability and 
tradition are valued again at home, Japan, despite defeat 
and three years of military occupation, has regained her 
national self-confidence."21
Paying close attention to the attitudes and 
feelings of the Japanese people since defeat, we can readily 
see that it was not the sense of loyalty to the nation that 
was changed, but rather the expressions and manifestations 
of that loyalty. Despite reforms and new patterns of life 
imposed by the Occupation authorities, Japanese pride in 
their country and their affective sentiments toward the 
Emperor system have been changed little.Leonard Mosley 
went so far as to argue that "By 1950 it could be said that 
Hirohito was established as Emperor of Japan more solidly 
than he had ever been before, even though the people no
21n6W York Times, February 19, 1949.
22nugh H. Smythe, "The Japanese Emperor System," 
Social Research, XIX, No. 4 (December, 1952), 485-93.
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longer bowed in fear when he ventured a b r o a d ."^3
The persistence of Japanese traditional thinking and 
the resuscitation of Japanese national pride may be 
explicated by the argument that "It is thus possible for 
great and revolutionary changes to take place in the 
institutions of a nation without a parallel change in the 
underlying qualities of the mass of the n a t i o n . "^4 Japan's 
growing national pride was well implied when Prime Minister 
Kishi Nobusuke of Japan addressed the members of the United 
States Senate and House of Representatives on June 20, 1957.
We [Japanese] firmly believe that they 
[Communists] are wrong. . . .  As the most 
advanced and industrialized nation in Asia, Japan 
has already shown that economic and social 
progress can be achieved without the Communist 
shortcut. . . .  It is my [Kishi*s] firm 
conviction that Japan, as a faithful member of the 
free world, has a useful and constructive role to 
play, particularly in Asia, where the free world 
faces the challenge of international Communism.
We are resolved to play that role.^S
Kishi's attitude implied in the passages above are 
in many respects redolent of the pre-1945 Japanese sense of 
national mission as the self-appointed civilizer of Asia.
Z^Mosley, o£. cit., p. 348.
24#. Ginsberg, "National Character," British Journal 
of Psychology, XXXII, Part 3 (January, 1942), 188.
25u. S., Congress, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke of 
Japan addressed members of the United States Senate and 
House of Representatives, 85th Cong., 1st sess., June 20, 
1957, Congressional Record, CIII, 9777.
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With the rise of the conservative and nationalistic tide 
following the introduction of the reverse course, the 
growing Japanese national pride was quite evident. Instead 
of the hammer and sickle, the neo-nationalist Japanese 
youngsters exalted the Rising Sun flag. They have revived 
the nationalist mystique that surrounded the imperial family 
before Emperor Hirohito divested himself of all claims to 
divinity in January, 1946.26 por example, a Japanese youth, 
Komori Kazutaka (17 years of age), angered by a fiction 
article in a magazine describing the imaginary execution of 
the present imperial family by a revolutionary mob, 
attempted to kill the publisher of the magazine. Following 
the assassination attempt, Komori was found to possess in 
his pocket a handkerchief on which was written a poem: 
"Long live the Emperor— who would hesitate to sacrifice his 
life for the sake of the Emperor and his country, since the 
life of man is as transient as a dewdrop on a blade of
grass."27
What George R. Packard III wrote on Japan's 
resurging nationalism in 1963 seems so cogent that a partial
^^The persistence of the "Emperor complex" of the 
Japanese can be better understood if we bear in mind that 
the Japanese are far from a religious people. For results 
of various surveys on how Japanese feel about religion, see 
Tokei Suri Kenkyujo. Research Report General Series, No. 38, 
pp. 32-34. For a detailed analysis of opinion survey 
results on Japanese religiosity, see Nishira, 0£. cit., pp. 
58-63.
2?New York Times, February 12, 1961.
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quotation is warranted.
. . . But the force of nationalism that permitted 
Tojo and the militarists to take over before the 
war is the overriding factor on the Japanese 
political scene today. The old quest for a sense 
of mission, for national unity, power, and world 
recognition, has reappeared in new shapes and 
guises. . . . Japan is still a status-conscious 
nation looking for its proper position in the 
world. There is unspoken agreement among all the 
people that Japan has a rightful destiny at the 
top of the international h i e r a r c h y . 28
Then, Packard posed soul-searching questions.
Is Tojo rejected for his error in starting a war 
he could not win, or is he rejected for his aims 
and methods— expansion and power through the use 
of force? Have we grown so used to the cliches 
about Japanese pacifism, hatred of war, revulsion 
against nuclear weapons, that we see only 
chrysanthemums where the sword once glistened? Is 
it fair to ask or expect Gandhi-like pacifism from 
a nation that has been dominated for centuries by 
military men? Will Japan be content to remain a 
third-rate or second-rate military power if its 
peace diplomacy fails? Has Japan been so 
thoroughly democratized that it would never engage 
in the use of force even if it could? °
Packard finds the growing Japanese national pride 
not only in the Japanese adult, but also in the young 
Japanese. There seems to be a three-way pull on every young 
Japanese. He is, first of all, a nationalist, who is not 
only more confident and relaxed, but also more determined
^®George R. Packard, III, "Japan's New Nationalism," 
Atlantic Monthly, CCXI, No. 4 (April, 1963), pp. 65-66.
Z^Ibid., p. 68.
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than his elders. Secondly, he is an Asian, thirdly, he is 
a citizen of a great modern state, proud of Japan's economic 
ties with the advanced West and anxious for a responsible 
role in world affairs. Of these three forces, the first 
two, rooted in history and emotion, are tremendously 
powerful.30
In proportion to the inflation of Japanese national 
pride, the Japanese seem to detest the fact that the United 
States regards Japan as an "automatic ally" which is to do 
things exactly as America w i s h e s .3^ Japanese 
dissatisfaction with the way they are treated 
internationally is bound to further fan Japanese national 
sentiment which, during the immediate postwar years, had 
lain frozen like a giant glacier. In the mid-sixties, this 
glacier began to thaw, melted by a growing confidence of the 
Japanese people in themselves. As this confidence grows, 
the sense of nationalism grows. There are indications that 
the isolationism, pacifism, and business-first-ism of the 
postwar years no longer seem quite enough to satisfy.
3^New York Times, August 29, 1965.
31william B. Dickinson, Jr., "Rising Japanese 
Nationalism," Editorial Research Reports, I (January 5,
1966), pp. 3-20; Kato Yoshimani, Zaikai (Tokyo; Kawada 
Shobo, 1966), p. 184).
32Rosaka Masataka, "Nanajunendai no Nichi-Bei Kankei 
0 Kangaeru" [Thinking the Japan-United States Relations in 
the 1990's], Bunqei Shunju XLVIII, No. 10 (September, 1970), 
94-108; Kano Tsutomu, "Why the Search for Identity," The
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Of course, Japan can be seen as a nation of 
prosperous, satisfied businessmen and enraged students. 
Japan, however, is a land with roots struck deep into the 
past and visions soaring far into the future. Though the 
Pacific War, to some Japanese, was a complete break with the 
past, the postwar era signified a clean page of history. 
Yet others, including historians, political scientists and 
sociologists, have found that old problems exist in new 
guises. Such questions as possible militarism, nationalism 
and lack of individualism still prove troublesome. Some 
argue that democracy has taken firm roots, whereas others 
argue that the democratization in Japan has been 
superficial.33 Perhaps we could safely state that the one 
problem that does not remain any longer is Japan's feeling 
of economic inferiority to the West.34
At a symposium sponsored by the Japan society of New 
York and the Johnson Foundation on December 2, 1969, Herman 
Kahn declared that "the driving force in Japan today is 
prestige. They will insist on a status equal to the United 
States and the Soviet Union, or just below. This includes 
getting a permanent seat in the United Nations Security
Japan Interpreter, VIII, No. 2 (Spring, 1973), 153-58.
33üavid Reisman and Evelyn Thompson Reisman, 
Conversations in Japan : Modernization, Politics, and Culture 
(New York: Basic Books, 1967), pp. 18, 199.
34New York Times, October 23, 1968.
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Council." Praising Japan's postwar performance and economic 
growth, James Abegglen argued that the rapid growth of 
Japanese economy was not a function of cheap labor nor was 
it based on copying others. He went on to argue that there 
was no reason to believe Japan's growth rate would slow. 
James W. Morley observed that "the tide toward radicalism 
and leftist extremism had ebbed and that a shift toward the 
right or political centrism was in prospect." Dr. Morley 
foresaw a continuing growth of nationalism, more stress on 
law and order, and a search for "what is best for J a p a n . " 3 5  
Through Expo-70, the futuristic world's fair of arts 
and industry, which opened in Osaka on March 15, 1970, the 
Japanese, in effect, were saying to the world and to 
themselves that they were a proud people who deserved 
respect because of their accomplishments. The year 1970 
seemed to be the year in which a resurgent nationalism had 
come nearly to full force, twenty-five years after the 
humiliating defeat in World War 11.36
Mishima Yukio's death on November 25, 1970 should
not be treated lightly as an isolated incident. Mishima's 
death might have been indicative of the prevailing Japanese 
mood. Richard Halloran writes on the implications of 
Mishima's death.
35ibid., December 7, 1969.
36Richard Halloran, "Japan's Future on 
E x p o - s i t i o n , " Comm o n w e a l , April 17, 1970, pp. 109- 
110.
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Mishima's death was his final battle in the 
defense of Japanese culture. . . . Mishima 
pleaded for a rejection of alien traits, 
especially the materialism of the West, and a 
return to the best in the tradition of Japan. He 
railed against the Constitution that was imposed 
on Japan by the American Occupation nearly 25 
years ago. . . . His seppuku came in the midst of 
a national search for identity in which the 
Japanese are looking into themselves, their 
history, and their culture to discover again who 
they are. Mishima's memory may well become one of 
the beacons lighting the way. The strongest 
sentiment that is coursing through Japan today is 
the resurgence of nationalism, which should not be 
confused with the ultra-nationalism of the 1930s. 
Rather, it is a renewal of pride in being uniquely 
Japanese and a revival of confidence in Japanese 
ways and customs and institutions. Mishima was 
eminently a man of his times and could well have 
stimulated the already swift flow of Japanese 
nationalism. . . . they are coming out of their 
postwar cocoon to demand what they consider to be 
their rightful place in the political sun.37
In 1973, Richard Halloran expressed the view that 
there was a widespread feeling among Japanese senior 
officials that President Nixon and Dr. Henry Kissinger 
disliked Japanese. Stories abounded that Nixon and 
Kissinger mocked the Japanese. Many politically articulate 
Japanese thought that the Nixon Administration took Japan 
for granted. Kissinger was quoted as saying that Japan had 
to go along with the United States because she had nowhere 
else to go. This definitely was offensive to Japan's 
resurgent national pride. Halloran went on to say that "the
^^Richard Halloran, "The Politics of Suicide: Yukio 
Mishima and the Spirit of Japan," Commonweal, March 19, 
1971, pp. 34-36.
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Japanese, perhaps more than any other people, respond to 
power when it is applied with finesse. If they are 
threatened openly, their resistance stiffens because 'face' 
is at issue."38
Echoes of Japan's resurgent nationalism were getting 
louder in proportion to her economic muscle. In 1973, 
Secretary General of the Liberal Democratic Party Hashimoto 
Tomisaburo along with other elites stated that Japan felt 
isolated and that the Western powers were discriminating 
against her politically and economically. They talked about 
an informal, tacit understanding with the Chinese, with whom 
they are culturally and racially linked, against the West. 
Some Western observers have already speculated on the 
consequences of a combination of Japanese industrial might 
and Chinese manpower. "The Japanese are experiencing a 
resurgence of national pride based largely on having built 
the world's third most productive economy. Nevertheless, 
there is every indication that the Japanese want more than 
economic strength, for in Japanese national and personal 
life little is more important than prestige or recognition 
from other nations or p e o p l e . T h e  "true Japan" might 
have long been lost in the course of modernization and 
democratization. "It still exists, however, somewhere in
^®New York Times, February 27, 1973.
3*Ibid.
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the depths of the Japanese mind and every time the pendulum 
swings inward, this image is called back into active 
service."40
In this connection, it should not go unmentioned 
that with the passage of time and the increase of Japan's 
economic aggressiveness there is a strong likelihood of a 
growing significance of the Yasukuni Shrine. Cyril Powles 
argues that "the re-establishment of the Yasukuni Shrine 
represents one aspect of a large-scale drift on the part of 
Japan's ruling elites back toward the Emperor-centered, 
authoritarian society which existed before 1945. "4^
The increasing importance of celebrating Japan's 
National Foundation Day on February 11 can also be seen as a 
good indication of the growing national pride of the 
Japanese. Inamura Sakonshiro, Director General of the Prime 
Minister's Office, representing the Government, in an 
address at the ceremonial rally in 1978 stated that "the 
National Foundation Day was intended to inspire the public 
with a sense of national unity and to foster a love of the 
nation and a commitment to the development of J a p a n . "42
4^Kano Tsutomu, "Why Search for Identity," The Japan 
Interpreter, VIII, No. 2 (Spring, 1973), 153-8.
4^Cyril Powles, "Yasukuni Jinja Hoan; Religion and 
Politics in Contemporary Japan," Pacific A f f a i r s , IXL, No. 3 
(Fall, 1976), 492.
42"Japan's Foundation Day Stirs Controversy," Asian 
Student, February 25, 1978, p. 1.
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Mayuzumi Toshiro, president of a private committee
representing some 120 groups that sponsored the celebrations 
said in a speech that "Japan stood high among the nations of 
the world because of its unbroken line of Emperors.
Japanese people should respect the unparalleled culture and 
tradition of their own country in their endeavors toward 
building an excellent nation."^3
It seems as essential for a nation as it is for an 
individual to have a sense of significance and achievement. 
Every people lives by a conviction of benevolent destiny. 
In fine, the Japanese are becoming more self-confident and 
nationalistic because of their country's growing economic
strength.44
2. National Security Concern 
As in any country, Japan too has historically always 
been concerned with national security. In addition to the 
foreign threats which we already discussed in Chapter 2 at 
great length, the Russian ambition for aggrandizement
haunted Japan as early as 1797.45 We can state that the
43l b i d .
44par Eastern Economic Review, Asia 1977 Yearbook,
p. 203.
45por Japan's historical concern about national 
security and its fear of Russia, see John A. Harrison, 
Japan's Northern Frontier; A Preliminary Study in 
Colonization and Expansion with Special Reference to the
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Meiji leaders' utmost concern was the speedy release of 
Japan from fear of foreign attack and infringement upon its 
sovereign rights by the Western P o w e r s . ^6
Given the reality of international politics, even 
today no nation is free from national security concern. The 
postwar Japan is by no means an exception, for Japan's 
growing national pride resulting from its miraculous
economic growth would be ludicrous without a reasonable
degree of national security. The Japanese system, except in 
unusual circumstances, does guarantee a meager security. A 
rash Westernization in Japan is likely to break down that 
security without giving anything to replace it. The
Japanese defense planners seem to believe that Japan's
national security ultimately depends upon its political 
stability, which, in their opinion, must derive from the 
spirit of national loyalty and patriotism of the Japanese 
people as a whole. 7^
Relations of Japan and Russia (Gaineville; University of 
Florida, 1953). For an account that the foreign threat has 
tended to fortify the Japanese national consciousness and 
national unity, see Maruyama Masao, Nihon Seiji Shiso-Shi 
Kenkyu [A Study of History of Japanese Political Thought] 
(Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1970), p. 340.
4Gjosefa M. Saniel, "Mobilization of Traditional 
Values in the Modernization of Japan," in Robert N. Bellah, 
ed. Religion and Progress in Modern Asia (New York: The Free 
Press, 1965), p. 143.
47sakanaka Tomoshsa et al, Nihon no Jiei Ryoku 
[Japan's Self-Defense Power] (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Sha,
1967), pp. 44-50.
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Some observers of Japan are wont to believe that the 
brief span of time since the end of World War II did a 
tremendous job in discrediting the military, arguing that 
"the Japanese boys actually ranked the soldier lower on all 
scales than did the girls. . . . This case provides an 
instance of marked attitude change within a brief time span, 
and represents an important development for Japan's role in 
world a f f a i r s . " 4 8  However, this negative attitude of 
Japanese youth cannot be interpreted at its face value. 
Public opinion polls in the 1960's indicated that such 
measures as amending Article IX of the 1947 Constitution, 
developing nuclear weapons, upgrading the Defense Agency to 
a full-fledged ministry, or sending Japanese troops 
overseas, have been extremely unpopular. But these same 
polls also indicate that a great majority of the Japanese 
people are of the opinion that maintaining conventional, 
strictly defensive forces is not only necessary, but also 
does not militate against the spirit of the Constitution.49
By the same token, as Table 23 shows^O already in 
the early 1950's more and more Japanese held a favorable 
opinion on maintaining a military establishment.
4®Robert J. Smith, "Attitudes of Japanese High 
School Seniors Toward the Military," Public Opinion 
Q u a r t e r l y , XXVI, No. 2 (Summer, 1962), 253.
49do1 Akio, Shin Senryaku to Nihon [The New Strategy 
and Japan] (Tokyo: Jiji Tsushin Sha, 1968), pp. 73-83.
50Cole and Nakanishi, op. cit., p. 628.
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Rearmament
TABLE 23 
for Self--Defense
Oinstloni Do you support or opposo our oountry*# reormomont for oolf-dofonoe?
Rotumsi
IsiaJL
Support
47.8%
Oppoee
38.8%
Othere
3.6%
Don't Kno* 
15.4%
No Aneeer 
1.0%
By ocouDOtioni
FSrmoro end fiehemen 80.8% B8.B% 1.6% 3.8% 1.8%
Salaried people 54.1% 33.4% 7.4% 4.8% 0.8%
Leborere 43.8% 43.4% 0.«l 11.6% 0.8%
Nerohente and Induetrlallete 85.3% 20.5% 5.4% 8.4% 0.4%
Profeeelonale 81.8% BB.4% 8.8% — —
Others 55.5% 86.5% 1.3% 13.5% 3.8%
By leyel of education
Under 8 years 46.3% 31.1% 1.7% 18.8% 1.3%
10 to IB yeara 50.0% 37.1% 5.4% 6.8% 0.8%
More then 18 y sere 81 .B% 36.4% 10.0% 8.4% —
Bv flfla fwenl
BO to B9 45.7% 43.0% 4.8% S.^ 0.7%
SO to 38 53.4% 83.5% 8.4% 8.6% 1.1%
40 to 48 81.5% 86.0% 3.1% 7.8% 1.5%
GO and over 85.6% 80.6% 1.1% 11.4% 1.3%
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Table 23 suggests that already in 1953 a majority of 
Japanese were quite concerned about Japan's national 
security. Another point worthy of attention is that the 
Japanese, regardless of their occupation or level of 
education, seem to hold similar opinions when they are 
questioned about matters pertaining to national security. 
It is important to note that the better-educated score a 
higher percentage of support than the less-educated, albeit 
the better-educated are usually liberal or progressive, if 
not left-leaning. Table 23 also seems to confirm our 
general understanding that the Japanese tend to become more 
conservative and nationalistic as they get older.
The rearmament question has been the most 
controversial issue in recent Japanese politics. It is 
ironic that the thoroughness of the 1945-1948 
demilitarization reforms pursued by the American Occupation 
was to be quickly followed by American demands that Japan 
become a bulwark of the free world against Asian Communism. 
Justification for the Occupation's "reverse course" in Japan 
was found in the rethinking on the part of Americans. For 
one, in his New Year's message of 1950 to the Japanese 
people. General MacArthur claimed that "by no sophistry of 
reasoning can [Article IX of the 1947 'Peace Constitution' 
of Japan] be interpreted as a complete negation of the right
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of self-defense against unprovoked attack.
The pace of the American rethinking quickened after 
the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950. On July 8, 
1950, General MacArthur ordered the creation of a 75,000-man 
National Police Reserve, which was the forerunner of today's 
Ground Self- Defense Force. The Occupation began to apply 
the purge to Japanese Communists. In effect, the United 
States was belatedly reminded by the Korean War that it was 
the Soviet Union and Red China rather than postwar Japan 
that posed the greatest threat to world peace. The new 
development in East Asia hastened plans for the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty, in which affirmed that Japan "as a 
sovereign nation possesses the inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defense . . . and may voluntarily enter 
into collective security arrangements."^2
The Japanese were fully aware that the reverse 
course in Japan pursued by the United States was in line 
with United States interests rather than those of Japan. 
When the United States expressed dissatisfaction with the 
slow progress of Japanese rearmament, Japanese response 
thereto sounded typically Japanese and nationalistic. A 
Yomiuri Shimbun political critic on September 3, 1953,
S^New York Herald Tribune, January 1, 1950.
52por the full text of the Treaty, see U S. 
Department of State, Treaty of Peace with Japan and Related 
Documents, Publication 4561, Far Eastern Series 54 
(Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1952).
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deemed representative of the Japanese reaction to the 
American demands for Japanese rearmament may be quoted here.
It is America which destroyed our mighty army and 
navy and the munitions industry . . . even dumped 
research equipment into the ocean. ^  is^  also 
America which, with an air of importance, forced 
on Japan a silly constitution renouncing arms. 
America instilled antimilitary thought in the 
Japanese; America opened all Japan to the 
Communist party. In short, it is America which 
made Japan such that it cannot meet the American 
demands of today. . . . ^  America wishes to have
Japan as its true ally, it must first recognize 
its past errors. (Emphasis added. )~^
It is interesting to note what the Washington Post 
had to say in this connection.
You have to pinch yourself to realize that we are 
only eight years away from 1945. In that year we 
disarmed Japan entirely. What is more, we made 
the Japanese write a new Constitution pledging 
themselves and generations unborn that they would 
never again raise an army or navy. That was a 
profound mistake. But a worse mistake would be to 
behave^ as if the Japanese Constitution did not
exist.
Despite the reluctance on the part of the Japanese 
to expand their Self-Defense Forces, more Japanese favor the 
use of their own troops than reliance on the United Nations, 
United States bases, or other arrangements. As Table 24
53yomiuri Shimbun, September 3, 1953. 
^^Washington Post, September 3, 1953.
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TABLE 24
Constitutional Provision for National Defense
Agmnoy, Oats» Basiling and Nathodi
Yoron Kanaku Kvokal: Ootobar 28, 1854; Tokyo HatropoLla, Random Sampling, 787 of 800 
Raapondlng; Into nrlaming.
Quaatlont It la rooommandad that tha Conatltutlon should provldr, for the paopla'a duty ts 
dafamd the eountry. Do yw agroa?
Agrma Dlaagraa Don't Knoa Othar Opinion No Anamar
TOTAL 58.1% 84,8% ie.«i 0.3% 0.3%
Bv Occuoatlon
Balarlad pooplo BE.B% 88.5% 7,8% — —
Harohanta/Xnduatr1allata 84.1% 83.8% 8,4% — 0.8%
Laborers 80.e% 84.7% 14.0% — 1.1%
Houssalvsa 55.8% 88.8% 88.8% 0.4% —
Btudanta 51.8% 38.5% 8.3% — —
Profaaslonals 85.5% 88.8% 3.8% 3.8% —
Farmsro 81.3% 18.5% 58.8% — —
Una^ iloyad 55.0% 14,8% 88.5% — —
eo to B8 58.8% 81,0% 18.0% — 0.4%
80 to 39 61.0% 81.4% 17.1% 0.5% —
40 to 48 57.8% 88.8% 15.8% — 0.5%
50 and ovar 63.0% 18.3% 17.8% 0.5% —
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clearly s h o w s , 55 demilitarization of occupation reforms
and the easing of tension over Korea still left the majority 
of the Japanese people convinced that their own forces could 
offer the best national security.
Opinion surveys^® conducted by the Central Research 
Services in October, 1956, and August, 1957, reveal 
similarly that the Japanese are convinced that their own 
forces are the best means for Japan's security, having a 
very low opinion of American forces as a means for 
protecting Japan's security, as shown in Table 25.
Means for
Table 25 
Japan's Security
October 1956 August 1957
Our Own Forces 38% 37%
Collective Security 33 27
American Forces 4 4
Other Opinion/Don't Know 25 32
That a plurality of respondents believed in 
depending on their own forces rather than United States 
forces or United Nations guarantees is a finding which
55cole and Nakanishi, op. cit., p. 455.
5®Central Research Services, Kempo ni Kansuru Yoron 
Chosa— Dai San-Kai [Public Opinion Survey on the
Constitution— No. 3] (Tokyo; Prime Minister's Office,
September, 1957).
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requires further examination.^7 It must be noted that 
preferring native defense to collective security measures or 
United States bases is not tantamount to strong support for 
full-fledged rearmament.^® The Japanese attitudes toward 
national security must be seen in the light of the changing 
international situation and the utilitarian view of the 
Japanese for the maximization of Japanese interest.
A Mainichi opinion survey on the adequacy of the 
policy force after the Peace Treaty conducted during the 
period of March 30 through April 1, 1950 (namely, before the 
outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950), reveals quite 
natural responses: 12.7% of 3,515 respondents thought that 
the present strength of the police force would be adequate; 
36.3% thought that it is sufficient at present, but 
insufficient after the Peace Treaty; 23.4% thought that it 
is sufficient neither for now nor for the post-treaty days; 
and 27.6% expressed other opinions.®® In view of the 
prevailing political situation at that time, when the Cold 
War was steadily becoming very serious, on the one hand, and 
the Japanese were looking forward to regaining their 
independence as the Peace Treaty negotiation was making 
headway, on the other, the Japanese were about to become
®7cole and Nakanishi, o£. cit., pp. 563-69.
®®Ibid., p. 567. 
®®Ibid., p. 563
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conservatively-oriented.
Another Mainichi opinion survey®^ conducted about 
two months after the outbreak of the Korean War shows that 
there were more Japanese opposing United States military 
bases in Japan than those approving them, albeit the 
Japanese were fully aware of the fact that their national 
security was protected by the United States military 
p r e s e n c e . T h i s  seems to imply that the maintenance of 
national defense attributable to the United States military 
presence was once thing, and that the Japanese, regardless 
of their ideological orientation, did not wish to get 
directly involved in the East-West confrontation was quite 
another.
A Mainichi survey conducted in December, 1950, 
indicated that the Japanese were becoming more or less 
rearmament-oriented as the uncertainty surrounding the 
Korean War loomed larger and larger.^2 While Japan was 
gradually expanding its defenses, various opinion surveys 
continued to show strong majority approval of the basic
GOlbid., p. 566.
G^As early as July, 1946, the fear of the threat of 
Soviet Communism was quite evident in the United States and 
Japan. AN early warning of this threat is found in "The 
Fortune Survey," Fortune, July, 1946, pp. 5-6, 10.
62Cole and Nakanishi, op. cit., p. 567.
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principle denied by Article IX of the 1947 Constitution. 
Thus, by 1957 the margin was over three to one in favor of 
rearmament.® 3
Japan at the time was less interested in embroiling 
itself in such an emotionally touchy issue as rearmament 
than in taking advantage of the on-going war in Korea to 
improve its national economy, as table 26®^ and table 27 65 
clearly show.
Table 26 seems to prove once again that all the 
Japanese are basically nationalistic. Quite contrary to the 
usual findings that Japanese intellectuals tend to be 
liberal, progressive, and left-leaning, the percentage 
favoring rearmament among the college-educated is 70.7%, 
whereas that among the primary-school-educated is only 60.2%
Findings of other surveys on the Japanese attitudes 
toward rearmament and United States bases in Japan seem to 
be very contradictory. According to a Mainichi survey of 
September 13-14, 1951 on the "Danger of Communist Invasion 
Because of Japan-U. S. Security Pact," 46.5% expressed the
G^Asaki Shimbun, May 2, 1957. Writing in 1950,
Kawai Kazuo observed that "Japan's commitment to forsake 
war, originally forced on the defeated Japan, no longer 
depends primarily on whether or not the Japanese are willing 
to abide by it, but upon whether the Allied Powers will be 
able to agree to allow Japan to retain it." See his 
"Japanese Views on National Security," Pacific Affairs 
XXIII, No. 2 (June, 1950), p. 127.
6^Cole and Nakanishi, op. cit., p. 574.
65ibid., p. 579.
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TABLE 26 
Rearmament After Peace Treaty
Quastloni "Do you think «Japan ahould hava Ita oan anaasant In ordar to protaot tha aaourlty
of thia country aftar the paaca treaty?"
Yaa No Don't Knee No Anaaer
m a L 88=8% 18.5% 18.7% 0.8%
Bv Occupation
Balarlad Pacpla 67.4% E8.1% 4.0% 0.5%
Marchante and Xnduatrlallata 73.4% 18.8% 6.5% 0.3%
Formera and Flahaman 71.E% 16.7% 12.5% 0.5%
Labe rare 88.8% 17.5% 10.4% E.E%
Othara 34.4% 17.8% 16.1% 1.7%
Bv Level pf Education
Primary School 80.E% 17.4% E1.6% D.8%
Middle School B8.E% E3.8% 7.5% 0.4%
Collage 70.7% E4.4% 8.4% 1.5%
giasâ
EO to ES S6.B% ES.6% 6.1% 1.5%
30 to 38 88.8% E4.3% 5.8% 0.E%
40 to 48 73.2% 15.4% 10.3% 1.1%
50 and over 88.8% 13.7% 15.6% 0.4%
Souroe: Mainichi national aurvav of June 15-17. 1851 (N=3.5B41
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TABLE 27
Rearmament After U. S.-Japan Security Pact
OuBBtlont "The Japan-U. S, Security pact *111 Laat until our country can manage Ita o*n 
aalf-dafanae. What do you think about our country'a rearmament?"
Batter Ream 
Quickly
Rearm After Should Not Othara 
Economic Rearm 
Security
Don't
Kno*
No
Anamer
jsm. 24.9X 51.4% 12.1% 2.9% 7.9% 0.8%
PX Occupation
Salaried people 30.1% 47.7% 14.5% 3.6% 2.6% 1.3%
Lahorera 30.7» 52.0% 6.6% 2.4% 4.7% 1.6%
Marchante and 
Induat rial lata %7.2% 62.4% 6.6% 3.2% 1.6% 0 %
Othera 23.7% 50.6% 11.2% 1.1% 11.2% 2.2%
By Laval of Education
Under 9 yaara 27.1% 50,0% 6.5% 2.2% 11.3% 0.9%
10 to 12 yaara 22.6% 51.9% 16.4% 4.1% 4.1% 0.9%
More than 13 yaara 21.4% 55.7% 16.4% 2.9% 3.6% —
Source: Main1chi aurvey of Saptambar 18-14, 1951 (N=1,860).
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feeling that danger of invasion would decrease, whereas 
13.3% thought the danger of invasion would i n c r e a s e . 66 
Another Mainichi survey of January 31 and February 1, 1953 
produced results which are not consistent with the above 
findings. When Japanese were queried "The U. S. has 
established military bases in Japan. Do you think this is 
for Japan or for the U. S.?," 44% thought it was for the 
United States, whereas only 17% felt that it was for 
Japan.67
The contradiction of Japanese attitudes seems to be 
inevitable, for the Japanese are practical in terms of 
taking advantage of what the United States offers for their 
national security. 6® But at the same time they are so 
nationalistic that they detest the very idea that they have 
to stomach the presence of the United States bases in 
J a p a n . 69 in his speeches in 1967 and 1968 on the Security 
Treaty and on Okinawa, Prime Minister Sato Eisaku preached 
to the Japanese to cultivate their Boei Ishiki [Defense 
Consciousness]. Sato stated that Japan needed military 
defense, and they would have to continue to rely on the
52-59.
66j b i d . , p .  666.
67j b i d ., p. 609.
66Japan Times, July 9, 1968; Sakanaka, 0£. cit., pp.
69oka Takashi, "Japan's Self-Defense Force Wins a 
Skirmish with the Past," New York Times Magazine, February 
28, 1971, p. 35.
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Treaty and protection under the U. S. nuclear umbrella. 0^
Opinion polls seemed to indicate that with the 
passage of time more and more Japanese held favorable 
opinions on maintaining a military establishment. Already 
in the mid-sixties there was a rise in popularity of movies 
and literature depicting the military heroes of Japan's 
p a s t . Arguing that, due to Japan's dependence on outside 
resources to feed its industry, Keyes Beech comments that it 
is highly unlikely that Japan will return to militarism 
unless the military and political situations in the Far East 
are drastically changed, and that Japan is fatefully, as far 
as the current political wisdom goes, tied to the United 
States by necessity, trade and common aspirations. Beech 
goes on to state.
The [1947] Constitution is a kind of judicial 
chastity belt preventing a return to militarism. .
. . Perhaps the best argument for a peace-loving 
Japan is its awful vulnerability to attack. "The 
biggest non-floating target in the world," one 
State Department official called Japan in pointing 
to the density of its population and industry. 
Scoffing at an American futurologist's prediction 
that Japan would "go nuclear," a Japanese defense 
analyst said; "To be an effective nuclear power, 
you must have a second-strike capability. But 
after the first strike on Japan, there wouldn't be 
anything left of J a p a n . "72
7^Asahi S himbun, August 17 and September 4, 1967. 
7^New York T i m e s , November 5, 1965, and March 13,
1966.
72Keyes Beech, "Japan— The Ultimate Domino?" 
Saturday Review, August 23, 1975, p. 17.
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No one could confidently dispute the argument that 
Japan is vulnerable to military attack and foreign economic 
strangulation. Yet, whether or not Japan would go nuclear, 
remains a moot question.Japan's enormous energy needs, 
and its well-nigh total dependence on foreign sources have 
necessitated a top-priority decision to develop the most 
advanced nuclear processes in the world and a self-reliant 
nuclear energy program. Japan's program for the peaceful 
use of atomic energy could doubtlessly be transformed into a 
military purpose, with hardly any additional cost. Many 
observers are of the opinion that the present program will 
engender a psychological climate that will redound to a 
decision to develop military w e a p o n r y . 4^
Given the Soviet t h r e a t , J a p a n ' s  military 
planners, imagining an attack from the Soviet Union, have 
predicted that "the Air Force would live for four hours 
against the Russians in the sky, the Navy might survive four
73por a good essay on the development of the 
Japanese perception of their national security since the 
idealism contained in the preamble of the Constitution in 
effect since May, 1947, see Hirasawa Kazushige, "Japan's 
Emerging Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, LIV, No. 1 
(October 1975), 155-172.
^^Asahi Shimbun, November 16, 1973.
75inoki Masamichi, "Foren no 'Kyoi' ni do Taisho 
Suruka" [How to Face the Soviet Threat], Chuo Koron, 
(November, 1976), 56-65. Also see Chitoshi, "Japan in
Danger," Current History, XXVII, No. 159 (November, 1954), 
283-88.
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days at sea, and the Army could hold out for about four 
w e e k s . "76 Though fully convinced of a possible military 
attack on Japan, Japanese defense planners believe that 
building conventional military forces strong enough to 
enable Japan to repel a possible Soviet conventional attack 
is an unnecessary duplication of effort as long as the 
United States is committed to the defense of South Korea and 
retains its naval and air superiority in the Western
Pacific.77
Insofar as Japan's security is concerned, it seems 
to be very delicate and difficult for the Japanese to be 
nationalistic and realistic at the same time. Some critics 
of the Government's policy have claimed that as long as the 
United States maintains a positive defense posture in the 
Far East, Japan's security is protected even without the 
physical presence of the United Forces in J a p a n . 78 on the 
other hand. Director General of the Defense Agency claimed 
in November, 1977 that
the defense of our country does not pose a threat 
to other countries. It is designed to complete a 
structure which will make it possible for the
76n[ew York Times, June 12, 1975.
77gakanaka, op. c i t ., pp. 52-59; Saeki Kiichi, Nihon 
no Anzen Hosho [Japan's Security Policy] (Tokyo: Nihon
Kokusai Mondai Kenkyujo, 1966), pp. 60-67.
78Royama Michio, "Kaku Senryaku no Igi to Nihon no 
Shorai" [The Meaning of Nuclear Strategy for Japan's 
Future], Chuo Koron (March, 1968), pp. 50-67.
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people to sleep without fear, providing security 
against aggression by other countries.79
According to former Director General of the Defense 
Agency Sakata Michita, Japan's defense rests on three 
principles: "The will of all Japanese to defend the nation, 
an adequate defense force, and the mutual security treaty 
with the United States."®® The national security concern of 
the Japanese people is likely to be heightened, for pride in 
economic accomplishments and uncertainty about future 
security prevail in J a p a n . O n e  thing that seems to 
further stimulate Japanese security concerns is the Japanese 
people's waning faith in the United States' military 
might.
Indeed, Japan's confidence in American know-how and 
military capacity is being eroded.®® As Morton Kondracke 
argues, "the future that the Japanese Government prefers is
7®Mainichi Shimbun, November 29, 1977.
®®Beech, op. cit., p. 16.
®^Morton Kondracke, "Tokyo Has Risen," The New
Republic, September 10, 1977, pp. 11-14.
®®G. Ringwald, "Tokyo's Waning Faith in U. S.
Military Might," Business Week, December 31, 1979, p. 54;
John K. Emmerson, "Our Asian Interests: Japanese Allies,
Chinese Friends," Vital Speeches of the Day, July 15, 1980, 
pp. 578-81; Lawrence Minard, "Guns Instead of TV Sets," 
Forbes, March 20, 1978, pp. 71-72; Kawada Tadashi, "Seicho 
Suru Nihon no Boei Sangyo" [Defense Industry of Growing 
Japan], Sekai, October, 1964, pp. 64-74.
®®Emmerson, op. cit., p. 579.
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that of a superpower without military power, an 
unprecedented creature in world h i s t o r y . "84 Perhaps the 
Japanese attitude toward national defense is best 
encapsulated in the words uttered by Director of Nikkeiren 
[the Japan Federation of Employers Organization=JFEO] 
Sakurada Takeshi: "I do not want economic development where 
you have peace and freedom without an assured national 
d e f e n s e . "85 the Japanese believe that national strength is 
safer than alliance.
3. Racial Implications 
Along with Japanese national pride and security 
concern stands the Japanese racial feeling, which can be 
stated as the most essential ingredient in continuously 
fostering the Japanese national consciousness. As Anthony 
D. Smith states, "The essential background for an 
understanding of the appeal of nationalism is the concept of
®4Kondracke, op. cit., p. 13.
85Asahi Nenkan, 1969, p. 465.
88por a fuller understanding of the relationship 
between the Japanese racial feeling and national 
consciousness, see Minami Hiroshi [a Ü. S.-educated Japanese 
social psychologist], "Nihonjin.no Gaikokujen Kan" [Japanese 
Views of Foreigners], Ninqen no Kaqaku, II, No. 1 (1964),
14-23; Katamura Hiroshi, "Psychological Dimensions of U. S.- 
Japanese Relations, Occasional Papers in International 
Affairs, No. 28 (August, 1971) (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Center for International Affairs, 1971.)
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the ethnic."87
Despite the moralistic preachments by thoughtful and 
well-meaning observers to the effect that racism is one of 
the greatest human follies, that culture is not a function 
of race, and that no racial type has a monopoly on high 
culture, racism still lingers on even in the second half of 
the twentieth century, pestering mankind and international 
relations.88 Thus, we are led to argue that a civilized 
type of world view does not necessarily develop together 
with a civilized type of social relations.
It is by no means a recent development that the 
Japanese are subject to the emotional aspects of racism. 
Since the centuries-old national consciousness and racial 
feelings were already discussed at some length in Chapter 
II, in the following pages we will discuss some of the 
racially-related developments that have either stimulated or 
aggravated the Japanese racial feelings.
Given the Japanese racial feelings of extraordinary
8^Anthony D. Smith, "Ethnocentrism, Nationalism, and 
Social Change," International Journal of Comparative 
Sociology, XIII, No. 1 (March, 1972), 19.
88por some arguments against racism, see, for 
example, James Bryce, The Relations of the Advanced and 
Backward Races of Mankind (Oxford: Clarendon, 1902); Ruth 
Benedict, Race and Racism (London: George Routledge & Sons, 
1942); John Benjamin Nichols, "We Are Not Born Civilized," 
Common Ground, VIII, No. 4 (Summer, 1948), 3-10; Francis B. 
Sayre, "The Problem of Underdeveloped Areas in Asia and 
Africa," Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences, LXXXI, No. 6 (April, 1952), 284-98.
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nature, a series of international developments even after 
Japan's emergence as a major power following Japan's 
victories over China and Russia at the turn of the century 
have further deepened the racial feelings of the Japanese.89 
Minami Hiroshi tells us that the foreigners are, in the 
views of the Japanese, not only different people of 
different race and nationality coming from outside, but also 
they are people of higher status and stronger power, coming 
from above. Minami goes on to tell us that the Japanese 
feel shy toward the foreigners as outsiders and feel an 
inferiority-superiority complex toward the foreigners who 
come from above.9®
Though the Japanese might feel racially inferior to 
Westerners, they do hate to be looked down upon or to be 
sneered at. No less a figure than Woodrow Wilson expressed 
his racial view in the following words in 1902.
Chinese laborers had poured in [to the Pacific
Coast], first by hundreds, then by thousands, 
finally by hundreds of thousands, until the labor 
situation of the whole coast had become one almost 
of revolution. Caucasian laborers could not
compete with the Chinese, could not live upon a
handful of rice and work for a pittance, and found 
themselves being steadily crowded out from 
occupation after occupation by the thrifty.
89por an overview of race sentiment, see James 
Bryce, Race Sentiment As a Factor in History (London; 
University of London Press, 1915). The January 1921 issue 
of Annals was devoted to "Present Day Immigration With 
Special Reference to the Japanese."
90Minami, op. cit.
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skillful Orientals, who, with their yellow skin 
and debasing habits of life, seemed to them hardly 
fellow men at all, but evil spirits, rather.
It does not take much intelligence to read between 
the lines of the passage above. For racially self-conscious 
Japanese, learning that such a noble, "humanitarian" 
personage as Woodrow Wilson harbored racial prejudice 
against non-Caucasian races must have been very disturbing 
and gnawing. We should also note that President Woodrow 
Wilson had long opposed Oriental immigrants and in 1912 had 
declared "We cannot make a homogeneous population out of a 
people who do not blend with the Caucasian race."92
According to Fred H. Matthews' argument, "The real 
[American] prejudice against the Japanese dates from the 
time when they began to be small owners, rather than farm 
l a b orers."93 Matthews' statement would have been truer to 
reality had he used the word "discrimination" rather than 
"prejudice." The Japanese could not have failed to notice 
the hypocrisy involved in the American attitude in dealing 
with Asiatics: that it was all right to take Christianity to 
the Far East, but it was not desirable that its peoples
91woodrow Wilson, A History of the American People 
(6 vols.. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1902), p. 185.
93guoted in Fred H. Matthews, "White Community and 
the 'Yellow Peril'," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 
Vol. L (1964), 620.
93lbid., p. 618.
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leave home to seek it in the United States.
For a fuller understanding of American racial 
prejudice of an earlier period, we may quote the following;
Puritan pastors of the early colonial period began 
to forge the American myth of foundation. It was 
argued that God separated the good wheat from the 
chaff of Europe, and appointed the good the task 
of founding a "Wilderness Zion," a "City on the 
Hill," in America. This kind of religious 
pronouncements was to be later exploited in 
spiritualizing the secular revolution. "We have 
incontestable evidence," said one preacher- 
patriot, "that God Almighty, with all the powers 
of heaven, are on our s i d e . "94
Similar views on American prejudice were voiced by 
many. In a editorial in the New York Morning News on 
December, 1845, John L. O'Sullivan (1813-1895) argued that 
it was the "manifest destiny" of the United States to expand 
to the Pacific, "the manifest design of Providence." His 
phrase was to become a name and a rationale to conjure with 
in the justification for the land the United States took 
from Indians and Mexicans as well as for demands that it 
take Cuba, Canada, perhaps all of North America. He went on 
to argue that the expansion of the Anglo-Saxon was not only 
inevitable, but also he had a duty to discharge— a duty to
^^Quoted in Robert Middlekauff, "The Ritualization 
of the American Revolution," in Lawrence Levine and Robert 
Middlekauff, eds.. The National Temper (New York: Harcourt, 
1972), p. 107.
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spread free and democratic institutions.®^
Furthermore, advocating the application of American 
Manifest Destiny to Asia, United States Senator Thomas Hart 
Benton eloquently expressed his belief in May, 1846.
The arrival of the van of the Caucasian race upon
the border of the sea which washes the shore of
Eastern Asia promised a greater and more 
benificent change upon the earth than any human 
event past or present since the dispersion of man 
upon the earth. The Caucasian race "must wake up 
and reanimate the torpid body of Asia. . . . The 
moral and intellectual superiority of the White
race will do the rest; and thus the youngest
people, and the newest land, will become the 
reviver and the regenerator of the oldest."®®
Of course, the Japanese detested the American 
doctrine of Manifest Destiny. But it must be a historical 
irony of the first order that the Japanese came up with 
their own version of Manifest Destiny, conquering their 
Asian neighbors under the pretext of "the Greater East Asia 
Co-Prosperity Sphere." The sudden emergence of 
extraordinarily altruistic pretensions in national life 
raises a problem which transcends the sphere of conscious 
reasoning.®? There is no denying that national self- 
interest is aggresively pursued in the name of Providence,
®^Quoted in Richard Current and John Garraty, eds.. 
Words That Made American History (2 Vols.; Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1965), I, pp. 437-445.
®®Quoted in Yanaga Chitoshi, Japan Since Perry (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1949), p. 17.
®?New York Times, April 30, 1967.
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international morality, or civilized dignity. As Albert K. 
Weinberg rightly said, "the enlargement of territorial aims 
was probably due less to philanthropy than to a 
consideration of national self-interest."98
American racial politics has been a function of 
emotion, not of reason. There had been no significant anti- 
Japanese legislation passed in California prior to 1913, but 
there had been a long struggle for Japanese e x c l u s i o n . 99 
Toward the beginning of this century, "California was 
alarmed, for no very good reason other than that these new 
people [Japanese] did not look r i g h t . (Emphasis added.)
Edward Seidensticker says that
the subtler rationale for 'the Pacific War' was 
racist not nationalist. . . . Xenophobia and 
insularity are part of the Japanese facts of life 
that may one day disappear but today must be lived 
with. This disquieting thought is that the 
stronger the initial affinity with the West 
appears to be and the longer the exposure, the
98Albert K. Weinberg, Manifest Destiny; A Study of 
Nationalist Expansion in American History (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins Press, 1935), p. 169.
^^For a good account of anti-Orientalism during the 
Hiram Johnson Administration in California, see, among 
others, Rogert B. Daniels, Politics of Prejudice: The
Anti-Japanese Movement in California (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1962).
lO^Edward Seidensticker, "The Image," in Herbert 
Passin, ed.. The United States and Japan (2nd ed.; 
Washington, D. C.: Columbia Books, 1925), p. 14.
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more violent may be the hostile forces that are 
ultimately released . . . the race issue may 
really lie nearer their hearts than any other 
noisy issues.^01
Japanese were fully aware of the fact that they did 
not "look right" in the eyes of Americans. What is more, 
Japanese surely hated to be in a subservient position, doing 
menial labor. As one Fresno fruit grower explained in 
January, 1907, ". . .we [American fruit growers] are wholly 
dependent upon [Japanese] labor. If they are excluded, we 
shall have to give up our farms and go out of b u s i n e s s . " ^ 0 2  
Japanese characteristic independence was bemoaned by 
many large American growers, one of whom expressed his 
dismay as follows:
The Chinese when they were here were ideal. They 
were patient, plodding, and uncomplaining in the 
performance of the most menial service, they 
submitted to anything, never violating a contract.
The exclusion acts drove them out. The Japanese 
now coming are a tricky and cunning lot^ who break
contracts and become quite i n d e p e n d e n t .
As the Japanese in California had steadily become 
bolder and more independent, the American hatred of Japanese 
had proportionally grown stronger, trying to prevent
lOllbid.
lO^Quoted in Herbert B. Johnson, Discrimination 
Against Japanese in California (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1907), p. 42.
103"Chinese and Japanese in America," Annals, XXIV 
(1903), 5.
377
Japanese from owning land.^®^ As early as 1913 the "yellow 
press" in the United States and Japan had contributed to a 
crisis which only hard labor in Washington and Tokyo was 
able to o v e r c o m e . 105 it seems quite strange that the
Hiram Johnson Administration, so concerned about the plight 
of the immigrants, would at the same time support 
legislation designed to restrict the activities of a large 
portion of the state's [California's] alien population, the 
O r i e n t a l s . 106 in September, 1913, public opinion in
Japan continued to be bitter against the United States. 
Hypersensitive to any hint of inferiority, the Japanese were 
using the California law to oppose not only the United 
States, but Christianity. Irate Japanese said that when 
Americans spoke of "the fatherhood of God," and the 
"brotherhood of Man," they meant only "White M e n . "107
The racial question involving the United States and 
Japan was becoming extremely serious toward the end of World
lO^Raymond Leslie Buell, "The Development of the 
Anti-Japanese Agitation in the United States," Political 
Science Quarterly, XXXVII, No. 4 (December, 1922), 605-38.
105rphomas A. Bailey, "California, Japan, and the 
Alien Land Legislation of 1913," Pacific Historical Review, 
I (March, 1932), 54.
lOOgpencer C. Olin, Jr., "European Immigrant and 
Oriental Alien; Acceptance and Rejection by the California 
Legislature of 1913," Pacific Historical Review, XXXV, No. 3 
(August, 1966), 309.
^07paolo E. Coletta, "The Most Thankless Task: Bryan 
and the California Alien Land Legislation," Pacific
Historical Review, XXXVI (May, 1967), 182.
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War 1.108 Many derogatory writings pandered to a further 
worsening of the racial question. For instance. Dr. 
Benjamin I. Wheeler, President Emeritus of the University of 
California, made an inflammatory remark in May, 1920;
The two civilizations [of America and Japan] 
cannot mingle, and the leaders in Japan agree that 
it is not well to attempt to amalgamate them.
They cannot and will not understand our 
civilization, and no matter in what part of the 
world he is, a Japanese always feels himself a 
subject of the Emperor, with the Imperial 
Government backing him, much as a feudal retainer 
had the support of his overlord in exchange for an
undivided l o y a l t y .
In March, 1919, Prescott F. Hall wrote an extremely 
racial essay which merits quotation.
You cannot make bad stock into good by changing 
its meridian, any more than you can turn a cart 
horse into a hunter by putting it into a fine 
stable, or make a mongrel into a fine dog by 
teaching it tricks. . . . Immigration restriction 
is a species of segregation on a large scale, by 
which inferior stocks can be prevented from both 
diluting and supplanting good s t o c k s .
^88see Ralph E. Minger, "Taft's Missions to Japan: A 
Study in Personal Diplomacy," Pacific Historical Review, 
XXX, No. 3 (August, 1961), 279-94; Kell F. Mitchell, Jr., 
"Diplomacy and Prejudice; The Morris-Shidehara 
Negotiations," Ibid., XXXIX, No. 1 (February, 1970), 85-104; 
Foreign Relations, 1921, II, 343-47; New York Times,
September 2, 27, 28; December 28, 1920; January 8, 30;
February 7, 1921
lOBguoted in Japan Advertiser, May 22, 1920.
HOprescott F. Hall, "Immigration Restriction and 
Eugenics," Journal of Heredity, X, No. 3 (March, 1919), p. 
126.
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To be sure, remarks like these could not go unheeded 
in the racially sensitive Japan. Writing again in January, 
1921, Hall argued that history evinces that the mixture of 
races tends to bring about demise of civilizations. And 
the author went on to argue that the Nordic race is superior 
to the Alpine and Mediterranean races, and that the 
characteristics of the former are individual initiative, 
love of personal liberty, while those of the latter are 
centralization of authority, reliance upon the state, and in 
war subservience and absence of morality.
American racial discrimination culminated in the 
Exclusion Act of 1924, which effectively prevented the 
immigration of Orientals for almost twenty y e a r s . A l o n g  
with the United States there was Australia, among others, 
which insisted on racial discrimination. White Australians 
are opposed even to a quota system for Asiatic immigration. 
In 1946, Australian racism was so naked as to assert that 
"there can be no concession whatever . . . the idea of 
racial purity is sacred to her [Australia], and she must 
maintain that to the very point of death. Even in the
Hlprescott F. Hall, "Immigration and the World 
War," The Annals, XCIII (January, 1921).
^^^Roger Daniels, "Westerners from the East:
Oriental Immigrants Reappraised," Pacific Historical Review, 
XXXV, No. 4 (November, 1966), 374-75.
ll^ciive Turnbull, "Australia and Asiatics,"
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1960's, Australia doggedly pursued the "White Australian 
Policy."114
Japanese response to the racial discrimination in 
the West was based on emotion, not on reason, resulting in 
the miscalculated Pacific War. Not to be outdone by the 
West, Japan demonstrated its own share of racial arrogance 
by being indifferent to other Asian peoples and by waging 
racial propaganda against Anglo-American racism.
A telling example of American racial discrimination 
against the Japanese was demonstrated by the United States' 
government's official policy during World War II of 
relocating the Japanese and the Japanese-Americans on the 
West C o a s t . T h e  singling out of the ethnic Japanese only
Spectator, March 8, 1946, pp. 241-42.
ll^Ernest 0. Ames, "Australia— for Whites Only," The 
Nation, September 17, 1949, pp. 274-75; Sydney Morning
Herald, May 19, 1945; Herbert I. London, "Foreign Affairs
and the White Australia Policy," Orbis, VIII, No. 2 (Summer, 
1969), 556-77.
llSpor good discussions of Japan's ultranationalism 
through racism, see Seldon C. Memefee, "Japan's 
Psychological War," Social Forces, XXI, No. 4 (May, 1943), 
425-36; Sakamaki Shunzo, "Shinto: Japanese Ethnocentrism," 
in Charles A. Moore, ed.. Philosophy: East and West
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1944), Ch. VI; 
Yves R. Simon, "Secret Sources of the Success of the Racist 
Ideologv," Review of Politics, VII, No. 1 (January, 1945), 
74-105.“
H®"As time passes, it becomes more and more plain 
that our wartime treatment of the Japanese and the Japanese- 
Americans on the West Coast was a tragic and dangerous 
mistake. That mistake is a threat to society, and to all 
men. Its motivation and its impact on our system of law
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to the exclusion of the ethnic Germans and Italians was seen 
by the Japanese as the clear manifestation of Caucasian 
racism against the Orientals, in general, and the Japanese, 
in particular.117
Informed or not, the majority of the American people 
advocated a harsh punitive treatment of Japan after the 
surrender, revealing the deep-rooted American prejudice 
against the Japanese.H® That racial prejudice dies hard, 
indeed, seems to be a truism. It is interesting to learn 
that the American discrimination against non-white people
deny every value of democracy. In the perspective of our 
legal tradition, the facts are almost incredible." Eugene 
V. Rostow, "Our Worst Wartime Mistake," Harpers, September, 
1944, pp. 193-201. For a more scholarly treatment see. 
Idem, "The Japanese-American Cases— A Disaster," Yale Law 
Review, LIV (1945), 489-553. For a penetrating analysis of 
the wartime treatment of the ethnic Japanese, see Edward N. 
Barnhart, "The Individual Exclusion of Japanese Americans in 
World War II," Pacific Historical Review, XXIX, No. 2 (May, 
1960), 111-30.
case is a clear indication of the 
traditional Atlantic-mindedness of Americans and of 
Caucasian racism against the Japanese. See Marguerite Ann 
Stewart, "Asia in the School Curriculum," Far Eastern 
Survey, XIV, No. 8 (September 12, 1945), 256-59. One page 
256, Stewart writes; "The fact is that the average American 
school child learns more about the tiny country of Holland 
than about the whole continent of Asia, which includes more 
than one-third of the land space, and is inhabited by nearly 
half the people on earth."
l^®See Louise Merrick Van Patten, "Public Opinions 
on Japanese Americans," Far Eastern Survey, XIV, No. 15 
(August 1, 1945), 207-208; Shirley Jenkins, "'Uninformed'
Opinion on Japan," Far Eastern Survey, XIV, No. 18 
(September 12, 1945), 251; A Fortune survey conducted in
December, 1945 revealed that Americans were prejudiced more 
against the Japanese than the Germans. See Fortune, 
December, 1945, pp. 303, 305-6, 309-10.
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was demonstrated by the immigration quota made public in 
June, 1952: 65,361 for Great Britain and Northern Ireland; 
100 for China; and 185 for J a p a n . W e  should be reminded 
that relations between Japan and the United States were very 
propitious in June, 1952: Japan needed United States aid for 
its reconstruction, whereas the United States needed Japan 
as a bulwark against Communist expansion.
However much the more liberal advocates of the 
ethnic revival may proclaim the contrary, the fact remains 
that the glorification of one's heritage and one's group 
always implies its superiority, its "chosenness" over all 
o t h e r s . 1 2 0  is not difficult to see that racial and
national prejudices are not likely to disappear: They can be 
more easily denounced than actually given up, Henry Walter 
Brann writes.
When making large plans regarding future 
developments on the world's political and social 
scene, we must never forget that the strongest 
motor of human actions was and remains HABIT. . . 
Group thinking, in Which our apparently most original
119"Presidential Proclamation 2980 of June 20, 
1952," United States Code, Congressional and Administrative 
News, vol. 1 (1952), pp. 986-88.
120iphoughtful observers deplore the disparity 
between the American idealism and American practice. Lester 
B. Granger, "The Negro Views Peace," Far Eastern Survey, 
XIV, No. 17 (August 29, 1945), 237-39; Rupert B. Vance,
"Tragic Dilemma: The Negro and the American Dream," Virginia 
Quarterly Review, XX, No. 3 (Summer, 1944), 435-55; Suzuki 
Eisuke, "Foreign Students and the American Dream," Yale 
Review, LXVIII, No. 3 (March, 1979), 369-82.
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thoughts have a source, moves in concentric 
circles of a century-old routine. We are all 
dominated by the terrible law of mental inertia 
which so often degenerates into moral 
indifference. How many progressive thinkers and 
writers, who with all the strength of their 
professional talents fight against any kind of 
discrimination and for a just and equal treatment 
of all races, nations, and faiths of the world 
actually live up to their own teachings in 
everyday life? Their number is astonishingly 
small indeed.121
By the same token, Frederick Hertz argues that 
"Racialism can be defined as the belief in deep, innate and 
unalterable differences of appearance, mentality and value, 
between human groups. . . . This idea definitely asserts 
that human races are not merely distinguished by outward 
characteristics but also their whole mentality and their 
cultural v a l u e . "122 Japanese obsession with skin color is 
still as pronounced as ever before. The Japanese regard 
white skin as beautiful and black skin as ugly even before 
they have any meaningful contact with Europeans, Africans or 
Indians.123 The Japanese racial feeling, be it from their 
own ethnocentrism or from the racial discriminations in the
121nenry Walter Brann, "Is the Complete 
Disappearance of Racial and National Prejudices 
Realizable?," Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, XXVI, 
No. 1 (June, 1945), 78. In this connection also see,
Nichols, 0£. cit., p. 9.
122prederick Hertz, "Racialism As a Social Factor," 
Sociological Review, XL, Section 10 (1948), 123.
123Mainichi Shimbun, August 2, 1965; Wagatsuma
Hiroshi, "The Social Perception of Skin Color in Japan," 
Daedalus, XCII, No. 2 (Spring, 1967), 407- 43.
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West, is likely to remain as a major nationalistic factor.
CHAPTER XIII
NATIONAL INTEREST
It appears that the world in which we live still 
confirms the old dictum that "States have no friends, only 
interests." Nations, of course, do not have friends and do 
not feel gratitude. Nations have interests, and they act 
accordingly. That was the defense for the United States 
abandonment of Free China on Taiwan. "In essence, liberal 
internationalists reaffirm their faith in a positive role 
for the United States, but their proposals are 
unconvincingly rhetorical— at once too easy and too 
feeble."1
Despite all the noble pronouncements by many well- 
intentioned internationalists, more and more studies have 
revealed that neither the advanced industrial countries nor 
the developing ones are in process of jettisoning national 
interests in favor of international cooperation and 
collaboration based on the spirit of "universal
^Richard A. Falk, "Beyond Internationalism," 
Foreign Policy, No. 24 (Fall, 1976), 103.
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brotherhood."2 Gunnar Myrdal, for one, harbored no
illusion when he said; "The Welfare-State is
nationalistic."^
Realities of international power politics convince 
us that each nation seems destined to pursue its own 
national interests unless the few countries with spacious 
land and abundant natural resources are willing to share 
them with other peoples. Otherwise, internationalism and
humanism only signify ruination for disadvantaged
countries.4 Unless very general psychological and even 
sociological causes of nations are basically changed, 
international cooperation, in the real sense, is wishful
2gee, among others, Sekai Keizai Chosakai, 
Nashonarizumu no Kenkyu [A Study of Nationalism] (Tokyo: 
Sekai Keizai Chosakai, 1956); W- T. Stace, "Have Nations Any 
Morals?," Atlantic Monthly, November, 1945, pp. 83-87; 
Hannah Arendt, "Imperialism, Nationalism, Chauvinism," 
Review of Politics, VII, No. 4 (October, 1945), 441-63; Hans 
J. Morgenthau, "The Twilight of International Morality," 
Ethics, LVIII, No. 2 (January, 1948), 79-99; idem, "The
Meaning of American Foreign Policy: The National Interest 
vs. Moral Abstractions," American Political Science Review, 
XLVI, No. 4 (December, 1950), 833-54; idem, "Another 'Great 
Debate': The National Interest of the United States," Ibid., 
XLVI, No. 4 (December, 1952), 961-88; John Somerville,
"World Authority: Realities and Illusions," Ethics, LXXVI, 
No. 1 (October, 1965), 33-46; Paul K. T. Sib, "Nationalism: 
The Driving Force in Asia," Issues and Studies, II, No. 2 
(November, 1965), 14-17.
^Gunnar Myrdal, Beyond the Welfare State (New 
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1960), p. 159.
4gir Alexander M. Carr-Saunders, "Crowded Countries 
and Empty Spaces," Foreign Affairs, XXVIII, No. 3 (April,
1950), 477-86.
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thinking. Seeing the futility involved in the slogan of 
international cooperation, Pitman B. Potter argued that 
men's thoughts and sentiments have not caught up with the 
changes in the world which made international cooperation so 
much more important in the recent decades.^
By the same token, David Hume minced no words when 
he criticized the whole idea of natural benevolence, and 
denied categorically the existence of innate nobility, or of 
regard of others. He states: "It may be affirmed that there 
is no such passion in human minds as the love of mankind 
merely as such, independent of personal qualities, or 
services, or relations to ourselves.
Since Japan is the unique non-Western advanced 
industrial country most vulnerable to international crisis 
or disorder, she should not be blamed for her relentless 
pursuit of national interests at all cost.^ Yoshida 
Shigeru was blunt enough when he stated that the economic 
necessity of Japan would "prevail in the long run over any
^Pitman B. Potter, "Progress in International 
Cooperation," Political Science Quarterly, L, No. 3 
(September, 1935), 377-404.
^David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book II, 
Part II, Sec. 1 (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1898), 
p. 401.
^That Japan's economy is placed at the mercy of 
stable international economic arrangements is forcefully 
discussed in Kanamori Hisao, "Future U.S.-Japanese Economic 
Relations," in Priscilla Clapp and Morton H. Halperin, eds.. 
United States-Japanese Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1974), pp. 58-69.
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ideological differences and artificial barriers."® This 
clearly means that Japan, like any nation, will remain 
nationalistic and opportunistic, adopting policies wherever 
national interests lead.® Tanaka Naokichi sees that the 
international community in which international politics 
operates still finds itself not far from the state of 
nature, and that the rule of the dominant class obtains in 
international politics. Tanaka further maintains that, 
while one cannot deny the tendency of law and morality to 
exert an increasingly large influence on international 
politics, power is still found to prevail over law and 
morality. He warns those who aspire to world peace, arguing 
that the call for world peace is meaningless unless we 
create a strong international organization with effective 
power.
Since technology, of itself, is incapable of 
resolving the looming spectre of scarcity or ensuring 
physical, let alone spiritual, stability, the scientific and 
technological explosion, which has accompanied the growth of
®Yoshida Shigeru, "Japan and the Crisis in Asia," 
Foreign Affairs, XXIX, No. 2 (January, 1951), 179; for a
similar view, see also "Miyazawa Outlines Foreign Policy," 
Japan Times Weekly, January 1, 1975.
®See Jesse F. Steiner, "Social Change in Japan," 
Sociology and Social Research, XXXI, No. 1 (September- 
October, 1946), 3-11.
Tanaka Naokichi, Kokusai Seiji Gaku Gairon [An 
Outline of International Politics] (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1956).
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the industrial state, is far from eliminating the 
manifestations of bondage in society, tending to accentuate 
relationships of dominance and dependence. As Louis L. 
Snyder writes.
Although technology has brought national cultures 
closer together, at the same time it has tended to 
emphasize political differences. . . . Technology 
not only hardened the political structure along 
national lines but it also has affected national 
economies.
In the conduct of its foreign policy, each nation is 
after its own interest. All nations can profess lofty 
idealism, and, indeed, they may be motivated in varying 
degrees by sincere altruism. However, due to the very 
nature of things, nations have no choice but to act in 
accordance with their self-interest. Such are the facts of 
life; such are the realities of international politics. 
Indeed, lofty idealism is easier said than done. A speech 
by former Prime Minister of Japan Miki Takio delivered at 
the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco on June 10, 1977,
reads in part as follows:
Humanity is at last one race, with one destiny.
^^See Louis L. Snyder, Varieties of Nationalism 
(Hindsdale, 111.: The Dryden press, 1976), pp. 131-32.
^^It is very difficult to disagree with Reinhold 
Niebuhr's remark: "There is little connection between the
ideals of liberal internationalists and the sorry realities 
of the contemporary international scene." See his "World 
War III Ahead?," Nation, March 25, 1944, p. 356.
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No longer can any democracy, no matter how 
powerful, be selfishly concerned with only its 
national interests. Unless the world's 
democracies work effectively together, and in 
harmony and accommodation with the legitimate 
interests of the rest of mankind, we shall fail 
the test of our own governability.
It takes little intelligence to realize that Miki's 
internationalistic-sounding noble speech did not match with 
Japan's foreign policy, in general, and Japan trade policy, 
in particular. In the course of trying to negotiate with 
Japan on the sticky question involving trade, French 
President Francois Mitterrand pleaded in the following 
words: "But we must surmount the temptation of each for
himself and together face up to common dangers.Ishihara 
Shintaro was quite right when he stated that the 
justification of national self-interest has been the sole 
guide of Japan's modern history.
1. National Interest and the Seeming 
International Cooperation
As the mainspring of human action is self- 
interest,^® so the most potent single force in international
l^Miki Takio, "The Future of Democracy in Japan: 
Personal Freedom and Fulfillment," Vital Speeches of the 
Day, August 15, 1977, p. 660.
^^Time, April 26, 1982, p. 25.
^®Ishihara Shintaro, "A Nation Without Morality," 
The Japan Interpreter, IX, No. 3 (Winter, 1975), 276-91.
l®It may be noted that Thomas Hobbes regarded self-
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politics is national interest. In 1951, General Douglas 
MacArthur stressed the importance of national interest in 
the following words:
If they [great issues] are not conducted with the 
single purpose of serving the national interest in 
this hour of crisis, we will fail those who have 
given us their confidence and depend upon us for 
leadership and guidance. The guiding light here 
today, and in the days to follow, must be the 
national interest, for the national interest 
transcends, in importance, the fortunes of any 
individual, or group of individuals.
Given the modern system of competitive territorial 
states, the conduct of nations must be based upon the law of 
their own nature— that of self-interest, self-preservation, 
and growth. Any so-called morality can be little more than 
egocentric worship of their own pure motives and 
righteousness. Writing on Nationalism and Internationalism 
in 1917, Ramsay Muir listed "the spirit of nationalism, the 
spirit of commercialism, and the spirit of militarism" as
interest as the main spring of man's action, an argument 
underlined by Malthus who argued that benevolence has no 
subsistence when population must be related to the means of 
subsistence. And it finally collapsed on the scientific 
doctrines of Gall, Mendel, and Darwin that Nature progresses 
by means of a ruthless extermination of the weaker stock and 
that no natural nobility can arrest the process of the 
survival of the fittest. Darwin argues that the most 
powerful force in human nature is the instinct for self- 
preservation .
S. Senate, Military Situation in the Far East,
p. 2.
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enemies of the international idea.18 Yet, the fact is that
"the most important emotional factor in public life today is 
1 Qnationalism."
Time and again, scholars and "statesmen"20 speak of 
nationalism as an outdated phenomenon now in process of 
decline in the presence of a rising internationalism. Those 
of reason know that it is wrong to base a world society on 
so flimsy an edifice as nationalism, but they fail to see 
that they are dealing with a highly emotional and often 
illogical historical force. The fact remains that the whole 
machinery of nationalism works blindly all over the world—  
east and west, north and south. While the leaders of the 
world speak grandly of growing international cooperation, 
they invariably place their own nation foremost in any list 
of priorities. They are judged by their people on how well 
they succeed in enhancing the national image and protecting 
it from assault from without. They, as calculating 
politicians, must regard national power as the key essential
^^Ramsay Muir, Nationalism and Internationali sm 
(London: constable and Co., Ltd., 1917), p. 195.
^^Carlton J. H. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism (New 
York: The Macmillan Co., 1926), p. 1.
^^Harold J. Laski, Nationalism and the Future of 
Civilization (London; Watts and Co., 1932); Julius 
Braunthal, The Paradox of Nationalism (London: St. Bololph 
Publishing Co., 1946); Bertrand Russell, New Hope for a 
Changing World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951); Miki, 
op. cit.
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to existence in a dangerous world.
Those who realistically see the realities of power 
politics claim that nationalistic ethics outweighs 
international morality.^2 Attacking the U. S. foreign 
policy as utopian, sentimental, legalistic, Hans J. 
Morgenthau argues that once the United States thought it 
could do nothing; now it thinks it can do everything, giving 
the impression that it can run the whole world strictly 
according to American ideals ; instead it should go back to 
the realities of power politics. Morgenthau maintains that 
the object of foreign policy should be the defense of the
9  *5national interest, neither more nor less.
It may be morally satisfying for liberal humanists 
to advocate internationalism here and now, but the 
psychology of nationalism and the reality of international 
politics do not seem to lend support to the unrealistic call 
for internationalism and world government. Bertrand 
Russell, for one, argues that nationalism is in our day the
2^See Stace, op. cit.; Imai Senichi, "On Self-Love 
as Formative Principle in the World of Politics," Japan 
Annual of Law and Politics, No. 7 (1959), 52-53; Walter
Sulzbach, "The New Nationalism," South Atlantic Monthly, LI, 
No. 4 (October, 1952), 483-92.
^^Morgenthau, "The Twilight of International 
Morality," pp. 79-99.
23por a fuller understanding, see Hans J. 
Morgenthau, ^  Defense of the National Interest; A Critical 
Examination of American Foreign Policy (New York: Knopf,
1951).
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chief obstacle to the extension of social cohesion beyond 
national b o u n d a r i e s . 24 g y  the same token, applying certain 
psychiatric standards of evaluation to the understanding of 
social-political thinking and dogmas, Kenneth E. Appel has 
written.
We are citizens of the world. Isolationism and 
the idea of national sovereignty as supreme power 
are outdated concepts— psychologically unsound. 
Isolation for the individual is self­
nullification— for nation it is "globalunacy" and 
war. We need leaders with vision to show nations 
how to live in the global community, as 
psychiatrists help individuals live in their 
smaller communities. Health and happiness for the 
individual consist of contributing to the life of 
the community, accepting its responsibilities and 
limitations. Similarly, the health and happiness 
of nations depend upon the acceptance of world 
responsibilities a ^  cooperation in the solution 
of world problems.
Appel's contention seems so idealistic and divorced 
from reality that it reminds us of the Marxian doctrine that 
"to each according to his need and from each according to 
his ability." It would, indeed, serve us well to remember 
the argument that the perilous world situation today results 
from the conjunction of three poison-breeding factors: 1)
hunger and disease; 2) racial hatred; and 3) surging forces 
of nationalism. Francis B. Sayre claims that "the most
2^Russell, 0 £. cit.
^^Kenneth E. Appel, "Nationalism and Sovereignty: A 
Psychiatric View," Journal of Abnormal and Social
Psychology, XL, No. 4 (October, 1945), 362.
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profound and baffling problem of all is racial 
discrimination.
Arguing that a hasty, fervid exhortation of 
internationalism is likely to result in a failure of good 
intentions, and that we should be content with accomplishing 
specific objectives in international control in limited 
fields, W. F Cottrell concludes that "to attack nationalism 
in the name of internationalism is to murder a mother whose 
womb harbors the still unborn child."2?
Regardless of how one feels about it, nationalism is 
something that is a significant political factor for 
national as well as international politics. Hardy C. 
Dillard bluntly states that "Nationalism is the sentiment of 
belonging to a nation. Critics of nationalism are thus 
really critics of the concept of the nation."^8 Given the 
state of power politics, internationalism or a lasting peace 
is out of the question without the relinquishment of 
national sovereignty. In this sense, it is rather strange 
that the advocates of internationalism fail to deal with the
2®Francis B. Sayre, "The Problem of Underdeveloped 
Area in Asia and Africa," Proceedings of American Academy of 
Arts and Sciences, LXXXI, No. 6 (April, 1952), 284-98.
2?W. F. Cottrell, "Cultural Growth of 
Internationalism," American Sociological Review, X, No. 5 
(October, 1945), 586-95.
28nardy C. Dillard, "Nationalism: Midcentury
Puzzle," Virginia Quarterly Review, XXVIII, No. 4 (Autumn,
1952), 534.
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central problem, namely, the abrogation of the principle of 
national sovereignty.^ 9
The discrepancy between economic internationalism 
(that is, world-wide economic cooperation) and the principle 
of national self-determination (interpreted as the creation 
and maintenance of any number of politically sovereign 
nations) can by no means be reconciled.^® As long as the 
national sovereignty of states is maintained, no thought of 
internationalism can be seriously entertained, for the 
possibility of a war has been deliberately left open— a 
possibility which is likely to become a certainty due to the 
entire structural and ideological framework of the nation­
state. In other words, no meaningful internationalism is 
feasible until nationalism is brought under control.
It is obvious that no nation-state, except by force, 
can be moved to a course of action which it deems to be in 
opposition to its own interests. The egoism of nation-
29por a detailed discussion in this regard, see
Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Illusion of World Government," 
Foreign Affairs, XXVII, No. 3 (April, 1949), 379-88.
3®N. A. Pelcovits, "World Government Now," Harper's, 
November, 1946, pp. 396-403. For a penetrating examination 
of this aspect, see Francis Delaisi, Political Myths and
Economic Realities (London; Williams & Northgate, 1925).
31gee Percy E. Corbett, "The Future of Nationalism 
and the Nation- State," The Annals, 218 (November, 1941),
153-61. For a devastating attack on the naivete of
internationalism, see Kamikawa Hikomatsu, "Senso no Riaritei 
to Heiwa no Yutopia" [Reality of War and Utopia of Peace], 
Kokusei Seiji (Spring, 1957).
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States must be taken for granted just as the egoism of 
individuals. Thus, given the selfish idea of interest 
obtaining in human society and harbored by individuals,^^ it 
is a corollary that "one loves," as Rousseau once said, 
"what is one's own more than another."
It may be pointed out that the entanglement of the 
well-intentioned internationalist's altruism with his 
patriotism must tend sadly to curtail the social usefulness 
of the former. Moreover, the internationalist's idealism 
without a total liquidation of nationalistic megalomania and 
of racial prejudice is bound to become a ludicrous 
hypocrisy. In this connection the following merits 
quotation, despite its sounding rather utopian and 
unrealistic.
This prerequisite [one important prerequisite of 
world government] is the liquidation of all 
remnants of appeasement and tolerance toward 
fascism. World government with fascist regimes is 
impossible. . . . Our whole concept of 
imperialism must be changed. The idea of spheres 
of interest . . . must be abandoned. Above all, 
all principles of human rights "without 
distinction of race, sex, language and religion" 
already adopted in the United Nations Charter, but 
far from being applied, must become an integral
S^The tragedy of war, in general, and the Hiroshima- 
Nagasaki tragedy, in particular, dragooned many into 
rethinking. For one, Louis Dolivet argues that the post- 
Hiroshima-Nagasaki historic necessity behooves us to create 
a world government, but we are, sadly, still very remote 
from even the beginnings of world government. See his 
"World Government vs. National Sovereignty; New York Leads 
Intellectual Revolution," Free World, X, No. 4 (October, 
1945), 25-28.
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part of the everyday life of those people who want 
to have the privilege of being admitted into the 
world government. It would be a dangerous
illusion to believe that the fight for all these 
partial aspects of democracy has become
superfluous and that world government would
automatically solve all problems. World
government cannot be better than the people and 
the individual governments that will form it. It 
would seem to us that the best way to fight for it 
is to act, in everyday life, for the elimination 
of those constant and common injustices which are 
still the plague of our humanity.33
Though the passage quoted above contains moral 
preachments of stupendous quality, the feasibility of such 
prerequisites seems to be an impossible possibility, for the 
ignoring of the problem of nationalism is based on wishful 
thinking, not on reality.34 David Thomson is forced to
conclude, "It would be truer to say now that all history is 
nationalist history, and especially that all contemporary 
history is nationalist history."35
The major obstacle to further progress in 
internationalism seems to lie not in true national interest 
but in the fact that of two competing conceptions of 
interest the patriot tends to choose the one which appeals
33jbid., pp. 27-28.
3^Richard Pipes, "The Forces of Nationalism," 
Problems of Communism, XIII, No. 1 (January-February, 1964), 
1-6.
35David Thomson, "Must History Stay Nationalist?," 
Enounter, XXX, No. 6 (June, 1968), 22.
399
to nationalist emotion rather than r e a s o n . A s  already 
noted, Americans, or any other people, have their own share 
of cultural, racial and historical prejudice, their own 
parochial nationalism. That is to say, they live in their 
own glass house.
Internationalism is, indeed, a fitful impulse 
everywhere, in Washington as well as in Tokyo, easily 
overborne by the urges of national pride and national 
interests. As for the Japanese, "parochialism and 
insularity, however, continue to breed Japanese indifference 
toward other Asian peoples except as their attention is 
teased by some political crisis or other."3?
Many studies have established that the persistent, 
rather increasing, strength of nationalism is real and 
ubiquitous. National interest rather than international 
cooperation continues to be the single most important 
political factor in international politics.^® It may be 
noted that the new nationalism seeks not liberty but 
security and power, with which the Japanese are most 
concerned. "Throughout the time that nationalism has been a
^®In this connection, see Karl W. Deutsch's 
distinction between "rational behavior" and "subjectively 
convenient behavior" in his Tides Among Nations (New York: 
The Free Press, 1979), p. 24.
3?Lawrence Olson, "Japan and Asia: An American
Viewpoint," Asia, No. 8 (Sumrrier, 1967), p. 104.
^®Marshall D. Shulman, "What Does Security Mean 
Today," Foreign Affairs, IXL, No. 4 (July, 1971), 607-18.
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political force it has been concerned with states and their 
frontiers. . . . national allegiance and frontiers are not 
likely to disappear in the near f u t u r e . T o  be sure, the 
history of the past years does not indicate that the demise 
of nationalism is as near as has often been predicted, or 
that it will cease, for a good many years to come, to be a 
great political force deserving more attentive and more 
sympathetic study than it has thus far received. As Denis 
W. Brogan states meaningfully, "Mere patriotism is often 
enough, but it cannot be always enough and the transition 
from the blind loyalty of the simplest nationalism to a 
combined loyalty to the nation and the human race is the 
hardest political step to take."*0
Harboring a hope for international cooperation is 
morally right, but nation-centered power politics suggests 
that international cooperation is a "sometime thing."^1 
International cooperation is found only in case of 
transnational nature, not in case of supernational nature.^2
S^Sulzbach, op. cit., pp. 483, 492.
^^Denis W. Brogan, The Price of Revolution (New 
York: Harper, 1951), 126.
^^Ohira Zengo and Myres S. McDougal, "Exchange of 
Views Toward Public Order of the World Community," 
Hitotsubaski Journal of Law and Politics, III (April, 1964), 
p. 17.
'^^Horst Mendershausen, Outlook on Western 
Solidarity: Political Relations in the Atlantic Alliance
Systems, R-1512-PR (Santa Monica, Ca.: The Rand Corporation,
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As W. T. Stace says, "We can't have a high level of morals 
until we get a world state. And we can't have a world state 
till we get a higher level of morals." Appreciable 
international cooperation in the midst of growing 
nationalism is something that is likely to remain wishful 
thinking.43
For resources-poor Japan, acutely vulnerable to 
international crisis and totally dependent upon free trade, 
seeking national interests, through acquiring raw materials 
from without and having overseas markets for finished 
products, "is a matter of life and death to the industry of
Japan."44
2. Trade War
Broadly speaking, our discussion has hitherto 
centered around various aspects of Japanese "national 
mission" and their security concern which tend to either 
maintain or further stimulate Japanese national 
consciousness. In other words, we have dealt with the state 
of Japanese social psychology or political sentiment that is 
intimately related to Japanese national consciousness. In 
the following pages, we will treat the economic aspect of 
nationalism. Writing in 1965, Harry G. Johnson made the
June, 1976).
43pelcovits, op. cit.
44Mainichi Shimbun, January 1, 1965.
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following distinction:
. . . the benefits from the gratification of 
national sentiment are of two sorts, particular 
and general, or tangible and intangible. The 
particular benefits are the incomes and prestige,^ 
that accrue to those nationals who acquire the 
property rights or the offices and employment 
opportunities in which nationalism invests. The 
general benefits consist of the psychic 
satisfaction derived by the community at large 
from gratification of the taste for n a t i o n a l i s m .  ^
International economic activities still, as in the 
past, concern the Japanese more than anything else. Indeed 
Japan must export or die. Having lost her Empire, Japan 
must continue to develop overseas markets and new methods of 
trade.46 The persistent strength of nationalism throughout 
the world as the most potent single force in international 
politics has fragmented the two color maps of the world 
since World War II. It is no longer possible for nations to 
define their interests or seek their security in terms of 
hegemonial control over territory. The alternative to 
international anarchy calls for the acceptance of two
4^Harry G. Johnson, "A Theoretical Model of Economic 
Nationalism in New and Developing States," Political Science 
Quarterly, LXXX, No. 2 (June, 1965), 177.
46in his book, Japan* s Economic Recovery (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1958), George C. Allen lists four 
factors that contributed to the "Japanese miracle:" 1) 
American aid; 2) the Cold War; 3) the Korean War; 4) the 
absence of heavy defense spending. In addition, Allen 
attributes the principal credit to the Japanese people 
themselves— their enterprise, skill, and their adaptive 
capacity to deal with changing situations.
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principles which grow out of the new physical and political 
conditions of international life: one is the right of free 
access, and the other is non-interference by force in 
process of international change. 7^
The preponderant opinion of scholars is that the 
major wars of the twentieth century were basically caused by 
economic factors, in the broadest sense of the term. That 
is, these wars represented essentially the continuation of 
struggles over the control of markets, raw materials, 
natural resources, and the territories in which the sources 
of wealth and power are located. 8^ The economic factors of 
nationalism lead each nation to blindly seek its own 
interest, paying only lip service to the rationalization of 
international economic activities.^9
The utmost importance of trade for Japan 
necessitated the close coordination among government, 
business, and labor, which has been called "Japan, Inc.," a 
term first used in Time magazine's story of May 10, 1971.
^^shulman, op. cit., pp. 607, 614.
^8John Somerville, "World Authority: Realities and 
Illusions," Ethics, LXXVI, No. 1 (October, 1965), 38.
49por a good discussion of the relationship between 
the demands of nationalism and those of international 
economic activities, see Hosoya Toshio, Kindai Shakai no 
Kyoiku [Education in Modern Society] (Tokyo: Asakura Shoten, 
1952).
88"japan, Inc.: Winning the Most Important Battle," 
Time, May 10, 1971, pp. 84-89.
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Ezra F. Vogel calls "Japan, Inc." a pejorative, misleading 
notion, arguing that it is rather "guided free enterprise" 
for Japan as opposed to "regulated free enterprise" for the 
United States. Vogel maintains that the United States 
should learn something from the Japanese system, for it has 
served Japan so well.51
A Sumitomo official candidly describes the thinking 
behind the cooperation and coordination among major elements 
in Japan for the sake of Japanese interests in the following 
words ;
If we [Japanese companies] compete against each 
other overseas, it's no use; some foreign company 
may get the job. We have to present a joint front 
against the overseas competitors. This will 
become more and more necessary as the years go by- 
-to keep up our competitive advantage against 
other countries. In order to safeguard Japanese 
interests against powerful foreign companies, we 
must form a united front.5%
This phenomenon found among the Japanese leads many 
observers to believe that the strength of Japan lies in 
talents of the people, work enthusiasm, group consensus, and 
national sense of solidarity.53 Frustrated foreign
5lEzra F. Vogel, "Guided Free Enterprise in Japan," 
Harvard Business Review, LVI, No. 3 (May-June, 1978), 1-170.
53lou1s Kraar, "How the Japanese Mount that Export 
Blitz," Fortune, September, 1970, p. 170.
53pujino Chujiro, '"Keizei Taikoku' Nihon 0 Miru 
Sekai no Me" [The World Looks at 'Economic Great Power'
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competitors view the Japanese business practice as follows.
The Japanese have a high regard for loyalty to a 
national goal or a family goal or a company goal.
They believe loyalty is more important than what 
Americans might regard as ethical business 
standards. . . . One Detroiter maintains that 
Japan's national goal is to expand her exports and 
that business, government and labor in Japan work 
together to achieve that goal. "They are not in
business to make a profit, but to fulfill an
obligation to Japan.
The world's trading nations are truly worried about 
the menace of "Japan, Inc.," whose weapons include cartels, 
price-cutting, and limitless patriotic zeal. Writing on the 
relentless pursuit of expanding overseas markets by the
Japanese, Louis Kraar declares that "Japan's export drive is 
taking on the overtones of a relentless conspiracy to invade 
and dominate every vital international market. . . . The 
Japanese team goes after exports with genuinely patriotic 
zeal."55 Kraar concludes by saying that "a larger sense of 
nationalism derived from growth and market expansion— not 
hard economic necessity— seems to drive the Japanese toward 
ever rising exports."5®
It must be pointed out, however, that Japan is the 
unique industrialized nation most vulnerable to disruption
Japan], Chuo Koron (March, 1977), pp. 84-88. 
5^New York Times, August 23, 1971. 
55Rraar, op. cit., pp. 127, 129. 
56ibid., p. 172.
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of international trade patterns and access to food, energy, 
raw materials sources, and markets. Conversely, Japan is 
dependent upon stable international economic arrangements 
more than ay other major industrialized nation.5? For the 
continuous promotion of trade and national interests, Japan 
appears to be intent on being all things to all people. 
Foreign Minister Miyazawa Kiichi's policy speech to the Diet 
in early 1975 called for "diversified diplomacy" to 
strengthen friendly relations with all nations, regardless 
of national ideological orientations, while keeping close 
ties with the United States as the cornerstone of foreign 
policy. He touched upon international economic issues and 
urged cooperation of all nations in the establishment of "a 
new international order." He further stated that Japan must 
"make a positive contribution to the formation of new 
harmonious international order."^8
It is interesting to note that Japan's postwar 
approach to her national prosperity is through free trade 
and international cooperation, unlike her pre-1945 
aggressive adventures. Sensing Japan's imminent defeat, 
Willis Church Lamott argued in June, 1945 that a favorable 
world of international cooperation might likely induce the 
Japanese to lead life in a civilized world. He further
^^Kanamori Hisao, "Future Ü. S. Japanese Economic 
Relations," in Clapp and Halperin, op. cit., pp. 58-69.
58Japan Times Weekly, February 1, 1945,
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maintainedi
But the world must be civilized, for the 
Japanese will take advantage of every 
lapse into the old ways, particularly 
the dark maneuvering of power politics, 
and will use every such opportunity to 
assist the nation once more in her climb
to world power. 59
As in the case of the individual, a nation's outlook 
changes depending upon her relative position in 
international politics. As Harry G. Johnson states.
. . the strength of economic an d
cu Itural interests in nationalism wi 11
va ry with the threat of competition f rom
f oreign cu Iture or from foreign econ om ic
ac tivitie s ; conversely, one would ex pe ct
t o find that the nations that a re
le ading cu Iturally and economically wi 1 1
t end to be internationalist and
CO smopo1itan in outlook, because th i s
wo uld ten d to extend the market area :9r
th eir cul tural and economic products  ^6 0
Though Japan's resource vulnerability is so great 
that she has more at stake than any of the other major 
countries in a peaceful, stable free-trade world, the fact 
that the income gap between developed and underdeveloped 
countries is steadily widening and the sense of nationalism 
is growing all over the world poses an ominous threat to the 
future of the Japanese economy. While all the nations are
S^Willis Church Lamott, "What Not To Do With Japan," 
Harper's, June, 1945, p. 288.
GOjohnson, op. cit., p. 178.
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being consolidated and isolated politically by the policy of 
national unity and sovereignty, they are being increasingly 
disintegrated economically by international cooperation in 
such areas as production, commerce, transport, and finance. 
The irony of the present world seems to lie in the fact that 
political unity and self-containedness are confronted with 
economic interdependence.®^ In short, the international 
community is incapable of harmonizing political myths with 
economic realities.
As old political problems have dwindled and receded, 
economic problems that defy easy solutions have come to the 
face, resulting in a growing sense of nationalism.®^ 
Writing in 1947, Eugene Staley attributed the pre-1945 
Japanese ultranationalism to the continuation of Japan's 
feudalistic features, international power politics, and 
economic difficulties. These same factors do still exist, 
though less obvious at the present time.®^
The postwar Japan tries to satisfy through trade 
what she could not accomplish through military aggression. 
The basic purpose of international trade is the promotion of
®^For a good discussion in this regard, see Delaisi,
op. cit.
®^Herbert Passin, ed.. The United States and Japan 
(2nd ed., Rev.; Washington, D. C.; Columbia Books, 1975), p. 
25.
®^Eugene Staley, "Economic Development in the 
Orient; Some Problems," Pacific Affairs, I, No. 2 (Spring, 
1947), pp. 149-50.
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national living standards, and is pursued within the 
framework of national interests. Put differently, "The 
objective [of international trade] always was to strengthen 
the economic position of the nation using the schemes, even 
if at the expense of other n a t i o n s . T h e  following seems 
to merit quotation for further illustration of this point;
The [nations] are running the gauntlet
today and the prospect is fair that some 
of the worst features will eventually be 
eliminated. But that all of them will 
be torn up by the roots and thrown on
the scrap pile is a vain hope. The 
weeds in the garden of world trade may 
be kept down while the going is good, 
but give us another period of universal 
difficulty and they will spring into 
life all over the lot in a remarkably 
short time. . . . The great American
fallacy is that this country should be 
permitted freely to sell, but need not 
freely buy. The conflict is basic
between the high tariff economic 
nationalists and the moderate-tp-low
tariff economic internationalists.®^
Dr. Saburo Okita, one of the leading economists in 
Japan, commented to the effect that Japan's economic and 
foreign policy have only one route to follow: to be
everyone's friend and to diversify its markets and resources 
throughout the world.®® Japan's postwar "economic miracle"
®^C. Hartley Grattan, "If We Really Want
International Trade," Harper's, April, 1947, p. 354.
®®Ibid., pp. 357-58.
®®Sol W. Sanders, "The New, New Japan," Asian
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could not have failed to earn jelousy and animosity. It 
may be a truism that men think well of others when they are 
protecting and leading them, but when others become equals, 
their attitude changes. In this connection, attitudes be­
tween nations could not be different.^7 As Tocqueville 
observed perspicaciously, "the desire of equality always 
becomes more insatiable in proportion as equality is more 
complete." Where there is greater equality, there is 
greater competition. Tocqueville further noted: "When in­
equality of conditions is the common law of society, the 
most marked inequalities do not strike the eye; when every­
thing is nearly on the same level, the slightest are marked 
enough to hurt it."^®
It appears that Japan has become everybody's favorite 
whipping boy, getting blamed for its efficiency. Partly due 
to the lingering superiority complex of the West and partly 
due to the "missionary disposition" of the American people, 
Japan's efficient economic performance is subject to almost 
world-wide jealousy. As C. Hartly Grattan comments on 
American reaction.
A;ffairs, I, No, 6 (July-August, 1974), 371-76.
G^Kasaka Masataka, "Nanaiunendai no Nichi-Bei Kankei 
O Kangearu" (A thinking on the U.S. Japanese Relations in
the Nineties) , Buncei Shuni^ui, XLVIII> No. 10 (September,
1970), 94-108. '
^®Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New 
York: Vantage Books, 1945), II, 146-47.
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It is fine to sell abroad, they
[Americans] think, and foreigners who
raise obstacles to American sales are
obviously low scouridrels, . but it is
poisonous to American welfare to buy
abroad and persons who propose to
encourage imports are malignant
creatures, enemies of the American
standard of living.
A typical illustration of a very graphic account of 
the well-nigh world-wide jealousy of the Japanese economic 
success may be found in the following passages, which merit 
a lengthy quotation, for the words thereof cannot be 
bettered.
In a way, it's sour grapes, the kind of 
gut feeling that comes when a father can 
no longer win on the chessboard he gave 
his son, or when a daughter starts 
fooling around the way her mother always 
said she never did. It must have been
the way an Englishman felt about those 
unmannered Americans who had inherited 
an industrial revolution from the old 
country and began doing with great power 
that which Britain found it increasingly 
difficult to do in a world that had 
called her colonial bluff., Now it is 
the American who sits over his beer in a 
Bangkok bar, his mind inexcusably full 
of old visions of cheap toys and those
polite, shy little windup Japanese who 
made them —  wondering why he can't sell 
steel, or cars or television sets, even
to his own countrymen. "Those little 
bastards," he grumbles in a somewhat 
racist preface to what is becoming an
endless diatribe these days. "You know 
what they do?" Then he rambles on about 
how they are all over the place and work
69Grattan, o£. cit., p. 358.
412
together, eat together, play golf 
together, and how they sneak around 
making shady deals, and use that cheap 
labor and that incomprehensible
language, and how they are so arrogant 
and think they're so superior but how 
they hide behind that shyness bit —  shy 
like a fox . . .70
Japanese are apprehensive of the currently
fashionable argument of the major industrial nations that 
"Japan is the villain" for troubled economies of the 
world.71 As James Sterba tells us,
Americans complain because Japanese
companies get together to get business 
for the good of Japan, with profit
consideration secondary. But when the 
American government tries to encourage
the same tactics overseas for the good
of America, it sometimes finds that 
American companies are so jealous,
uncooperative and un t r vis t worthy that
they won't work t o g e t h e r . 72
By the same token, the haters of Japan's economic 
prosperity go so far as to blame the Japanese businessman 
for being too aggressive, for getting up too early, working 
too late, for being the product of a culture that puts
virtue in loyalty to both the company and the country.73
70james Sterba, "Japanese Businessmen," The New York 
Times Magazine, October 29, 1972, p. 15.
7^Tokyo Shimbun, Editorial, December 1, 1977.
72gterba, op. cit., p. 64.
73ibid., p. 66.
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Japan, however, is not about to give in to foreign pressure. 
An editorial in Tokyo Shimbun asserts that the nations of 
Europe and America have been showing too highhanded an 
attitude in making demands on Japan. Also some of the 
demands are so unreasonable as to constitute an intervention 
in Japan's internal affairs. The editorial further 
maintains that it is good for Japan to reject such demands 
resolutely by clarifying the reasons for the rejection, and 
ask these nations for calm self-reflection on their high­
handed attitudes.^  4
Having no other choice except for continuously 
exploring overseas markets for the survival of Japan's 
economy, the undaunted Japan doubles its efforts to increase 
trade. Threat to Japanese economic activities comes not 
only from the nations of the West that have been hurt by the 
Japanese competition^^ but also from developing nations 
which are no longer content with the position of poor 
suppliers of raw materials for the further enrichment of the 
rich nations.76 in short, demand for a more rational, more 
just international division of labor lies at the root of
74Tokyo Shimbun, Editorial, December 1, 1977.
75heon Hollerman, "United States Protectionism in 
Economic Relations with Japan," Asian Survey, XVII, No. 5 
(May, 1977), 491-96.
76Joseph C. Chen, "The Economic Relations of Japan 
and Southeast Asia," Soochow Journal of Literature and 
Social Studies, III (September, 1973), 145- 65.
414
economic nationalism— or "resources nationalism" as often 
called in Japan nowadays— among oil-producing and other 
resources-rich Third World countries.^7 Japan, which had 
been engrossed in "resources diplomacy," giving primary 
attention to various resources, had to learn from the oil 
crisis that the resources problem goes beyond the realm of 
economics and is inseparable from politics.^® Resources 
have long been not only the foundation of prosperity, but 
also a political fuse for international conflict or war.^® 
Since the oil crisis of the early seventies, Japan has been 
reminded on various occasions that indulgence in a self- 
image of powerlessness and diplomacy of economism are no 
longer tenable.
As demonstrated by the Japanese-American textile 
wrangle in 1969-1971, the issues causing friction between 
Japanese and Americans were not economic, but political.
^^Yamamoto Mitsuru, "'Resources Diplomacy' Runs into 
a Stone Wall," Japan Quarterly, XII, No. 4 (October- 
December, 1975), 324.
7®"Kissinger on Oil, Food, and Trade," Business 
Week, January 3, 1975, pp. 66-76. Also see Taira Koji,
"Japan After 'Oil Shock'; An International Resource Pauper," 
Current History, LXVIII, No. 404 (April, 1975), 145-76.
7®History since the beginning of the present century 
abounds in cases of conflict involving, in particular, 
Japan's endless ambition for security, unimpeded access to 
raw materials and Ü. S. intentions of taking advantage of 
embargo leverage to enhance its international position. 
See, for example, Jeffrey J. Safford, "Experiment in 
Containment: The United States Steel Embargo and Japan,
1917-1918," Pacific Historical Review, XXXIX, No. 4 
(November, 1970), 439-51.
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psychological and nationalist. 0^ The tension between Japan 
and the United States surrounding the textile question "is a 
very good example of how easily two nations, which are 
separated by the barrier of different races and different 
cultures, can part company."®^ Japan's postwar high growth 
and trade policy are strongly detested by her Asian 
neighbors as well. As Lawrence G. Franko notes.
Japanese multinationals in Southeast 
Asia have, however, experienced the kind 
of political hostility once reserved to 
Western multinationals. Memories of 
Japan's imperial pretensions in that 
area and a tendency of Japanese 
companies to produce goods highly 
competitive with small local companies 
have combined to concoct an explosive
political cocktail. 82
As for the tension between the United States and 
Japan, statistics speak for themselves. While Japan's much 
criticized trade surplus of $4.1 billion in 1972 had been 
reduced to $1.4 billion in 1973 and to $1.7 billion in 1974 
and 1975, it increased again to $5.4 billion in 1976. 
Despite Prime Minister Fukuda's promise to reduce the gap in
®®For detailed discussion, see Sato Hideo, "The 
Crisis of an Alliance; The Politics of United States- 
Japanese Textile Trade" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. 
University of Chicago, 1976).
®^Washinqton Post, March 27, 1971.
®^Lawrence G. Franko, "Multinationals: The End of U. 
S. Dominance," Harvard Business Review, LVI, No. 6 
(November-December, 1978), 98.
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1'977, Japan's surplus in 1977 was as much as $8.1 billion. 
Consequently, protectionist pressure intensified in the 
United States and "belaboring the Japanese" became "one of 
the most popular American pastimes."^3
Despite the evidence to the contrary, Japan tries to 
Justify its position.
Tokyo insists that major improvements have been 
made and that it is being unfairly blamed for the 
shortcomings of others. There is growing resentment 
of the criticism and a conviction that Japan is 
being punished for working harder, living more 
frugally and competing more effectively than other 
industrial nations. . . . The biggest headache of 
all may be the U.S. and European conviction that 
what is good for Japan is not good— or acceptable 
— for the rest of the w o r l d . 84
According to the above-mentioned Japanese psychology.
The Japanese see nations in terms of winners and 
losers. They find it difficult to cooperate with 
peoples they consider inferior. They can lead and, 
if they are defeated, they can be submissive. But 
to cooperate with people who lack the Japanese sense 
of order and discipline is very hard for them.°5
B^Robert C. Christopher, "They Try Harder," The 
New York Times Magazine, January 22, 1978, p.27.
®^"Ohira's Aim in U. S.: Averting a Trade War,"
U. S. News and World Report, May 7, 1979, pp. 69-70.
®^New York Times, March 14, 1967.
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That Japan enjoys the reputation as the second strongest 
capitalist economy in the world must have inflated its 
national ego.
In Asian eyes, the "ugly Japanese" of today rivals 
the most absurdly presumptuous ugly American in 
offensiveness. While Japanese may be polite and 
respectful in dealing with Western peoples, 
especially Americans, all too many Japanese are 
contemptuous and arrogant of Asians and move 
abroad only in Japanese groups, not dealing often 
with other Asians. All rhetoric to the contrary 
aside, Japan now identifies culturally with the 
West more than any component of the Asian group of
nations.86
Japan, taking advantage of the postwar international 
economic environment which enabled it to buy any amount of 
needed raw materials anywhere in the world and allowed it to 
sell manufactured goods, made from such raw materials, 
wherever demand has existed, has, through trade, acquired 
the long-coveted status of being included among the great 
powers.
3. Liberalism in Japanese Nationalism 
Leaving aside all the pros and cons as to what the 
American Occupation did accomplish in Japan, very few could 
dispute the fact that the Occupation, at least, gave rise to
®®Lawrence W. Beer, "Some Reflections on Japan: 
American National Interest," Vital Speeches of the 
XLVI, No. 14 (May 1, 1980), p. 444.
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the liberalizing trends in postwar J a p a n . The new trends 
based on "given liberalism" have entailed the shifting 
balance between public and private values. The futility of 
the Pacific War and the humiliation suffered in defeat 
brought in a new awakening on the relationship between the 
individual and the state.®® We should, however, be careful 
lest we should come to a hasty conclusion that the 
liberalizing trends are bound to alter individual values.
One of the fascinating aspects of Japanese society 
remains the effect of political behavior patterns, many of 
which are deeply impregnated with traditional cultural 
legacies, upon the new institutions. This development leads 
us to be mindful of the sagacious counsel of John Stewart 
Mill:
When society requires to be rebuilt, there is no 
use attempting to rebuild it on the old plan. No 
great improvements in the lot of man are possible
®7gee Robert A. Scalapino, "The American Occupation 
of Japan— Perspective After Three Decades," Annals, Vol. 428 
(November, 1976), 104-13.
®®Many writers paid serious attention to this new 
development in Japan. See, for example, Allan B. Cole, 
"Children of a Vacuum," Pacific Spectator (Spring, 1950), 
153-59; Simizu Yoshihiro, "The Problems of Juvenile 
Delinquency in Post-War Japan," Journal of Educational 
Sociology, XXVI, No. 1 (September, 1952), 32-36; John M.
Maki, "Japan's Subversive Activities Prevention Law," The 
Western Political Quarterly, VI, No. 3 (September, 1953), 
489-511; David Spitz, "Democracy and the Problem of Civil 
Disobedience," American Political Science Review, XLVIII 
(June, 1954), 397-404; Hatada Shigeo, "Sengo Sekai Heiwa
Undo no Hattatsu" [The Postwar Development of the World 
Peace Movements], Kokusai Seiji (Spring, 1957), 152-72.
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until a great change takes place in the 
fundamental construction of our own mode of 
thought. ^
The real implications of the "new liberalism" in 
postwar Japan should be seen in the light of the nature of 
the international situation. Men have a habit of 
attempting, in an almost haphazard fashion, to bring about a 
new domestic and world order, built on law, committed to 
peaceful negotiation of international rivalries and 
conflicts; assisting in the orderly emergence of a host of 
Third-World nations ; and preserving those natural resources 
of land, sea, and air that are the heritage of all mankind 
and of prosperity. Men are attempting all of these without 
changing those fundamental assumptions that have been 
responsible for the problems themselves. Our greatest 
difficulty lies in the fact that we are attempting to solve 
global problems within the framework of nationalism.^®
The Japanese, who are extreme nationalists 
themselves, are not blind to the reality that the 
nationalism we now practice is an anachronism, but instead 
of abating nationalism, our generation has exacerbated it.^l 
Given the nature of nationalism, a question may very well be
Quoted in Henry Steele Commager, "To Consult Our 
Copes and Not Our Fear," The Christian Science Monitor, 
January 7, 1980.
9®Dillards, op. cit., pp. 539-41.
91Ibid., p. 543.
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raised whether the rest of the world can expect an
increasing trend toward political liberalism in the domestic 
institutions of Japan in a world characterized by extremes 
of competition and rivalry. If such competition is to call 
for a large scale mobilization of national efforts by the 
great powers, it will be no wonder if the small countries 
subordinate the liberty and individual rights of the average 
citizen to the needs of building a structure of internal
power.92
The Japanese, as believed by many, find no
difficulties in embracing foreign ideas, but they cling as 
firmly as they can to their long-cherished values. Karl W. 
Deutsch's conception seems to facilitate our understanding 
of why the changes in Japan take place as they do. As
Deutsch has written.
. . . there is perhaps one characteristic 
similarity between games and competitive social or 
economic situations, and that is the distinction 
between objectively "rational" behavior, i.e. 
behavior rewarded by the intrinsic rules of the 
game, or the "logic of the situation" as against 
subjectively convenient behavior, i.e. behavior 
that is most probable because of the previously 
acquired personal memories and habits of the 
players. Most individuals and groups learn only 
to a limited extent from playing games, regardless 
of experience; much of their behavior may remain 
an experience of their previously acquired and 
slow-changing personalities or habits, rather than 
of any strategy objectively conducive to
92pavid Nelson Rowe, "The New Japanese Constitution- 
-III," Far Eastern Survey XVI, No. 2 (February 12, 1947), p. 
34.
winning
421
93
What is revealed in Japanese social change is that 
"rational behavior" in line with foreign ideas can become 
insitutionalized in so far as it does not militate against 
"subjectively convenient behavior." Put differently using 
the concept advanced by Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, 
"product affect" is encouraged and promoted within the limit 
of not sacrificing "system affect."94 in other words, 
Japanese national morality stresses that patriotism and 
loyalty take precedence over individual rights and personal 
comforts.
In his book. On Freedom and Human Dignity; The 
Importance of the Sacred in Politics,^ 6 Morton A. Kaplan 
attempts to explain how to manage human freedom and dignity 
consistently in a sea of potential disasters ranging from 
the Skinnerian advocacy of conditioning to the Charles 
Reichian glorification of impulse. Kaplan attacks the
9^Karl W. Deutsch, Times Among Nations (New York: 
The Free Press, 1979), p. 24.
^^Almond and Verba, o£. cit., Ch. III.
9^Hugh Byas, "The Japanese Problem," Yale Review, 
XXII, No. 3 (March, 1943), 456. As early as 1904, Lafacadio 
Hearn called Shintoism "the religion of loyalty." See his 
Japan: An Attempt at Interpretation (New York: The Macmillan 
Co., 1904), pp. 311-330.
9®Morton A. Kaplan, On Freedom and Human Dignity: 
The Importance of the Sacred in Politics (Morristown, N.J.: 
General Learning press, 1973).
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Skinnerian approach by arguing that controls beget more 
controls, ending in more conditioning of society, while 
attacking the Reichian approach as nothing more than the 
advocation of narrow utilitarianism. The individual's 
relationship to other people, to society, or to his work 
leads to the polarity between intrinsic ends and 
instrumental ends. Intrinsic ends are good in themselves. 
Instrumental ends are good only because of what they 
achieve. Motherhood, patriotism, and love are intrinsic
ends.97
As Kaplan goes on to state.
The conservative regime is based on tradition and 
the liberal regime on utility. The problem with 
conservatism is that a particular tradition may be 
incompatible with human nature and needs and that 
tradition is inadequate for coping rationally with 
changed circumstances. On the other had, the 
emphasis on utilitarian science of liberal regimes 
encourages the analysis of changed requirements 
but undermines loyalty and value. . . . Two sets 
of beliefs are inconsistent with identity, 
recognition and responsibility. The belief that 
everything is environmentally determined— the 
Skinnerian world view— denies the self-directing 
characteristics of the organism and acts as an 
informal input that defeats its proper 
functioning. The viewpoint that love is all— the 
Reichian world view— denies an appropriate role 
for the ultrastable regulator and thereby 
undercuts its identity and responsibility.9°
In a similar vein, Alfred N. Whitehead pointed out
97ibid., p. 48.
98Ibid., p. 52, 60.
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the importance of symbolism in political life. As Whitehead 
has written,
a social system is kept together by the blind 
force of instinctive actions, and of instinctive 
emotions clustered around habits and prejudices. .
. . There is no foothold for the intervention of 
"rational consideration." . . . Symbolic
expression first preserves society by adding 
emotion to instinct, and secondly it affords a 
foothold for reason by its delineation of the 
particular instinct it expresses.
Whitehead further maintains that the symbol evokes loyalties 
to vaguely conceived notions and that no elaborate community 
of elaborate organisms could exist unless its systems of 
symbolism were in general successful.99
Deutsch, Kaplan, and Whitehead all point to the 
importance of symbolism needed for affective sentiments 
toward the political system. Despite the seemingly total 
destruction of the Emperor system as a power structure as 
well as an ideological system, the Japanese still find the
historical continuity of Japanese " w e - c o n s c i o u s n e s s . "^90
It is interesting to see that Japanese writers tend 
to over-state the postwar liberalism in Japan, whereas 
Western writers emphasize the persistence of Japanese
99Alfred N. Whitehead, Symbolism, Its Meaning and 
Effect (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1927), pp. 68-70, 74, 
87.
^90ishida Takeshi, Japanese Society (New York: 
Random House, 1971), p. 29.
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nationalism.101 Of course, there are some Westerners who are 
wont to exaggerate social ills attendant upon "undigested 
l i b e r a l i s m . "102 Though many observers, who focus on 
aberrant aspects of American-induced liberalism, regret, as 
Matsumoto Sannosuke does, that "postwar Japanese have 
carried the Enlightenment ideals of individualism and self- 
interest to extremes, that they lack an understanding of the 
importance of horizontal, 'public' bonds." Matsumoto goes 
so far as to regard the contemporary liberated Japanese 
society as a self-seeking, willful "state of nature" in 
which a narrow egoism reigns supreme, and which lacks both a 
sense of civic responsiblity and a concern for political
l^ljn writing on postwar Japan, Japanese writers are 
redolent of theorists of mass society, frequently using such 
mass politics phrases as a feeling of purposelessness, a 
spiritual vacuum, and extremes of self-interest and 
individualism- See, for example, Ishida, op. cit., p. 41; 
Takahashi Akira, "Development of Democratic Consciousness 
Among the Japanese People," International Social Science 
Journal, XIII, No. 1 (1961), 88; Morito Tatsuo, "Educational 
Reform Reconsidered," Japan Quarterly, XIII, No. 1 (January- 
March, 1966), pp. 27-45; Yoshida Shigeru, The Yoshida 
Memoirs ; The Study of Japan in Crisis, trans. by Yoshida 
Kenichi (Westport, Conn.; Greenwood Press, 1973), p. 171; 
Matsuhara Haruo, Nihon Seinen no Ishiki Kozo [The 
Attitudinal Structure of Japanese Youthl (Tokyo : Kobundo,
1975); Matsumoto Sannosuke, Kindai Nihon no Chiteki Jokyo 
[The Intellectual Climate of Modern Japan] (Tokyo: Chuo
Koronsha, 1974).
^O^Mark Schorer, "Japan's Delinquents: Children of
the Sun and Moon," Reporter, October 18, 1956; John W.
Dower, "The Masterless Students of Japan," Asia Scene, June, 
1963; H. Ehrlich, "Troubled Japan," Look, August 10, 1965; 
Joseph A. Massey, "The Missing Leader: Japanese Youth's View 
of Political Authority," American Political Science Review, 
LXIX, No. 1 (March, 1975), 31-48.
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affairs that affect the common w e l f a r e . 1^3
But many observers view Japan quite differently. 
Remarking that the Japanese are as patriotic now as ever 
before, Frank Gibney argues that the strength of Japan lies 
in talents of the people, work enthusiasms, group consensus, 
and national sense of solidarity. Gibney further argues 
that "the economic growth of the sixties and early seventies 
could never have been attained without "a unification of 
national effort not possible in any other c o u n t r y .  
Franz Michael and Gaston J. Sigur express a similar view by 
stating "they [the Japanese] are highly motivated in their 
loyalty to their country and their identity as Japanese. . .
Military defeat, however traumatic and fearful, can now 
be seen as a temporary setback to Japanese efforts to 
achieve industrial and economic parity with the most 
advanced Western s t a t e s .
As already examined at some length in Chapter II, 
the liberalism of the Meiji period as well as that of the 
Taisho period were Japanese adaptations which did not
lO^Matsumoto, op. cit.
^^^Frank Gibney, Japan ; The Fragile Superpower (New 
York: W. W. Norton, 1975), p. 65.
105pranz Michael and Gaston J. Sigur, The Asian 
Alliance: Japan and United States Policy (New York: National 
Strategy Information Center, 1972), pp. 35-36.
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militate against Japanese values and nationalist 
t h i n k i n g . lOG would not be amiss to recapitulate briefly
Second Lieutenant Onoda Hiro's surrender after holding out 
for 29 years on a jungle island in the Philippines. When 
the 22 year old intelligence officer in the Japanese 
Imperial Army set off for the Great Pacific War in 1944, his 
mother gave him a sword and some old-fashioned Japanese 
advice: "Die well. Return dead!" Some 29 years later in
1974, at the Tokyo International Airport, Onoda's mother was 
there to greet him: "I'm so happy to see you come home
alive. You did a fine job."^®^
A critic in Manila noted: "Onoda is the model of the 
fanatical soldier peculiar to the Japanese militarism that 
wrecked our country." That unpleasant thought also occurred 
to some Japanese back home. "Onoda should be regarded as 
messenger tolling an alarm bell to warn all Japanese against 
taking the road they took in the recent past," said an 
editorial in the Asaki Shimbun. What is significant here is 
that Onoda*s example of obedience, self-sacrifice, and 
loyalty amply impressed most of his countrymen.
iOGsee Charles N. Spinks, "Liberal Myth in Japan," 
Pacific Affairs, XV, No. 4 (December, 1942), 450-56; Fang- 
quei Quo, "Jiyushugi: Japanese Liberalism," Review of
Politics, XXVIII, No. 4 (October, 1966), 277-92.
107"Japan: old Soldiers Never Die," Newsweek, March 
25, 1974, p. 49.
lOOlbid., p. 52.
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This episode seems to imply that the Occupation 
induced reforms did have some positive influence on "product 
affect" in Japan, without adversely affecting "system 
affect." Needless to say, that Onoda's mother's advice to 
"Die well. Return dead" was dictated by the feudalistic 
Bushido morality existing in Japanese society at the time. 
But the mother's wrenching advice uttered apparently under 
social pressure was clearly repugnant to human nature. We 
can say that the Occupation's reforms which targeted the 
obnoxious features so repugnant were gladly accepted by the 
Japanese. The emotions shown by the Japanese in welcoming 
Onoda's return may be indicative of the unchanged nature of 
Japanese nationalism.1^9
What has changed seems to be that the Japanese have 
been liberalized to such an extent as to enjoy reasonable 
"product affect," while harboring an unabated "system 
affect." In this connection, it seems warranted to quote 
Whitehead again.
As a community changes, all such rules and canons
require revision in the light of reason. The
object to be obtained has two aspects; one is the 
subordination of the community to the individuals 
comparing it, and the other is the subordination 
of the individuals to the community. . . . The
art of free society consists first in the
maintenance of the symbolic code; and secondly in
^O^Tsukasa Matsueda and George E. Moore, "Japan's 
Shifting Attitudes Toward the Military: 'Mitsuya Kenkyu' and 
the Self-Defense Force," Asian Survey, VII, No. 9 
(September, 1967), 621.
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the fearlessness of revision, to secure that the 
code serves those purposes which satisfy an 
enlightened reason. These societies which cannot 
combine reverence to their symbols with freedom of 
revision, must ultimately decay either from 
anarchy, or from the slow atrophy of a life 
stifled by useless shadows.^
Though it was fashionable in the immediate post­
surrender days to say that what Japan gained was freedom, 
what Japan lost was a sense of national pride. Moreover, 
intoxicated by the given freedom, most Japanese were keen on 
their rights and oblivious to their duties. Yoshikawa 
Kojiro of Kyoto University stated that
. . .  we [the Japanese] were reminded clearly that 
one's country and race are dearer than any others, 
as one's own body is dear to oneself. Americans 
kindly taught us that all their lip service to 
righteousness, morality, and humanity will reach 
only so far as they benefit their own country or 
race.
By the same token, Nakaya Kenichi of Tokyo University said: 
"I cannot think of anything America can give to other 
nations except freedom.
The above views not only represent Japanese 
apprehension about American influence, they also reveal that 
the Japanese understanding of the unmistakable rule of 
American foreign policy that is always in the national
ll^Whitehead, og. cit., p. 88.
lllguoted in Douglas G. Haring, ed., "Japan Looks 
Back on the Occupation: A Symposium of Japanese Views," Far 
Eastern Survey, XXII, No. 3 (February 25, 1953), 27, 29.
429
interest regardless of rational consequences.Given the 
notion of national interest and the near impotence of the 
United Nation, the Japanese, as any other people, believe 
that the state, not the world community, will still be "the 
ultimate determiner of the use of physical force.
As long as the two possibilities for world peace^^^- 
-the conquest of the world by one power or the creation of 
an effective United Nations— remain beyond our reach, Japan, 
as any nation, is bound to seek its national interest. A 
series of international crises in recent years such as the 
"Nixon Shock," the oil crisis of 1973-1974, the United 
States' debacle in Vietnam, and the waning American 
influence, convinced the Japanese that they "can no longer 
go on living in their comfortable little Douglas MacArthur 
w o r l d . "1^5 Kase Hideaki claims that America "demonstrated 
all too clearly in Vietnam that when the national interest
For a detailed discussion, see Edmond 0. Clubb, 
"The Perils of a Political Foreign Policy," The Nation, 
December 8, 1979, pp. 584-86; W. Stull Holt claims that
every nation, including the United States, is engaged in 
power politics, trying to promote the national interest. 
See his, "Uncle Sam As Deer, Jackal, and Lion, or the 
United States in Power I’olitics," Pacific Spectator, III, 
No. 1 (Winter, 1949), 41-54.
ll^Lowell Juilliard Carr, "A Situational Approach to 
Conflict and War," Social Forces, XXIV, No. 3 (March, 1946), 
302.
^^^Holt, o£. cit., p. 53.
H^Kase Hideaki, "Japan: Paradise Lost?" Newsweek,
June 25, 1975, pp. 36, 41.
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requires it, Washington is perfectly capable of abandoning 
an ally. As a result . . .  we can trust the Ü. S. no 
l o n g e r . what makes Kase's article notable is that it 
should surface at a time of resurgent Japanese nationalism.
Like liberalism in the Meiji, Taisho, and Showa 
e r a s , the postwar liberalism is very much nationalistic, 
if not largely frowned upon.H® Given the persistence of 
traditional values, it is small wonder that the nature of 
the postwar liberalism in Japan is quite similar to that of 
the pre-1945 days. As Table 28 s h o w s , t w o  decades of 
democratization and liberalization since defeat have failed 
to make a large number of Japanese truly treasure 
liberalism. Only a quarter of the Japanese seem to 
positively favor liberalism.
Though not a few observers tend to exaggerate the 
negative aspects of industrial society, arguing that with 
the increasing achievement of economic growth, "the 
[Japanese] people gradually turned away from political and
l^^Ibid., p. 36.
^^7«Japanese liberalism has obediently kept step 
with Japanese militarism since the first shot was fired in 
Manchuria in 1931. . . .  To the Japanese, national unity is 
an end in itself." See Hugh Byas, "The Japanese Problem," 
Yale Review, XXXII, No. 3 (March, 1943), 456.
llBTakahashi, op. cit., p. 81; Yoshida, The Yoshida 
Memoirs, p. 171.
119Tokei Suri Kenkyujo, Kokuminsei no Kenkyu (April, 
1969), pp. 132-33.
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TABLE 28 
Opinion on Liberalism
Ouastlont 1» llberalln good?
Ywr Sood1 Depende on 
Time & Piece
Not good Othere Don’t Knoa Total
1963 94E 43% 19% 1% 90% 100%
(98981
1988
as^ (1888]
99% 44% 13% 1% 13% 100%
(1808)
Nala 39% 49% 11% ex 7% 100%
(1497)
FosalB 91% 4SK 14% 1% 19% 100%
(1808]
90 ta 94 33% 89% S% 1% 8% 100%
( 378]
98 to 99 30% 89% S% 0% 9% 100%
( 398]
30 to 34 98% 61% 19% 1% 8% 100%
( 639]
38 to 38 31% 45% 14% OX 10% 100%
( 399]
40 to 44 97% 46% 18% 1% 11% 100%
( 344]
46 to 48 30% 43% 17% 0% 10% 100%
( 943]
60 to 84 97% 40% 18% 1% 17% 100%
( 999]
88 to 89 90% 38% 19% 1% 18% 100%
( 9œ]
Over 80 98% 
Py Level of Education
99% 13% 4% 98% 100%
( 487]
Primary Ochool 94% 9S% 18% 1% 31% 100%
( 494]
Middle School 99% 49% 18% 9% 13% 100%
(1909]
High School 30% 81% 11% 1% 7% 100%
(1019]
Collage 39% 81% 7% 0% 3% 100%
( 309]
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TABLE 28 
Opinion on
(continued)
Liberalism
Quistloni le llberelln good?
Good1 Depanda en 
Time & Pleoa
Not good Othere Don't Knoe Total
Bv Political Party
Liberal Daaooratio 85E 41% 18% 1% 11% 100%
ri257J
Daeooratic Booialiat 84% 68% 7% 1% 5% 100%
I 1171
Sooialiat S7% 48% 16% 1% 10% 100%
( 864]
CoBBuniat ES% 46% 88% 8% 4% 100%
( 47]
Kameito B3% 48% 18% 1% 8% 100% 
t 114]
Non-party E3% - 48% 9% 1% 19% 100%
( 834]
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public affairs to devote themselves entirely to the pursuit 
of their own i n t e r e s t s , t h e  truer reality of Japan seems 
to be rather innocent of the social ills usually found in 
other industrial societies. If we are to find something 
that is still characteristic of Japan, we could easily point 
out that the Japanese have, as ever, a strong sense of 
loyalty to their country, enjoying a high degree of national
solidarity.121
Since the given liberalism has had little corrosive 
effect on the Japanese traditional values, in Japan it was 
"patriotic fervour that supplied the impulse to achievement 
and at the same time made it possible for her to undergo 
massive material changes without the disruption of social 
unity . . . without a strong unifying purpose it may be 
difficult for an emotional people to resist corrosive 
influences from without and to maintain social unity
unimpaired."122
Viewed objectively, the only hope for Japan to 
weather through the economic and political storms of the 
eighties and beyond lies in the solidarity of its people. 
As Prank Gibney has written.
The United States can protect a considerable
12^Takahashi, op. c i t ., p. 88. 
12lNewsweek, November 18, 1974, p. 15. 
122Allen, pp. c i t ., p. 189.
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amount of bickering and divisiveness among its
citizens behind the mirror of its natural 
resources and its industrial and military power.
Japan is the fragile superpower. Its huge
economic wealth can continue to work and grow only 
if the consensus of the Japanese people is firmly 
behind it. . . . [Japanese] are the least 
alienated of peoples in a world where 
technological pressures make citizenship a
demanding role and individualism an increasingly
expensive l u x u r y .
We may add that Japan might be the only country 
where emotional warmth is not drained out of the workplace 
in the name of the cold dictates of efficiency and 
rationalization. Japan's constant feeling of insecurity is 
bound to further stimulate national solidarity. Japanese 
group conformity, together with the principle of
competition, is one of the elements in Japanese society that 
are most important to an explanation of Japan's "miraculous"
postwar economic d e v e l o p m e n t . ^^4
That Japan is subjected to international jealousy 
surrounding international trade fans Japanese national 
consciousness. "The sudden sense of isolation forced on 
Japan seems fertile ground for a new nationalism and could, 
at its worst, produce full-scale x e n o p h o b i a . Based on 
his study of Japanese history, Hugh Byas stated in 1943 that
^^^Gibney, The Fragile Superpower, pp. 65, 84. 
124%ghida, Japanese Society, p. 40.
^25"Japan: End of the Miracle," Newsweek, December 
17, 1973, p. 49; Yomiuri Shimbun (evening edition), January 
6, 1972.
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"It may be said with much truth that Japan was 'liberal' 
only when she was w e a k . "126
It is difficult not to agree with Kato Shuichi that 
the Japanese are likely to pursue a policy of "liberalism 
within and national interests a b r o a d . "127
12®Byas, 0£. cit., p. 472.
127Rato Shuichi, "Japanese Writers and 
Modernization," Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward 
Modernization (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1965), p. 444.
CHAPTER XIV 
SUMMARIES AND CONCLUSION
The misappraisal of Japan by the outside world, 
which persisted until she manifested her ambition in 
Manchuria in 1931, is not too hard to explain. The Meiji 
Restoration of 1868 did not put a clean end to her self- 
imposed seclusion. It was extended in practice into this 
century by geographical location, by the barrier presented 
to international understanding by the Japanese language, and 
by the Japanese insistence on their racial uniqueness and 
their reluctance to freely associate with the international 
community. Many of the Japanese who came into contact with 
the West were intent on making propaganda for their country, 
designed to promote her national interests and conceal her 
true intentions. The number of foreigners with sufficient 
knowledge of spoken and written Japanese to enable them to 
interpret Japanese psychology was so limited as to prevent 
the application of a disinterested corrective to the 
deliberate distortion of facts. The opinions of foreign 
observers were more often than not characterized by a lack 
of balance, and alternated between adulation and unreasoned
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criticism.
It was rather natural that western powers, absorbed 
during the first few decades of the present century in 
coping with the increasing gravity of their own problems, 
should have been only too willing to accept a distant and 
baffling people at their own valuation. The material 
success of the Japanese in peace and war, their highly 
developed aesthetic taste, and their engaging personalities 
have been conducive to the usual misappraisal of Japan. 
Perfervid nationalism and Emperor worship were either 
ignored or identified with patriotism in its Western sense.
As a matter of fact, it was assumed that Japan had 
achieved the impossible, and had overcome in a matter of a 
few decades the debilitating legacies of the recent feudal 
past, which had actually been perpetuated both by restricted 
international associations and by calculated official 
policy.
Improper understanding of the unique nature of 
Japanese national consciousness and their extreme patriotism 
left Western nations ill-prepared to deal with Japan when 
the latter became a disturber of peace in Asia. The racial 
pride of the Japanese as "a divinely descended people," 
offered the Japanese "a sense of national mission" which 
could be likened to "white man's burden" or "civilizing 
mission." Japan's national mission was accompanied by her 
claim of "special interests" in Asia— the Japanese version
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of the "Monroe Doctrine,"
Having tasted the benefits of technical civilization 
for national aggrandizement since the closing decades of the 
last century, Japan became obsessed with conquering one 
country after another in Asia. We noted that the Japanese 
national consciousness has always been influenced or 
stimulated by such concerns as national security, economy, 
and "national mission," Overwhelmed by the superiority of 
Chinese civilization for many centuries, deeply enamored of 
their national pride revolving around the much lauded idea 
of "a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal," and 
intoxicated by their successful history of coping with 
foreign threats, the Japanese national consciousness has 
developed into a unique nature, which is a peculiar 
combination of inferiority complex toward the West and 
nationalistic narcissism of sorts, harboring a superiority 
complex toward Asian neighbors.
The Japanese national consciousness has further been 
solidified by the fact that the scarcity of natural 
resources conditioned Japan to turn to foreign trade out of 
desperate need for national survival, Japanese national 
consciousness came to be confronted by threats from the 
colonial and expansionist activities of Western powers. 
Convinced that she was no match for the powerful West, Japan 
realized that she would be able to maintain her independence 
only through learning from the West,
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Despite the urgent need for modernization to catch 
up with the West, the Japanese were careful enough to be 
selective in their importation of foreign cultures lest they 
be overwhelmed by alien cultures. They were mainly 
interested in Western science and technique, not in Western 
ideas, in order to build a strong army and to industrialize 
their country.
The Japanese experience in culture contact bears out 
the widely accepted principle in acculturation theory that 
the first and easiest transfers between societies are in the 
realm of material culture, that transfers of forms of social 
organization are slower and more difficult, and that the 
transfers of values and beliefs are slowest and face the 
greatest obstacles. Japan has eagerly accepted materials 
and institutions which could be fitted to Japanese 
requirements, but has not allowed the entry of ideas and 
values that would undermine the basic attitudes of the 
people toward the Japanese political, economic and social 
system. This selectivity has been possible because alien 
influences have entered the country only on Japan's terms at 
least until Japan's defeat in 1945. Foreign invasion has 
never flooded Japan with unwanted ideas, customs, and 
institutions which have left their mark on Japanese society. 
Even though a completely new form of government 
administration has been set up, the people who control and 
who operate it have basically the same political philosophy
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that motivated the feudal Tokugawa regime. New and foreign 
ideas made entry into Japan, but they were never allowed to 
get out of hand.
Unprecedented military defeat, humiliating 
surrender, and seven years of Allied Occupation confronted 
established Japanese forces and ideals with challenges as 
great as, and in many respects even greater than, those that 
had faced the country at the time of the demise of the
Tokugawa regime. Total defeat is bound to have the most 
profound effects on any modern nation-state, in which 
virtually the entire population is identified with the war 
effort. For a host of reasons it was particularly
overpowering in the case of Japan, where the myth of
politico-military superiority had been so carefully 
fostered. Surrender dealt a sledge-hammer blow to the
"divine country myth," the integral national ideal, 
comprising the structure of the absolute Emperor system and 
the all-encompassing concept of Kokutai. which the country's 
leaders had instilled into themselves and into the people 
since the Meiji Restoration.
The Occupation, with its initial objectives of 
rebuilding Japanese society on modern, democratic lines, 
dealt severe blows to certain influential elements in the 
country. Through a series of political, economic, and 
ideological measures, it undermined much of the structure 
upon which Japanese ultranationalism and militarism had been
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based. By placing emphasis on individual human rights, 
instead of on loyalty and obligations, it attempted to 
weaken traditional values supportive of loyalty and 
patriotism, which, the Occupation believed, had been 
responsible for Japanese ultranationalism.
The dislocation of the old order was accompanied by 
the strengthening of certain forces and ideals that had been 
incompatible with nationalism. At least during the hectic 
days of Occupation reforms, the individual's desire for 
material improvement in his everyday life replaced the 
earlier goals of national aggrandizement. May of the new 
forces that come into being after 1945 were aimed at 
securing such improvement. These forces, including the 
Socialist Party, which has never achieved the status of a 
majority party, have been very effective in preventing the 
government from scrapping the postwar reforms on a wholesale 
basis.
The growing power of an independent public opinion 
has been playing an important role in preserving Occupation 
induced reforms. We may note that the Meiji leaders had 
quickly realized the importance of making use of education 
and propaganda to mobilize public opinion in support of the 
official national goals. With the breakdown of the 
"national mission" in 1945, however, and with the advent of 
a relatively free society supported by many democratic 
liberties, public opinion was no longer a tool to be
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exploited by the government on behalf of conformity at home 
and aggression abroad.
But the individual's desires for improvement 
mentioned above belong to the area of "product affect." It 
would be a grave mistake to regard the individual's strong 
desires for improvement as the Japanese abandonment of their 
traditional love of their country. Even at the time of 
surrender, unification of the national will was clearly 
manifested. The reforms many of the Japanese gladly 
embraced were the ones that did away with elements of 
conformity and regimentation that were repugnant to 
essential human nature. Actually, the acceptance of reforms 
for material improvement was nothing more than rational
behavior encouraged by the logic of the situation. 
Historically, Japan was willing to accept industrialization, 
but not the developments toward a mass society which
industrialization implies. The call for the adoption of 
"the religion of patriotism and of loyalty" was an attempt 
to keep Japan from developments toward a mass society.
This study has been concerned with Occupation 
reforms that concerned the subjective, or psychological,
areas, for hardly anyone ever questioned the Occupation's 
capability to destroy what could be physically destroyed. 
The focus of this study has been on whether or not the
Occupation was successful in its attempt to deprive the 
Japanese of their uniquely strong national consciousness.
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We see a nation as a community knit together by a common 
experience over £i reasonably long past, shaping a common 
tradition and culture. It is obvious that a national
consciousness is not, and by its nature cannot be, any 
sudden or even speedy process. Over long periods of time 
there must be a storing up in the minds of men a folk sense 
of shared memories, of common patterns of life, which gives 
this particular people a deep and profoundly significant 
sense of sharing a common destiny from which all the rest of 
mankind is excluded. Put differently, nationalism is in 
part necessarily a return to the past, to those things which 
distinguished this nation from the rest of the world.
The disestablishment of Shintoism and the 
discrediting of the Emperor system in an attempt to de­
nationalize the Japanese spirit were rendered very noisy 
with little result of substance. Despite the changed status 
of the Emperor, the people's affective sentiments toward the 
Emperor as a national rallying point remain basically
unchanged. Trying to alter the affective bond between the
people and the Emperor through the "humanization" of the
latter proved to be ineffective at best, for the Japanese 
attachment to the Throne is of cultural significance, not of 
political make-shift.
It is rather unreasonable to try to rid the Japanese 
of the focus of their nationalism while the world is divided 
into nation-states, all of which are in need of a strong
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sense of nationality. Reform of a society is always carried 
out in the midst of international polarization which is 
increasing antagonism among nations, and in domestic 
atmosphere of underlying unrest, confusion and crisis. As 
citizens of a crowded country, bereft of resources, 
vulnerable to economic disruption, and subject to jealousy 
from without, Japanese nationalism is bound to intensify in 
crisis and challenges.
Given the division of the world into nationalities, 
each nation is perforce conditioned to seek its own national 
interest. And thus, the need for nationalism is likely to 
further stimulate and foster existent national 
consciousness. From this study emerges the following 
conclusions. Japanese national consciousness is a unique 
one, wrought by Japan's history and tradition. Such major 
factors as Japan's "national mission," national economy and 
national security that bear on the fortification of the 
Japanese national consciousness have in general remained 
unchanged. National consciousness is something that can 
neither be wrought for political expedience on short order, 
nor can that be done away with by fiat.
Japanese experience seems to confirm the generally 
accepted principle in the theories of acculturation that 
transfer of ideas and values is most difficult. So the 
Occupation's attempt to make Japanese less Japanese by 
trying to deprive the Japanese of their strong national
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consciousness was from the outset an "impossible 
possibility** at best. Hence, the Japanese have been 
résistent to reform over spiritual and etiological areas, 
while they have been very receptive to reform involving 
material matters and institutions. In other words, Japanese 
system affect can remain unchanged, while the promotion of 
product affect is pursued. The study seems to bolster the 
argument advanced by many, including Almond and Verba, that 
the political system needs a reasonable degree of system 
affect for its stability and survival. Given the nature of 
the prevailing international politics, the stability and 
prosperity of Japan will, as in the past, depend on 
unification of national will stemming from the "religion of 
loyalty."
Japan will be less than a "fragile superpower" 
without loyalty and patriotism for which the Japanese have 
long been reputed. Blind liberalization and unrestrained 
maximization of product affect at the expense of system 
affect in Japan will only court political instability at 
best and a crisis situation that might endanger the future 
of Japan at worst.
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